

THE
LIFE OF MAJOR-GENERAL

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K.C.S.I., C.B.,

OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.

BY

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OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. II.

LONDON:
W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE,
PALL MALL, S.W.

1883.

LONDON
PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER,
BUEFORD LANE, STRAND, W.C.

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SIR HENRY DURAND.

ESSAYS AND MINUTES.

I.

CENTRAL INDIA UNDER BRITISH SUPREMACY.

(Written for the *Calcutta Review* in 1850.)

THREE-AND-THIRTY years ago, the few British statesmen, who in those days paid any attention to the affairs of India, or were interested in its welfare, knew that the time had arrived when a great effort on the part of the British Power was inevitable. They were aware that that Power—from its character and constitution the friend of order and of security of person and property—was necessarily in permanent antagonism to the chaotic misrule and license, which were devastating not only Central India, but also all the adjacent territories. Our statesmen felt, therefore, that the decisive struggle between the Anglo-Indian armies and their numerous, but ill-organized, opponents could not longer be deferred. The conflict was for the ascendancy of good or evil. Never, in the course of our rapid rise to supremacy in India, has the sword been drawn more justly, or with more humane motives, than by the Marquis of Hastings in 1817; and seldom did God grant a good cause more entire success.

In these times it is not easy to realize in idea the state into which the ceaseless strife and turmoil (internal and external) of the Mahratta Governments, and of the Rajput principalities, abetted by the common foe of all, the Pindarris, had plunged the wretched people of Central India. One-and-thirty years of com-

parative calm have not yet effaced from the minds of chiefs and people those days of affliction : and, well as Malcolm and others of our Indian historians have sketched the miserable condition of society during the "times of trouble," as they are still emphatically designated, they have barely succeeded in giving more than a faint outline of the reality. Talk to the elders, whether of chiefs or people—to those whose years admit of their instituting a comparison between the scenes in which youth was passed, and the repose in which old age is closing—and the vividness of human speech and feeling brings home to the heart the misery in which the largest and worthiest classes of the population were, to all appearance, irretrievably immersed. An Englishman can with difficulty portray to himself so woful a state of society. The scenes with which revolutionary war has made them acquainted, might enable a Croat or Hungarian to do so : but, on the Continent of Europe, license and oppression, under the mask of liberty, are of a less chronic character, and civil war, with Christian lands for its theatre, falls short of the horrors of a Pindarri incursion ; even Red Republicans are scarce so basely and systematically cruel.

Our purpose is not here to follow the events by which Providence gave peace to these long distracted countries. We shall not trace the assembly of the British armies ; their simultaneous advance from the Nerbuddah and the Jumna ; the ancillary political negotiations ; the conduct of doubtful allies ; the treachery of compulsory ones ; the sweep over Malwa by Malcolm, Adams, Marshall, scattering before them the Pindarri hordes ; the battle of Mahedpur ; the entire dispersion of the Pindarris ; and the capture, surrender, or destruction of their leaders. Our business is rather to avoid achievements so well known and so well told, and to content ourselves with the endeavour to lay before the reader a general view of the system which took the place of the anarchy to which we have alluded.

From the period that the Mahrattas gained the ascendant in Central India, and the Mogul Empire ceased to be otherwise than nominally supreme, the once controlling power of the latter was succeeded by no correspondent authority. True it is, that the influence of the Mogul Emperors over the more distant portions of their dominions was uncertain, and oscillated with the personal character and renown of the individual on the throne—being shadowy, or real, in proportion to his wisdom and strength ; but, even in the weakest hands, the Emperor's authority had a form

and substance which were wanting to that of the Paishwa. The control of the latter over the Mahratta states, which had loosely aggregated, rather than formed themselves, from the debris of the empire, was, when compared with the influence of the Mogul Emperors over their territorial subordinates, a mere mockery of supremacy. The Mahratta rule and institutions, with their peculiar basis of Hindu thought and feeling, lacked the principle of concentration. Even in the event of the Mahratta powers not having been so circumstanced as to be early brought into conflict on various points with growing and vigorous Anglo-Indian Governments, it may be doubted whether the Paishwa, or any other Mahratta Prince, such as Holkar, or Scindia, would ever have succeeded in establishing a virtual supremacy over the countries under the sway of the various Mahratta rulers. The battle of Paniput tested the pith and quality of a Mahratta confederation.

Satisfactorily to assign a reason for these centrifugal tendencies is difficult. Enlisting, as they necessarily must have done, the sympathies of the Rajput Princes and of the great mass of the Hindu population, both of whom they freed from a yoke galling and obnoxious, the Mahrattas had much to favour the consolidation of their acquisitions and conquests into an empire of some solidity of fabric. A very loose confederacy was, however, the utmost to which it attained. The fact is a remarkable one. We may observe, however, that among the very numerous sects classed under the generic name Hindu, though there exist points of strong sympathy, these are not sufficient to counteract the isolating and repellent properties of Hinduism, as a system; for its whole tendency is to split its votaries into a multiplicity of petty communities, having with each other nothing but distant and constrained social intercourse and relations. The bars to intimacy are insuperable; and encroachments on the petty demarcations, not only of caste, but of sects of castes, are jealously watched. Minds, trained from infancy in such a school, are imbued with the contractile spirit of pertinacious sectarianism; and though they may be greedy of power and wealth, and extremely patient and subtle in their pursuit, yet they enter upon such a career incapacitated for the entertainment of those comprehensive views which enable ambition to establish empire. The case is different with the Mussulman. His creed, in these respects, is in marked contrast to that of the Hindu, and has a direct tendency to mould the mind to the idea of concentration of power. The Deism of the one is

not more opposed to the Polytheism of the other, than are the several tendencies of these two great classes of India to monocracy and polycracy.

Though no ocean divided them from their mother-country, the Mahratta colonies, for such they may be styled, owed but a nominal allegiance to the Paishwa. His supremacy was a phantom, if not a nullity. After the battle of Mahedpur, not only the Paishwa's, but the real influence of the Mahratta states of Holkar and Scindia, were dissolved and replaced by British supremacy. The latter came to a chaotic inheritance; and in order to judge how the restorers of order performed their high duty, it must be shown, however faultily and inadequately, what the establishment of our authority involved. Within the limits at our disposal, we cannot attempt to review in detail the conduct and labours of the various subordinate agents of the Anglo-Indian Government. Nor is this necessary in order to obtain a general idea of that which had to be accomplished. If we confine ourselves to a general summary of the duties entrusted to the ministerial representatives of British power, and to the circumstances under which they have been placed and acted, the patience of the reader will be spared—at the same time that he obtains a sufficient insight into the system which succeeded to that of the Mahratta ascendancy.

Most men in India have read Sir J. Malcolm's instructions to the assistants and officers acting under his orders; and whilst from these the spirit in which the British agents entered upon the exercise of power may be gleaned, a reference to Malcolm's appendix to his valuable work on Central India will make the reader acquainted with the number of States, petty Chiefs, Grassiahs, Bhils, and Pindarris, whose affairs had to be adjusted by the intervention of functionaries who earnestly and ably applied themselves to the work in the spirit of conciliation which pervaded their Chief's orders.

None of these States, or Chiefships, were otherwise than dependent on the paramount authority; and it must be borne in mind, that this dependence was, notwithstanding that some had entered into treaties with the British Government, often most indefinite; that their relations with each other were frequently peculiar, and, in cases of tribute, often delicate and complicated; that, however small the State or Principality, extreme jealousy of encroachment on their territory, or of neglect of their dignity, was a common characteristic; that, in

consequence of the distracted condition of the country and the repeated changes and revolutions, which every State, small or great, had undergone, the boundaries of all were unsettled; that, as a general rule, the power to assert and keep had been the definer of each State's boundary; that the latter had therefore expanded or contracted, according as accidental circumstances favoured, or were adverse to, a Chief's pretensions; that, besides the *number* of different petty States and Chiefs with ill-defined possessions, both Holkar's and Scindia's territories were strangely intermixed with them; that Scindia had outlying districts, isolated from his main possessions, and cast, as provocatives of discord and misrule, in the midst of the domains of other States; and, finally, that none of these States or Principalities had anything deserving the name of a systematic internal administration. The necessities of the rulers drove them to extort as much as possible from the people; the Revenue Department, therefore, was an object of much and constant solicitude; but justice, civil or criminal, was rather regarded as a subordinate branch of their fiscal system, than as an important department of good government. Coin was struck everywhere. Transit duties were levied in each State, small or great, and with no fixed rule but that of the will of the Chief, and the moderation of his unchecked tax-gatherers, usually the farmers of the revenue. The people, exposed to violence from their neighbours and to frequent robbery, and unable to secure redress, had recourse to retaliation; and thus habits of plunder, particularly of cattle-stealing, became very general amongst the village communities. The custom of reprisals soon passes into confirmed predatory habits, and rapidly demoralizes a people. To crown the whole, many Chiefs and Thakurs did not scruple to share in the proceeds of the plundering expeditions of their subjects—thus encouraging their adventures as profitable sources of income.

Little reflection is necessary in order to imagine that, when, under such circumstances, a paramount power of overwhelming strength suddenly appeared upon the scene and scattered its agents—men of undoubted integrity—over the face of the country to watch events and maintain tranquillity, these representatives of a power (resolved to have, and able to enforce, order) became the foci of reference on a host of subjects from a multiplicity of different quarters and people. They found themselves forced to take up questions of every class and character: and it would be hard to say, whether the military, political, financial, or judicial

prevailed. The importance of the matters which came before them of course varied; but it would be a misnomer to apply the term "international cases" to the greater part of the requests for the intervention of the British officers. Private international cases, though circumlocutory, would be a more appropriate designation; they seldom have risen to the dignity of national negotiations or controversies, but have turned in general upon private interests and common business. If, in the United States, where municipal administration is well understood, and the common law of England forms the basis of the *Lex Loci*, it has been found that very complicated private relations and rights arise between the citizens of some six or seven-and-twenty independent States, and that there is a necessity for the constant administration of extra municipal principles (as one of their juriconsults terms them), how much more ought this to prove the case in a country like Central India? Any common law is unknown: the country is studded with petty but independent States and Principalities, acknowledging as their heads, here a Mahratta, there a Rajput, further on a Mussulman; each has its own local laws and customs, and often its distinct religion; and there is not even a common basis, such as affords some bond to the United States of America. Should it be asked, What was the code furnished to the British agents for their guidance under these circumstances of incontrovertible difficulty? the reply is simple—None whatever. But as men in their positions must, it will be rejoined, be guided by some rules or other, what was it that regulated their proceedings, and the exercise of their authority, amid this conflict of laws and customs? We cannot claim for them, as a body, any great knowledge of jurisprudence. By far the greater number had wielded the sword before they became administrators: and they pretended to no acquaintance with Huberus, Boullenois, or Vattel. At present there is not, perhaps, a man among them who has heard of Burgi or Story. Nevertheless, acting upon an axiom, which is the fundamental one of all justice—"Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you"—they proved good practical administrators, and were kept pretty right in the discharge of their mixed political, judicial, and administrative functions by the golden rule which they owed to their Christian education. They were led by it to a practical sense of what public interest and utility required, and of the inconveniences which cannot fail to arise from any neglect of this moral foundation of justice. They

felt, and felt rightly, that the paramount power had neither the right nor the wish, in maintaining the public peace, to enforce laws, customs, or institutions subversive of the social polity and morals of the different races under its sway. Very few fixed and certain principles were ever enunciated by the Government to its agents; and it was not till late that the Court of Directors hazarded a few brief rules for the guidance of their political officers. It may be said that the vast mass of private international cases disposed of before the tribunals of our Residents and Agents, have been decided by their sense of what was just and equitable, rather than by any fixed principles. Both the Home and the Indian Governments shrunk from the delicate duty of legislating on such matters. For the former there was an excuse: "*Trois degrés d'élévation du pôle renversent toute la jurisprudence; un méridien décide de la vérité.*" The Supreme Government, however, seemed not a whit more ready to face the difficulty, and preferred building on the good sense, right feeling, and sound integrity of its servants, rather on its own wisdom and the sufficiency of legislative enactments. Responsibility was thus kept with its full weight on the shoulders of the agents of the paramount authority. They could appeal to no code, to no rules, and must always be prepared to show that their acts and decisions were in conformity to the most comprehensive views of equity.

Nothing is further from our intention than to give an exaggerated notion of the ability and judgment of the various principals and subordinates who have taken part in the administration of the affairs of Central India. Men of every shade of opinion, acquirements, and character have figured on that (of late but little observed) scene. Of these few have proved deficient either in ability or in character; whilst some have been much distinguished, both for their attainments, and by their zealous exertions and exemplary discharge of duty. The attempt to compare or analyze the labours of so many valuable officers would be invidious; but we may safely assert that, as a body, their conduct has been such as to create confidence in the ability and impartiality of our countrymen; while, as to themselves, the result has been, that they have found themselves forced to discountenance reference to their tribunals, rather than to grasp at authority; and, in spite of this, they have often found themselves with more work on their hands than could well be done by them. Instead, therefore, of seeking to extend their

jurisdiction, and to arrogate to themselves undue power and interference, their endeavours, with few exceptions, have systematically been turned to strengthening the hands of the petty rulers with whom they were brought into connection.

Under this system, person and property have attained a considerable degree of security, and the predatory habits of the people have undergone a marked improvement during the thirty years of its continuance. "We are now in the English times," has become a proverbial mode of concisely signifying that the spokesman has no intention of submitting as helplessly and hopelessly to oppression as he might have done in the "times of trouble."

Let us not, however, be mistaken. We have no wish to give the English times a particle more of credit than may be their due, or to ascribe to the system and its agents a degree of success to which they themselves have never pretended to attain. Our readers must not suppose halcyon days for Central India. They must not imagine that person and property are as secure, and the countries which it comprises as free from marauders as is the case in England. They will misunderstand us completely, if they arrive at any such conclusion. Neither the spirit nor the practice of marauding are forgotten, or out of vogue. Whenever favourable opportunities present themselves, events still occur, which teach how difficult it is permanently to subdue the predatory habits of a people, or of tribes. The seeds of evil may lie buried a while; but they spring into life and organized activity with wonderful alacrity when circumstances suit. The causes of this are various; and it will be well to note a few of the chief.

Our power, when it has to cope with an object of sufficient magnitude, is capable of great efforts, and treads down opposition, or crushes evil, as in the case of the Pindarris, with irresistible force. But—the effort over, and the strength of first impressions gone—the knowledge gained of the cost and difficulty of putting our masses into motion soon restores confidence to the freebooter, who seldom has any apprehension from the march of a single detachment,—escape from such being a matter of extreme facility. Intermixed territories, under the rule of weak, and sometimes distant Chiefs, as in the cases of Holkar and Scindia; a very imperfect Police; a pervading fear of the resentment of the marauders; a consequent anxiety among the people to secure to themselves and their property impunity from vindictive violence, by silence and secrecy as to the movements of predatory bands, and by compliance with their requisitions for food and shelter; the apathy,

fear, and (worse still) the corruption of the amils and subordinate servants of petty States; the difficult nature of the jungles and wild country, which are usually the haunts and power of the marauders; want of information as to their times and places of assembly, plans, and movements; if by accident any should be caught and delivered into the hands of a Chief for punishment, the misjudged leniency exhibited; the fact that occasionally a respectable man is driven to revolt and plunder by the oppression and spoliation of men in authority; the pretext, which such instances afford, for those who choose, by plunder and violence, to seek to enforce compliance with unreasonable demands and pretensions; the favour with which such men are invariably regarded by village landholders and authorities, who are always prone to think that the case may any day be their own; the eagerness with which systematic plunderers range themselves under such leaders, in order to indulge marauding habits under the sanction of a cause which unfortunately bears with it the sympathies of the people; the number of adventurers either seeking for, or discharged from, the service of petty rulers—a class of men hanging loose on society, and possessed of no means of livelihood except their weapons; intermixture of jurisdictions and territories, each jealous of trespass, even in pursuit of the greatest of criminals;—all these, and a variety of minor circumstances, which reflection cannot fail to derive from those specified, have favoured, and still do favour, the unextinguished spirit of marauding, which has few better fields than Central India.

In 1837, the Supreme Government was fully alive to the real state of affairs in Malwa and the neighbouring countries; and much consideration was bestowed upon various plans for more effectually subduing these evils. Lord W. Bentinck had seen the futility of the principle of holding petty and weak Chiefs responsible for the acts committed in their territories. Theoretically the principle could not be departed from: but much combined to render its practical application often impossible, and often inequitable. He had shrewdly enough seen the inefficiency of reclamations by Political Agents, through durbars and their vakils—that nerve, energy, and action were paralyzed by such a system—and that, with the view of our influence being efficacious, it must not be diluted by passage through such a chain of references, but that control must be brought more directly and immediately to bear.

The first project, entertained and discussed, was to entrust the

general charge and direction of measures against marauding bands to one military officer, the Political Agent at Mahedpur ; placing under his command all the military means of the country, whether contingents trained and commanded by European officers, or undisciplined troops, Horse and Foot, in the service of the various States. This proposition, however, met no support from the Residents and Political Agents consulted, and was rejected—mainly on the ground that the country was too extensive to be effectually controlled by being placed under the supervision of one military officer.

The second project was concentration of authority in the hands of a Resident, or Agent for the Governor-General, who was to reside at some central point between Indore and Gwalior, and who was to have the general political superintendence of Malwa, and of all the States and Dependencies then under the separate Residents of Indore and Gwalior. The plan was analogous to the one originally recommended by Malcolm, except that the latter wished to create a government out of this charge, whereas with Lord W. Bentinck it found favour because it would have enabled him to abolish a Residency. He accordingly consulted Speirs, Sutherland, and Wilkinson respecting its merits : but the plan was less agreeable to these officers than to the Governor-General. They had differing views and opinions : and, finally, the idea was relinquished from the opposition of Scindia's Durbar—the Maharaja being averse to a measure calculated, in his opinion, to lower the dignity and weaken the authority of his government. Under these circumstances, recourse was had to a circumscribed and modified form of the first proposition. A detachment of Scindia's Contingent was moved to the Sathmahilla ; one from the Mahedpur Contingent to the Rampura district of Holkar ; and the charge of operations was entrusted to the Political Agent at Mahedpur, Lieutenant-Colonel Borthwick, who effected temporarily as much as could be expected, from the means at his command, and the limited nature of his authority.

Nothing, however, of a more permanent or comprehensive character was done ; and, with the exception of raising Bhil Corps—one for the Vindhya Range, and one for the Southern Frontier of Oodeypur—and entering upon a discussion of the proposal for establishing in Malwa and Rajputana Courts similarly constituted to those in Kattywar and Myhi Caunta, the measures adopted were of little importance or effect ; and the predatory spirit met with but a partial check, whilst minor kinds of maraud-

ing, and particularly cattle-stealing, flourished with as much vigour as ever. Discussion regarding the establishment of principal Courts, similar to those instituted in the Myhi Caunta, for the adjudication of international offences in Malwa, did not indeed drop; but it was continued to small purpose. Mere forms of procedure were not wanted, but modes of rapid organized action. These deliberations on the applicability of Kattywar Courts to Malwa served the object, however, of a Government too deeply interested in the current of events on the North-West frontiers of India to have leisure for such minor considerations as those of the real improvement of the internal administration of Central India. Absorbed by the contemplation of the terrible turn of affairs in that distant scene of disaster, the Governor-General could only have regarded the discussions, above adverted to, as the least costly mode, whether in time, means, or thought, of evincing solicitude for the heart of an empire shaking in his grasp. He was, besides, apparently unaware that the elements of disorder were fast rekindling. Beyond a few long despatches on the subject of these Courts, matters remained exactly as they had always been; and, as the attention of Residents and Political Agents was soon concentrated upon threatened disturbances of a more serious aspect than mere plundering adventures, they were not in the humour to pay much further heed to disquisitions never very apposite, never based on any clear apprehension or enunciation of principles, and the importance of which, if ever imbued with any, was vanishing before more pressing considerations. As our misfortunes thickened, the activity of latent enemies gained confidence; and emissaries were everywhere busy, disturbing the minds of the people, and exciting the turbulent to take advantage of our humiliation. It was no longer a question of a few predatory bands, but of watching over and maintaining the supremacy of the British name and power. From the Kistna to the Jumna matters were ripe for confusion. A spark might have kindled a serious conflagration. Indeed, at one time it had nearly done so; but a bold deed or two of timely stroke checked the growing spirit of disaffection, and kept things quiet in Central India until our armies and authority had recovered their wonted ascendancy.

From that time up to the present moment, war, or the consequences of war—embarrassed finances—have so occupied our rulers, that, provided the agents of Government (employed elsewhere than on the actual scene of operations) could manage to rub on, keeping matters as they found them, and could avoid

drawing too largely on the time and attention of the Government, the policy of successive Governors-General was satisfied. Under the pressure of such a state of affairs, Central India was not likely to be the subject of excessive care or cost; and the Residents and Political Agents have remained, except as to emoluments, much what they have always been, since the time of Malcolm and Wellesley (of Indore), and quite as unshackled in influence and authority.

Some modifications have taken place within the last few years; but they are not such as have been productive of improvement. Whatever the necessity of humiliating the Court of Scindia after the battle of Maharajpore, it may be doubted whether the substitution of an Assistant, in charge of the affairs of Scindia's Government, in lieu of a Resident, was the most judicious method of marking the displeasure of the paramount power. The measure weakened our direct control over the Durbar, at the very moment that everything should have been done to strengthen our influence. It was not that the change in the official designation of the Resident Agent mattered in the smallest degree: provided that officer had been kept in direct communication with the Supreme Government, the latter might have styled him what they pleased, and his real influence would have been as great as was desirable; but reference to a distant superior, laden with the charge of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, placed the officer at Gwalior in a secondary, an ill-defined, and a most anomalous position. We advert to this fact, in order that our remarks upon the detrimental effects of the measure in question may not be supposed to imply any animadversion upon the distinguished officer to whom this delicate, but unsatisfactory, charge was entrusted. No one could probably, in that position, have effected more; and when we state that little has been done towards the introduction of an improved system of internal administration throughout Scindia's long straggling country, and that little has been accomplished towards the eradication of predatory habits and the security of person and property throughout that extensive line of territory, we reflect on the measure, and not on the man. The resulting evils would have been greater had it not been for the minority of the Maharaja; the party of the Bhai, who had adopted the young prince, was always in conflict with the Regency and its President. As the Regency was by treaty under the control of the British agent, the President naturally leaned for advice and strength where both were to be had; and thus the

resident officer, though only a subordinate, enjoyed greater influence than would otherwise have been the case. But, though the peculiar circumstances and constitution of Scindia's Government thus happened to be favourable to the weight of the local subordinate, they by no means counterbalanced the disadvantages inherent in, and inseparable from, his position.

One of the best men and best writers of the age, speaking of the spheres of action of Gospel ministers, says:—"Where influence is diffused beyond a certain limit, it becomes attenuated in proportion to its diffusion: it operates with an energy less intense;"—the remark is as applicable to political as to clerical charges, and the Anglo-Indian Government would do well to bear it in mind. There is a tendency to confound two very distinct things—concentration of authority, and efficacy of beneficent sagacious influence. Government seems apt to consider these as exchangeable terms. This is a mistake. There is a certain sphere, within which personal agency can operate with advantage, and occupy the space with a suitable pervading energy; beyond this sphere it ceases to act with regularity, and only makes itself felt by occasional impulses—and these, not always either well-timed, or free from detrimental accompaniments. Concentration of authority is then synonymous with dilution of influence. Accordingly, during a minority, when every circumstance was favourable for the fullest impression and effect of our influence upon the councils and administration of Scindia's Government, what are the fruits? What has been accomplished? Is the youthful prince well educated, and fitted, by habits of attention to business and acquaintance with the actual condition and policy of his State, for the exercise of authority? Is the system, so much reprobated by Sleeman and others, of farming districts on very short leases to revenue contractors, reformed? Is the Sathmahilla free from bands of predatory Soandís, and are districts, much nearer to the capital than the one named, unaccustomed to witness scenes of plunder and violence? Do neighbouring States enjoy paradisaical repose from the incursions of such marauders? Are the grinding vexatious transit and other taxes, in which Mahratta intellect has shown so much pernicious ingenuity, annulled or modified? Are the municipal cesses and dues levied in their larger towns improved, and have the latter, such as Burhanpur for instance, increased in size or population? Has the trade, the wealth, the prosperity of Scindia's country advanced, and are the agricultural classes more numerous, intelligent, and contented

than they were thirty years ago? If, with a few exceptions, a negative must be given to these queries, what does our Government anticipate when the Minority and the Regency terminate?

Whilst the state of affairs at Scindia's Court has been most favourable for the exercise of British influence, the existence, contemporaneously, of a Minority and Regency at Holkar's Court offered to the Indian Government precisely similar advantages, and a combination of circumstances, under which much ought to have been done for Central India. Who can say how much might have been effected, could an able Governor-General—impressing upon those regencies, through the agency of the Residents, unity of action and congruity of purpose—have given his attention to comprehensive measures for the welfare of the two countries, and moulded the two Durbars into a practical co-operation for the common improvement of the territories under Mahratta rule? Virtually wielding the power of Holkar's and Scindia's Governments, such an organized system might, by this time, have been in full operation, that when the minors severally came of age, they could not well have broken loose from the established order and relations, which it would have continued to be the duty of the Residents to watch, and, by their advice and influence, to perfect and secure. As the Mahommedan State of Bhopal (Mahommedan only in its rulers) was similarly circumstanced with Holkar's and Scindia's, having a minor at its head, there is no exaggeration in saying that the whole of Central India was under the direct control of the paramount power. We must deplore the want of thought, or the too absorbing interest of events on the North-West frontier, which rendered our rulers negligent of such propitious contingencies.

Young Holkar has had justice done him. The Resident at Indore speaks and acts with no reflex authority: and, as the adoptive mother of the young chief was sensible, and exercised such influence as she possessed discreetly, the training and education of the youth have been in conformity to the plans and wishes of the Resident, and the late Bhair Sahiba. Young persons of his own age, and destined to be members of his Durbar, were associated with the chief: and thus, in the course of his education, his abilities were afforded the benefit of a wholesome, though probably subdued, competition. The result has been excellent. His own language—Mahratta—he is master of; he can read and understand English; is ready at arithmetic; and has more than an average knowledge of geography, besides much general informa-

tion, and a desire for its acquisition. So far, therefore, as the welfare of Holkar's country may be considered to depend on the general intelligence of its ruler, its prospects are fair; and both young Holkar and the British Government are indebted for this pleasing circumstance to the exertions of Mr. Hamilton, the Resident.

The charge of the Resident at Indore is considerable; under his own superintendence are the States of Holkar, Dhar, and Dewass. A Political Agent at Mahedpur has Rutlam, Jelana, Sitamow, Jhabua, and Jhowra under his supervision. Another at Sehore has Bhopal, Kurwai, Nursinghur, Rajghur, and Kilchipur. A third officer has Amjhera, Burwai, and Ali Mohun. Besides these functionaries, who are under the general control of the Resident, must be added much miscellaneous business connected with the administration of the southern districts and the outlying fragments of Scindia's territory, so inconveniently interspersed with the possessions of other principalities. He has charge also of the Opium Agency: and, though this, and the Thuggi Department are, in a great measure, devolved upon his assistants, the amount both of work and responsibility is heavy. During a minority, the weight of these is necessarily much increased: for on such an occasion, whatever the form of administration—whether the functions of Government be carried on by a Council of Regency, or by a Regent—the representative of the Supreme Government is held responsible for the welfare of the State, which, during the minority, is regarded as being specially under the protection and guardianship of the British power. This trust, involving as it does the good faith and character of his Government, invests the Resident with the entire control of the Regent, or Regency. Accordingly, at Indore, everything done or contemplated must have his approval; and thus, virtually, the administration is in his hands. The Bhai Sahiba, when alive, though cognizant of all that took place, was not authorized to interfere in the conduct of affairs; and the frequent changes of ministers, if they deserve the name, ending in the appointment of the Munshi, against whom, through the press, constant attacks are now made, prove that the Resident, in fact, exercises the power of appointing what minister or ministers he pleases. Under these circumstances he is, undoubtedly responsible for the administration of Holkar's Government and country: and we might proceed to ask similar questions to those we have put with respect to the progress of improvement in Scindia's territories. With the exception, however, of young

Holkar's comparative proficiency, and a revenue administration not quite so faulty, we fear that the replies would, on the whole, prove unsatisfactory.

Central India is, it must be confessed, very much where Sir J. Malcolm left it. Thirty years have gone over it, with but few and partial improvements, and very moderate advance in general prosperity, if any. The Bombay and Agra road can, it is true, be noted; but in doing so, attention is called to a long line of marked out, unmetalled, and unbridged road, in many parts unpassable during the rainy season. No practicable roads unite the military stations along the Nerbudda, and the lines of communication throughout the country generally remain as execrable as ever. Education owes such progress as it has made chiefly to the exertions of one individual, Mr. Wilkinson. His Sehore School bears a name, which the Indore and Gwalior establishments have not as yet attained. These are the main public educational establishments which have arisen under our influence; as exponents of the sense entertained by the native Chiefs and community of the value of learning, they are, except perhaps Wilkinson's, but sorry institutions. An English reader will probably ask whether European science, languages, and history have been the subject of attention. At these institutions it would not, perhaps, be natural to expect or look for much infusion of the spirit of European knowledge or ethics. A few works may be seen, purporting to be on subjects of history or science, and to be either translations or compilations from European works. But watch the course of tuition, and you will soon observe that these treatises are not in vogue, and that the inanities of Hinduism are the staple—the only pabulum, which the scholars are taught to relish. Of course this remark does not apply to the Mussulman youths, who, however, stick with equal pertinacity to the ordinary course of Persian classics. As for Hindu Patshalas and Moslem Madrissas, they remain what they were in the days of Akbar—and this whether they owe their origin to our influence, or not.

In Malcolm's time great hopes were entertained of the rapid development of the resources of the countries comprised under his charge. It was believed that one and all of the territorial Chiefs would, in the course of a quarter of a century, find their revenues largely augmented, in consequence of the increase of cultivation, commerce and population. The result has not borne out these sanguine expectations. After the dispersion and settlement of the Pindarris, and the establishment of comparative security of person

and property, the various States regained speedily an average state of prosperity, at which they have ever since remained, far more permanently and with much less progress, than might reasonably have been anticipated. Were we to institute a comparison between the gross revenues of the States of Central India in 1825 and in 1850, it would be surprising how small the improvement is demonstrable. The production of opium has been fostered by the demand for the drug—the high profits realized, and the portability of the article, encouraging the Malwa cultivators; but, highly favourable as is their soil and clime to the culture of some of the most valuable of agricultural products, none has met with the like attention and energy as the poppy. Considering that the price of the necessaries of life is very moderate, labour cheap, failures of crops and famines almost unknown, land (uncultivated, but culturable) abundant—the causes, which have operated inimically to the increase of population and the extension of agriculture, must be forcible and constant. Some of these are patent and easily stated; others lie deeper, have moral sources, and are not so easily laid bare. Want of internal communications, and distance from the sea-board; heavy, vexatious transit duties; a general rule to take from the cultivator as much as can be taken without driving him from the soil; the system of farming whole districts on short leases to revenue contractors; the great positive poverty of the people; and the fact that the balance of emigration and immigration is *against* the countries, which border provinces under the management and administration of the Indian Government and its officers, have all tended to retard the population and general improvement of Central India. The moral causes are likewise numerous, and to the full as operative. Since Lord William Bentinck's time, female infanticide cannot be reckoned as one of these: nor do the checks on marriage, numerous as the considerations of caste and family and expense of ceremony render these, operate very seriously in giving men a Malthusian spirit of anti-connubial caution. But any one who has mixed with the different classes forming the population of Malwa and the neighbouring countries cannot fail to have observed that large families are rare; and that those considered such would scarcely be so regarded elsewhere. Reasons for this may be found in the dissipated habits of the larger towns, the general use of opium, and of various other deleterious drugs, besides no small consumption of spirits. But if the men can with justice be taxed with indulgence in these and similar practices, there is such a general knowledge and practice

of methods of procuring abortion, that it would be hard to say which of the two sexes frustrates nature most, or suffers most by the destruction of health and constitution. Whatever the combination of moral and physical causes, certain it is that there cannot be a greater contrast than the rapid increase of population during a period of twenty-five years in the United States, and its lagging pace in the countries of which we are writing.

If it be asked, What then has been the result of our two-and-thirty years' supremacy in Central India? we must, we fear, return a very moderate and probably disappointing reply. There are now comparative security of person and property, a curb on the violence and oppression of princes and chiefs, a curb too on the marauding habits of large classes of the people, and a general impression of the impartiality of the tribunals over which British officers preside. The character of the Agents of the British Government stands high, as unbiassed, incorruptible judicial functionaries, though viewed with suspicion as political ones, from the apprehension that the tendency of our system is gradually to undermine the influence and authority of the chiefs, and, upon any plausible pretext, to absorb all petty States. This feeling is by no means incompatible with their acknowledging that many of them owe to the Government of India all they possess, and that, but for our intervention, they must have been swallowed up by their potent neighbours and rivals. But they regard this to have been the policy of our rise, and are not at all sure that it may continue the policy of our empire, when freed from all external foes, but embarrassed by the financial difficulties which have accompanied conquest.

Our mission cannot, therefore, be said to have altogether failed; though, if weighed in the balance of our opportunities and circumstances, it must be acknowledged to have very partially fulfilled its high duties.

That our agents have maintained the character and authority of the Government which they represent, and have manfully laboured, though little heeded or encouraged, to do the good which was in their power, reflects credit on themselves, and on the Government which they have served. It is something to have established confidence in our rule, and confidence in the general conduct and integrity of those to whom the exercise of great and undefined powers are entrusted, and who, sensible of the weight and importance of the trust, have there, as elsewhere, done their duty to their nation, and to their Government.

II.

ADONIRAM JUDSON, THE APOSTLE OF BURMAH.

(Written for the *Calcutta Review* in 1850.)

INDIAN HISTORY has few more remarkable events, and yet few less accurately known, than the rise and fall of the Buddhistic creed. Its extinction from the plains of India remains, in a great measure, an historical enigma. The architectural remains of the fallen religion, thinly scattered over the face of the country, were long misinterpreted. With the classical prejudices of a European education, our countrymen would gaze on the far-famed Tope of Manikyala, or the striking one in the defile of the Khyber Pass, or those less known, but not less curious, in the ravines of the mountain range near Cabul, and even on that, which has attracted so much attention as the Sanchi Tope, near Bhilsa;—and everywhere in massive monuments of a vanished, but once dominant, religion, they traced the forms of Grecian artistic genius, the records of Alexander's conquering march, or of the subsequent Hellenic dynasties, which were assumed to have extended their influence far beyond the utmost limits attained by the Macedonian leader and his tried soldiery. Very gradually this error was rectified. Inscriptions from all quarters of the compass were collected, compared, finally mastered, and correctly rendered. The Ceylon Buddhistic annals were analysed by a Turnour; the Thibetan books were revealed by a Csoma de Koros and a Hodgson; and the antiquarian riches of the literature of China were made to cast light upon what had hitherto been a dark Cimmerian desert of ignorant surmise. Fa Hian's travels over the continent of India, in the fourth century of the Christian era, have done much towards dispelling the darkness which enveloped that early period of the religious condition of the great country now under British rule. The fact of (what may be termed) the classical hallucination as to these monuments is curious; for it would seem almost impos-

sible that any one, who has dwelt in a country where Buddhism prevails, should turn his attention even cursorily to the Topes of India, the Punjab, or Afghanistan, without being struck with the analogies presented by these once architectural enigmas to the Pagodas of Gaudama. Though in stone, the normal forms are preserved; and it is difficult to escape from the conviction, that the exemplars must have been structures raised in countries where wood was plentiful, the rainy season heavy and destructive, and the mason's art, when durability was an object, able to soar to no higher an emanation of genius, than a solid, dome-shaped mass of brick or stone, which promised to withstand the utmost malice of time and of the elements. Even when in stone, the palisade, or rail, round the Tope is put together as if a carpenter had turned mason, and worked from a wooden model—beams of stone being treated with mortice and tenon junctions, as if teak had been the material in lieu of sandstone. The gateways, by which you pass into the space between the rail and the Tope, or Pagoda, bear the same impress of having wooden progenitors; and, until the original idea is brought to mind, and the material in which it was embodied, the observer is puzzled to imagine why stone should have been thus applied. Tall stone columns take the place of the lofty mast-pieces, from which long flaunting pennants stream to every breath of wind that sweeps round a Burman Pagoda. Sprites, Ghouls, and Leo-griffs of indescribable form and feature, but bearing an undeniably brother-likeness to the wooden prodigies of Buddhist phantasy and myth, often cap the lofty stone columns. There are the same small altars, on which a few flowers would be laid in Pegu or Burmah; and lastly the same kind of sites selected for the edifice, commanding hill-tops, or the summit of a long gentle swell of land as at Manikyala. Looking carefully at the elaborate carving which adorns some of the gateways of the Indian Topes, the observer becomes quickly convinced both of the prototype, and of the purposes to which these edifices were devoted. There is the miniature resemblance of the Pagoda; the devotees bearing their offerings, flowers, fruits, umbrellas, fans, and gay banners; and, as there is a limit to available space in the compartments of rich carvings, the pennants, or banners, are often represented as doubled up by a breeze, in which form they bear some likeness to Greek and Roman standards, and have thus misled casual observers: but no one, intimate with Buddhist processions, can be deceived by this fortuitous similarity. Looking closer, the fashion of intertwining the long hair (on which the Buddhist

Burman prides himself), with the rolls and folds of the turban, appears then to have been as much in vogue with the Indian, as it now is with the Burman or Peguan, Buddhist. This peculiarity would not have been so carefully and delicately chiselled, had it not been a cherished distinction. There could, therefore, be little hesitation in identifying the Buddhistical character of these ancient monuments, even if the discoveries in literature, to which we have alluded, had not informed us, that from Cashmere to Ceylon, from Cabul to Gya, Buddhism once prevailed throughout the length and breadth of India. In spite of this extension, and of the millions who must have professed it as a creed, it has, however, been utterly swept away. Error—and error far grosser, idolatry far more debasing—replaced it as the belief of the masses; and, until the Moslem faith with its sword polemics stepped upon the scene, that crass idolatry swayed without a rival the minds of India's millions. Here then history affords us experimental proof that Buddhism can be smitten down, and that too by a polytheism fouler, more dark, and more hideous in its grossness and superstition, than the worship of Gaudama.

Are we to suppose truth less powerful than falsehood? Are we to despair of her coping with an opponent, which the Hindu Pantheon and the Brahminical fallacy trod down into the dust? We must be of very different mettle, and actuated by very different views from the Burman apostle, Adoniram Judson, if for a moment so faint-hearted a feeling lodge in our breasts. He, from the dawn to the close of his eventful career, could contemplate the millions still under the yoke of Buddhist error with the hope and the assurance of ultimate victory for the cause of truth. Strong in this hope, like a good soldier of the Cross, he unfurled his standard on the enemy's ground; and, though in the contest it was at times struck down, yet the standard bearer's heart and courage were proof, and the banner, triumphing in such hands over every struggle, soon rose and floated again in the breath of Heaven. We may well say with the Psalmist, "How are the mighty fallen in the midst of the battle!" But in this instance, though the mighty are fallen, the weapons of war are not perished. A champion of the Cross, and a notable one too, has indeed, after waging a seven-and-thirty years' conflict against the powers of darkness, fallen at his post: but he has fallen gloriously, leaving a well-furnished armoury to his seconds and successors in the fight—weapons sound of temper, sharp of edge, and gleaming brightly with the light of Heaven. He was indeed a mighty champion—

mighty in word—mighty in thought—mighty in suffering—mighty in the elasticity of an unconquerable spirit—mighty in the entire absence of selfishness, of avarice, of all the meaner passions of the unregenerate soul—mighty in the yearning spirit of love and of affection—above all, mighty in real humility, in the knowledge and confession of the natural evil and corruption of his own heart, in the weakness which brings forth strength—mighty in fulfilling the apostolic injunction, “Whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men,”—mighty in the entire unreserved devotion of means, time, strength, and great intellect to his master, Christ.

In stature Judson was not like the son of Kish, but rather resembled what we imagine to have been the personal presence of the Saul brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, who, from his own description, leaves the impression of an ardent, dauntless spirit in a weak tenement. A person overtaking Judson in one of his early morning walks, as he strode along the Pagoda-capped hills of Moulmein, would have thought the pedestrian before him rather under-sized, and of a build showing no great muscular development: although the pace was good and the step firm, yet there was nothing to indicate great physical powers of endurance in the somewhat slight and spare frame, tramping steadily in front of the observer. The latter would scarcely have supposed that he had before him the man, who, on the 25th March, 1826, wrote:—“Through the kind interposition of our Heavenly Father, our lives have been preserved in the most imminent danger from the hand of the executioner, and in repeated instances of most alarming illness during my protracted imprisonment of one year and seven months—nine months in three pairs of fetters, two months in five, six months in one, and two months a prisoner at large.” Illness nigh unto death, and three or five pairs of fetters to aid in weighing down the shattered and exhausted frame, seemed a dispensation calculated for the endurance of a far more muscular build. But meet the man, instead of overtaking him, or, better still, see him enter a room and bare his head, and the observer caught an eye beaming with intelligence, a countenance full of life and expression. Attention could scarce fail of being riveted on that head and face, which told at once that the spiritual and intellectual formed the man; the physical was evidently wholly subordinate, and must have been borne through its trials by the more essential elements of the individual, by the *feu sacré*, which predominated in his composition.

Nor was this impression weakened by his conversation. Wisdom and piety were, as might be expected in such a man, its general tone: but there was a vivacity pervading it, which indicated strong, buoyant, though well it may be said, very severely disciplined animal spirits. Wit, too, was there—playful, pure, and free from malice; and a certain, quiet, Cervantic humour, full of benignity, would often enliven and illustrate what he had to say on purely temporal affairs. His conversation was thus both very able and remarkably pleasing.

We have without special advertence to the circumstance touched on one or two points of resemblance between the great Jesuit Missionary, Xavier, and the Baptist Missionary, Judson: and, if it were our intention to attempt a life of the latter, we could easily, without, however, for a moment confounding the doctrinal antagonism between these two great and good men, adduce other minor points of analogy in their idiosyncracies. The three centuries of time, which lie between their careers, form scarcely a broader boundary of demarcation, than do their respective views on the dogmata of that faith, for the propagation of which both were fearless and indefatigable champions. Xavier, with the words ever ringing in his ears, which his friend and chief had indelibly stamped upon his mind—"What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"—went forth upon his Mission, trained and disciplined in the school of fanaticism and superstition, but strong in his Papist faith, in single-eyed devotion to the service of the Lord, and to the temporal and eternal welfare of his fellow-men. He must not be entirely confounded and condemned with the Order which takes pride in his name. From their first foundation laid by the soldier-priest Loyola, doubtless, "*les Jesuites ont voulu joindre Dieu au monde, et n'ont gagné que le mépris de Dieu et du monde*"; but the condemnatory clause of this sentence did not follow immediately upon the institution of the Order. "*Il était meilleur, pour le commencement, de proposer la pauvreté et la retraite:*" and it was when the Constitutions of Loyola were fresh or framing, that Xavier went forth uncontaminated in the stern simplicity of his self-devotion. "*Il a été meilleur ensuite de prendre le reste:*" but, long before that time had arrived, Xavier had laid down his head in the dust. We class him not with those who followed. He stands alone in the Order; and who, at this distance, and through the mists and fables of his weak superstitious eulogists, shall presume to judge

how much of truth, though clouded by a Papal dress, was granted to that sincere man, bearing to India with him the copy of a part of the New Testament? Ten short years saw the wonderful enthusiast labouring with signal success at Goa, Travancore, Meliapore, Malacca, and Japan; and he died on the eve of sailing for Siam, with the Empire of China in his heart, as the object of his future energies, had he been spared. From the Buddhists of Japan, it was natural that he should turn his attention to the Buddhists of Siam and China: and had his life been prolonged a few short years, the writers of his Order would have had, doubtless, to relate the wondrous workings of the spirit of their great Missionary upon those vast fields of error. If Ranke's opinion of him be correct, *Sein Bekehrungs Eifer war zugleich eine art Reiselust*,* even Burmah might have come within the sweep of his wanderings and labour; and then there would have been another and a closer point, on which for a moment to compare the career of the Spanish Jesuit with that of the American Baptist. But this was not to be; and the isle of Sancian saw Xavier expire, with "*In te, Domine, sperari; non confundar in eternum*" on his lips. Three centuries have passed since this hope was uttered with his dying breath by one of the noblest heroes of the Cross. Of his labours, which under any aspect were truly gigantic, what now remains? Where are the Churches which he founded? We will not ask where are the Scriptures which he translated, for that he considered neither his duty nor his calling; but where is there anything to indicate that the spoken word, the seed sown three centuries ago, struck root, and grew, and continues to bear fruit? His success was sudden, meteor-like, and transient, as that of one of earth's conquerors. It was too much based upon the gross superstition of his hearers, to which his own deep enthusiasm and fanaticism made no vain appeal:—he conquered them with their own weapons, rather than with the dogmas of his own creed.

Far different has been the success of the seven and-thirty years of Judson's continuous, unflinching labour. His career has not been marked by the alleged sudden conversion of tens of thousands of idolaters. Princes indeed listened, but did not bow their heads to the truths of the Gospel. Brilliant success nowhere attended him. Yet, it may be permitted us to doubt, whether Judson has not laid the foundation of a fabric, which, instead of vanishing in the course of the next three centuries,

* "His Missionary zeal was at the same time a kind of love for travelling."

will, should earth last, grow into the stately proportions of an extensive and solid Spiritual Temple. Driven from Burmah, he planted his small, but really Christian Church of Burmese converts on the frontier of the Burman and Peguan Empire; first, at Amherst; subsequently, where Boardman had preceded him, at Moulmein—a position from whence, at any favourable moment, it can with great facility go forth to the work of evangelizing the surrounding heathen. His converts and disciples have not been altogether idle in spite of the stern persecution which awaits them on discovery; and, as most Burmans can read and write, the translation of the Scriptures, their wide dissemination, and the teaching of these converts, few though they be, cannot fail to prepare the soil, and to sow the seed of a future far richer harvest, than the state of this Buddhist stronghold at present promises.

We recollect hearing a Civil Servant of the Company, a gentleman now holding one of the highest judicial offices in the Presidency to which he belongs, observe, that he had never been able to account for a fact which he had had repeated opportunities of witnessing. He, by no means a second-rate linguist, had, during a long course of public service, been in constant daily attendance in his *kacheri*, with every description of case to investigate, and an unceasing intercourse with natives of every rank, character, and kind; yet, notwithstanding this constant intercourse during so many years, he at that time felt that he was very far from being at all a proficient in Urdu, always the language of the people with whom his services had associated him, and for a good many years the language of the Court—while a Missionary, who might have been less than one-fourth of the time in India, would, in the course of a short conversation, utterly dishearten him by the correct and even eloquent facility with which the Missionary would discourse in Urdu upon the most difficult subjects. Various reasons were advanced by those present, but were easily shown to be insufficient by the person who had brought the question under discussion. One, however, of the company suggested, that, in the practice of Civil and Criminal Courts, as in the connection between military officers and their men, even when cordial and intimate, the language employed, though more or less extensive, still partook of a limited and technical range, which a short application was sufficient to master; on the contrary, it was otherwise with the Missionary. He was under the necessity, from the very beginning, of aiming at far higher attainments; for he could have no hope of

being useful, until he should have acquired such a command of the instrument he was to use, as would enable him to launch freely upon the consideration and discussion of metaphysical subjects. But the scope of language, essential for a due treatment of such subjects, is of a far higher order than that with which a person can very creditably and ably perform the duties of Civil or Criminal Courts. We think that the true proximate cause of the observed fact of Missionary success in the acquisition of languages was here struck. Think for a moment of the command of language requisite, even in a speaker's own mother-tongue, in order to treat adequately of the materiality or immateriality of the soul; of time, space, eternity; of the intellectual faculties and the moral conditions of man's soul and spirit; of good and evil, and a beneficent Deity. Yet upon all these subjects the Missionary must be prepared to speak, not in his mother-tongue alone, but in the foreign tongue of his adoption. He must be able, not only to rise to the contemplation of the attributes of Omniscience, but also to their expression; and though sin and death and a Redeemer may be, and fortunately are, simple facts for a home address to the bosoms of mankind, yet, in every one of these, the passage from the simplicity of the Gospel truth to an infinity of subjects, in which human reason may be bewildered, is so easy, and the pride of intellect is so apt, backed by the passions, to stray into these dark and mysterious regions of thought, that the teacher's voice must be clear, precise, and strong; for, otherwise, if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle? Although, therefore, we own ourselves somewhat sceptical of the astounding rapidity with which a Xavier is said to have acquired languages the most radically distinct, yet, we admit the full force of the powerful stimulus which operates upon the Missionary's mind. Wholly independent of preternatural inspiration, they are under the impulse of a ruling necessity, if earnest in their vocation, to rest content with no inferior acquirements, but to strain every faculty with which they may be gifted, in order to insure a thorough mastery of the instrument, however difficult, with which they purpose to expound God's Word and Will. Judson was an eminent instance of such high aim, determined resolve, and most successful accomplishment;—we say determined resolve; for even he, although gifted with a natural ability for the acquisition of languages, had to sit at close study twelve hours out of the twenty-four; and, after two years of such continuous labour, wrote as follows, in January 1816 :—

“ I just now begin to see my way forward in this language, and hope that two or three years more will make it somewhat familiar ; but I have met with difficulties that I had no idea of before I entered on the work. For a European or American, to acquire a living Oriental language, root and branch, and make it his own, is quite a different thing from his acquiring a cognate language of the West, or any of the dead languages, as they are studied in the schools. One circumstance may serve to illustrate this. I once had occasion to devote a few months to the study of French ; I have now been above two years engaged in the Burman. If I were to choose between a Burman and a French book to be examined in, without previous study, I should, without the least hesitation, choose the French. When we take up a Western language, the similarity in the characters, in very many terms, in many modes of expression, and in the general structure of the sentences, its being in fair print (a circumstance we hardly think of), and the assistance of Grammars, Dictionaries, and Instructors, render the work comparatively easy. But when we take up a language spoken by a people on the other side of the Earth, whose very thoughts run in channels diverse from ours, and whose modes of expression are consequently all new and uncouth ; when we find the letters and words all totally destitute of the least resemblance to any language we had ever met with, and these words, not fairly divided and distinguished, as in Western writing, by breaks, and points, and capitals, but run together in one continuous line—a sentence or paragraph seeming to the eye but one long word ; when, instead of clear characters on paper, we find only obscure scratches on dried palm leaves, strung together, and called a book ; when we have no Dictionary, and no interpreter to explain a single word ; and must get something of the language, before we can avail ourselves of the assistance of a native teacher—

“ *Hoc opus, hic labor est !* ”

“ I had hoped, before I came here, that it would not be my lot to have to go alone, without any guide, in an unexplored path, especially as missionaries had been here before. But Mr. Chater had left the country ; and Mr. Carey was with me very little, before he left the mission and the missionary work altogether.

“ I long to write something more interesting and encouraging to the friends of the Mission : but it must not yet be expected. It unavoidably takes several years to acquire such a language, in

order to converse and write intelligibly on the great truths of the Gospel. Dr. Carey once told me that, after he had been some years in Bengal, and thought he was doing very well in conversing and preaching with the natives, they (as he was afterwards convinced) knew not what he was about. A young missionary, who expects to pick up the language in a year or two, will probably find that he has not counted the cost. If he should be so fortunate as to obtain a good interpreter, he may be useful by that means. But he will learn, especially if he is in a new place, where the way is not prepared, and no previous ideas communicated, that to qualify himself to communicate divine truth intelligibly by his voice or pen is not the work of a year. However, notwithstanding my present incompetency, I am beginning to translate the New Testament, being extremely anxious to get some parts of Scripture at least into an intelligible shape, if for no other purpose than to read, as occasion offers, to the Burmans with whom I meet."

But Judson was the very man to contend with, and to overcome, such difficulties; and he became as powerful in discourse as he was clear, correct and erudite in writing Burman.

Judson's study of French, the language which he brings into contrast with the Burman, appears to us to have been useful to him. It made him acquainted with Pascal, who always remained a favourite; and, we think, the pregnant, suggestive writings of this author, with their close antithetical style of reasoning, unknown perhaps or unobserved by Judson, came into play, when he had to wield the Burmese language as a dialectic weapon. The structure of this really difficult language forbids long involved sentences, in which the sense can be suspended, with the view of arraying and bringing before the mind a many-sided comprehensive survey of closely associated subjects. Concise reasoning in few words is indispensable; and, when we read Judson's account of the line of argument he adopted with Oo-yan, one of the semi-atheistic school of Buddhists, it strikes the ear, not as a plagiarism, but like a vibration of Pascal's mind: "No mind, no wisdom; temporary mind, temporary wisdom; eternal mind, eternal wisdom." The harmonic note is so truly in accord that the reader might expect, when he next opened Blaise Pascal, to find this among the *Pensées*. Well might Judson modestly add—"Now, as all the semi-atheists firmly believe in eternal wisdom, this concise statement sweeps, with irresistible sway, through the very joints and marrow of their system; and, though it may seem rather simple and inconclusive

to one unacquainted with Burman reasoning, its effect is uniformly decisive."

Sentences are the formulæ of thought; words are the algebraic symbols of such formulæ; and, according to the richness, flexibility, and structure of different languages, the same thought will have to be expressed by a more or less perfect array and concatenation of these symbols into the requisite formulæ. In Mathematics, as is well known, a very concise formula may be the exponent of a widely applicable, and almost universal law; but, in general, to arrive at this formula, much ground must be previously gone over; and, at the various stages of the elimination, the same truth and the same thought are before the mathematician, although the number of symbols and their form of expression may be presented, in the course of the series of equations, under every variety of aspect, from that of the most complicated to that of the apparently most simple and concise. The student of mathematics soon finds that the simplest-looking formula is not always either the easiest to arrive at, or to apply when found; and he learns to be thankful to those who do not scorn to show the steps by which they reach their resulting expressions, and to value the intermediate (more complicated, but often more easily apprehended) forms of symbolical enunciation. Some languages, however, and the Burman is one, seem to mould themselves with great difficulty to the elimination of thought in the intermediate stages of a continued chain of close argument. In such languages an argument, or train of reasoning, appears to advance by abrupt steps, the mind being left to trace and fill up their connection; the resulting formula has to be reached, dropping out, as it were, some of the intermediate equations. Let our readers for a moment dwell upon the difficulty, in their own powerful Saxon tongue, of discoursing upon free-will, predestination, and many other such subjects, and then endeavour to realize to themselves how infinitely more difficult the attempt must be, in a language of a monosyllabic foundation and structure—its very polysyllables being the roughest possible mosaic of monosyllables, and the genius and construction of the tongue such that even the simple language of the Gospels (the sentences of which are in general so remarkably plain and free from complication) is beyond its flexibility—the simplest sentences in the Gospels of Mark or John having to be chopped up and decomposed, in order to adopt them to this peculiar language. Let our readers imagine, if they can, the wonderful command requisite of so awkward an instrument, in order to be enabled to answer an Oo-yan—

“How are sin and eternal misery reconcilable with the character of an infinitely holy, wise, and powerful God!” or to meet the subtleties of a Moug Shwa-gnong,* arguing on his fundamental doctrine, “that Divine wisdom, not concentrated in any existing spirit, or embodied in any form, but diffused throughout the universe, and partaken in different degrees by various intelligences, and in a very high degree by the Budhs, is the true and only God.” Yet so completely was Judson master of this very difficult tongue, and of the modes of thought of its people, that he could, by his replies and arguments, impart to an Oo-yan intense satisfaction, and a joy which exhibited itself by the ebullitions natural to a susceptible temperament; and in the end could force a subtle Moug Shwa-gnong to yield to the skill of a foreign disputant.

In reply to a tyro in Burmese, who observed upon the want of flexibility, attested by the necessity for decomposing sentences of ordinary length into still shorter ones, and how incomprehensible it was that a person could be eloquent in a tongue of such remarkable abruptness and curtness of construction, Judson acknowledged the fact of the need for the remoulding of sentences of ordinary length into others of simpler and shorter form; but long habit had not only made him lose sight of this characteristic of the language, which, when then stated, struck him both as a novel and a correct observation, but also to the essential difficulties which oppose themselves to a continuous flow of eloquence in such a tongue. In fact, it had become a mother-tongue to him; and a mere tyro could note difficulties of which Judson had long ceased to be aware. He thought in Burman with as much facility as in English, as was proved by his own acknowledgment, that he preferred preaching in Burman to preaching in English, and felt that he did so better. Certain it is that he addressed a Burman congregation with a confidence and a power that will hardly be rivalled by his successors; and we have heard from those present on the occasion of a farewell discourse, when about to sail for America, that he seemed to express his own deep solemn feelings in such pure, heart-touching language that his Burman flock melted into tears, and wept.

Powerful as a teacher of the word; searching and acute in argumentation; having success given to him in a moderate but encouraging degree, in the effectual conversion of Burman disci-

* *Oo* and *Moug* are honorary prefixes, denoting age:—*Oo* being applied to an elderly, and *Moug* to a young man.

ples to the faith, and therefore the founder of a true, though as yet a small Christian church; Judson, besides accomplishing these things, was spared to fulfil the aspiration of his first wife—"We do hope to live to see the Scriptures translated into the Burman language, and to see a Church formed from among the idolaters." That first noble companion of his toils and sufferings did not indeed live to witness the fulfilment of her ardent prayers with respect to the Scriptures, though she not only saw, but was instrumental in aiding to lay the foundation of the spiritual Burman Church. She seemed, however, clearly to anticipate, from the indefatigable study and the thorough grounding in the language to which her husband was devoting years of energetic toil, that nothing less than a complete translation of the whole Bible, a truly gigantic labour for any single man, was to crown his efforts;—and she was right. Long years of toil were to be endured; and she, the heroic companion of the first and most eventful years of his career, was not in her mortal frame to witness the consummation of this single-handed achievement; but she had a prophetic feeling that her husband's meed was to be the imperishable honour of completing this great work;—and it came to pass. To Judson it was granted, not only to found the spiritual Burman Church of Christ, but also to give it the entire Bible in its own vernacular, thus securing that Church's endurance and ultimate extension—the instances being few or none of that Word, after once it has struck root in any tongue, being ever wholly suppressed. Divine and human nature alike forbid such a result: for, when once it has become incorporated in a living tongue, holiness and love join hands with sin and weakness to perpetuate that Word's life and dominion. We honour Wickliffe and Luther for their labours in their respective mother-tongues; but what meed of praise is due to Judson for a translation of the Bible, perfect as a literary work, in a language originally so foreign to him as the Burmese? Future ages, under God's blessing, may decide this point, when his own forebodings, as he stood and pondered over the desolate, ruinous scene at Pah-gan, shall be fulfilled.

"*January 18th, 1820.*—Took a survey of the splendid Pagodas and extensive ruins in the environs of this once famous city. Ascended, as far as possible, some of the highest edifices; and, at the height of one hundred feet, perhaps, beheld all the country round, covered with temples and monuments of every sort and size; some in utter ruin, some fast decaying, and some exhibiting marks of recent attention and repair; the remains of the ancient wall of

the city stretched beneath us. The pillars of the gates, and many a grotesque, dilapidated relic of antiquity, checkered the motley scene. All conspired to suggest those elevated and mournful ideas which are attendant on a view of the decaying remains of ancient grandeur; and though not comparable to such ruins as those of Palmyra and Balbec (as they are represented), still deeply interesting to the antiquary, and more deeply interesting to the Christian Missionary. Here, about eight hundred years ago, the religion of Budh was first publicly recognized, and established as the religion of the Empire. Here Shen-ah-rah-han, the first Buddhist apostle of Burmah, under the patronage of King An-aur-al-ah-men-yan, disseminated the doctrines of atheism, and taught his disciples to pant after annihilation as the supreme good. Some of the ruins before our eyes were probably the remains of Pagodas designed by himself. We looked back on the centuries of darkness which are passed. We looked forward, and Christian hope would fain brighten the prospect. Perhaps we stand on the dividing line of the Empires of darkness and light. O, shade of Shen-ah-rah-han! weep over thy fallen fanes; retire from the scenes of thy past greatness! But thou smilest at my feeble voice;—linger, then, thy little remaining day. A voice mightier than mine—a still small voice—will ere long sweep away every vestige of thy dominion. The Churches of Jesus will soon supplant these idolatrous monuments, and the chaunting of the devotees of Budh will die away before the Christian hymn of praise.”

True, Judson; and those Christian hymns of praise will ascend heavenward, either in your own pure rendering of the words of the sweet psalmist of Israel, or, in the poetical versions and original compositions of the talented being, the second partner of your labours and trials.

One-and-twenty years after his first landing at Rangoon Judson finished his translation of the whole Bible; but not satisfied with this first version, six more years were devoted to a revision of this great work; and, on the 24th October, 1840, the last sheet of the new edition was printed off. The revision cost him more time and labour than the first translation: for what he wrote in 1823 remained the object of his soul:—“I never read a chapter without a pencil in hand, and Griesbach and Parkhurst at my elbow; and it will be an object with me through life to bring the translation into such a state that it may be a standard work.” The best judges pronounce it to be all that he aimed at making it, and

also (what with him never was an object) an imperishable monument of the man's genius. We may venture to hazard the opinion that as Luther's Bible is now in the hands of Protestant Germany, so, three centuries hence, Judson's Bible will be the Bible of the Christian Churches of Burmah.

His labours were not confined to this his *magnum opus*. Early in 1826 a Dictionary of his compilation was published in Calcutta, at a time when the fate of the prisoners at Oung-pen-la was still unknown. This work, in Burmese and English, proved most valuable, and was praised by every one but himself for its extreme utility. With a far larger, and much more complete Dictionary of the language in view, at the perfecting of which he was assiduously labouring to the close of his life, it was natural that he should esteem the smaller and less finished work but lightly, however eminently useful. He published, also, another work, a Grammar, of no pretension and of very small dimensions, yet a manual which indicated the genius of the man perhaps more strikingly than anything else except his Bible. He has managed, from a thorough knowledge of the language, to condense into a few short pages a most complete Grammar of this difficult tongue; and as the student grows in knowledge, *pari passu*, this little volume rises in his estimation: for its lucid, comprehensive conciseness becomes the more and more manifest. In our limited acquaintance with languages, whether of the East or West, we have seen no work in any tongue which we should compare with it for brevity and completeness: yet we have, in our day, had to study and wade through some long, and some would-be-short, Grammars.

With respect to his great Dictionary, which is left, in his own opinion, unfinished, we would venture the suggestion that the world will gain much by its being printed off exactly as he has left it. The conjecture may be very safely hazarded, that it will be found (what other ripe scholars, were there any capable of giving a competent opinion, would pronounce) complete, and that it will be many years before any one arises, fitted by acquirements and erudition to finish it, in Judson's sense of the word—"finish." Such a work is too valuable to be botched by inferior, though it might be zealous, hands; and it would argue sad presumption to find this attempted by anyone of much shorter apprenticeship, less unremitting toil, and less indubitable genius than Judson. It should be considered a national work: and America should see to it, for it will be found a work worthy of her rising name. If

America decline the honour, we venture to hope that the East India Company will come forward, and offer to meet all the expense of the printing and publication of this great work. As it will be not less useful in a secular than in a spiritual light, and as it must prove invaluable to the Company's servants on the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal, the cost should not be allowed to fall on the Baptist Mission of America, unless by that body's own wish. Whoever may undertake this great and truly important task we trust that it may be done rapidly and well; and that the world may be quickly in possession of a work which had so much of Judson's time and assiduous care, and which, from a sense of its utility to others, he had so much and so long at heart. His Bible is secure of life: but we should very much regret, now that the "mighty are fallen in the midst of the battle," to see any of "the weapons of war perished."

These monuments of the labours of Judson may not, to outward appearance, be such brilliant trophies of success as Xavier is recorded to have left behind him. A Dictionary, a Bible, and a small Church of true Christian converts are the fruits of the devoted life of the Baptist Missionary. These results may seem of less gigantic proportions than those of the Jesuit; yet, to our minds, there is in reality no comparison, either on the point of stability, or of ultimate effect. The "sword of the spirit," which Judson leaves unsheathed, will be wielded by men of a different stamp from Xavier's followers, of whom it was truly said—"Que, quand ils se trouvent en des pays où un Dieu crucifié passe pour folie, ils suppriment le scandale de la croix, et ne prêchent que Jésus Christ glorieux, et non pas Jésus Christ souffrant: comme ils ont fait dans les Indes et dans la Chine, où ils ont permis aux Chrétiens l'idolâtrie même, par cette subtile invention de leur faire cacher sous leurs habits une image de Jésus Christ à laquelle ils leur enseignent de rapporter mentalement les adorations publiques, qu'ils rendent à l'idole Cachinchoam et à leur Keum-fucum, comme Gravina, Dominicain, le leur reproche; et comme le témoigne le mémoire, en Espagnol, présenté au Roi d'Espagne, Philippe IV., par les Cordeliers des Iles Philippines, rapporté par Thomas Hurtado dans son livre du Martyre de la Foi, 427."*

* "That, when they find themselves in countries where a crucified God is looked upon as 'foolishness,' they suppress the reproach of the cross, and preach only Jesus Christ glorious, and not Jesus Christ suffering; as they have done in the East Indies and China, when they have permitted idolatry itself to their Christians,

We hope that the American Baptists will continue to occupy the ground they have won, and fill up the gaps, as men fall in the contest. Their *που στω* may as yet be small; but the firm foot needs little space on which to plant itself, to sling the pebble that overthrows a Goliath. Let them, however, always bear in mind Judson's advice:—"In encouraging young men to come out as Missionaries, do use the greatest caution. One wrong-headed, conscientiously obstinate man would ruin us. Humble, quiet, persevering men; men of sound, sterling talents, of decent accomplishments, and some natural aptitude to acquire a language; men of an amiable yielding temper, willing to take the lowest place, to be the least of all and the servants of all; men who enjoy much closet religion, who live near to God, and are willing to suffer all things for Christ's sake, without being proud of it;—these are the men we need."

The religious principles and dogmata of a Protestant and of a Papist Missionary are scarcely in more violent contrast than are their social existences. What would the celibate Xavier have thought of a soldier of the Cross, going forth upon his Mission, trammelled by the company of a delicate help-mate, by the tender bonds of a wife? To our mind, few circumstances are more remarkable in Judson's career than that he should have been the husband of three such wives. A Xavier himself would, however, have been shaken in his celibate notions, and struck with astonishment and admiration, could he have witnessed the indomitable spirit and courage, which neither the most severe sufferings and privations, nor the presence of imminent danger could for a moment quell; but which, enduring the most appalling physical pain and misery unaided, strong in the love borne to a husband, strong in the love borne to Christ and his cause, trod under foot despair, and braved all danger, and endured untold misery, in order to alleviate the captivity of her husband by such kind office and attention as exhausted strength, but the unquenchable spirit of a woman's love, could effect. The prison of Oung-pen-la, though the name be not euphonious, merits an immortality of renown: for never on earth was witnessed a more truly

by the subtle invention of making them conceal in their dress an image of Jesus Christ, to which they teach them mentally to refer the public adoration, which they offer to the idol Kachin Choam, and to their Keum-fucum (Confucius?) as Gravina, a Dominican, reproaches them with; and as is testified in a memoir in Spanish, presented to Philip IV. of Spain, by the Cordeliers of the Philippine Islands, given by Thomas Hurtado in his book on Martyrdom for the Faith."

heroic example of the unconquerable strength of a Christian lady's love and fortitude than was exhibited at Oung-pen-la by Ann Judson. What the mother and the wife must have endured we will not endeavour to depict; it must be gathered from her own words: we know not where to quote from that unpretending record of female heroism and devotion. Our readers must turn to her letter of the 26th May, 1826, for a tale of trial, suffering, and fortitude, such as few could imagine, and, we trust, none may ever witness. In every line her character speaks; and when, hopeless of recovery, during a short absence at Ava, whither she had gone to procure food and medicines, she says, "my only anxiety now was to return to Oung-pen-la, to die near the prison," near her fettered husband and her famishing babe, one feels that the words might have been her epitaph.

In every scene of her life, whether, when driven from Calcutta in 1812, alone in a tavern half way between Saugor Island and the City-of-Palaces, uncertain where Judson was, when he would come, or what treatment she might meet with at the tavern; or, during Judson's temporary absence in 1818, when alone at Rangoon; or, at Ava, and the prison of Oung-pen-la—we find displayed a constancy and a courage, rising superior to the natural timidity of her sex, to the example of faint-hearted desertion in others, and at last, to a complication of the most appalling sufferings and trials of her own. We know not who the writer was; but the following, from a Calcutta paper, written after their liberation by one of the English prisoners who had shared Judson's imprisonment at Ava at Oung-pen-la, we cannot refrain from laying before our readers:—

"Mrs. Judson was the author of those eloquent and forcible appeals to the Government which prepared them by degrees for submission to terms of peace, never expected by any who knew the hauteur and inflexible pride of the Burman Court.

"And while on this subject, the overflowings of grateful feelings, on behalf of myself and fellow-prisoners, compel me to add a tribute of public thanks to that amiable and humane female, who, though living at a distance of two miles from our prison, without any means of conveyance, and very feeble in health, forgot her own comfort and infirmity, and almost every day visited us, sought out and administered to our wants, and contributed in every way to alleviate our misery.

"While we were all left by the Government destitute of food, she,

with unwearied perseverance, by some means or other obtained us a constant supply.

“When the tattered state of our clothes evinced the extremity of our distress she was ever ready to replenish our scanty wardrobe.

“When the unfeeling avarice of our keepers confined us inside, or made our feet fast in the stocks, she, like a ministering angel, never ceased her applications to the Government, until she was authorized to communicate to us the grateful news of our enlargement, or of a respite from our galling oppressions.

“Besides all this, it was unquestionably owing, in a chief degree, to the repeated eloquence and forcible appeals of Mrs. Judson that the untutored Burman was finally made willing to secure the welfare and happiness of his country by a sincere peace.”

What must have been the anguish of Judson, that she, who had been the guardian angel of his prison, who had assuaged his sufferings at the expense of her own health and strength, braving and enduring for his sake more than words can tell, was alone—he far from her side—when she laid down her head and died! Well might he write of her, as “one of the first of women, the best of wives.”

A highly gifted and a most noble lady then passed away from earth—but neither more talented, more intrinsically noble, nor more lovely and amiable, than she who, eight years after, became Mrs. Sarah Judson. She was known to say, “never woman had two such husbands;” whilst Judson wrote, thanking God that he had been blest with two of the best of wives. It would be difficult to judge which of the two had the most truth in their remark; but we do know that Sarah B. Judson was a character of very rare excellence; one of those angelic beings to whom Heaven seems to rejoice in pouring out its best and highest gifts; one of nature’s own gentlewomen. Exquisite sensibility, a poet’s soul and imagination, great natural abilities, thorough unselfishness, and a woman’s depth of love and affection, all shrouded by the most unpretending Christian meekness and devotion, were some of the elements, which blended together to form a character of extreme beauty. Her countenance harmonized with her spirit: for, even after years of toil, of maternal sufferings and sorrows, of exposure, and exposure too, in such a climate—after undergoing all calculated to break down and exhaust the strength of a delicate and feminine form—as she lay, on the eve of her final embarkation from

Moulmein, with the hand of death upon that worn, pallid visage, it could not touch the uneffaceable lineaments of beauty, which seemed to outlive all suffering, and to smile upon their approaching enemy.

All medical skill had been exhausted ; she had returned from a trip down the coast, touching at Tavoy and Mergui, "weaker and nearer the grave than when she set out." Perhaps this was not much to be wondered at : for to a person of acute sensibility, coupled with great debility, sailing down that coast must have been a painful review of scenes hallowed by the remembrance of the tender ties of early love, hope, labour, and bereavements. Her stay at Tavoy, so long her happy home, but the spot where Boardman and her eldest child were laid, and where she again met old and dear friends, did her health no good. Nor was the stay at Mergui and the Pali Chan more successful ; though at times she seemed to rally and gave hopes of amendment. No disease, however, is on that coast more treacherous and deceptive than that under which she laboured ; and long years of residence in that trying climate had effectually sapped her strength. After her return to Moulmein it was evident that, humanly speaking, the only chance of saving her valuable life lay in removal from the coast and a voyage to America. It was a forlorn hope : and, in her state of extreme debility Judson could not leave her to encounter such a voyage alone. Two high duties were in apparent antagonism ; and for a time he hesitated and was in suspense. The devotion of the missionary to his cause, and his wish to die at his post, seemed in conflict with the solemn duties of the man and the husband. Many may fancy themselves qualified to judge of the effect upon the mind and feelings from the undeniable claim of the latter class of duties ; but few can presume to estimate the weight of the former. That he decided as he did must afterwards have proved a source of much consolation and of deep thankfulness, for he was thereby saved the anguish of thinking that Sarah Judson had been left to die alone.

He sailed with her, and had the happiness at first of seeing her rally ; and there was so promising an amendment that he resolved to return to Moulmein from St. Helena. On this occasion she wrote the lines which follow :—

" We part on this green islet, love,
Thou for the Eastern main,
I for the setting sun, love—
Oh, when to meet again !

My heart is sad for thee, love,
 For lone thy way will be ;
 And oft thy tears will fall, love,
 For thy children and for me.
 The music of thy daughter's voice
 Thou'lt miss for many a year,
 And the merry shout of thine elder boys
 Thou'lt list in vain to hear.
 When we knelt to see our Henry die,
 And heard his last faint moan,
 Each wiped the tear from the other's eye—
 Now each must weep alone.
 My tears fall fast for thee, love,
 How can I say farewell ?
 But go, thy God be with thee, love,
 Thy heart's deep grief to quell.
 Yet my spirit clings to thine, love,
 Thy soul remains with me ;
 And oft we'll hold communion sweet,
 O'er the dark and distant sea.
 And who can paint our mutual joy,
 When all our wanderings o'er,
 We both shall clasp our infants three,
 At home, on Burmah's shore.
 But higher shall our raptures glow,
 On yon celestial plain,
 When the loved and parted here below
 Meet, ne'er to part again.
 Then gird thine armour on, love,
 Nor faint thou by the way—
 Till the Budh shall fall, and Burmah's sons
 Shall own Messiah's sway."

Their parting was destined, however, to be of another kind ; and he landed at St. Helena to commit to the grave what was mortal of Sarah B. Judson. What he felt we leave him to express :—

"Barque Sophia Walker, at Sea, September, 1845.

"MY DEAR MRS. —, I was so overwhelmed with grief after the death of my beloved wife at St. Helena that it never occurred to me to write a single line to any of my friends. The only communication, therefore, which will have probably reached you is a letter to Mr. Osgood a few days before her death, in which I stated that I had nearly given up all hope of her recovery. I have just written another letter to Mr. Osgood, to be forwarded from America, which I request him to send for your perusal. I feel

that my next is due to you, and dear —, for your many and great kindnesses to the dear departed, and on account of the great affection and respect which she felt for you both. She has frequently told me how much she enjoyed your society on board the *Ganges*, and when, during her seasons of convalescence, we conversed about returning to Moulmein, she would always mention the great pleasure she anticipated in again meeting you : and now, I trust, that though that meeting be deferred, it will ultimately be a more joyful one, in the realms of life and immortality. Death was not triumphant, as is sometimes the case ; but more composure and security, more unwavering trust in the Saviour, and more assured hope of being admitted, through grace, into the joys of Paradise, I never knew or heard of. For some months no shadow of doubt or fear ever disturbed her peaceful soul. If she felt distressed at the thought of leaving her husband she fled for refuge to the anticipation of a happy meeting and a joyful eternity together ; if distressed at the thought of leaving her children, she fled to the Throne of Grace, and spent, as she told me, much of the time during her last days in praying fervently for their early conversion. O, how much more valuable is a well grounded hope in Christ than all the riches and glories of this vain world ! and we never feel the value of such a hope so deeply as when we assist in sustaining the steps of a dear friend towards the verge of the grave and of eternity ;—nor shall we ever feel it more, until we are called ourselves to look into the dread abyss, and, losing all support from any earthly arm, find that we have nothing to cling to but the arm of the Saviour. It affords me, and must afford all her friends, the richest consolation that she departed clinging to His arm, and evidently supported thereby. It furnishes also some additional consolation that instead of being consigned to the deep, as I expected would be the case, it was so ordered that she died in port, and was consigned to the grave with those funeral obsequies which are so appropriate and desirable. I unexpectedly found in the place a dear brother missionary, the Rev. Mr. Bertram, who came on board and conducted the body to the shore, where it was met by the Rev. Mr. Kempthorn, Colonial Chaplain, who performed the service at the grave : and, though we were perfect strangers, it seemed as if the whole population turned out to attend the funeral ; and, would you believe it, these unknown friends, with our captain, insisted on defraying all the expenses of the funeral ! They even sent mourning suits on board for the three children.

After the funeral they took me to their homes and their hearths; and their conversation and prayers were truly consoling. I was, however, obliged to leave them the same evening. We immediately went to sea; and the next morning we had lost sight of the rocky isle, where we had deposited all that remained of my beloved wife. The children are a great comfort to me in my loneliness, especially dear Abby Ann, who seems to have taken her mother's place in caring for the rest of us. But I must soon part with them too, and probably for life. May their dying mother's prayers be heard, and draw down the great blessing on their hearts, and on the poor little orphans we have left at Moulmein and Amherst.

"At the Isle of France we left the *Paragon*, and embarked on an American vessel, bound direct to the United States; so that I shall not have the privilege of visiting ——'s friend in London. I have not heard a word from Moulmein since leaving. I am anxious to hear of your family affairs, and most anxious to hear whether poor little Charlie, your ship-mate in the *Ganges*, is still alive. If so, pray send for him some times, and look on his face, which I hope is not so thin and pale as formerly.

"Yours affectionately,

"A. JUDSON."

The letter was long in reaching its destination, and poor little Charlie had laid his pale face in the grave. Written after he had recovered composure under his heart-crushing bereavement, and in order to convey what he knew would be a life-long source of mournful happiness, the message of her "great affection"—written therefore in the confidence of friendship—we should not have given it publicity, but that we think the letter beautiful, characteristic, and sure to be treasured by all connected with Sarah Judson and her husband. To their children it will be one more record of their mother's love and prayers; and to Abby Ann in particular it will be a wreath, though a cypress one, from her father's hand, as a time of peace, partly through her instrumentality, though a child, was returning to her pious father's breast.

That a man of Judson's eminence, and virtually the father of the American Baptist Mission to Burmah, should have been received as he was in America, was to be expected. Upon his short, but useful stay there, and his rapid return to the field of his life and labour, it is not our purpose to dwell: but we think our readers will thank us for the following farewell address read at

Boston—Judson being at the time unable to sustain his voice through more than a few sentences:—

“There are periods in the lives of men, who experience much change of scene and variety of adventure, when they seem to themselves to be subject to some supernatural illusion, or wild magical dream,—when they are ready amid the whirl of conflicting recollections to doubt their own personal identity, and, like steersmen in a storm, feel that they must keep a steady eye to the compass, and a strong arm to the wheel. The scene, spread out before me, seems on retrospection to be identified with the past, and, at the same time, to be reaching forward and foreshadowing the future. At one moment the lapse of thirty-four years is annihilated; the scenes of 1812 are again present; and this assembly, how like that which commended me to God, on first leaving my native shores for the distant east! But, as I look around, where are the well known faces of Spring, and Worcester, and Dwight? Where are Lyman and Huntington, and Griffin? And where are those leaders of the baptized ranks, who stretched their arms across the water, and received me into their communion? Where are Baldwin and Bolles? Where Holcombe and Rogers, and Staughton? I see them not. I have been to their temples of worship, but their voices have passed away. And where are my early Missionary associates—Newell, and Hall, and Rice, and Richards, and Mills? But why inquire for those so ancient? Where are the succeeding labourers in the Missionary field for many years, and the intervening generation, who moved among the dark scenes of Rangoon, and Ava, and Tavoy? Where those gentle, yet firm spirits, which tenanted forms delicate in structure, but careless of the storm, now broken and scattered and strewn like the leaves of autumn, under the shadow of over-hanging trees, and on remote islands of the sea?

“No; these are not the scenes of 1812; nor is this the assembly, that which was convened in the tabernacle of a neighbouring city. Many years *have* elapsed; many venerated, many beloved ones *have* passed away to be seen no more. ‘They rest from their labours, and their works do follow them.’ And with what words shall I address those who have taken their places—the successors of the venerated and beloved—of the generation of 1819?

“In that year American Christians pledged themselves to the work of evangelizing the world. They had but little to rest on, except the command and promise of God. The attempts then made by British Christians had not been attended with so much

success as to establish the practicability, or vindicate the wisdom, of Missionary enterprise. For many years the work advanced but slowly. One denomination after another embarked in the undertaking, and now American Missionaries are seen in almost every land and every clime. Many languages have been acquired; many translations of the Bible have been made; the Gospel has been extensively preached; and Churches have been established, containing thousands of sincere, intelligent converts. The obligation, therefore, on the present generation to redeem the pledge given by their fathers is greatly enhanced. And it is an animating consideration, that with the enhancement of the obligation, the encouragements to persevere in the work, and to make still greater efforts, are increasing from year to year. Judging from the past, what may we rationally expect during the lapse of another thirty or forty years? Look forward with the eye of faith. See the Missionary spirit universally diffused, and in active operation throughout this country—every Church sustaining, not only its own minister, but, through some general organization, its own Missionary in a foreign land. See the Bible faithfully translated into all languages—the rays of the lamp of Heaven transmitted through every medium, and illuminating all lands. See the Sabbath spreading its holy calm over the face of the earth—the Churches of Zion assembling, and the praises of Jesus resounding from shore to shore; and, though the great majority may still remain, as now in this Christian country, ‘without hope and without God in this world,’ yet the barriers in the way of the descent and operations of the Holy Spirit removed, so that revivals of religion become more constant and more powerful.

“The world is yet in its infancy. The gracious designs of God are yet hardly developed. ‘Glorious things are spoken of Zion, the city of our God.’ She is yet to triumph, and become the joy and glory of the whole earth. Blessed be God, that we live in these latter times—the latter times of the reign of darkness and imposture. Great is our privilege, precious our opportunity, to co-operate with the Saviour in the blessed work of enlarging and establishing His kingdom throughout the world. Most precious the opportunity of becoming wise in turning many to righteousness, and of shining, at last, as the brightness of the firmament and the stars, for ever and ever.

“Let us not, then, regret the loss of those who have gone before us, and are waiting to welcome us;—nor shrink from the summons that must call us thither. Let us only resolve to follow them

‘who through faith and patience inherit the promises.’ Let us so employ the remnant of life, and so pass away, that our successors will say of us, as we of our predecessors, ‘Blessed are the dead that die in the Lord. They rest from their labours, and their works do follow them.’”

Though under the necessity of having the foregoing read for him, yet he was able distinctly, but with marked emotion, to speak the following words, prophetic of what has come to pass:—“I wish, however, with my own voice to praise God for the proofs which He has given of His interest in Missions; and to thank you, from the bottom of my heart, for the kindness which I have received from you. I regret that circumstances beyond my control have prevented my being much in this city, to make more intimate acquaintance with those whom a slight acquaintance has taught me so much to love. I am soon to depart; and, as is in the highest degree probable, never to return. I shall no more look upon this beautiful city—no more visit your temples, or see your faces. I have one favour to ask of you—pray for me, and my associates in the Missionary work; and, though we meet no more on earth, may we at last meet, where the loved and the parted here below meet never to part again.”

We have observed that it was the lot of Judson to have for the companions of his life and toil women remarkable in a high degree for their abilities, attainments, and characters. They were as different in cast and qualities of intellect, and in the shades of distinctive character, as they were in personal presence. In one respect, however, they have been essentially alike; if they shared Judson’s toil and labours, they also not only shared his glory, but brightened its light with their own effulgence. The lot of the one might be heroically to sustain and assuage, in the dawn of his career, in the first sharp struggles for Mission life, in the dark hour of imprisonment, suffering, and impending violent death, which threatened to cut short the hope of that life; the lot of the second, to encourage, soothe, and cheer through long years of labour; that of the third to sweeten the close of the long years of toil, and to lend an arm to the edge of the grave; but one and all filled their respective posts, performed their appointed duties in a manner which associate with Judson’s name bright tender rays of their own shedding. They were the stars of three distinct eras of his life—the active and militant, the contemplative and laborious, the hopeful and triumphant. We have not attempted to depict the peculiarities

of the life and difficulties of a Missionary's wife in Burmah. These must be witnessed to be understood; but the most cursory attention cannot fail to be struck with the fact that everything they accomplish (and they accomplished much) must be done in addition to the duties which a family devolves upon them, and in a climate where a delicate American frame and constitution are ill calculated for the almost menial toil and labour, which very circumscribed means, and a consequent want of attendants and aids, necessarily cast upon them. Without a murmur, without a wish that it were otherwise, glorying in the cause of Christ, and taxing their frail, delicate frames to the uttermost, fulfilling all family and household duties under the most trying, and sometimes the most health-destroying, circumstances, these noble women have achieved more than many men, free from infirmities, and unembarrassed by the daily care and the multifarious duties of a family, would have accomplished. Whether we contemplate the heroine of his suffering and militant era, or the seraph of his less chequered, but not less useful, period, the wonder is, how could they find time (great as their abilities undoubtedly were) to master difficult languages, found, and teach in, schools, and aid in the work of conversion! We must answer, by a self-devotion fatally exhaustive of health and strength. To our mind there is no comparison whatever between what the Missionary has to bear and what his wife has to endure, in the American Baptist Mission on the Tenasserim coast.

As Emily Judson survives, we have said little of the companion of the close of Judson's life. The following poems will, if not before known to our readers, give them some slight notion of the present Mrs. Judson:—

TO MY MOTHER.

Give me my old seat, mother,
 With my head upon thy knee;
 I've passed through many a changing scene,
 Since thus I sat by thee.
 O! let me look into thine eyes!
 Their meek, soft, loving light
 Falls like a gleam of holiness
 Upon my heart to-night.

I've not been long away, mother;
 Few suns have rose and set,
 Since last the tear-drop on thy cheek
 My lips in kisses met.

'Tis but a little time, I know,
 But very long it seems ;
 Though every night I come to thee,
 Dear mother, in my dreams.

The world has kindly dealt, mother,
 By the child thou lov'st so well ;
 Thy prayers have circled round her path—
 And 'twas their holy spell
 Which made that path so dearly bright,
 Which strewed the roses there,
 Which gave the light, and cast the balm
 On every breath of air.

I bear a happy heart, mother—
 A happier never beat ;
 And, even now, new buds of hope
 Are bursting at my feet.
 O ! mother, life may be a dream ;
 But if such *dreams* are given,
 While at the portal thus we stand,
 What are the *truths* of Heaven ?

I bear a happy heart, mother !
 Yet, when fond eyes I see,
 And hear soft tones and winning words,
 I ever think of thee :
 And then, the tear my spirit weeps,
 Unbidden fills my eye ;
 And, like a homeless dove, I long
 Unto thy breast to fly.

Then I am very sad, mother,
 I'm very sad and lone ;
 Oh ! there's no heart whose inmost fold
 Opes to me like thine own.
 Though sunny smiles wreath blooming lips,
 While love tones meet my ear ;
 My mother, one fond glance of thine
 Were thousand times more dear.

Then with a closer clasp, mother,
 Now hold me to thy heart ;
 I'd feel it beating 'gainst my own
 Once more before we part.
 And, mother, to this love-lit spot,
 When I am far away,
 Come oft—too oft thou canst not come—
 And for thy darling pray.

Boston, July, 1846.

Verses like these need no praise of ours ; and the following

lines, written in Burmah, will show that her genius lost none of its powers under the blaze of an Eastern sun :—

Ere last year's moon had left the sky,
A birdling sought my Indian nest,
And folded, oh ! so lovingly,
Her tiny wings upon my breast.

From morn to evening's purple tinge,
In winsome helplessness she lies :
Two rose-leaves with a silken fringe
Shut softly on her starry eyes.

There's not in Ind a lovelier bird :
Broad earth owns not a happier nest.
O God ! Thou hast a fountain stirred,
Whose waters never more shall rest.

This beautiful mysterious thing,
This seeming visitant from heaven,
This bird with the immortal wing,
To me, to me, Thy hand has given.

The pulse first caught its tiny stroke,
The blood its crimson hue from mine :
This life, which I have dared invoke,
Henceforth is parallel with Thine.

A silent awe is in my room,
I tremble with delicious fear ;
The future, with its light and gloom,
Time and eternity are here.

Doubts, hopes, in eager tumult rise,
Hear, oh, my God ! one earnest prayer—
Room for my bird in Paradise,
And give her angel plumage there.

Since these lines were written, alas ! the spoiler has found his way again and again into that happy nest. But "the great trial" we must give (by permission) in her own beautiful words.*

"Last month I could do no more than announce to you our painful bereavement, which, though not altogether unexpected, will, I very well know, fall upon your heart with overwhelming weight. You will find the account of your brother's last days on board the *Barque Aristide Marie*, in a letter written by Mr. Ranny, from the Mauritius, to the Secretary of the Board; and I can add nothing to it with the exception of a few unimportant

* They are taken from a letter addressed by her to a near relative of Dr. Judson's.

particulars, gleaned in conversations with Mr. R. and the Coringa servant. I grieve that it should be so, that I was not permitted to watch beside him during those days of terrible sufferings; but the pain which I at first felt is gradually yielding to gratitude for the inestimable privileges which had been granted me.

“There was something exceedingly beautiful in the decline of your brother’s life—more beautiful than I can describe, though the impression will remain with me as a sacred legacy, until I go to meet him, where suns shall never set and life shall never end. He had been, from my first acquaintance with him, an uncommonly spiritual Christian, exhibiting his richest graces in the unguarded intercourse of private life; but, during his last year, it seemed as though the light of the world on which he was entering had been sent to brighten his upward pathway.

“Every subject on which we conversed, every book we read, every incident that occurred, whether trifling or important, had a tendency to suggest some peculiarly spiritual train of thought, till it seemed to me that, more than ever before, ‘Christ was all his theme.’ Something of the same nature was also noted in his preaching, to which I was then deprived of the privilege of listening. He was in the habit, however, of studying his subject for the Sabbath audibly, and in my presence; at which times he was frequently so much affected as to weep, and sometimes so overwhelmed with the vastness of his conceptions, as to be obliged to abandon his theme, and choose another. My own illness, at the commencement of the year, had brought eternity very near to us, and rendered death, the grave, and the bright heaven beyond it, familiar subjects of conversation.

“Gladly would I give you, my dear sister, some idea of the share borne by him in these memorable conversations; but it would be impossible to convey, even to those who knew him best, the most distant conception of them. I believe he has sometimes been thought eloquent, both in conversation and in the sacred desk:—but the fervid, burning eloquence, the deep pathos, the touching tenderness, the elevation of thought, and intense beauty of expression, which characterized these private teachings, were not only beyond what I had ever heard before, but such as I felt sure arrested his own attention, and surprised even himself.

“About this time he began to find unusual satisfaction and enjoyment in his private devotions; and seemed to have new objects of interest continually rising in his mind, each of which in turn became special subjects of prayer. Among these one of the most

prominent was the conversion of his posterity. He remarked that he had always prayed for his children, but that of late he had felt impressed with the duty of praying for their children, and their children's children, down to the latest generation. He also prayed most earnestly that his impressions on this subject might be transferred to his sons and daughters, and thence to their offspring, so that he should ultimately meet a long unbroken line of descendants before the Throne of the Lord, where all might join together in ascribing everlasting praises to the Redeemer.

“Another subject which occupied a large share of his attention was that of brotherly love. You are, perhaps, aware that like all persons of his ardent temperament, he was subject to strong attachments and aversions, which he sometimes had difficulty in bringing under the controlling influence of Divine Grace. He remarked that he had always felt more or less of an affectionate interest in his brethren, as brethren, and that some of them he had loved very dearly for their personal qualities; but he was now aware he had never placed his standard of love high enough. He spoke of them as children of God, redeemed by the Saviour's blood, watched over and guarded by His love, dear to His heart, honoured by Him in the election, and to be honoured hereafter before the assembled universe; and, he said, it was not sufficient to be kind and obliging to such, to abstain from evil speaking, and make a general mention of them in our prayers, but our attachment to them should be of the most ardent and exalted character. It would be so in heaven; and we lost immeasurably by not beginning now. ‘As I have loved you, so ought ye also to love one another,’ was a precept continually in his mind; and he would often murmur as though unconsciously, ‘As I have loved you; as I have loved you’—then burst out with the exclamation, ‘Oh, the love of Christ! the love of Christ!’

“His prayers for the Mission were marked by an earnest grateful enthusiasm; and, in speaking of Missionary operations in general, his tone was one of elevated triumph—almost of exultation; for he not only felt unshaken confidence in their final success, but often exclaimed, ‘What wonders! oh, what wonders, God has already wrought!’ I remarked that during this year his literary labours, which he had never liked, and upon which he had entered unwillingly and from a feeling of necessity, were growing daily more irksome to him; and he always spoke of them as ‘his heavy work’—‘his tedious work’—‘that wearisome Dictionary,’ &c. Though this feeling led to no relaxation of effort he longed, how-

over, to find some more spiritual employment—to be engaged in what he considered more legitimate Missionary labour; and he drew delightful pictures of the future, when his whole business would be but to preach and pray.

“During all this time I had not observed any failure in physical strength; and, though his mental exercises occupied a large share of my thoughts when alone, it never once occurred to me that it might be the brightening of the setting sun. My only feeling was that of pleasure that one so near to me was becoming so pure and elevated in his sentiments, and so lovely and Christ-like in his character. In person he had grown somewhat stouter than when in America; his complexion had a healthful hue compared with that of his associates generally; and though by no means a person of uniformly firm health he seemed to possess such vigour and strength of constitution that I thought his life as likely to be extended twenty years longer as that of any member of the Mission. He continued his system of morning exercise, commenced when a student at Andover, and was not satisfied with a common walk on level ground but always chose an uphill path, and then went frequently bounding on his way with all the exuberant activity of boyhood. He was of a singularly active temperament, although not of that even cast which never rises above a certain level and is never depressed. Possessing acute sensibilities, suffering with those who suffered, and entering as readily into the joys of the prosperous and happy, he was variable in his mood; but religion formed such an essential element of his character, and his trust in Providence was so implicit and habitual, that he was never gloomy, and seldom more than momentarily disheartened. On the other hand, being accustomed to regard all the events of this life, however minute or painful, as ordered in wisdom, and tending to one great and glorious end, he lived in almost constant obedience to the Apostolic injunction—‘Rejoice evermore.’ He often told me that, although he had endured much personal suffering and passed through many fearful trials in the course of his eventful life, a kind Providence had hedged him round with precious, peculiar blessings, so that his joys had far outnumbered his sorrows.

“Towards the close of September, last year, he said to me one evening, ‘What deep cause have we for gratitude to God! Do you believe there are any other two persons in the world so happy as we are?’—enumerating in his own earnest manner several sources of happiness, in which our work as Missionaries, and our eternal prospects, occupied a prominent position. When he had

finished his glowing picture I remarked (I scarcely know why, but I felt immeasurably depressed that evening), 'We are certainly very happy now; but it cannot be so always. I am thinking of the time when one of must stand helplessly by the bed, and see the other die.' 'Yes,' he said, 'that will be a sad moment. I felt it most deeply a little while ago; but now it would not be strange if your life were prolonged beyond mine, though I should wish, if it were possible, to spare you that pain. It is the one left alone who suffers—not the one who goes to be with Christ. If it should only be the will of God, that we might die together, like young James and his wife—but He will order all things well, and we can safely trust our future to His hand.'

"That same night we were roused from sleep by the sudden illness of one of the children. There was an unpleasant, chilling dampness in the air as it came to us through the openings in the straw above the windows, which affected your brother very sensibly: and he soon began to shiver so violently, that he was obliged to return to his couch, where he remained under a warm covering till morning. In the morning he awoke with a severe cold, accompanied by a degree of fever; but as it did not seem very serious, and our three children were all suffering from a similar cause, we failed to give it any especial attention. From that time he was never well; though in writing to you before I think I dated the commencement of his illness from the month of November, when he laid aside his studies. I know that he regarded this attack as trifling; and yet, one evening, he spent a long time in advising me with respect to my future course, if I should be deprived of his guidance; saying that it is always wise to be prepared for exigencies of this nature. After the month of November, he failed gradually, occasionally rallying in such a manner as to deceive us all, but, at each relapse, sinking lower than at the previous one; though still full of hope and courage, and yielding ground only inch by inch, as compelled by the triumphant progress of disease. During some hours of every day he suffered intense pain: but his naturally buoyant spirits and uncomplaining disposition led him to speak so lightly of it, that I used sometimes to fear that the doctor, though a very skilful man, would be fatally deceived. As his health declined, his mental exercises at first seemed deepened; and he gave still larger portions of his time to prayer, conversing with the utmost freedom on his daily progress, and the extent of his self-conquest. Just before our trip to Mergui, which took place in January, he looked

up from his pillow one day with sudden animation, and said to me earnestly, 'I have gained the victory at last. I love every one of Christ's redeemed, as I believe He would have me love them;—in the same manner, though not probably to the same degree, as we shall love one another when we go to be with Him in heaven; and gladly would I prefer any one, who bears His name, before myself.' This he said in allusion to the text, 'In honour preferring one another,' on which he had frequently dwelt with great emphasis. After some further similar conversation, he concluded, 'And now here I lie, at peace with all the world, and, what is better still, at peace with my own conscience; I know that I am a miserable sinner in the sight of God, with no hope but in the blessed Saviour's merits; but I cannot think of any particular fault, any peculiar besetting sin, which it is now my duty to correct. Can you tell me of any?'

"And truly, from this time, no other word would so truly express his state of feeling as that one of his own choosing—*peace*. He had no particular exercises afterwards, but remained even and serene, speaking of himself daily as a great sinner, who had been overwhelmed with benefits, and declaring that he had never in his life before had such delightful views of the unfathomable love and infinite condescension of the Saviour, as were now daily opening before him. 'Oh, the love of Christ! the love of Christ!'—he would suddenly exclaim, while his eye kindled, and the tears chased each other down his cheeks—'we cannot understand it now; but what a beautiful study for eternity!'

"After our return from Mergui, the doctor advised a still farther trial of the effects of sea air, and sea bathing; and we accordingly proceeded to Amherst, where we remained nearly a month. This, to me, was the darkest period of his illness—no medical adviser, no friend at hand, and he daily growing weaker and weaker. He began to totter in walking, clinging to the furniture and walls, when he thought he was unobserved (for he was not willing to acknowledge the extent of his debility), and his wan face was of a ghastly paleness. His sufferings, too, were sometimes fearfully intense, so that, in spite of his habitual self-control, his groans would fill the house. At other times a kind of lethargy seemed to steal over him; and he would sleep almost incessantly for twenty-four hours, seeming annoyed if he were aroused or disturbed. Yet there were portions of the time when he was comparatively comfortable, and conversed intelligibly; but his mind seemed to revert to former scenes, and he tried to amuse me with

stories of his boyhood, his college days, his imprisonment, and his early missionary life. He had a great deal also to say on his favourite theme, 'The love of Christ;' but his strength was too much impaired for any continuous mental effort; even a short prayer, made audibly, exhausted him to such a degree that he was obliged to discontinue the practice.

"At length I wrote to Moulmein, giving some expression of my anxieties and misgivings; and our kind missionary friends, who had from the first evinced all the tender interest and watchful sympathy of the nearest kindred, immediately sent for us—the doctor advising a sea voyage. But as there was no vessel in the harbour bound for a port sufficiently distant, we thought it best, in the meantime, to remove from our old dwelling, which was in an unhealthful situation, to another mission house fortunately empty. This change was at first attended with the most beneficial results; and our hopes revived so much that we looked forward to the approaching rainy season for entire restoration. But it lasted a little while only; and both of us became convinced that though a sea voyage involved much that was deeply painful, it yet presented the only prospect of recovery, and could not, therefore, without a breach of duty, be neglected.

"'Oh, if it were only the will of God to take me now—to let me die here,' he repeated over and over again, in a tone of anguish, while we were considering the subject. 'I cannot, cannot go. This is almost more than I can bear!—Was there ever suffering like our suffering?' and the like broken expressions, were continually falling from his lips.

"But he soon gathered more strength of purpose; and, after the decision was fairly made, he never hesitated for a moment, rather regarding it with pleasure. I think the struggle, which this resolution cost, injured him very materially, though probably it had no share in bringing about the final result. God, who sees the end from the beginning, had counted out his days, and they were hastening to a close.

"Until this time, he had been able to stand, and to walk slowly from room to room; but, as he attempted to rise from his chair one evening, he was suddenly deprived of his small remnant of muscular strength, and would have fallen to the floor but for timely support. From that moment his decline was rapid. As he lay helplessly on his couch, and watched the swelling of his feet and other alarming symptoms, he became very anxious to commence his voyage; and I felt equally anxious to have his

wishes gratified. I still hoped he might recover. The doctor said that the chances of life and death were, in his opinion, equally balanced;—and then he loved the sea so dearly! There was something exhilarating to him in the motion of the vessel; and he spoke with animation of getting free from the almost suffocating atmosphere incident to the hot season, and drinking in the fresh sea breezes. He talked but little more, however, than was necessary to indicate his wants—his bodily sufferings being too great to allow of conversation; but several times he looked up to me with a bright smile and exclaimed, as heretofore, ‘Oh, the love of Christ, the love of Christ!’ I found it difficult to ascertain from expressions casually dropt from time to time, his real opinion with regard to his recovery; but I thought there was some reason to doubt whether he was fully aware of his critical situation. I did not suppose he had any preparation to make at this late hour, and I felt sure that, if he should be called ever so unexpectedly, he would not enter the presence of his Maker with a ruffled spirit. But I could not bear to have him go away, without knowing whether our next meeting would not be in eternity; and perhaps, too, in my own distress, I might still have looked for words of encouragement and sympathy to a source which had never before failed.

“It was late in the night, and I had been performing some little sick-room office, when suddenly he looked up to me and exclaimed, ‘This will never do. You are killing yourself for me, and I will not permit it. You must have some one to relieve you; if I had not been made selfish by suffering, I should have insisted upon it long ago.’

“He spoke so like himself, with the earnestness of health, and in a tone to which my ear had of late been a stranger, that for a moment I felt bewildered with sudden hope. He received my reply to what he had said, with a half pitying, half gratified smile, but in the meantime his expression had changed—the marks of excessive debility were again apparent, and as I looked at him I could not forbear adding, ‘It is only a little while, you know.’ ‘Only a little while,’ he repeated mournfully; ‘this separation is a bitter thing, but it does not depress me now as it did: I am too weak.’ ‘You have no reason to be depressed,’ I said, ‘with such glorious prospects before you. You have often told me, it is the one left alone who suffers—not the one who goes to be with Christ.’ He gave me a rapid, questioning glance; then resumed for several moments an attitude of deep thought; finally he slowly

unclosed his eyes, and, fixing them on me, said in a calm earnest tone, 'I do not believe I am going to die. I think I know why this illness was sent upon me; I needed it. I feel that it has done me good: and it is my impression that I shall now recover, and be a better, and a more useful man.' 'Then it is your wish to recover?' I inquired. 'If it should be the will of God, yes. I should like to complete the Dictionary, on which I have bestowed so much labour, now that it is so nearly done: for, though it has not been a work that pleased my taste, or quite satisfied my feelings, I have never under-rated its importance.' Then after that, came all the plans that we had formed. 'Oh I feel, as though but just beginning to be prepared for usefulness.'

"'It is the opinion of most of the Mission,' I remarked 'that you will not recover,' 'I know it is,' he replied; 'and I suppose they think me an old man, and imagine it is nothing for one like me to leave a world so full of trials; but I am not old, at least in that sense. You know I am not. Oh, no man ever left this world with more inviting prospects, with brighter hopes, or warmer feelings—warmer feelings,' he repeated, and burst into tears. His face was perfectly placid, even while the tears broke through his closed lids, and dropped one after another down to the pillow. There was no trace of agitation, or pain in his manner of weeping; but it was evidently the result of acute sensibilities, combined with physical weakness. To some suggestion, which I ventured to make, he replied, 'It is not that; I know all that, and feel it in my inmost heart; lying here on my bed, when I could not talk, I have had such views of the loving condescension of Christ, and the glories of heaven, as I believe are seldom granted to mortal man. It is not because I shrink from death, that I wish to live; neither is it because the ties that bind me here, though some of them are very sweet, bear any comparison with the drawings I at times feel towards heaven; but a few years would not be missed from my eternity of bliss, and I can well afford to spare them, both for your sake, and for the sake of the poor Burmans. I am not tired of my work, nor am I tired of the world. Everything is bright and pleasant about me. Yet when Christ calls me home, I shall go with the gladness of a boy bounding away from his school. Perhaps I feel something like the young bride, when she contemplates resigning the pleasant associations of her childhood for a yet dearer home; though only a very little like her, for there is no doubt resting on my future.' 'Then death would not take you by surprise,' I remarked, 'even if it should come before you could

get on board ship?' 'No,' he said, 'death will never take me by surprise; do not be afraid of that. I feel too strong in Christ. He has not led me so tenderly thus far, to forsake me at the very gate of heaven. No, no! I am willing to live a few years longer, if it should be so ordered; and, if otherwise, I am willing and glad to die now. I leave myself entirely in the hands of God, to be disposed of according to His holy will.'

"The next day some one mentioned in his presence, that the Native Christians were greatly opposed to the voyage, and that many other persons had a similar feeling with regard to it. I thought he seemed troubled: and, after the visitors had withdrawn, I inquired if he still felt as when he conversed with me the night previous. 'Oh yes; that was no evanescent feeling; it has been with me to a greater or less degree for years, and will be with me I trust to the end. I am ready to go to-day—if it should be the will of God, this very hour; but I am not anxious to die—at least when I am not beside myself with pain.'

"'Then why are you so anxious to go on board?' I inquired, 'I should think it would be a matter of indifference to you.' 'No,' he answered quietly, 'my judgment tells me it would be wrong not to go; the doctor says *criminal*. I shall certainly die here; if I go away, I may recover. There is no question with regard to duty in such a case; and I do not like to see any hesitation, even though it should spring from affection.'

"He several times spoke of a burial at sea, and always as though the prospect were agreeable. It brought, he said, a sense of freedom and expansion, far pleasanter than the confined, dark, narrow grave, to which he had committed so many that he had loved; and he added that although his burial place was of no importance, yet he believed it was not in human nature to be altogether without a choice.

"I have already given you an account of the embarkation, of my visits to him while the vessel remained in the river, and of our last sad silent parting; and Mr. Ranny has finished the picture.

"You will find in this closing part, some dark shadows, that will give you pain: but you must remember that his present felicity is enhanced by those very sufferings; and we should regret nothing that seems to brighten his crown in glory. I ought also to add, that I have gained pleasanter impressions, in conversation with Mr. Ranny, than from his written account; but it would be difficult to convey them to you; and, as he whom

they concern was accustomed to say of similar things, 'You will learn it all in heaven.'

"During the last hour of your sainted brother's life, Mr. Ranny bent over him, and held his hand, while poor Pinapah stood at a little distance, weeping bitterly. The table had been spread in the cuddy as usual, and the officers did not know what was passing in the cabin, till summoned to dinner. Then they gathered about the door, and watched the closing scene with solemn reverence. Now, thanks to a merciful God, his pains had left him: not a momentary spasm disturbed his placid face, nor did the contraction of a muscle denote the least degree of suffering. The agony of death was past; and his wearied spirit was turning to its rest in the bosom of the Saviour. From time to time he pressed the hand in which his own was resting—his clasp losing in force at each successive pressure; while his breath (though there was no struggle, no gasping, as if it came and went with difficulty) gradually grew fainter and softer, until it died upon the air, and he was gone. Mr. Ranny closed the eyes, and composed the passive limbs; the ship's officers stole softly from the door; and the neglected meal was left upon the board untasted. They lowered him to his ocean grave without a prayer; for his freed spirit soared above the reach of earthly intercession, and, to the foreigners who stood around, it would have been a senseless form. And there they left him in his unquiet sepulchre; but it matters little: for while we know that the unconscious clay is drifting on the shiftless currents of the restless main, nothing can disturb the hallowed rest of the immortal spirit: neither could he have a more fitting monument than the blue waves, which visit every coast: for his warm sympathies went forth to the ends of the earth, and included the whole family of man. It is all as God would have it; and our duty is but to bend meekly to His will, and wait in faith and patience till we also shall be summoned home.

"With prayers that, when that solemn hour shall come, we may be as well prepared as was the Saint we mourn, and feelings of deep sympathy for your share in this heavy affliction,

"Believe me, my dear Sister,

"Most affectionately yours,

"EMILY JUDSON."

What striking traits of Judson's character come out in this beautiful account of his end! "Let me die here;"—at his post,

amid his small church and flock, where he so long laboured, usefully, earnestly, faithfully;—beneath the banner he had planted on the enemy's breach. "I do not believe I am going to die!" How was it possible for him—in whom the mere physical frame was a wholly subordinate constituent, and who was essentially spirit and intellect—how was it possible for such a man to feel that he *could* die? He might feel that his unfinished labour could be brought to an untimely close; that a sphere of usefulness, widening upon his spiritual vision, might be veiled by the pall; that all tender ties might be rudely snapped by the touch of death; that he was ready "though no man ever left this world with more inviting prospects, with brighter hopes, or warmer feelings," joyously to obey such a summons, and enter into that future upon which for him no doubts rested. But a spirit in such a frame, whatever the state of the body, feels no weakness. It "hath everlasting life," and, unconscious of any debility, or lack of energy, analogous to that taking place in the failure of the vital forces of the body, its natural expression must ever be, "I do not believe that I am going to die." The two are not yet separate; and the one, still the organ (though the fainting organ) of the other, fails clearly to apprehend that the eternal is already asserting its superiority to the transitory; that the spirit, youthful in hope, in love, and in life, is pluming itself for its upward flight to everlasting joy and light, whilst the body, shattered, worn, and unstrung, being on the edge of dissolution, can no longer respond to its superior. Their connection is almost at an end; and though the spirit in parting unfurl, even for the body, hope's standard on the brink of the yawning grave, yet the union is fading, and the soul is about to wing its way to Heavenly mansions.

Affection, when bereaved, yearns for a spot to which the heart can turn, either in reality or in contemplation, and say, "There lies one I loved, not lost, but gone before;" and therefore Judson's consolation, derived from Sarah Judson's sepulture on the rock of St. Helena, was as natural as that his own elastic spirit should have preferred in contemplation for his body's rest the wide ocean to the narrow grave:—and, whether the solemn dirge of ocean's billows continue long to resound upon earth's shores, or that anthem's swell be doomed shortly to cease, whenever that hour which no man knoweth, cometh, and the sea gives up her dead, there will rise from her abyss the body of no truer servant of Christ than that of Adoniram Judson.

We have made no allusion to the very important services which he rendered to the British Indian Government, our attention being engaged by other and higher considerations; yet we should fail to convey even a faint sketch of the character and qualities of the man, were we to omit all notice of the aid he afforded, first to Sir A. Campbell, afterwards to Mr. Crawford, and subsequently to every Commissioner on the Tenasserim coast who had occasion to solicit either information or advice. To the last he clung to the hope that, through the instrumentality of our influence and power, Burmah would, sooner or later, be opened as a field for the exertion of Missionary labour; and to a Commissioner who was leaving Moulmein, and was bidding farewell to Judson, his last words were,—“In case of difficulties, or of war arising between the British Government and Burmah, I expect to see you again on this field; and mind, if ever you are sent, and you think I can be of any use to your Mission to Ava, if alive, I shall be happy to join you, and to be of every assistance in my power.” That which had induced him to accompany Crawford, and to afford him invaluable aid—the hope of securing in the treaty concluded with Burmah a proviso favourable to religious toleration—would, to the close of his career, have led Judson again to come forward as a powerful auxiliary to a diplomatic Mission, and to devote his great abilities and thorough acquaintance with Burmah, its princes, and its people, to aid in the conduct of negotiations; which, if successful on the one point he had at heart, would, he felt assured, prove to the enduring advantage of Burmah, and therefore would richly recompense him for the sacrifices such a journey and occupation must inevitably entail. Other reward, it is needless to add, found no place in his thoughts. The sum of money presented to him by the British Government after Crawford’s embassy went every farthing into the American Baptist Mission Fund, but swollen in amount by the addition of what constituted the whole of Judson’s private property. Altogether he appears in 1827 and 1828 to have been able in this manner to pay into the funds of the Board upwards of 10,000 dollars; that, too, at a time when such a sum was more needed, and of more importance to the Mission, than far higher amounts would be in the present day, when America has bestowed her sympathy and liberality on the cause of Missions.

These services were by no means all for which the Anglo-Indian Government stands indebted to Judson. Though the Burmans were his peculiar flock, and his Mission was specially to the

heathen, the British soldier shared his love and sympathy; and many an officer and many a private whom the course of duty quartered at Moulmein, found that they had been led, in the inscrutable will of Providence, to that distant and uncivilized region in order to hear a teacher who touched their hearts, awakened their consciences and turned them to the truth. Many a soldier left Moulmein feeling that, whatever his future career, he must ever look back to that spot as the birth-place of his spiritual life. An old Italian proverb says that there is often as much religion under the soldier's cap as under the Bishop's mitre; and, in many a scene of death, whether stretched on his hospital bed, or bleeding away life on the field of battle, the spirit of the soldier, as it passed in peace and hope to immortality, will have given a parting blessing to his father in Christ, Adoniram Judson.

Very inadequately we have adverted to the loss, which not alone America and Burmah, but the whole Christian world, must deplore.

' With the dead
 In their repose, the living in their mirth,
 Who can reflect unmoved upon the round
 Of smooth and solemnized complacencies,
 By which, in Christian lands, from age to age,
 Profession mocks performance.'

How different the contemplation of such a life as that we have very faintly scanned. May that life's history be written and given to the world by some one able to do the subject justice! The example of Judson will be salutary to all, but most so to the Missionaries whose destination is the East. The writing of that life is a duty which America owes to one of her noblest sons and three of her noblest daughters. It is a duty which America owes to the whole Christian Church; and a duty which, let us hope, will be religiously performed.

III.

THE SECOND SIKH WAR.

(Written for the *Calcutta Review* in 1851.)

THE narrative of a war can seldom be correctly and faithfully laid before the public immediately on the conclusion of military operations. The main facts of the struggle, its oscillations from partial success to partial failure, from victory to defeat, are, indeed, in the present day, through the energy of the Press, very early before the public. With the assistance of such information, and the aid of an occasional bulletin from one or both of the belligerent parties, men draw their own conclusions (sometimes nearly right, oftener very wrong) during the progress of the contest, until at last the final issue puts a stop to many crude and a few reasonable lucubrations. At this stage, were truth generally safe and acceptable, many a man, whose sword had been drawn in the quarrel, would, on sheathing it, take up his pen and give an account of the campaign in which he had been engaged. But wise men know the cost too well, and abstain; the field is left open to be occupied by men of a different calibre, who, neither aware of its difficulties or dangers, and protected by their very insignificance, plunge into their subject with the confidence of shallow minds. For one Eyre, who dares to come forward with a manly, sensible, truthful narrative at the close of a great event, there will always be on such occasions a score of Thackwells, aiming to accomplish that for which they are manifestly unequal.

We always take up the narrative of a campaign written by a British officer with a twofold purpose in its perusal, with a double interest in the work. The events of the war, as historical facts, are, of course, to be learnt therein—and that is one object: but it is one which we should equally entertain if reading any narrative of military operations written by a foreigner. War, however, is a great and a complicated science; and the attainments

of our officers, in mastering its details and comprehending its higher principles, are matter of national importance. We are no advocates for war, and least of all for wars of mere aggrandizement: but, in spite of Cobden, Bright, and the Peace Society, in spite of the dreams of well-meaning, honest enthusiasts, or the hazy aspirations of self-deifying sceptical demagogues, we cannot perceive that our Old World is inclined as yet to belie its character. It seems very consistent in its ways; has not even arrived at a transition-state with respect to its pugnacious propensities; and seems obstinately bent on proving that, neither for an Autocrat of all the Russias on the one hand, nor for a Cobden on the other (though each in his line doubtless a respectable practitioner), is it reserved to put sound hearts into the millions, principle and wisdom into rulers, or to make peace and good will paramount on earth. Take it as you please—like the fact, or dislike the fact—hate or honour the red coat—it does not much matter: for there stands the dread inevitable before you—war, frequent war; not to be denied, but (be it for weal or woe) necessarily to be encountered. It is therefore a matter of superlative interest to a State, and particularly to such a State as England, to gauge the qualifications of her officers; to scrutinize the indications in their writings of a knowledge of their peculiar science; and, from their works, to estimate their comprehensiveness of view and general ability. We read, therefore, a work written by a British officer with these important questions always present to the mind:—How rank our officers in the scale of professional depth of intelligence—of sound clear apprehension of the higher principles of the art? What is the promise of genius and ability for the vague future, when the Sword may be again in conflict with half-disciplined millions, or engaged in the more formidable contest between nations representing, on the one side free, and on the other autocratic, institutions? In that impending struggle, however much against our will, we may, before long, be forced to take a part.

With these questionings in view, what would be the impression left upon the mind of a military reader by Mr. Thackwell's work? * We do not hesitate to say that they would be most unfavourable. The reader, if wholly dependent for his knowledge of the war on the work before us, would rise from its perusal with the conviction that the author was ignorant of the very elements of his

* Narrative of the Second Sikh War in 1848-49.

profession; that he so stated facts as to make it appear that the commanders in the army were, alike with himself, grossly and inexcusably deficient, not only in the higher, but also in the elementary, principles of the art of war; that the military mind of our leaders was so effete, so wanting in conscious ability and ordinary self-reliance, that, whether a simple shift of camp or an action were in contemplation, a council of war was equally indispensable; that, if there is a low range of qualifications and ability among the commanders, there is a low tone of military feeling prevalent among the subordinate officers of the army, to whom the comforts of cantonment life are more agreeable than the endurance of camp and conflict; in short, that not only is the average of ability and soldierly qualities extremely mediocre amongst the regiments, but still more lamentably deficient among the staff, the commanders.

These would be very unsatisfactory and very painful conclusions to arrive at, from the perusal of a work by a British officer, who evidently had no intention of leading his readers to form such conclusions. We acquit him of any such design; his range of intellect is limited; filial reverence and partiality are excusable; and, though Saidúlapúr is brought up *ad nauseam*, we can pardon it on the score of a son's natural tendency to do all he can for his father's fame. Mr. Thackwell belongs also, or lately did belong, to Her Majesty's army, and no man who has the honour of bearing one of Her Majesty's commissions, would willingly tarnish the general character for ability and efficiency (let alone the honour) of her service. Willingly, therefore, we acquit Mr. Thackwell of purposing to bring his reader to such conclusions as those, the mere outline of which has been sketched; but, that they inevitably follow from the premises he has put forth to the public, no reasonable man can deny.

We think we can modify the asperity of such painful conclusions, by dealing with the main features of the war somewhat differently from our author: and, as we rely on the accuracy of our information, we shall both praise and blame with the freedom of truth, confident that time will prove our main positions and statements correct, and that our views and opinions, consonant with those of men of the greatest military skill and experience, will be found faithful and just.

In the chapter, designated "Origin of the Second Sikh War," the reader will in vain search for the real causes of that general rising of the Sikh nation in arms against us. They did so with

one mind and one heart; and the murder of the two officers, sent to Múltán, was merely the premature exhibition of the feelings which pervaded the masses of the ill-subdued followers of Govind. Múlráj knew it well; felt himself injured and insulted; and either could not, or would not control the minds of his soldiery;—but the great error lay at our own doors. Abbott, who had early given intimation that the spirit of revolt was on the wing and machinations were a-foot, was treated as a timid alarmist. Vigilance was fast asleep, where it should have been widest awake; and no greater proof of this fact, and of the real state of feeling in the Punjab, could have been evinced than by sending Vans Agnew and Anderson down to Múltán on such a mission as theirs, at such a time and in such a manner. It was virtually courting an outbreak—but courting it at the wrong season, and when we were wholly unprepared for it, and not at all desiring it.

There seems in the undisturbed course of a civilian to high place and power something which wholly unfits him for the exercise of the latter in positions of difficulty. His rise is too smooth and sedentary; so very regulation pace and fashion; he has so little knowledge or experience of the working passions of the masses; is so entirely ignorant of the fiery temper of armed, half-subdued, haughty enemies; is so easily bamboozled by a few interested smooth tongues and faces; brings himself with so much difficulty to conceive that the ordinary placid routine of *kacheri*, or board, or court, or secretariat, is something entirely different from sounding, mastering, controlling, and guiding turbulent levies, and masses infected with the ardour of military progress and conquest; he is so incapable of justly appreciating what military force can, or cannot do—when it should be employed, and how, and under whom—that nothing but the predominant influence of the class-interest in the Government of India would perpetuate an error, which never fails to produce bitter and costly fruit. Any one, but a civilian, would have foreseen that to send Vans Agnew and Anderson down to Múltán at the time, and in the manner selected, was almost sure to produce an ebullition of feeling, and of violence. It was very like rolling a live shell, with a lit fusee into a well-stored magazine, the chances in both cases being very decidedly in favour of an explosion. We despair of seeing it otherwise, when the training of the class is considered, whenever civilians are, in times of difficulty, in the position in which Sir F. Currie was placed; and therefore we do not blame him so much as those who should have known better, but who having purposes to serve by

the presence in England, for a short time, of Sir H. Lawrence, took him away—willing to go because in weak health—exactly at the most critical period for the Punjáb.

When Sir Henry Hardinge, anxious to show in how quiet and satisfactory a condition he quitted everything in India, largely reduced the army in order to cook a balance-sheet and found thereon a self-gratulatory farewell finance minute, it was clearly foretold by those who had been long intimately conversant with the course of events on the N.W. frontier, that he was preparing trouble for his successor, and that the parting economy of Lord Hardinge would entail, in the course of a short time, enormous outlay on the part of Lord Dalhousie. Those persons who said this would probably confess, however, that they did not anticipate such an immediate fulfilment of their prognostications: and we doubt whether Lord Hardinge's Punjáb policy, had he not taken Sir Henry Lawrence home with him, would so rapidly and thoroughly have gone to pieces. It must have failed, because it was unsound, hastily patched up to cover our own exhaustion, and thoroughly well fathomed by the Sikh leaders and people; but the evil day would, in all probability, have been staved off by Sir Henry Lawrence, and Lord Hardinge would have been saved the mortification of seeing his Punjáb policy crumble into the dust before he had drawn the first instalment of his pension. Hardinge took out his lynch-pin, where the coach had a steep descent before it: and the result was a hopeless break-down.

These were some of our errors, but there were others of internal administration of a different and deeper character, of which, for the present, we shall merely indicate the existence. Towards the close of 1848 many a village seemed to possess no other inhabitants than old decrepid men, women, and young children. Our two years' sway had not proved popular; and the able-bodied flocked to the rebel standards of the chiefs, even from districts under our immediate supervision and control, without the slightest check or hindrance.

We have said that Lord Hardinge, with the short-sighted vision of an ordinary mind bent on its own self-gratulation, sowed the soil with difficulties, which his successor was to reap. Tares proverbially shoot up apace; and, under the genial warmth of an Indian sun, rather faster perhaps than elsewhere; so, whilst Hardinge's partizans were giving out in England that matters had been left in India in such an admirable state of quiescent security, that there would not be another shot fired for

the next ten years, Sir F. Currie, though wedded to the Hardinge Punjáb policy, was forced to feel uncomfortably doubtful of the fact, and Lord Dalhousie gradually opened his eyes to the real state of affairs in the "Land of the Five Rivers," and began to entertain the unwelcome suspicion and forecast of the work his predecessor had left for him to execute.

Events followed fast after the murder of Vans Agnew and Anderson at Múltán; but, though we may admire the vigour and the activity of Edwardes, and the courage and skill with which he brought his undisciplined troops into operation, we cannot award, either to Sir F. Currie, his superior, or to himself, the meed of a clear apprehension of the state of affairs, or of sound military judgment as to the measures suited to the circumstances under which we then were placed in the Punjáb. For Edwardes there is the excuse that a clever man will dare much in order to acquire a reputation; but Sir F. Currie, instead of being stimulated by his energetic subordinate, should have controlled him. It was an unpardonable error, known as Múltán was, to endeavour to besiege it with the insufficient means with which this operation was first undertaken. Sir F. Currie must, or ought to, have been well aware, both of the strength of ordnance which Sir Charles Napier, when in Scinde, had always kept in readiness for Múltán at Bukkur, and also of the strength of the force which that General deemed essential for operations against the place. Sir C. Napier had never shown any disposition to be over-nice in counting heads on a battlefield; a few men went very far with him; and therefore it not only smacked of great presumption, but really was such, when, regardless of his opinions and example, Sir F. Currie undertook the siege with far inferior means. Prudence dictated a more cautious course.

We know that it was the fashion to make light of the place—this, too, not alone in India, but in England also; and at the India House, where they ought to have been well informed, the Chairman was known to have said "that the Court of Directors had a plan of it; that it was nothing of a place—only about 500 yards in length by 300 yards in breadth: and that it could be easily shelled into a surrender;" in fact, they had been informed, on (what they considered) good authority, that it was a contemptible place; and the expectation was, that the next news would probably be that it had fallen. At the Board of Control much the same impressions of course existed: and when the President was frankly told that the place might not prove so contemptible,

and that a check at Múltán might kindle the flame of revolt from the foot of the Himalayah to Scinde, or even to the sea, the idea was evidently as distasteful as it was new.

We cannot but blame Lord Dalhousie for his dilatoriness in arriving at the conviction that war, and war on a great scale, was unavoidable. A Governor-General, not very long arrived in Calcutta, new to the country, and ignorant of the men of the services holding at the time the posts of highest importance, cannot, however, for a while, do otherwise than see through the spectacles of those who are at the foci of political interest. If, as in the present instance, the Governor-General be not only labouring under the disadvantage of being new to his office, but also under that of thorough inexperience and ignorance of war questions, there are still broader grounds for excusing a somewhat tardy apprehension of the real condition of affairs, and an otherwise culpable neglect of all those timely preparations which war necessitates. We cannot judge harshly of a nobleman thus circumstanced—all whose previous training, whether as a lawyer or as a politician, had been foreign to military affairs of moment and magnitude. The hope of staving off war and its charges, and of maintaining peace and its economy, was a laudable sentiment; and, therefore, though when taking a retrospective glance at our own conduct of affairs we cannot but note, as a very grievous error, the utter want of due preparation for military operations in November, 1848—we do so respecting the motives, and appreciating the individual circumstances, under which that error was perpetrated. Once convinced, however tardily, that war was unavoidable, the Governor-General did all in his power to correct his own grave error. In selecting, for the head of that most important department—the Commissariat—Captain Ramsay, “an officer related by family ties to the Marquis of Dalhousie,” as Mr. Thackwell takes care to inform us, he selected the most active and the most intelligent officer available for such a crisis, and the man that any other Governor-General would at that time in all probability have chosen. Captain Ramsay proved the propriety of the selection, by at once pointing out that the absence of all preparation could only be remedied by the most prompt and the most energetic exertions on the part of his department, unhampered by the usual routine of the Military Board; and that he must have authority to act as the emergency required, if the army was to be fed, and the campaign to succeed. In no other way, at the

eleventh hour, could the Governor-General have rectified his own neglect; and perhaps few other men, except Captain James Ramsay, would have succeeded, even so empowered and supported, in enabling the army to move when it did. He had great opposition to contend with, particularly from Colonel Benson, who was wedded to the Military Board system, and who could not perceive the utter inapplicability of that system to the urgent difficulties of the moment. Benson, a narrow-minded economist, would have perilled success rather than break a Board rule, and would have preferred having two distinct classes of commissariat agents and contractors to plunder the State, rather than one. Ramsay was of a different opinion. However much he might value Board rules, and theories of check and counter-check, he knew the futility of a system so complicated, that the accounts of a campaign are, under its operation, seldom wound up under from five to ten years. He preferred success to failure, though failure were accompanied with the intense satisfaction of having been in strict conformity to a Military Board rule; and he probably thought that one Joti Persad, of ability and influence equal to the occasion, was better than half-a-dozen Joti Persads of less ability and influence, but to a certainty adepts at plundering the Government, both individually and collectively. He preferred, too, a system under which accounts could be balanced and cleared in the course of a year, instead of requiring ten. Any one conversant with Indian campaigns will side with Captain James Ramsay's views; and any one cognizant of the condition in which the army took the field on this occasion will not doubt that Benson would have ruined the campaign. Lord Dalhousie is more indebted to his cousin for the ultimate success of the war than perhaps to any other single individual, political or military, be their rank or position what it may. Impartial in blame, and plain, too, as we are in censure, it is gratifying to have to note a mind of vigour, rising to the emergency of a critical juncture, and bringing to a successful issue the great problem of suddenly provisioning a large army, for the existence of which no sort of preparation had been made, and which had subsequently to be fed and maintained, man and beast, under circumstances of very peculiar difficulty. This officer, Captain James Ramsay, single-handed, retrieved one of the greatest and most fundamental errors that could have been committed at the commencement of the war.

Not to fatigue the reader, we shall not revert in detail to the

first unsuccessful operations against Múltán; and we will concede it to be doubtful whether an officer of even greater ability than General Whish would not have refrained, circumstanced as Whish was, from pursuing and attacking Shere Sing. Whish had been thrust into a false position; and, perhaps, after the example of defection which he had experienced, his wisest course was to remain in observation at Múltán, until reinforced, and until some general plan of operations, on a scale corresponding with the emergency, was arranged. Shere Sing had first outwitted him; then, baffling his vigilance, had out-manceuvred him and gained a start, which the long legs and light camp equipage of his Sikhs were not likely to lose, when followed by our more embarrassed columns. Shere Sing would have taken care not to fight, unless he pleased; and Whish would have gained nothing by moving, unless he completely crushed Shere Sing. This was a feat he was not equal to; and any check, or combat with indecisive results, was at that period very much to be deprecated. Shere Sing's object was clearly to place himself in communication with Chutter Sing, and to throw his army into a position where he could assemble the Sikh levies, feed them, and have a strong country in which to operate.

When Lord Gough crossed the Sutlej, in November, 1848, he found his enemy, Shere Sing, well placed. The Sikh masses were on the right bank of the Chenáb, at Ramnuggur, drawing their supplies from the productive districts on the upper part of the Chenáb. In this position Shere Sing could intercept Gúlab Sing's movements, if favourable to the British, or a junction was secured, if Gúlab Sing was amicably disposed to the cause of revolt. Communications with Chutter Sing were covered, and reinforcements of men and guns could be looked for from Peshawur (as soon as Attock should have fallen) for the final struggle. The Chenáb—the strong ground on the left bank of the Jhelum—the Jhelum itself—the remarkably difficult country between the Jhelum and the Indus—the Indus itself—all presented a succession of formidable positions, on some one of which Shere Sing might hope to fight a successful action. To the southward Múltán held out. Múlráj, now hopeless of mercy, was sure to make a stout defence, and for a time occupy a large portion of our troops and guns. Shere Sing's object therefore ought to have been (and it apparently was so) to bring the British general to action, before Múltán should have fallen;—but to bring him to action in a position unfavourable to the

higher discipline and equipments of his force, and favourable to the larger numbers of the Sikh levies and their eagerness for conflict.

Lord Gough's course and position was marked out by the manifest objects of the enemy. To remain in observation on the left bank of the Chenáb; to regard himself as covering the siege of Múltán, and holding Shere Sing in check until that place fell; to give time for the completion of commissariat arrangements; to cover Lahore, and cut off all supplies from the districts on the left bank of the Chenáb reaching the enemy; jealously to watch the movements of the latter, whether to the northward or southward;—these should have been Lord Gough's objects. So long as Shere Sing was disposed to have remained on the right bank of the Chenáb Gough should have left him undisturbed, and patiently have awaited the fall of Múltán.

To see, to keep clearly in view, and never to swerve from, the objects of primary importance, and to subordinate to these the minor ones, is the stamp of military ability: to confound, to transpose, to invert things of major and minor moment, and to substitute the one for the other, are sure signs of military mediocrity. Tried by this standard, the operations at the passage of the Chenáb must be pronounced a normal strategetical blunder. They were untimely, objectless, fruitless, and a departure without cause from the principles which should have guided the general. As usual in military matters, where error is loss, the blunder cost him in the end very dear.

For the fall of Cureton and Havelock in the opening brush at Ramnuggur, and for the loss of a gun, Lord Gough is not to blame. Shere Sing was *à cheval* on the Chenáb, a position which could not be conceded to him; and it was incumbent on Gough to make him withdraw to the right bank of the river: for, so long as he held the left bank, he could continue to draw supplies of men and provision from the districts, of the aid of which Gough was bound to deprive the Sikh general. The mode of executing this might, perhaps, have been more judicious; but even on this point it is difficult to pronounce; for the ardour of Havelock completely disarranged everything, and Cureton, riding forward to bridle the fiery courage of the leader of the 14th, fell, struck mortally. Down went on that occasion the best cavalry officer we have seen in India; almost the only one who in command showed the nice judgment needed by the cavalry leader. Cautious, but quick and resolute, yet never carried away by his own or

any one else's impetuosity, he knew the arm thoroughly, and wielded it like a master; knew when to charge, and when to draw bridle, and never made a mistake as to what horsemen could or could not do. He was a great loss to the army; for a good cavalry commander is rarely to be met.

We will not attempt to analyze the unfortunate proceedings at Ramnuggur further than to say that they betrayed great preliminary ignorance on our part of the ground, and equal want of quickness in the faculty of *reading* ground (if such an expression be pardonable)—of taking in its features at a glance. The British horse-artillery were permitted to dip into the low sandy channels of a bight of the river swept from the opposite bank by the enemy's heavy artillery. This was not exactly the proper position for light field batteries—whoever sent them there; particularly as the enemy was steadily withdrawing to the right bank, as fast as they could, when they saw our intention of denying them the left bank. Ouvry's unopposed advance, in order to cover the retirement of our embarrassed gun, proves this. Again, when once it was found that the gun could not be moved, further exposure of the cavalry was useless, and Have-lock's request to be allowed to charge should have been met with a peremptory refusal. If the gun were to be saved in such a position it must be so by infantry; and Campbell, moving up his men and placing them under cover, of which the ground afforded plenty, might have prevented the gun being taken up by the enemy, and at night might himself have saved and withdrawn the piece. Our light field batteries and cavalry might have been withdrawn, so as to be out of range and reach of the enemy's heavy guns, yet near enough to Campbell to support him if the Sikhs tried to drive him from his cover; which, however, they would probably not have attempted, because, in so doing, they must have placed themselves where the re-advance of our light pieces would have caused frightful havoc amongst them, whilst their heavy guns on the right bank must have remained in great measure silent.

Passing over the throwing up of batteries at ludicrously safe distances from the enemy, and other minor vagaries which followed this unlucky affair, and taking no note of Mr. Thackwell's cogitations on his friends, White, Scott, and Campbell, who must feel, we should opine, almost as much obliged to him as Sir J. Thackwell for the mode in which they are obtruded on the reader; and, for the present, abstaining from remark on the crude

lucubrations of our author upon the native cavalry, regular and irregular; we must observe upon one very curious and very characteristic circumstance.

For two years the Punjáb had been in our hands. The Sikhs had been but partially overcome; and, though conquerors, we could not be said to feel very secure in our new position; and, if the provisions of the treaty were anything more than verbiage, it was clearly to be anticipated that there would be more trouble at a future day. Now any other nation so circumstanced but ourselves would have made use of those two years in causing a military survey of the country to be made. Especial attention would have been paid to the great military lines of operation: these are always pretty nearly constants, being marked out by the natural features of the country, its practicable roads, fords, &c., and by the position of the capital, chief towns, rich districts, and the like. A few officers of engineers, with suitable establishments, labouring under one head and on a well-arranged system, would have completed such a work in the course of the first year—certainly before the campaign of 1848-49 broke out; yet, so simple a precaution, if thought of at all, was so very inadequately provided for, that, when war broke out, our ignorance of the ground on which the army was to operate was as profound as if Lord Gough and his troops had been suddenly thrown ashore in Kamschatka. A thorough knowledge of the ground on which he was to act would have been worth five thousand men to Gough and possibly to Whish; but, though we could pay our civil or military resident highly, and expend large sums in pensions, and other questionable ways, the obvious and the useful were neglected. A few hundred soldiers' lives, more or less, do not signify, nor the credit of our arms, nor the fame of our generals, nor the shake and perhaps peril of an empire; but the economy, which, whilst it stints the necessary and the useful, squanders on the day-hero and the questionable, is dubbed politic and wise, and lauded accordingly. Every main line of military operations—what may be termed the constants for Punjáb strategical and tactical operations—should have been laid before Lord Gough, when the war again broke out: and it was very inexcusable, grossly culpable neglect, an unpardonable error, that such was not the case.

It has been observed that until the fall of Múltán Lord Gough, unless the enemy committed some very glaring blunder, should have remained on the left bank of the Chenáb. He

should have kept the Sikh general carefully under view, and watched his every movement: but he had nothing to gain by crossing the river to attack the Sikhs, for he could not hope to strike a decisive blow. The enemy was not likely to stand, and await imperturbably an attack on his left flank by a detachment; he would rather move up to meet an attack, taking care to have his line of retreat on the Jhelum clear; or to retire, when threatened. If, however, Gough had succeeded in driving him to the southward, he thrust him on the besieging force, which at that time had other irons in the fire, and did not at all desiderate the sudden appearance of Shere Sing in that quarter. Managed as the passage of the Chenáb was, the Sikhs were not likely to be ignorant of what was in contemplation. Quietly to withdraw his artillery of position, from in front of Lord Gough's distant batteries, was no difficult matter. To fall suddenly on Thackwell, and destroy the detachment before it could receive effectual support, was Shere Sing's proper course. If he succeeded, he could resume, if he pleased, his original position; if he did not succeed, his retreat on the Jhelum was safe, and his artillery of position, already on its march, secure from capture; for Thackwell was evidently too weak to be able to maintain a hot pursuit in face of the Sikh masses.

Thackwell made a mistake in not occupying the line of the three villages of Tarwalur, Ruttai, and Ramú-khail; and in not throwing out his advanced guards and pickets well in front of them. The villages were unoccupied when he came up to his ground; and there was nothing to prevent his taking up the position, which presented many advantages. As it was, when attacked, he was forced to withdraw his line, and thus gave confidence to the enemy, who took immediate advantage of his negligence, and themselves occupied the somewhat formidable position he had refused. The British artillery, opposed to about equal numbers, completely at last silenced their opponents; and the confusion consequent upon this was so apparent, that the line of infantry, Native and European, were alike anxious to be led against the enemy. It was the moment for an advance: and just at that critical time came Gough's order, leaving Thackwell free to act as his judgment might dictate. A portion of the enemy's guns were in his grasp, and victory sure:—but, instead of action, came a consultation, and the moment was gone for ever. Pennycuik was right in his soldierly advice; it was not a question of attacking Shere Sing's original position and

entrenchments, as our author would suggest. Shere Sing had moved out far from his original position and entrenchments, had attacked, and had failed. The question was, whether to make his failure a defeat, accompanied by loss and dishonour, or to permit him to withdraw scatheless, and at leisure, without the loss of a gun. No one in his senses could have argued on the possibility of the original Sikh entrenchments being close in front of the villages: and that to push back the disheartened Sikhs would be tantamount to knocking the heads of the British troops against such formidable field-works. Every one knew, that if they existed at all, they were miles off. The very doubt on such a head would betray a neglect of ordinary precaution, which is not Thackwell's character. That general deserves no such imputations, for he is wary, cautious, indefatigable in endeavouring to know his ground: and our author has himself told us that "patrols and scouts *were* sent towards the Sikh entrenchments, the exact distance of which from us was not known." He had evidently no suspicion whatever that such questions as the following might be founded on his representations: Why did not the general explore his front and flanks by the irregular or regular cavalry? What sort of alertness is that which subjects a force to a cannonade before anything is known of the approach of an enemy? How long has it been usual in the Indian army that round shot lobbing into a line of troops shall be the first intelligencers that the foe is at hand? Yet such must be asked, if we are to be guided by our author's work. We take the liberty to correct him. Sir J. Thackwell is a cautious, active, vigilant officer. Age has tamed the fire of youth, but it has given him much experience, and a calmness free from all precipitation on the battle-field. He may have thought himself not strong enough to press on, and turn the failure of the enemy into a decisive defeat; but he did so on no misconception, either of his own whereabouts, or of that of the Sikh entrenchments. Good soldiers make mistakes occasionally; and in our opinion Thackwell made two at Saidúlapur. He, first, with his mind full of the expected junction with Godby, and his attention too exclusively riveted on that, neglected to occupy the line of villages; and secondly, when the enemy failed and offered him victory, he stood fast, asked counsel, and let slip the moment. Notwithstanding this over-caution at a critical instant, Sir J. Thackwell is far from being the indifferent officer which the author's work would, in spite of its stilted

endeavours to exalt the object of its peculiar laud, force upon the reader's conviction. All in all, he is a prudent, active, safe commander; and enjoyed the confidence of officers serving under him, whose abilities and experience were of a far higher order than Mr. Thackwell's.

If Thackwell was over-cautious at Saidúlapur Gough was still more slow at Ramnuggur. After harassing the European troops with the elevation of batteries at all imaginable distances, the gratifying result was that shot and shell were flung away into an enemy's empty camp: and the fact that there were no Sikhs to pound being at last accidentally discovered, the main army crossed in support of Thackwell, about the time that the heads of Shere Sing's columns were composedly taking up new positions on the left bank of the Jhelum. Our false move had gained us nothing, except the power of somewhat circumscribing the sphere from whence the enemy, in Gough's front, could draw his supplies—an advantage counterbalanced by the greater difficulties cast on our own over-tasked commissariat department, which was straining every nerve to remedy the normal error of the campaign. The movement indeed elicited a despatch, but one that it would have been far better to have left unwritten. A few more of the same stamp would make the despatches of British officers as proverbial as bulletins.

The ill-advised passage of the Chenáb, the failure to strike a blow, and the withdrawal of the enemy, intact, to positions of his own choosing, were doubtless sufficiently irritating. The Press sang all sorts of notes. After having once made the forward movement, and effected the passage of a formidable river in order to close with the enemy, there was an indignity to the character of our arms in suddenly and respectfully drawing up, when the patrols and pickets of the two armies were touching each other. Had there been a strong reserve on the river, no siege of Múltán in course of procedure, and field magazines complete, the passage of the Chenáb should only have been the prelude to a rapid advance on the enemy. There was, however, no available reserve; insecurity was felt at Lahore; Wheeler was busy in the Jullunder: the siege of Múltán was far from concluded; commissariat arrangements were anything but complete; and, instead of an unfaltering march on the foe, hesitation and a protracted halt ensued, as if the British army dreaded to measure its strength with the Sikh force. It was felt by every one to be a position derogatory to the *prestige* of

the British arms, and calculated to produce an unfavourable impression. Gough would, if left to himself, have moved against the enemy, and have tried the fate of battle: but the Governor-General, on whom the responsibility of Empire pressed, felt and wrote in a different tone. The result was half measures; and, next to error, half measures are the worst in military matters. A protracted halt at and about Heylah, from the 5th December to the 12th January, during which time Attock fell, and Chutter Sing was set free to act in support of Shere Sing, served to excite the impatience of the public, and to produce uneasy feelings that something should be done in almost every one. Strong minds, that can withstand the surprise and abuse of the Press, the fretting of the public, and the impatient importunities of an eager army, are rare, whether in governors-general or commanders-in-chief. After a month both gave way; and that which, if done at all, should have been done at first, when Attock had not fallen, and when we had first crossed the river and closed with the enemy, was now done, on the ground that Attock had fallen, and that Shere Sing might therefore, unless beaten beforehand, receive reinforcements from the side of Peshawur. This, so far as it went, was true: but if the argument had weight against the reasons opposed to crossing the Chenáb, it would have been wiser to allow that weight to operate before Attock had fallen, and whilst Shere Sing, with troops somewhat disheartened by failure against Thackwell, was retreating before the British army. To delay a month and then fight was to allow time for the enemy to regain confidence, and to have the assurance that, as Attock had fallen, reinforcements and a strong reserve were either at hand or available to fall back upon.

At Dingí the plan of battle was determined upon, and explained to the divisional commanders and brigadiers. A tolerably good general idea of the position occupied by the enemy had been obtained, and the dispositions for the attack framed accordingly. The left of the Sikhs rested on the heights of Russúl, whilst the line, passing by Futteh Shah ka Chuck, was said to have its right resting on Múng. It was known that the belt of jungle was thick along the front of this position; but a frequented road from Dingí led straight upon Russúl, and the country was known to be more open and free from jungle along this line of road; and, as the enemy's line must be very extended and weak to cover the ground from Russúl to Múng and the great mass of the troops

must necessarily be in the plain, it was clear that to march in the direction of Russul, to force the enemy's left, and to double up his line, and thrust it back in the direction of Futteh Shah ka Chuck and Múng, would be to cut him off from the fords of the Jhelum, his line of communications with Chutter Sing, and the strong country between the Jhelum and Attock; from Golab Sing's doubtful troops; from the aid in men and provision he still continued to draw from the Sikh districts at the upper parts of the Chenáb and Jhelum; and to push him south, hemmed in between rivers he would not have the means of crossing, and upon a country which could not afford him the means of supporting his force. This was well and soundly reasoned; and, to fulfil these objects, Gough's army marched on the memorable morning of the 13th January, the heavy guns on the main road, Gilbert on their right, Campbell on their left, and cavalry and light artillery on both flanks.

The attack, as planned, would have done credit to a Frederic, and was in his style. Virtually it would have been an *echelon* attack—Gilbert's division forcing the left of the Sikhs, whilst the heavy and field artillery, massed together, would almost have swept in enfilade along the curvilinear position of the centre and right of the Sikhs. As soon as Gilbert's division had shaken and broken in upon the left of the enemy, Campbell, who up to that moment would have been in reserve with the massed artillery, was, with Gilbert and the cavalry, to throw themselves fairly perpendicularly across the left centre of the opposing force, and to hurl it to the southward.

Advancing with these intentions, Gough halted his army at Chota Umrao, whilst he sent on the engineers to reconnoitre ahead. They advanced along the Russul road, until, finding pickets of Sikh horse close in front and on their flank, they returned, and reported the road, as far as they had been able to proceed, clear and practicable for the guns, and the enemy marching down in columns of infantry from the heights of Russul, apparently to take up their position in the plain. This was about ten o'clock in the morning, or a little after; and Gough, on hearing their report, continued his march along the road to Russul. After proceeding some little distance beyond the village of Chota Umrao, some deserters from the Sikh camp came to Major Mackeson, informing him that the enemy was in some strength on the left of Gough's advancing column, in the neighbourhood of the villages of Moza-wala and Chillianwala. On hearing this Gough inclined to his

left, and quitted the Russúl road. He at the same time sent on the engineers to reconnoitre, directing them to explore in the direction of Chillianwala; meanwhile the army continued slowly inclining to the left of its original direction. The engineers returned, and reported small detachments of horse in advance of the mound of Chillianwala on the plain, and infantry on the mound. Upon this Gough turned to his left, and marched his whole force straight on Chillianwala, leaving the Russúl road in rear of, and parallel to, his line when it was deployed. It would have been a very hazardous movement in front of an intelligent general, with troops quick and ready at manoeuvre; for Gough offered his right to an enemy in position within 4,000 yards of him, with a thickish belt of jungle, which would have covered their approach until they debouched and formed across his exposed flank. However, the outpost of Sikhs retired precipitately from the mound, and fell back upon its main line by the Mung road.

From the top of the mound of Chillianwala the enemy's position was distinctly visible; and the army had to bring up its left in order again to front the Sikh line. Whilst this change of front was being effected, and the British force was assuming its new alignment, their commander was examining the position of the enemy from the tops of the houses of the village of Chillianwala. The Sikhs were drawn out in battle array. Their right centre, which was immediately in front of Chillianwala, was about two miles distant from the village, but less from the British line, which was deploying about 500 yards in front. The Sikh left trod off to rest on the heights of Russúl. There was a great interval between the left of the right wing of the Sikhs under Utar Sing, and the right of their centre under Shere Sing. It was evident that the enemy occupied a position too extended for his numbers; and, jealous of his extreme right, it was refused, and inclined back towards Mung. The British line did little more than oppose a front to Shere Sing's centre, the right of which it a little overlapped, so that Campbell's left brigade was opposite to part of the gap we have noted in the enemy's order of array—a circumstance to be kept in mind, as it told in the course of the battle. Front for front, therefore, the British army faced only the Sikh centre; their right and left, extending far beyond the left and right of Gough's force, were free to take advantage of the disposition, if events favoured.

Being about two o'clock in the afternoon, and the troops having

been under arms since daybreak, Gough determined to defer the action, if possible, until the morrow, for he had but a remnant of the short day then before him. The Quarter-Master General was accordingly busy making the usual arrangements, whilst the troops, drawn up in front of the village, were awaiting the issue, whether that were a quiet encampment for the night, or immediate battle. Shere Sing had no wish to give them a night's rest, or to afford time for dispositions which should favour an attack otherwise than on his front; so, perceiving that Gough showed no intention of attacking, he sought, knowing the impetuosity of the British general, to bring on the action, and with this view he advanced a few guns, and opened fire at a distance which rendered it very innocuous and in no wise compromised his pieces.

The enemy's fire determined Gough to attack; the heavy guns were ordered to respond, and having got into position, opened fire at a distance of between 1,500 or 1,700 yards from the enemy. They had, however, to judge their distance by timing the seconds between the flash and the report of the enemy's guns, and could see nothing amid the thick jungle in which they were placed. They were not left long to play single at their blind, but, as it chanced, effective game; for Gough, feeling that daylight was precious, very soon ordered the British line to advance. This was about three o'clock in the afternoon, or a little after. Steadily, and as well as the jungle admitted of its doing, that line advanced at the bidding of its chief, whilst the enemy, relieved from the fire of the heavy guns, opened all his artillery on the approaching infantry. The Commander-in-Chief, who had at first given out that his staff would always find him near the heavy guns, advanced considerably in front of them and was in rear of the centre and right of Gilbert's division, being desirous of seeing more than he could have done from the position of the heavy guns.

For a while nothing but the roar of the enemy's artillery was to be heard; but after a time the sharp rattle of the musketry spoke that the conflict had begun in earnest, and that the infantry was closing on the enemy's position. Campbell's right brigade (that of Pennyquick) came full in front of Shere Sing's right centre, which was strengthened by many guns. Though the fire of these had been rapid, the brigade had suffered comparatively little, until, breaking out of the jungle, it came to a more open space in front of the guns. Now the storm of shot and grape thickened, and the gallant brigade charged; but the jungle had necessarily disordered the formations, and, having to charge over

about 300 yards, the men were winded before reaching the guns, and broke from the charging pace at the moment that it was most important to have continued it. The brigade fell unavoidably into some confusion; and a close well-delivered fire of musketry from the Sikh infantry, followed by a rush of their horse, completed the disorder and the defeat of the British brigade, which, already broken, now fled, pursued with great havoc by the Sikh sabres, almost up to the original position of the British line at the commencement of the action.

Campbell happened to be with Hoggan's brigade. He had overlapped the right of Shere Sing's centre, and marching on the gap we have already noted, he did not meet at first with the opposition which fell to the lot of Pennycuick's brigade. When the latter was attacking the batteries, Campbell, finding he had outflanked the enemy, brought up his left so as to place his brigade on the right flank of Shere Sing's formation; and, as the pursuit of Pennycuick's brigade somewhat weakened Shere Sing's right by withdrawing horse from it and throwing the infantry forward, Campbell soon found himself in sharp conflict with the infantry and guns of the enemy, whom he now took in flank and at disadvantage. They were, however, quick to front him, and showed no purpose of being easily beat. Meanwhile, although the cavalry under Thackwell and the guns under Brind kept in check, to some extent, the troops with Utar Sing, that is to say, checked their advance to their own front, they could not prevent corps of his infantry marching to their own left, and falling on the rear and left flank of Campbell. The latter, therefore, soon found himself engaged in front, flank, and rear, and his brigade's safety was to fight desperately. All honour to H.M.'s 61st for a most indomitable courage during that mortal struggle, and on that strange day of stern vicissitudes!

Whilst matters stood thus on the British left the right, under Gilbert, had as hard a contest to maintain; for he, too, not only had to storm batteries supported by infantry in his front, but, owing to the break in the British line by the retreat of Pennycuick's brigade, and the repulse of the cavalry brigade with a loss of guns, both his left and right flanks were at the mercy of the enemy, whilst the repulse of the gallant 56th N.I., after severe loss, disconnected his two brigades, and made a gap in the centre of his division. He, too, like Campbell, found himself enveloped, forced to fight to front, rear, and flanks—a strange mixed combat, for even his two brigades were separated, and

trove singly but bravely! Dawes's battery of guns did good service on that day; for, in spite of jungle and every difficulty, whenever in a moment of peril he was most needed, Dawes was sure to be at hand; his fire boxed the compass before evening, and Gilbert felt and handsomely acknowledged the merit and the valour of Dawes and his gunners.

The day wore a frowning gloom at one period for Gough. The grey-headed commander sat calmly watching the issue of events, when a staff officer rode up, and reported Pennycuick's brigade to have been beaten back to the village with heavy loss, and half the 24th down. Shortly after Gough himself had to witness the cavalry on his right retiring in confusion, and passing to the rear of where he stood; whilst the Sikh horsemen, only checked by Grant's being at last able, disembarassed of the flying cavalry, to bring round a gun and fire a shot, were within a few hundred yards of the Commander-in-Chief. This was followed by a cloud of dispersed infantry retiring in confusion and dismay from the front, and giving the impression that Gilbert's division, too, was shaken. It seemed as if left, front, and right were yielding, and the day promised to be a black one in our annals. At length, however, the well-known cheer of the British infantry sounded exultingly over the roar of the artillery and the rattle of the musketry; and gratefully it must have struck upon the old leader's ear, for he knew that it was the shout of victory, and that that stout infantry, which has so often upheld its country's fame and honour in moments of appalling difficulty, had again proved true to itself, and would come forth with untarnished lustre out of the sanguinary struggle which was raging around.

Penny's reserve brigade had been brought up on the repulse of Pennycuick's; but brigades were by that time disconnected, fighting as each best could; and, by accident, he joined Gilbert's right brigade, and wisely stuck to it.

The enemy's artillery now fired more slackly and fitfully; the musketry rang sharp and fast; and it seemed as if the brigades, unable to see or support each other, communicated by hearty cheers that each made good its ground.

Meanwhile, after Grant with a few rounds had driven back the small band of triumphant Sikh horse, the cavalry had reformed; and we feel convinced that, had Lord Gough ridden up at this moment to H.M.'s 14th Dragoons, spoken a few words to the corps, and bid them retrieve the lost guns and strike for the bright fame of their Peninsular honour, they would have swept

on like a whirlwind, and dashed upon the retiring confused masses of the enemy, as heedless of numbers as Unctt's squadron of the 3rd had done on Utar Sing's compact unshaken troops. It would have saved many a bitter pang, many a reproach, and silenced for ever the mention of the unhappy and unaccountable retreat, which gave our guns and gunners to the enemy. It would, too, have prevented the withdrawal of the infantry from the ground so hardly won; and all the guns taken from the Sikhs, and all the wounded, of whom we had many, would have been saved. Guns and cavalry were left where they had reformed, as if useless; whereas the horsemen, having come to their senses from the strange momentary panic into which they had been surprised, were themselves eager to wipe out the remembrance of the event, and were headed by officers that would have led them chivalrously. Grant's brigade of guns, though overwhelmed and forced back by the sweep of the retreating cavalry, had never partaken of the panic. Stern, calm, and as ready for battle as before a shot had been fired, he would have rendered invaluable service at the close of the action, when Shere Sing's forces, driven from their ground, were retiring to the heights of Russul—guns, horse, and foot, in a confused and crowded mass. Grant's brigade of artillery and the cavalry were, however, left to their own moody thoughts and inglorious inaction; whilst Gough rode forward to the infantry which was close in front of him.

How much a mere handful of men could effect had been shown by Lane, who, on the extreme right, even after the retreat of the brigade of cavalry had isolated his position, kept in check large masses of the enemy's horse, and by his firmness prevented the Sikhs from taking advantage of the repulse of the main body of our cavalry on the right. More important service was never done to an army than by Lane's four squadrons and guns. But for their conduct there is no calculating what the issue of the day might have been, had the masses of horse and foot on the enemy's left borne down upon our right and rear, both vitally exposed when the cavalry brigade gave ground. A few steady horsemen and guns may be said to have remedied this otherwise fatal event; yet, such is the discrimination of despatches, that this admirable service, so firmly, so judiciously, so timely performed, met with no mention, and no thanks! For once we concur in Mr. Thackwell's remarks.

Sir J. Thackwell and his guns and cavalry on the left had also done important service. He held in check Utar Sing's force, and

prevented its bearing down upon our left and rear, when Penny-
cuick's brigade was beaten. It was impossible for him to prevent
Utar Sing from pouring some of his battalions upon Campbell's
rear and flank; for this could be done without Thackwell being
either aware of, or able from his position and the nature of his
force to prevent, the movement; but he, like Lane, did very great
service on that memorable day, by maintaining an imposing front,
working Brind's guns to advantage, and shewing by the gallant
Unett's daring charge that Utar Sing's advance from his ground,
without the support of his batteries of position, would meet with
no respect from those ready swordsmen, and that, once in motion,
the Sikh chief might look for rough handling from the 3rd
Dragoons and their native comrades. Thackwell acted wisely,
cautiously, and firmly.

It cannot be denied that the effect produced by the great loss
sustained, the defeat of one brigade of infantry, the panic of the
cavalry on the right, and the disgrace of losing guns, was to
damp the confidence of the leader, and of some of his divi-
sional commanders, and that it shook, too, when the amount of
loss was known, the confidence of the troops; nor was this feeling
counterbalanced by our having driven the enemy from his position,
taken or spiked many of his guns, and remained masters of the
field. Yet in our opinion the latter consideration ought to have
prevailed: and it was an error to withdraw the infantry from the
ground they had very nobly won, leaving the wounded to their
fate, and the guns taken to be recovered by the enemy. Night
had come on; and the Sikhs, who had retired in confusion, were
not likely to disturb the bivouac with more than a distant random
shot. It was perfectly practicable to have bivouacked the in-
fantry, supported by guns, on the ground until daylight, by which
time the wounded and the captured guns might have been
secured, the weary troops refreshed, and, when day dawned, such
dispositions made as circumstances warranted. Nothing was in
fact gained by massing our force confusedly on Chillianwala; and
much was lost. Whether or not, when day broke, Gough would
have been able to advance and drive the Sikhs from their position,
may fairly be open to question. We incline to the opinion that
the infantry, confident in their own unaided success, and scarce
aware of the conduct of the cavalry, of the loss of guns, and of
the havoc in Pennycuick's brigade, would have moved readily to
the storm of the position. Our heavy artillery was intact, per-
fectly prepared for action; our field artillery had suffered, and

much ammunition had to be replaced; but before morning all would have been ready; and, by massing heavy and light guns, the infantry would have advanced under cover of such a storm of shot and shell that the shaken Sikh masses, already broken in confidence, would have yielded the position, and in all probability would have fled, even before the infantry moved up to close and storm. If, in order to avoid the shot and shell, the masses had taken to the ravines and broken ground, the havoc would scarce have been less from the lobbing shot and bursting shell; and, when the infantry closed, the execution would have been awful: for the field artillery could have moved up to the last in support of the infantry, and the heaped and confused masses of the enemy would have been devoted to a terrible carnage. The action would have been over before the rain of the 14th began.

This, however, was not the feeling, or the opinion, of the influential commanders: and, it must be freely allowed, that they had strong arguments to advance in favour of the course that was pursued. We had suffered very severely. The enemy's position, upon which they had retired, was close, formidable to appearance, and unknown. Our troops were in want of food, rest, and ammunition. To bivouac on the ground might deprive the infantry of water, and food, and refreshment, as they might be harassed all night by the enemy's cannonade. There was a good deal of disorder; night was closing; the army should be concentrated, and, before more was attempted, the organization of the force restored. We will not pretend to say which was the correct view: but our own opinion is, that, having expected an easy victory, the sanguinary vicissitudes of the day had, although crowned with ultimate success, too much depressed some of the commanders, and that the Lion Counsel was on this occasion the best. Far be it from us, however, to pronounce authoritatively: for failure might have had most serious consequences. The issue could alone have proved the wisdom or the reverse of the more daring course. We know, however, that the Sikh infantry were desponding and dispirited at the close of the hard-fought day of the 13th January.

Lord Gough's original project of attack was admirable; and he committed a great error in departing from it. Had he advanced along the Russúl road, without turning off to his left, he would have gained, at a distance of about two thousand yards from the foot of the hills, open ground, free from heavy jungle; and he would have found nothing in the form of natural obstacles to impede the execution of his contemplated mode of attack. He

would, speaking with submission to the inscrutable will of an over-ruling Providence, have won a great and effectual victory, instead of a resultless action. Had he held on from Chota Umrao, he would have been in position about eleven o'clock, and before noon the battle would have begun.

When, however, he departed from his original intention, struck off to his left, and took up a position in front of Chillianwala, the gap between the enemy's right wing under Utar Sing and Shere Sing's centre merited attention, and a rapid attack, which should have placed the leading division where Campbell broke in upon the enemy's line would have given victory speedily, but not of so decisive a character as would have ensued from the original project; moreover, it would have required nice management and a departure from our every-day fashion of attack.

As it was, our attack, fair upon the centre of the enemy, gave the latter the full advantage of his very extended position; and, as his centre was covered by thickish bushy jungle, which dislocated all formations in line, and inevitably produced confusion in the brigades, besides offering difficulties to the movements of the guns, and to bringing them into action, the troops were sure to come into contact with the Sikh infantry and guns in the most unfavourable condition, their organization disturbed, and nothing but their own courage and the example of their officers to compensate for every conceivable disadvantage. Verily, British infantry, British officers, and British bayonets are of such a character, so entirely to be relied upon, that it is no wonder that British Generals will dare and risk much. The dauntless valour of the infantry rectifies the errors of its commanders, and carries them through what would otherwise be inevitable defeat and disgrace. But it redeems their errors with its blood: and seldom has there been more devotion, but, alas! more carnage than on the hard-fought field of Chillianwala, a field fairly won, though bravely contested by the Sikhs of all arms. Indecisive in its strategical and political effects, it was not the less valour's victory: and, notwithstanding the remarks alleged to have lately been made by the Governor-General on that battle-field and the memorial to its slain, it is a victory which, whether inscribed or not on the colours of the infantry, the latter may and will be prouder of than of most which decorate its standards: for it justly deems that struggle of two hours' deadly strife to have ended, we repeat, in valour's victory.

We have dealt chiefly with the main features of the campaign,

and have felt neither taste nor inclination for the exposure of the numerous errors and misrepresentations which disfigure Mr. Thackwell's work. Our object has been rather to convey a clear general conception of events and their causes, a bird's-eye view of affairs, than to descend into details. We cannot, however, altogether omit noticing his groundless animadversions; and perhaps the simplest and most effective method of doing so is to reprint the gentlemanly, thoroughly truthful, and soldierly letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, and that signed by the officers of the 45th Bengal native infantry. This is the more necessary, as our English readers, not aware of the extreme inaccuracy, the blunders, and prejudices of Mr. Thackwell, might, if we omitted all notice of his ignorance, mis-statement of facts, and crude presumption, have a very inadequate idea of the thorough untrustworthiness of the work:—

THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALA.

To the Editor of the *United Service Magazine*.

“MR. EDITOR,—My attention has been called to an article in your Magazine, headed ‘The Battle of Chillianwala.’

“The statement there given, as far as it relates to the 2nd Brigade of Cavalry, not only implies a want of exertion on my part in restoring order after the command of the Brigade devolved upon me, but the writer of it endeavours to fix upon me the odium of having given an order which, it is said, occasioned the disaster which afterward occurred.

“As I am not disposed to remain silent under such a charge, I have to observe in reply, that the circumstance of Brigadier Pope's having been wounded and disabled was only made known to me after the brigade had finally rallied; I was therefore not in a position to give any orders to the 14th Dragoons during the retreat.

“I solemnly declare that I gave no order to retire, either to my own or to any other regiment; nor did I hear such an order given; and the first intimation I had of the retreat of the brigade was, having it pointed out to me by one of my own officers, when we were in the midst of, and actually engaged with, the advanced party of the Ghorechurras; after which my whole energies and attention were necessarily directed to my own regiment, then giving way.

“My trumpeter sounded the halt and rally repeatedly, which had

the effect of halting the three troops of my own regiment engaged,* and other squadrons; but, our flank being by this time turned by the Ghorechurras, the retreat was continued, in spite of my exertions to stop it.

"I may here mention, that although there was great confusion, yet the retreat of that part of the line, which I witnessed, was not such a '*sauve qui peut*' affair, as the writer in your Magazine describes it: for example, my regiment did not ride through the ranks of the Artillery, or penetrate to the Field Hospital. On the contrary, we rallied in the right rear of the guns, and many officers exerted themselves to stop the retreat; and the following fact will in some measure prove my view of the case:—A standard of another regiment, which had fallen, its bearer having been killed in the advance, was brought in during the retreat by a havildar of my regiment, and restored to its own, after we rallied.

"There are several mis-statements, which I desire to notice, apparently introduced for the purpose of throwing blame on the Native Cavalry and its officers.

1st. The writer of this article has revived the story of a young officer of Light Cavalry having given the order, "threes about," as emanating from authority.

The story was sifted at the time, and acknowledged by the officer, who brought it forward, to be without foundation; and this the writer could hardly have been ignorant of.

2nd. The account implies, that no squadron of direction was ordered, whereas Brigadier Pope named a squadron of the 14th Dragoons, and was seen in front of them, and he ordered the "trot" and "gallop."

3rd. It is well known that the Brigadier led the 14th Dragoons, and was wounded in front of them; therefore, the supposition, which the writer indulges in, that the 6th Light Cavalry were the first to turn, because their colonel was wounded, goes for nothing.

4th. The other regiment could not have forced the 14th on the guns, as stated in the article in question, as we inclined to the left during the retreat, until after the temporary rally, when the troops inclined to the right on the flank being turned. But I do not think this could have affected the Dragoons, who by this time must have passed through the guns, having had a shorter distance to move.

"If, as the writer states, 'the turning of two troops' in a jungle

* The other three troops were detached with Colonel Lane's guns.

is sufficient reason to convert an attack into a retreat (a fact which, though asserted by him, I apprehend most cavalry officers would be loth to admit), then why is it necessary for the honour of the 14th Dragoons, that a young officer of Light Cavalry should be conjured up to give the word 'threes about?' Why is the camp whisper—satisfactorily disposed of at the time—to be re-echoed? and finally, why are faults to be imputed to me, of which I am wholly ignorant, and now hear of for the first time? Why are orders and actions insinuated and inferred, which never took place?

"I can well imagine, Sir, that the fame and renown of a distinguished Cavalry regiment are dear to their country: but does that justify the sacrifice of the reputation of others?"

"I think that even the most ardent admirers and anxious apologists of the regiment alluded to, would, on knowing the fallacy of the arguments, shrink from the disingenuousness of their advocate.

"I hope, Sir, it may prove that the writer of this article has done as little *harm* to those, whom he involves in his false accusations and insinuations, as (in the minds of all men at all acquainted with the unhappy circumstances) he has done good to the cause of the regiment, of which he is, I conceive, the self-appointed advocate.

"Requesting you will give this letter an early insertion in your Magazine,

"I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

"J. F. BRADFORD,

"Lieut-Col. *Commdg.* 1st Lt. Cav.

"*Cawnpur, November 21st, 1850.*"

To the Editor of the *United Service Magazine.*

"MR. EDITOR,—We beg to send you an article, which we request you will publish in a conspicuous part of the *United Service Magazine.* It is only fair that you should do so, after the article on the Battle of Chillianwala, which appeared in your number for September, 1850.

"We have ever been averse to moot this subject, being unwilling that the slightest slur should be cast on a regiment of Europeans, our own countrymen. We believe them to have been over-eager—that they knew not the description of enemy they were about to meet,—that, in short, they despised the Sikhs. We believe them to be brave and good soldiers, and that it was only the severe and

galling fire of the enemy, coupled with that of the enemy's resolution and other causes mentioned in our article, which caused them to retreat. But, in thus stating our opinion, we would observe that it has become too much the custom to decry the native troops—that corps of Europeans should not be praised at the expense of their native comrades,—that credit should be given where credit is due—and that we feel as deeply a stigma thrown on our Native regiments as on any in H.M. service under the same circumstances.

“ Nearly two years have elapsed since the action of Chillianwala ; and during that time we have remained silent, trusting that the affair would have been dropped. Now, however, when it is again stirred up, we consider it but due to ourselves, and but justice to our sepoys, to contradict the report of H.M. 24th outrunning the 45th. If need were, we are certain that Lord Gough would defend us. He knows the regiment well, and ever spoke highly of it. We give you full permission to publish this letter, and would account for the few signatures, by stating that, of those who were present at Chillianwala :—

Colonel Williams is absent with another Corps.

Captain Oakes is absent on political employ.

Captain Haldane is dead.

Lieutenant Oakes is dead.

Lieutenant Palmer is dead.

Ensign Evans is dead.

“ We beg to subscribe ourselves,

“ Your obedient Servants,

“ A. S. O. DONALDSON, *Lieut. and Adjt.*

J. FRASER, *Lieut. 45th N. I.*

G. C. BLOOMFIELD, *Lieut. 4th N. I.*

MILFORD TOZER, *Lieut.*

A. E. OSBORNE, *Lieut.*

W. L. TROTTER, *Lieut.*”

“ I have perused the accompanying account of the action of Chillianwala, and believe it to be essentially correct.

“ C. O. HAMILTON, *Capt. on Furlough, Med. Certificate.*

“ Feb. 11th, 1851.”

“ In the September number of this Magazine there appeared an article headed ‘ The Battle of Chillianwala.’

“ We also have a few words to say on that murderous, but not doubtful field. We say not doubtful, though many think otherwise; for many there are who cannot distinguish between victory and the fruits of victory, between a conquered or only a beaten foe. The Sikhs at Chillianwala were beaten, but not conquered. They were driven from the field of battle, only to take post in a more formidable position amidst the ravines of Múng Russúl.

“ Had two hours more daylight remained to Lord Gough on that eventful eve he would have gained a far greater, though not so bloodless a victory as Gúzerat: for the Sikhs, cooped up in a bend of the Jhelum and minus the whole of their artillery, which must have been left on the field or at the foot of the heights, would have been almost annihilated. They never could have made head again; the campaign would have ended there. Yet, though fortune thus interfered, she did not abandon her ancient favourite. Twelve Sikh guns were left upon the field of battle—a larger trophy than remained to Napoleon after the victories of Lutzen and Bantzen.

“ Our present object, however, is not to defend Lord Gough, who needs no defence, but to do justice to those who cannot defend themselves; and if, in the execution of our task we should seem to speak questionably of the conduct of some, we beg to assure our readers we do so with the utmost regret. We do so from necessity, because we cannot, without dereliction of duty, allow those to be misrepresented over whose welfare destiny has made us the guardians. We, therefore, now give a correct version of the advance and repulse of Pennycuick’s Brigade at the battle of

CHILLIANWALA.

“ This brigade consisted of H.M. 24th, the 25th N.I., and the 45th N.I. The 24th numbered about 1,100 bayonets, whilst the 45th N.I. had 600. We have more especially to do with this native regiment, to prove that the reflection cast on it in the September number of this magazine is unjust; and to assure our readers that the 45th N.I. was never outrun by the Europeans, when approaching the enemy, but supported them throughout well and firmly.

“ We commenced our march in contiguous columns, the 25th N.I. on the right, the 45th N.I. on the left, and H.M. 24th in the centre. The halt was sounded about ten o’clock, and each man opened three bundles of cartridges. After about an hour’s halt

the brigade deployed into line and loaded. The battery attached to the brigade went to the front, and about twelve o'clock came on the enemy's advanced post.

"It was a mound entrenched, and distant about 200 yards from the village of Chillianwala. (On this very spot sleep most of our comrades who fell in the action.)

"The force of the enemy at this post was said to amount to 500 men and two guns.

"The first shot was fired by the enemy; and our battery replied warmly, whilst the infantry continued advancing until close in rear of our guns. A loud cheer was then given, and the enemy fled, carrying off, however, their guns and losing but few men.

"We proceeded a short distance beyond this post, and halted a little to the left of the village of Chillianwala. The reason of the halt was not known, but it was supposed that it was Lord Gough's wish to ascertain the true position of the enemy. In about half an hour the quartermasters of corps, with camp colours, were sent for; and it was understood we should encamp for that day. Our fatigues were, however, not yet over. The booming of artillery was soon heard. Our politicals (heavy guns) answered in style, and we could soon perceive an extensive line of the enemy's batteries by the smoke from their guns. All was now excitement!

"After this cannonading had lasted for some time, our brigade was ordered to advance in line. It was soon anything but a line—marching through thick jungle, having to clear our way through enclosures of thorns, how could it be otherwise than broken? We could see no distance to our front. Our light companies were ordered to skirmish, but not to fire. They might have knocked over many of the enemy, who were among the bushes and up in trees taking our distance, had it not been for this extraordinary order. We received this order from Brigadier Pennycuik, with the remark that everything was to be done with the bayonet.

"When about 300 yards from the enemy's guns, either with or without orders, our whole brigade gave a cheer, and set off at the double. Many round shot had passed over us, and our battery had not opened its fire. At length it did so, but only fired about four shots when the line went a-head, the 45th N.I. not losing a foot of ground, but keeping up all the way with the Europeans. As we advanced the fire became hotter and hotter. The enemy commenced in earnest, finding we did not return a shot. Suddenly a battery, until then silent, opened unexpectedly on our left, and

sent such a raking fire amongst us that the ground was actually ploughed up. A battery, it is said, opened also on the right flank ; almost every man killed and wounded in the 45th N.I. was hit from the left.

“A short distance from the enemy’s guns the brigade was quite blown. It halted, the 45th N.I. shoulder to shoulder with H.M. 24th. Then was shown the absurdity of charging so soon ! The order not to fire should have been countermanded. The enemy’s guns to the front were placed on a mound, and opened upon us with grape and round shot. Their infantry, also, poured in a galling fire ; and still we were silent. A good rattling file fire would have soon driven the gunners from their guns. It was very lucky for us that their infantry fired so badly, and that, from our proximity, we were within the range of their guns. It was soon perceived that the enemy wished to concentrate their fire on the Europeans, easily known and quite conspicuous in their Albert hats. From the very long line of H.M. 24th, it is impossible for us to say what took place on their right ; but we can safely affirm that the Grenadier Company of the 45th N.I. was close to, and in line with, the left company of H.M. 24th—not a single pace in the rear. Three of the enemy’s guns were quite distinct in front of the 45th. Even the gunners were clearly seen ; and the 45th were as near to those guns as the Europeans. The enemy never left those guns whilst the brigade was near them. We repeat that what H.M. 24th did on their right we know nothing about ; but this we know, that their left wing was never one foot in advance of the 45th N.I. when approaching the enemy.

“We were under the impression that the Europeans were merely taking breath, and would immediately make the final spring ; but the enemy’s fire had been very severe, and, as it was concentrated on the Europeans, they could not stand it, but broke and made off for the village. The 45th N.I. followed their example. It was not to be expected that natives would stand when Europeans would not. We rallied at the village of Chillianwala.

“After a time we were marched down to support Gilbert’s division, which had got into the enemy’s trenches. After getting near, we were ordered to concentrate on some batteries ; here we remained until nearly dark. The dead of H.M. 29th, and of the 56th N.I., were lying thick, as also were numbers of Sikhs, most of them grey-headed men, and two of them Sirdars. Three shots then passed over us, when the order was given to retire, and after great difficulty in finding our way, we reached again the

village of Chillianwala. A very slight drizzling rain fell during the night.

“The tremendous fire of the enemy—the difficulty of advancing through thick jungle—the broken line—the absurdly long charge—the sudden fire of flanking batteries, and the order not to fire, were the true reasons of the repulse, and would have been quite sufficient, without laying it to the shuffling along of the natives in English leather shoes. The 45th N.I. did not wear English leather shoes. The forced marches, preceding the battle of Múdkí, will show how well the natives push along, and that they are not easily out-marched by Europeans.

“It is well known that the 45th, in the retreat, kept very well together; hence the small number of casualties in that corps, and the fact of their three colours coming safely out of action. The retreat of the 45th was also covered by a body of their own men, amounting to fifty-two files, with four officers. Three times were parties of the enemy beaten off by this body, who expended sixty rounds of ammunition per man. That their fire was effective may be inferred from the fact that only three men of the 45th were cut up, whilst the great loss of H.M. 24th was sustained in the retreat. This small party afterwards joined Brigadier Hoggan, and charged with his brigade. From the thick jungle the other sepoys saw not, or did not notice, this small force, or all would have rallied at once.

“Before closing this article we would remark that, in a work on the last campaign by Dr. McGregor, the blame is thrown on the native regiments. We were silent on its appearance, because we considered it beneath our notice, being written by one who was not present, and whose work is certainly nothing extraordinary; but, when an aspersion is thrown on the native corps in such a wide-spread periodical as the *United Service Magazine* we are bound to point out the inaccuracy.”

The European cavalry, engaged on the right, needed no such self-appointed indiscreet advocate as Mr. Thackwell; and its noble minded officers will feel no gratitude for a defence based upon an endeavour, by the resuscitation of a ridiculous rumour exploded at the time, and by the sacrifice of the reputation of gallant officers, to cast blame where none was merited, and thus to apologize for one of those events with which the military history of cavalry actions is replete. We could quote many instances, had we the space or leisure; but it would be useless;

for some future day will show that the old spirit, which hurled two weak unsupported squadrons under Hervey upon the French at the Douro, and brought them back again through the masses that had closed in upon their rear after their daring charge, is not extinct, but fresh and living in the hearts and arms of men and officers. There will be many chivalrous Herveys to lead; and their followers will wipe out all memory of the strange retreat at Chillianwala by noble bearing and gallant deeds. We mistake if their next field day, should the opportunity be afforded, be not memorable in the annals of cavalry success.

We have stated plainly that, in our opinion, Lord Gough was in error in departing from his original project of attack. It will have been easily inferred that, on the field of Chillianwala, though the aged commander merits all praise for his courage and firmness, there was little skill; and that, after his infantry had won him a victory, it is questionable whether he was right in yielding his own more noble opinion to the sentiments of his subordinate commanders, and whether the throwing up half the symbols of his victory was well considered or wise. We shall now have the more pleasant task of showing that, subsequently to the battle, which had cost him so much in men and officers, and had added so little to his reputation, the course which he pursued was, on the whole, the proper one to be adopted, and, as is well known, that it was finally crowned by entire success on the well-planned and well-fought field of Guzerat.

The day after the action of Chillianwala an error was committed in taking up too confined a position for the British camp. Instead of the compact parallelogram between Chillianwala and Mozawala, the left of the army should have rested on Chillianwala, the right on Kokri and its mound, and a strong outpost should have occupied the hill top opposite to Kokri. During the few first days, before the Sikhs had regained confidence, there was nothing to have prevented this position being assumed; and, had it been taken up, the enemy would have been so entirely under observation from the outpost, so closely cabined in his narrow, inconvenient position, that in all probability he would have withdrawn at night, and retired upon the fords of the Jhelum. The British army, on the more extended but strong position which we have mentioned, would have covered the roads to Dingí, and to Ramnuggur by Heylah; would have commanded the main road by the Khúri pass between the Jhelum and Guzerat; would have threatened the Sikh line of retreat and

operations between the Jhelum and Russúl; and would thus have rendered the Sikh position on the heights of Russúl untenable, without striking a blow or firing a shot to drive them from it. To coop up the British camp into a narrow parallelogram answered no purpose except to facilitate the enemy's foraging parties, to restore his confidence, to enable him to harass and insult the contracted position of the British General, and to maintain the command of the lines of road at the moment so important to the Sikh General. Nor was this error obviated by the ultimate erection of a redoubt on the Kokri mound. This somewhat restrained the insolence of the Sikh patrols and foragers, and made them respect the right of Gough's position; but it secured none of the strategical objects which would have been attained had the British General taken up the first position, which was obviously on every account the most desirable, and which it would have been practicable to assume without a chance of active opposition. Much was thrown away of the fruits of victory by withdrawing from the ground which the infantry had so nobly won at Chillianwala; but, when this had been done, much more was lost and thrown away, in our opinion, by failing to perceive the strategical importance of the position, which, for several days after the battle, the enemy left optional to Lord Gough to take up or not as he pleased. Afterwards, when our own timidity had restored their confidence, the Sikhs saw the momentous importance of what we had neglected. They became exceeding jealous of the hill-top looking down on Kokri; and any demonstration on the part of Gough to seize it would have been stoutly contested.

Múltán fell on the 22nd; and on the 26th a salute was fired from the heavy guns posted on the mound of Chillianwalla. The Sikhs turned out from their entrenchments to gaze upon the British camp, and wonder what the salute portended.

The Sikh army had been busily employed ever since the 13th in strengthening their Russúl position. When joined by Chutter Sing's reinforcements and the Afghans their position became too confined for their numbers, and the difficulty of provisioning their forces was enhanced. It now became the object of the Sikh commander, if possible, to bring the British army to action before the reinforcements, set free by the fall of Múltán, could join.

On the other hand Lord Gough was in a position which, though inconveniently contracted, covered and gave him the command of the direct road by Heylah on Ramnuggur, and thus secured his

communications with the expected reinforcements. He watched the hard-won field of battle and the open ground between Múng and the belt of jungle, so that the enemy could not well hazard a flank movement in face of the British force in that direction. He commanded the road from Russúl on Dingí, and observed that by Khúri on the same place. His proper course, therefore, was evidently not to gratify the Sikh general by an untimely, indecisive action, but to hold Shere Sing in check until Whish's reinforcements came within the sphere of tactical operations. Matters stood thus when the Sikhs, being in force at Púran as well as at Russúl, thrust their horse through the Khúri pass, and, on the 3rd February, thus threatened the road by Khúri on Dingí.

Mackeson, who had the credit of having wrung from the Governor-General a qualified assent to an attack on the Sikh position, and of having thus brought on the fight of Chillianwalla, now advocated such a change of position as would bring the army opposite the Khúri Pass, and prevent the Sikhs from issuing forth upon the plain and marching on Gúzerat. In order to avoid an action the change of position was to be effected by two or three pivotings on the flank of the camp.

The objections to this were obvious. Such a change of position, if effected as suggested, laid open the direct road by Heylah on Ramnuggur, threw up the battle field, and allowed the enemy to resume his original positions—an event which was sure to produce a bad moral effect—besides leaving it optional with the enemy to threaten or act upon our direct line of communication with Ramnuggur. Not only would the battle of Chillianwalla have palpably been then fought for nothing, but Gough must have fallen back from his new position across the Khúri road, and might have found himself awkwardly situated by one of the Sikh commander's bold and rapid movements.

Gough was very right in holding on where he stood. Provided he watched the movements of the enemy there was nothing to be apprehended from his issuing forth upon the plain. On the contrary, the Sikh commander would thus in all probability afford the British general the opportunity of fighting a decisive action. All that it behoved Lord Gough to be careful of was that if the enemy issued in force by the Khúri Pass and threw up the Russúl position, he should not be permitted to march on Gúzerat and across the Chenáb before the British army could close and prevent the passage of the river. With ordinary vigilance and prudence Gough's position rendered the unimpeded passage of the

Chenáb by the Sikhs almost an impossibility. He was in every respect justified, therefore, in giving weight to the objections against Mackeson's proposal, and in standing fast.

The enemy finding that the show of their horse through the Khúri pass had produced no effect on the British General, encamped in force, on the 5th, at the mouth of the Khúri pass, and on the 6th February pushed on their horse to Dingí; but they held Russúl in undiminished strength. Again Mackeson argued for a pivoting change of camp to Dingí: but this was almost sure to bring on an action necessarily indecisive from the position and strength of the enemy, whilst it was open to all the serious objections before stated. Lord Gough therefore stood fast.

The enemy, aware that the reinforcements from Múltán must be rapidly approaching, were now anxious to bring Gough to battle; and, on the 11th February, they sought to induce him to quit his camp, and to bring on a general action. Their cavalry in some force advanced to Burra Omra, whilst their infantry and guns formed a line in front of Khúri—their right resting on the strong hill ground, which was a prolongation of the Russúl position, their left refused, and the Khúri pass and road in their rear. At Russúl the Sikh force formed in front of its entrenchments—the infantry and guns half way down the slopes of the range, and a strong advance of horse, foot, and guns fairly in the plain, and within about a mile of our nearest pickets and videttes. The Sikh plan was evidently to draw Gough out of his camp, and to bring on an action in the direction of Khuri—the Russúl force taking the opportunity of falling upon his flank and rear, as soon as he was well compromised. The army was under arms, and a cavalry detachment properly supported was thrown out in the direction of Burra Omra to watch the Sikh horse. The skirmishers of the cavalry were for some time engaged, but nothing further ensued; as the Sikhs, when they found that if they would bring the British General to action they must attack him, withdrew to their original positions for the day. During the night they threw up the Russúl line of entrenchments, retiring that part of their force on Púran, and thus brought both wings of their army upon the same line of road, and in close communication with each other. On the 13th the enemy closed up their columns. At Khúri all was quiet during the day; but at midnight the army marched: and, on the 14th February, it became known to the British General that the Sikhs had gained a march, and were on the road to Gúzerat.

This movement had been anticipated, and, with a view to the speedy termination of the war, was the most desirable course that Shere Sing could adopt. But, instead of the 14th being lost in indecision and a sort of extemporised council, it should have found Gough prepared to make a corresponding movement, with the view of securing his own objects, and hindering those of the enemy. The troops were ordered to strike camp about 11 A.M., but the march was counter-ordered at one o'clock. Gough, however, sent orders to Whish to push up a detachment of troops to Wuzírabad along the left bank of the Chenáb, so as to check any attempt at the passage of the river. On the 15th the army moved to Lussúri, a position which secured a junction with Whish's force, and was near enough to the Sikh army to paralyze any attempt on its part to commence the passage of the Chenáb. Whish had judiciously anticipated the orders he received, and had pushed up to the neighbourhood of Wuzírabad a force of foot, horse, and guns under Colonel Byrne. This body prevented Shere Sing's placing himself *à cheval* on the Chenáb, whilst the proximity of the mass of the British army rendered a serious attempt to force a passage too dangerous and problematical an operation to be attempted.

The state of affairs was now delicate; for the 16th a march had been ordered, and subsequently counter-ordered. Indecision for a time prevailed. Mackeson was for marching to Kúngah, a place within about five miles of the Sikh position: but a junction with Whish's reinforcements had not been actually effected; and it was so evidently the game of the enemy to bring Gough to action before he was reinforced, and the opportunity would have been so favourable after the troops had made a fifteen-mile march, that a battle was sure to follow. To have waited patiently a month and upwards for reinforcements, and then to have suffered himself to be brought to action without them, when a single day would suffice to bring up the advance of Whish's troops, would have been fatal to Gough's reputation as a General: and, if the action under such circumstances had proved indecisive, the wrath of England would justly have overwhelmed him with disgrace. An advance to Saidúlápúr was free from the risk of collision with the enemy. At the same time that it must attract his attention, paralyze his movements, and force him to prepare for attack, it gave time for the reinforcements to come up, secured everything, and endangered nothing. Gough accordingly decided on the march to Saidúlápúr. On the 17th he

made another short march towards the enemy, halting with his right on Golí and his left behind Isharah. He had the satisfaction of being joined by a part of his reinforcements: but Dundas was behind, preferring to march according to his own opinion of what was necessary, rather than attend to Whish's instructions: and therefore he was written to peremptorily. His delay was injudicious and dreadfully inopportune. On the 18th the army made another short march, and halted its left on Kúngah. On the 19th the army halted to allow Dundas to join, and Markham to cross the river at Gurré-ka-Putun; and, on the 20th, another short march to Shadiwala, in battle order, brought the two armies face to face, with but a small interval to be traversed, before closing for the contest that was to decide the fate of the Punjáb. The Sikhs had, since the 16th, been kept in continual alarm and in daily apprehension of an attack; and having chosen their position had repeatedly been drawn out in battle array, anticipating a more precipitate advance and to be earlier assailed. But Gough, acting prudently, had determined to risk as little as possible: and knowing how much depended on the battle about to be delivered being a decisive one, he resolved to fight with well-rested troops and a long day before him.

Considering how long the country had been in our hands; that Gúzerat is a place of great resort; that officers and detachments had repeatedly been there—the ignorance of the ground under which the Commander-in-Chief laboured was truly remarkable. It proved how few men traverse a country with a military eye. Upon the little that was ascertained of the Sikh position Gough formed his plan of attack.

When expecting an attack on the previous day the Sikhs had drawn out their army with its right and right centre covered by the Dwara, a dry, sandy-bedded nullah of some breadth, which, after passing to the west of Gúzerat, took a bend to eastward before striking off south to Hariwala and Shadiwala. The Sikh centre occupied the villages of Kalra; and their left rested on the Katelah. They were supposed to refuse their right, which was thrown back nearly at right angles to their front, following the course of the Dwara, so that their left and centre, covered by the villages, was offered to the British. It was known that the Dwara, which bisected the British line, was nowhere at the time any real obstacle either to men or guns; though of course it might be very useful to the Sikhs in affording their infantry cover. Gough,

therefore, determined to attack their left and centre, and to thrust them back upon their right. With this purpose in view the British army was to advance with the heavy artillery in the centre, Gilbert and Whish's divisions forming the right wing, which, as that expected to bear the brunt of the action, was supported by the greater portion of the field artillery. The left wing, composed of Campbell's division, Dundas's brigade, and a smaller proportion of field artillery, was expected to come into play later than the right wing, and was intended to complete the destruction and dispersion of the enemy's masses, when the Sikh left and centre should have been doubled upon its right. The Dwara, up to the enemy's position, was to be the regulator of the advance of the British line—the right and left wings being ordered, with their respective left and right flanks, to skirt the banks of the nullah, whilst the general alignment and the pace of advance was to be governed by the progress of Shakespeare's elephant-drawn eighteen-pounders, a fine mark on that open-plain, and therefore a good "squadron of direction" to the British line of battle.

The morning of the 21st of February was clear and bright; and as the enemy's masses had very early taken up their positions there was no dust of moving columns to cloud the purity of the air and sky. The snowy ranges of the Himalaya, forming a truly magnificent back-ground to Gúzerat, and the village-dotted plain, seemed on that beautiful morning to have drawn nearer, as if like a calm spectator, to gaze on the military spectacle. A looker-on might have thought the army drawn out on some gala occasion; for, the baggage being packed in safety at Shadiwala, the force moved free of encumbrance, and the whole had the appearance of a grand review.

In the order we have mentioned, his flanks supported by cavalry and horse artillery, and reserve brigades to each wing of his army, Gough marched at seven in the morning, and advanced until his centre reached Hariwala, a village on the Dwara. His right wing had now in its front, at a distance of upwards of two thousand yards, the Sikh left and centre, and the villages of Kalra, which they held in force. The Sikh artillery opened an innocuous fire; and our heavy artillery, taking up ground, began to respond, whilst the right wing deployed into line. The distance was, however, too great; and the cannonade, beyond making a noise and burning powder, was ineffective on either side; so that our heavy guns had again to move, and assumed a more advanced, but still too distant, position. The field artillery threw themselves daringly to the

front, and made their fire tell well upon the enemy's line: but the most forward of our batteries went through a sharp ordeal, the enemy's guns being neither few nor slow to answer our gallant gunners. Meanwhile, the left wing, advancing gradually, so as to keep pace and alignment with the right wing, as the latter moved forward under cover of the artillery, remained in columns at deploying distance, and paid no respect to the ineffective fire of the Sikh artillery in its front. When, however, the columns had passed the villages of Jumna and Lunpur, which the Sikhs had neglected to occupy, the enemy's shot, from pieces about twelve hundred yards distant, ranged up fair and free; and, threatening mischief, Campbell deployed, and, moving up his line to within about a thousand yards of the Sikh artillery, made his infantry lie down; whilst Mouat's guns, trotting rapidly forward before the Sikh gunners got the range, unlimbered, and, at a distance of about eight hundred yards, opened a very effective fire on the battery opposed to him, and on the Sikh infantry supporting it.

Along the whole British line, except on the extreme left, the British artillery was now pouring shot and shell with rapidity and precision upon the Sikh batteries and masses; and the latter, unable to face the pitiless storm, began to yield ground. The centre and left of the Sikhs withdrew behind the line of the Kalra villages, still, however, holding these in force, for they afforded good cover; their right, having lined the bend of the Dwara in front of their guns with infantry, covered by the right bank from Mouat's shot, retired a few hundred yards, but in perfect order, and again fronted. In proportion as Mouat's fire told, Campbell pushed forward his guns, and advanced his division, making the line lie down when it halted. At length, the Sikh fire in front being greatly subdued, two of the British guns were enabled to take up a position such that they could sweep the bend of the Dwara, which they strewed with killed and wounded. This cleared the nullah rapidly of the Sikh infantry: and Campbell, with very trifling loss, by good management of the guns under his command, occupied the position, from which he had forced his opponents to retire without firing a musket-shot.

Meanwhile, the right wing had had sharp fighting in carrying the villages of Kalra. They were stormed with great gallantry, but with heavy loss to the 2nd European, and to the 31st Native Infantry, and with considerable loss to H.M. 10th, and to the 8th and 52nd Native Infantry. Had Shakespeare been permitted to expend a few minutes' attention and a few rounds upon Burra

Kalra and its supporting batteries the loss would have been less, or altogether avoided.

When the right wing had carried the Kalra line of villages, and the left wing had forced the Sikhs from the Dwara, the enemy, though he had fallen back, seemed at one time disposed again to advance. However dastardly the conduct of the chief sirdars, the subordinate commanders had stout hearts; and they could be seen actively reforming their infantry lines and encouraging their men. As the organization of their corps was not shaken by what they had suffered, and they were in good order, there was a prospect of sharp fighting in forcing the sullen mass from the strong environs of Gúzerat, even if their commanders failed to induce them to advance. Campbell and Dundas, however, taking up the line of the Dwara, had thrown themselves across the right flank of the Sikhs; whilst Thackwell, who in the early part of the action had punished an insolent demonstration of the Afghan cavalry by the gallant charge of the Scinde horse, and had pushed back the Sikh cavalry by the show of his own, now passing well a-head and to flank of Dundas's extreme left, threatened very dangerously the right and rear of the enemy, and was in a position to interpose his squadrons, and preclude the possibility of retreat by the direct road on the Jhelum,—that by which the Afghan horse had fled precipitately. The right wing, leaving the heavy guns in their last position, had, in the course of its advance, almost necessarily thrown up its touch with the Dwara; and for some time there was a very awkward gap in the centre of Gough's line. The Sikh commanders opposed to Campbell were quick to perceive this; and, finding themselves pressed and turned on their right, apparently thought that the gap might afford the chance of recovering the fortune of the day. They accordingly formed a body of infantry and cavalry opposite to and pointing at the gap, and even advanced as if resolved boldly to break in upon the weakened centre of the British line of battle and disconnect its wings. Two troops of horse artillery were now brought up, and partly occupied the endangered centre; but their shot and shell had been expended, and they had to await the arrival of ammunition from the rear. The Sikhs, judging from the silence of these batteries that something was wrong, and seeing that the opening was very partially occupied, were evidently serious in their intentions of an advance of horse and foot upon the empty interval and silent batteries, when Campbell, becoming aware of the threatened movement, turned part of his artillery upon the mass. The latter, finding

that its advance must be performed under a flank fire from these pieces, and that Campbell would be able to throw himself upon them as they advanced, desisted, and, covered by cavalry, commenced an orderly retreat. Indeed it was high time that they should; for our right wing was advancing rapidly, and the Sikh left and centre were retiring fast, in heavy columns covered by cavalry, over the open country, passing to the east of Gúzerat; their right, completely turned by Campbell and Dundas, and driven in upon the camp and centre, was forced to withdraw from the field by the same side of Gúzerat as the other masses; and the whole, being headed off the direct road on the Jhelum by Thackwell's advance with his cavalry, were driven to the northward. By one o'clock in the afternoon Gough had overthrown the Sikh army, and had crowded it in heavy masses upon a line of retreat which offered no hope of support, provision, or escape for the disheartened soldiery, if properly followed up. By two o'clock Gough's infantry was in position to the north of Gúzerat, and the cavalry and horse artillery left to pursue the retreating foe.

Gough, very superior to the Sikhs, not only in weight of metal and in number of guns, but also in the skill of his artillerymen, made great use of this effective and terror-striking arm, and won his crowning victory mainly through its instrumentality. The battle was in fact a combat of artillery. Gough also had the merit on this occasion of not only forming a good plan of attack, but, an unusual circumstance with him, of adhering to it. We have already shown that all his movements prior to the battle were cautious and judicious—and that, too, in spite of advice which at one time nearly prevailed with him, and would, had he followed it, most probably have been the ruin of his reputation as a commander.

On the field errors of detail were committed, the most important of which was that our artillery, when it first opened its fire, did so at too great a distance, and therefore it was remarkably ineffective as to numbers slain, though completely effective in daunting the courage of the enemy.

Our author is wrong in stating that the chief objects of the enemy at Gúzerat were to turn our right flank and penetrate to the guns. The Sikh cavalry out-numbered and out-flanked our horse at both extremities of the British line; and at both they made a show of turning our flanks and attacking. On the left Thackwell dealt with this demonstration as it deserved; he charged with the nearest squadrons (the Scinde horse, supported

by the squadrons, and the 9th Lancers), and made the enemy more respectful.

Lord Gough made a mistake when he recalled the cavalry, and prevented Thackwell from carrying out his intention of bivouacking on the ground and continuing the pursuit in the morning. The horse artillery, after a night's rest, would have been perfectly able to move in support of the cavalry; and the infantry ought, part by the direct route on the Jhelum, and part in support of the cavalry, to have been under arms and in full march before daybreak of the 22nd. Gough was too slow in his proceedings after the victory: but to insinuate that this arose from such motives as are implied by Mr. Thackwell's work, and that Gough sacrificed the interests of his Government to a personal bias in favour of Gilbert, in order that the latter might have an opportunity of becoming a K.C.B., is equally ridiculous and despicable. Gough had no wish to prolong the war, if he could avoid it: and the escape of the enemy's masses to the right bank of the Jhelum might have prolonged the war for another year. If open to be actuated by petty personal motives, the publicly-discussed and then anticipated appointment of his successor, Sir Charles Napier, under circumstances not complimentary to Gough's renown, was more likely to influence him than mere partiality for Gilbert, and to lead him to strain every nerve that the campaign might be satisfactorily concluded before Sir C. Napier could be sent to assume command. Willingly and of purpose, with the puerile object of making Gilbert a K.C.B., to prolong the contest, was to afford Sir C. Napier an opportunity of stepping in, finishing the war, and depriving Gough of much credit. The thought of such a contingency was not likely to be palatable to one so peculiarly jealous of all affecting his military fame as Gough always showed himself.

Our author says that "Major Mackeson, the Governor-General's agent, controlled the movements of the chief; and it was he who urged the advance of the British troops into the jungle at Chillian, as may be gleaned from Lord Gough's despatch." We have heard it affirmed on good authority that Mackeson was Lord Gough's own choice as a political agent. As the agent of the Governor-General, as the person entrusted with the duty of obtaining intelligence without restriction as to expense, and as the person charged with political negotiations, Major Mackeson's advice was sure to have weight. But we have shown that, as a military adviser, Mackeson was neither a safe nor a judicious one; and that if he

wrung an unwilling assent from the Governor-General, and induced the Commander-in-Chief to fight at Chillianwala, Lord Gough subsequently did not allow himself to be thus controlled, but rejected Mackeson's pressing and reiterated suggestions, and followed better counsel. Mackeson, although a most gallant officer, was not qualified for an adviser on military operations where the difficulties were many, the dangers great, and the position of the General delicate. He was well in place in a pursuit like Gilbert's. There no nice discrimination between things of major and of minor importance was essential; energy and a firm adherence to instructions were the requisites. Associated with the resolute and active Gilbert, there was no chance of a slack pursuit; and the manner in which it was conducted was highly creditable to both. Gilbert's operations perfected the victory of Gúzerat: but for that victory Gough was indebted to his neglect of Mackeson's advice—the latter failing to evince comprehensive views of Gough's position. The political shackles, in which our author states the Commander-in-Chief to have been entangled, were entirely of Gough's own forging, if they existed: for Mackeson could have no other weight on military questions except such as Lord Gough chose to concede to his arguments. That these were long-winded and pertinaciously obtruded was well known throughout the camp: but Mr. Thackwell is in error if he thinks that Lord Gough was otherwise authoritatively controlled than by the Governor-General's views and policy.

When a country like England entrusts its armies, and, with those armies, the military renown of the nation, to a General, the people will never ask whether a Chillianwala was fought by the advice of a Mackeson: but with great propriety, they hold the leader responsible for the use made of the armed thousands at his disposal. His fame and reputation are bound up with the fate of the troops he commands: his judgment, and his alone, must decide, under God, what that fate shall be: and it is ridiculous to suppose that the sound, practical common sense of the English nation will trouble itself to inquire whether a Mackeson, or even a Dalhousie, wrote this thing, or advised the other. It will always ask, What wrote the General? what measures did he take? and how did he act with reference to the circumstances in which he was placed? A Mackeson may give bad, and a Dalhousie may give ambiguous, advice; but all the world knows that the match cannot be lit, or the sword drawn, without the commander's word; and the British people are not of a character

to endure that paltry excuses be palmed off upon them, with the view of shifting responsibility to other shoulders than those which are bound to bear both the load and the honour. Our commanders should know and feel this truth: for most assuredly they will experience that no excuse is taken for great military errors; and that the allegation of advice given by high civil or political functionaries will be met with the smile of contempt. When once the sword is drawn it is impossible to foresee the bearing of a political question on the condition and circumstances of the army in the field; and no British General should contract his views upon the subject of his own responsibility. He should, whether invested with political powers or not, make himself thoroughly conversant with all that either directly or indirectly can affect the operations entrusted to him; keeping the fact clearly in view that England ignores any advice, as relieving its naval or military chiefs from their great but honourable responsibility.

We think it highly injudicious, except under peculiar circumstances, to separate, when operations on a great scale are undertaken, the political from the military power. When these powers are in distinct hands their representatives will, inevitably, to the great detriment of the public service, clash. We therefore concur generally in the expediency of investing military commanders in the East, when properly qualified, with political power. We would however stipulate that they be not only able but conscientious leaders, morally and mentally fitted for their high trust—men not likely to be swayed by the Siren charms of ribbons, rank, honours, and prize-money. These things are well enough in their proper places; some of them are necessary, and others advisable to prevent greater evils; but, whilst protesting against a system which may cramp and obstruct our military commanders, and has at times produced evil results and left deep scars upon our renown, we would still more strongly protest against either military or political power being entrusted to leaders of low moral tone and principle—men disqualified, ^{to} not alone by mediocrity or absence of diplomatic and military ⁿ talent, but also by a want of those higher qualities which confer real dignity on the profession of arms. Whenever that terrible necessity, War, calls forth a British army, be it in the East or in the West, let us have men in command, imbued with a keen sense of the not yet exploded truth, that a nation's honour and character are based on the justice and consideration evinced in

its bearing to friends and foes; and that conquest and victory, where international laws and rights are trampled upon, disgrace the transgressor, and frequently bring down on the offending nation the just, but terrible, retribution of Providence.

We had intended not to have dismissed the author of the work before us without a more detailed notice of his many errors, of his ignorance of native troops, and of the crudeness of assertions and opinions, which, apparently taken up at secondhand without a capacity in the recipient for investigation or inquiry, are misapplied strangely; but, in endeavouring to give a general sketch of the broader features of the eventful campaign, we have already outrun our limits. We leave, therefore, the personal prejudices, and the petty spirit of discontent at the distribution of honours and promotion, without further remark, than that the work derogates, by its tone of captious murmur, from the dignity of the profession, and is calculated to give the impression that Mr. Thackwell's brethren in arms are inclined, in the service of their country, to think more of purely personal questions and individual distinctions than of the performance, on high principle, of their duty—to convey the impression of a pervading low tone of thought and feeling amongst the officers of the British army. Mr. Thackwell may not have meant thus to impress his readers: but, notwithstanding much verbiage of the pseudo-Napierian style, stilted talk of glory, gallant Sabreurs, and the like, with very queer enlistment of would-be classical allusions, the effect of the work is incontrovertibly what we have represented: and, as such an impression is erroneous, it should be counteracted. We must, therefore, observe that, after sedulously decrying Lord Gough to the uttermost, both in his capacity as a commander in the field and as the appreciator and rewarder of military merit; after taxing him with partiality, and implying questionable, if not dishonourable, motives to the aged chief; after seeking in every way to damage his reputation, and to give currency to opinions most unfavourable to Lord Gough; the endeavour to shelter himself, under cover of such a passage as the following, betrays on the part of the author a spirit which we regret to find characterizing the work of a British officer. We do not give the writer credit for any originality of thought, or for any depth or breadth of view, but we should pronounce him utterly deficient in common sense were we to assume that he could for a moment imagine that an author, after disseminating opinions and commenting favourably upon them, can screen himself by so transparent a subterfuge as the disavowal of being himself

the originator of the opinions he takes up and puts forth to the world. The futile attempt is an insult to the good sense of his readers; an insult to that ingenuous truthfulness which should be the aim of all writers on historical events; and, for an officer and a gentleman, an unworthy attempt to mask a hostile attack by the endeavour to charge the sentiments and feelings of the author upon an honourable body of men, few of whom, if we mistake them not, would be thus guilty of shrinking from the candid avowal of their opinions, and none of whom would be guilty of charging them on others. The passage we allude to is the following:—

“It will be seen that no opinion has been pronounced in these pages on the policy pursued by His Excellency in these operations; it has been my object merely to place on record the plain facts connected with the action, and the different opinions current in the camp respecting it. The letters which appeared in the Indian newspapers during the progress of the campaign, containing animadversions on Lord Gough, were often based on false statements, and dictated by the most paltry malice. Men, who had been unsuccessful in their applications for staff appointments, vented their spite in elaborate articles, casting the most unwarrantable aspersions on the character of that illustrious soldier. Thus they were able to gratify their vindictive feelings without any fear of detection; for the papers to whom their dastardly libels were sent did not previously insist on their authentication.

“The injury which Lord Gough sustained in this way has been somewhat counter-balanced, however, by the glorious reception with which he has been honoured in his native land. Such a reception was justly due; for England has not sent forth a more successful General since the days of Wellington and Waterloo.”—P. 9.

If the writer of this passage was himself (as he was generally reputed to be) a frequent correspondent of the Indian Press, upon which he reflects, and also was not distinguished for over-accuracy in his communications, our readers may perhaps feel amused at his effrontery, and will feel inclined to think well of the temper both of the Press, and of those whom he accuses. That ignorant and sometimes desponding letters were written no one will deny; but that disappointed hopes or vindictive feelings gave rise to these communications is a gross misrepresentation of the men in H.M. and in the E.I.C. army. We could wish that officers, whilst operations are proceeding, would be more guarded in what

they write from camp, even when addressing friends and near relatives; for the impressions of the moment, which would often be corrected a few hours after, getting abroad often do much harm. We, however, acquit this species of indiscretion of any such malevolent motive as the author would clothe it with. The army considered Lord Gough no great genius of a commander; and certainly none of his campaigns in India warranted a different conclusion. That he was a successful commander was always allowed; but it had been experienced that his success, like that of other British Generals, was rather owing to the dauntless valour of the British infantry, than to any remarkable skill exhibited by Gough on the field. When, therefore, indecisive actions, accompanied by heavy loss, were fought, the opinions of the army naturally broke forth, and found vent through public and private channels. As soon, however, as that army found that its chief could act warily and wisely, and could fight a well-planned battle, it gave him credit for the display, on his last field and crowning victory, of more proficiency and skill than he had hitherto ever shown: and it hailed with pleasure the triumph of the veteran, and the brilliant close of his military career in India. Personally, Lord Gough, from the urbanity of his manners and his kindness of heart and disposition, was always a favourite with the army: and when he quitted India there was but one feeling pervading the men and officers who had fought for and won the Punjab—and that feeling was, that, if the Koh-i-Núr were honestly ours, the fittest man to lay it at the feet of Her Majesty was the one who, after the sanguinary actions of Múdkí, Ferozeshuhur, Sobraon, and Chillianwala, finally overthrew the Sikh power on the plain of Gúzerat. The army felt that the jewel, if fairly ours (which many doubted), was only so as the emblem of sternly-fought and dearly-purchased victories; that the jewel, if any ornament to the British crown, could only be so as symbolical of the valour of the troops which added to the empire of India the country of the five rivers.

We must close with a protest, in the name of the known humanity of the men and officers of the British army, against a sentence which implies the prevalence of conduct wholly foreign to the feelings and the practice of a beneficent profession, the members of which ever proved themselves alike brave in danger and merciful and attentive to *all* who needed their aid. After praising Surgeon Wirgman, of H. M. 14th Dragoons, for having wounded Sikhs conveyed to his hospital and their wants supplied,

the author proceeds to remark:—"This conduct should be placed on record, because mercy was a rare quality in those times."

We, on the contrary, assert, without fear of contradiction, that no such record was ever needed as an example; that to say that such a record was advisable, is an unfounded charge against the medical officers, who were zealous in alleviating the sufferings of war, whether friend or foe came under their hands, and with whom mercy, instead of a rare quality, was the exceptionless rule. The labours of a talented and devoted body of gentlemen ill deserve to be requited by such unmerited reflections; and the praise of Surgeon Wirgman, at the expense of his professional brethren, must be as little gratifying to him as the author's injudicious advocacy and praise of others of his friends and acquaintances will indubitably prove to them.

War is a terrible, a hateful, necessity. The horror of its atrocities is only qualified by the rays of Christian mercy which should break forth from Christian warriors. We are happy to know that British officers, at the hazard of their own lives, and in the very heat of conflict, sought to give and to obtain quarter for their infuriated enemies. Two officers were severely wounded by the men they had saved, or sought to save. More honour-conferring wounds could not have been received. They were wounds taken in behalf of humanity and mercy, and proved that the chivalry of the British officer is of the right stamp. Mercy was no rare quality even amongst the combatants, where Sikhs would receive quarter: but in general they fought desperately and unyieldingly, and, as they had never given, seemed never to expect, quarter on a battle-field.

Not ourselves having the honour to belong to the faculty, we may be permitted, without a suspicion of favour or prejudice, flatly to disavow and contradict the allegation that there was a want of mercy or attention to the wounded of the enemy. The medical officers were indefatigable; and their exertions were an honour to themselves and to their nation. Their conduct was throughout a noble tribute of respect to that Christian faith which teaches and enforces sympathy with and attention to the miseries of fellow-men—and that whether the sufferer be friend or foe.

IV.

HUTTON'S CHRONOLOGY OF CREATION.

(Written for the *Calcutta Review* in 1851.)

THE circumstances in which most men, with the exception of a few rich amateur travellers, are placed in India seem peculiarly unfavourable for the pursuit of science. The civil, military, and medical servants of the Company come out young; their education may be good, so far as it has gone (but that we know cannot be very far) into the domains of knowledge. The cleverest among them, those who are the most intellectual and aspiring, have had time to climb but a few steps of the Babel-like tower of modern science, when the necessities of the public service launch them upon the active duties of their several lines of employment. The civilian—what with the study of the languages, and an immediate induction into the mysteries of rúbukaris, purwanahs, and regulations—is not given much leisure even at starting; whilst the indefinite prospect of a range of metamorphoses, not at all inappropriate in the land where belief in metempsychosis is indigenious, can scarcely be expected to encourage him in application to lines of knowledge which promise him no assistance in the various departments into which he may chance to stumble. He may reasonably doubt whether the Financial Secretary knows much of transcendentials, and may even entertain a suspicion whether skill in vulgar and decimal fractions be a *sine quá non* to an Accountant-General; the ability to pen a tolerable article for the *Penny Magazine* on the staples and raw products of India is evidently wholly unnecessary for a Home Department Secretary; fortunately, too, it requires no acquaintance at all with the laws of the Universe to qualify a man for the Law-Commission; geology won't make a judge, nor conchology a collector; neither chemistry nor botany are the portals to a seat at the Board of Salt and Opium; acquaintance with the *Principia* or the *Mécanique Céleste*, though very

sublime attainments in their way, are not likely to raise him to the ethereal position of a seat in Council; and he knows right well that he might be the very Faraday of galvanism and electricity, but that the art of devising reasons for the appropriation of Koh-i-núrs would be far more effective in securing a berth at the Board of Administration of an annexed province. There is nothing, in short, but a pure love of knowledge—a passion rare among young men—to tempt the young civilian to enter on the thorny path of science.

With the young soldier the case, except as to the Protean prospects, is much the same. He, too, must study the languages; must be *set up*, drilled, shaken into his saddle, and become a proficient in “keeping his distance” and in the mysteries of the “halt, dress up” at the proper moment; must attend court-martials, and make himself acquainted with military law; must be prepared for its practice and application, which soon come upon him; must sound the profundities of the pay and audit regulations; and finally must almost magically become an economist of no mean order, to pass through the ordeal of years of poverty without embarrassment, and without being unable to meet the various demands which, as a gentleman and an officer, whether in war or peace, he is expected to satisfy. He, too, at starting, has little time for science, and usually less means than the civilian.

The medical man comes to India better prepared, in some particulars, than either of the above classes. Though young, he must have at least made his entrance-bow at the porch of science; ought at any rate to have had a glimpse of the interior of the fane, admired its architecture, and carried away with him an idea of the labour and skill already expended in rearing the edifice. But he, too, is young; is immediately brought into professional activity; in imitation of his military contemporary, is probably knocked about from Calcutta to Peshawur; is not much richer; and finds that, so circumstanced, and in such a climate, the performance of his duties, and the keeping up some degree of professional reading, are about as much as he can accomplish. Science has not much to expect from him.

The chaplains of the churches of England and Scotland and the pastors of churches of other denominations are devoted to a higher calling than the service of science. The same may be said of the Missionaries. Education, as auxiliary to religion and truth, comes indeed under their special care, and very nobly they have put their shoulders to the wheel; so much so, that although there

have been, and now are, men amongst them whose attainments are of the highest order, such as would insure success in every branch of science, and corresponding distinction—yet, with true singleness of eye and purpose, the greater the talents, the richer the intellectual gifts, the more devoted and the more entirely have these been applied to their Master's work. This is as it should be. Science would not wish more than the crumbs of their time, and does not look for material advancement at their hands.

Again, in India, except at the three Presidencies, the scientist finds no museums, no libraries, none of those facilities which even second and third-rate cities now present in Europe for the aid and encouragement alike of the student and of the proficient in the various branches of knowledge. Even at the Presidencies, (let those speak who know the real state and practical value of our museums, libraries, and philosophical societies,) we fear that at best they will be pronounced but sorry affairs; institutions by no means coming up to the intentions of their founders. Away from the Presidencies there is an utter want of everything of the kind; no museums, no libraries, and, what is still more disheartening, no means of obtaining works or instruments, except at great cost and risk from England. What wonder if the amateurs of science are few?

The necessity, imposed upon all branches of the public service, for acquiring a competent knowledge of the languages of India has been favourable to the pursuits of literature. Fewer difficulties present themselves to the philologist. If gifted with the requisite ability, ordinary perseverance will make him an erudite scholar, and will enable him to engage in the archæology, the history, the religious and purely literary works of the various peoples of the East—a wide and very important field for literary exertion. Accordingly, we have examples from every branch of the service, civil, military, and medical, of profound scholars in Sanscrit, Arabic, Persian, and other languages. Men in India are well placed for such pursuits, and in some important respects enjoy advantages which the European *savans* do not. In this line the Western world had even a right to expect from the Company's servants fully more than they have accomplished; the stores of Eastern literature might have been earlier and more completely made known, and a more rapid progress in disentombing the ancient history of the East might fairly have been anticipated. A Wilson, a Prinsep, and a Rawlinson did not step into the field a moment too soon to save our credit in these

respects. Continental Orientalists were very fast leaving us behind them. We are never, therefore, surprised at men in India seeking amusement, distinction, and fame, by devoting themselves to the literature, the history, the antiquities of the nations among whom their lot is cast; they are on the ground for such pursuits, and have much to invite and to encourage them in their labours. The case is very different, however, with the aspirant for scientific acquisition and distinction. Nothing can well be more discouraging than his prospects; and he needs a stout heart to face the difficulties, to appearance almost insurmountable, which beset his path. Yet, to the honour be it spoken of the Company's servants, men have been found not only to face, but to overcome, these difficulties; and, although the scientific labours and discoveries of our countrymen in the East cannot be ranked very high, cannot pretend to rival those of the chiefs of science in Europe, they have been by no means insignificant; and when the circumstances under which they were achieved are considered, they must be admitted to reflect credit of no ordinary stamp upon the individuals concerned. We have no intention, however, of calling the muster-roll of our best scientists; we have now to deal only with one branch of knowledge, and confine the few remarks we have to offer to our readers to that branch.

Geology has become an inviting (it may be even said, a captivating) study; and is scarcely, if at all, inferior to astronomy in interest. When Herschel tells us that admission to the sanctuary and to the feelings and privileges of a votary to astronomy can only be gained by one means—a sound and sufficient knowledge of mathematics, the great instrument of all exact inquiry—he at once assigns a reason why astronomy has so few real votaries, and geology so many. Except to a very few minds, the pure, abstract branches of mathematics offer a dreary prospect; and an apprenticeship in the differential and integral calculus forms by no means an inducement to enter upon astronomy. The threshold of geology is not quite so forbidding. She appears to dispense with extreme skill in the higher mathematics, and to be content with a less abstract, more experimental, class and calibre of intellect. What she deals with in the first instance is not the contemplation of bodies which in space are mere points, but the wear and tear of the earth we tread on. She does not bid her votary gauge the heavens, but asks him to climb the mountain, and read, if he can, what the bluff mass, from cloudcapped

pinnacle to rent ravine at its base, may reveal. She tells him to question old ocean as to the pranks he and his auxiliaries, the streams and rivers, are pleased to play with the land—to catechize light, heat, electricity, and to become as well acquainted as circumstances admit with all the denizens of earth and sea. Although her demands are rather encyclopedical, and her knights must be armed *cap-à-pie* in all points complete, yet it is felt that in her ranks, besides the men-at-arms, the squires and archers are given place. She discards none of her followers, however humble; only let them observe accurately, and record truly, and Geology has learnt from experience that she may be indebted for an extension of knowledge to her lighter armed troops. She forms the common goal in which the mineralogist, the conchologist, the botanist, the anatomist, and we scarcely know how many more sibillant-ending classes, find their lucubrations leading to broad startling facts, and still more startling theories. Under her magical wand even the microscopical observer finds his occupation Titan-like; and an Ehrenberg builds whole strata of the exuvie of animalculæ. Earth history necessarily comprehends all the phenomena, past and present, through which her material agents, whether organic or inorganic, passed or are passing. If pursued in a right spirit, the study of God's works, like the study of God's word, cannot be a trifling occupation, whatever line it takes: for man's limited faculties of perception and comprehension *always* prevent him from estimating the special value in the scheme of nature which any one branch of knowledge may be found to possess. Her modes of record are perhaps nearly as numerous as her modes of action, but the hand-writing of the record is not always equally legible—is in some instances more palpable than in others; yet we may safely assert that every branch of natural history, however minute or gigantic may be its objects, has been ennobled by alliance with the great aims and sublime ends of geology.

With one class this science cannot but prove a favourite study; for in time of peace there is no other which will form the eye and mind to that instantaneous perception of the characteristic features of ground so essential in war to the military man. To acquire even a smattering of the science a man must have all the activity and indefatigability of the sportsman, with something else in view for their reward than a full game-bag. There is no harm in combining the two pursuits, as the one can be easily subordinated to the other; and the killing a wild sheep on the Bolan Hills may

lead to after remarks, and eke out a theoretical notion with a few arguments; but there is little chance of the subsidiary becoming the principal object, if once an officer lodges a geologist's notebook in his game-bag. Sport or no sport,—river, moor, and mountain are then replete with instruction and amusement; game may be scarce, but geological subjects are multifarious; and as the science exacts topographical knowledge, and then proceeds to give it correctness of detail, maturing the judgment in the general pictures formed of the local features and peculiarities of ground, the man at play is all the time training for the serious business of war.

We must be pardoned for doubting whether considerations of this kind have usually been very operative in enlisting for the service of geology the few military men who in India have turned their attention to the science: we doubt also whether the fact that the East India Company very properly maintains a chemical and geological lecturer at their military college has in this respect been much more influential. A lecture from MacCulloch, like his treatise on rocks, must surely have been a heavy article; and that the Cadet-mind should revolt at both could not be surprising. He occasionally, however, seems to have sown a seed, which afterwards, under favourable circumstances, sprang into life and bore fruit. The neighbourhood of the Sub-Himalayas, and the discovery of a tertiary deposit rich in fossil remains, aided by the spirit of observation and inquiry evoked by Lyell's "Principles of Geology," doubtless had the main share in turning the attention of Cautley, Baker, and Durand to developing the palæontological treasures of the hills near them; but we have heard one of these officers gratefully acknowledge that MacCulloch had laid the foundation of much after-amusement in his life: for that it had been he of the *Treatise on Rocks* that had first given his mind an impulse towards the science, as fruitful in interest as in ill-appreciated importance. MacCulloch would probably have been rather vexed had he lived to see the line which his élèves took—to see them quitting the *fruitful* contemplation of Trap, Gneiss, and Granite, in order to pore over Cuvier's comparative anatomy, collect skeletons from man to mouse, build museum bungalows, and spare neither purse nor person in order to bring to light the fossil treasures of the Sub-Himalayas. Yet even MacCulloch would have smoothed his brow, and given a smile of approbation, when Cautley and his medical co-adjutor Falconer won the medal of the Geological Society for exhuming and describing

the Sevatherium; and might have admitted that (though the labours of Baker and Durand were less distinguished) to establish the fact of the existence of gigantic chimpanzee-like quadrumanous animals, and to add the camel to the list of fossil remains contemporaneous with the Sevatherium, and with animals allied to the Cuvierian Pachydermata, was some small service to his favourite science. The Sevatherium, and a very fine specimen of a fossil Mastodon with tusks complete, are amongst the most striking fossils in the British Museum, and bear witness in the capital to the labours of our Indian geologists; whilst, at Liverpool and other places in England, further proofs of their exertions may be found. Some of these scattered specimens, though less striking than those in the national Museum, are scarcely of minor interest; and MacCulloch's élèves have at any rate done something.

Falconer we believe to have been professedly a botanist, as he early succeeded to Royle's easy-chair at Saharunpore:—but geology is very captivating, and the fossil influenza of the vicinity was irresistible. Who could resist a full-blown Sevatherium? Nay, it does not need the apparition of so brave a monster to bid men turn to this alluring study. Far less made a Griffith alive to its charms, albeit a most enthusiastic botanist. We remember his being styled by his engineer comrades the bravest man in Keane's army of Afghanistan. They used to relate of him that nothing ever stopped Griffith, who seemed to bear a charmed life; that, when it was courting death to proceed alone beyond the pickets, he might every day be seen walking quietly off into the country to search for plants, always accompanied by a large bright shining tin box, which, carried on a man's head or shoulder, shot off the sunbeams like one of Colonel Waugh's reflectors, and could be seen for miles. On these occasions it was always a question whether Griffith, who was a great favourite, would ever come back; however, the sun was no sooner dropping towards the horizon than the botanist's day beacon hove into sight, and, in due course of time, in came Griffith, moaning over the poverty of the Afghan flora. It was a country to make a man a geologist, for if he could not find "sermons in stones," there assuredly was not much else to converse with: and accordingly, even Griffith, the hope and pride of botanical science, as he could not fill his tin light-house to his heart's content, nibbled freely at geology. Our readers must pardon this digression, as, except for his great promise, extensive travel, zeal for knowledge,

and a most faithful, indefatigable, truth-loving spirit, we are scarce justified in quoting the lamented Griffith among India's medical geologists. He and Falconer, however, came into our minds from their association with their military friends, and from no purpose of running over the names of many distinguished medical lovers of science.

James Prinsep's death is an era in the history of the Asiatic Society; since that event we have had little to denote intellectual vitality among the "physical" members of the Asiatic Society. With the exception that Falconer was labouring in England at a work on the palæontological remains of the Sub-Himalaya, nothing for years has been heard of their fossil treasures. The junta, which, some twelve or fourteen years ago, was busily engaged in exhuming and describing them, appears to have been suddenly broken up and dispersed: and none seem to have succeeded to their labours. These, it will be remembered, both in the instances specified and in others not here so noted, were confined to observation rather than to theorizing—to the collection of facts rather than to the framing or aiding to frame any particular system in vogue among geologists. Naturally enough, there was a leaning to Lyell's views; for his "Principles of Geology" took great hold of the public mind: but our Indian contributors were cautious in their conjectures, and none of them hazarded themselves far upon the shifting quicksands of theoretical geology. They eschewed cosmogony. For the last few years their silence has been so profound that we began to number them amongst the extinct species of a by-gone Indian era, which (as it passed away when that talented individual was laid in his grave) might very justly be called Prinsep's era of intellectual activity; for he had the gift of drawing forth the sympathetic co-operation of every class and branch of literary and scientific men to be found in India. The sleep of our geologists turns out, however, not so lethargic as we had imagined; and, to our surprise, one of its military votaries now comes forward with a bold, confident step, and a lofty aim, to prove to the world by the "Chronology of Creation" that our suspicions were unjust. Captain Hutton dates the foundation of his work as far back as 1837, and must therefore be considered as putting forth no hasty views. In the present day few authors dwell thus long and patiently upon their works; and though of all subjects theoretical geology merits least to be treated in the off-hand style of the day, we doubt whether, except our author, we can select another instance within a moderate

period of time in which a writer, with new theoretical views to propound, has been less in a hurry to divulge them. The fact is creditable to him; and, whatever may be our opinions as to the result of his well-weighed lucubrations, we respect the man who, in the present day, can take time to think before he writes, and when he does so, write free from the presumption and sceptical bias of shallow scientists.

In other respects the author is bold enough, and no bad hand at knocking on the head prior theorists. Armed in Whewell's panoply, he first breaks a spear with the nebular hypothesis, and combats the theory of gradual refrigeration. Lord Rosse's magnificent telescope, which has resolved into clusters of stars such multitudes of *Nebulæ* that had before, by instruments of inferior power, been irresolvable, has, of course, modified the views of astronomers. For a long time, influenced by Halley's idea that these nebulous objects were a gaseous or an elementary form of luminous sidereal matter, and by the elder Herschel's speculations, the opinions of astronomers were very generally in unison with the theory of the latter eminent man; but the late discoveries, made through the agency of Lord Rosse's fine instrument, have shaken astronomers from a close adherence to the nebular hypothesis, as originally propounded: and Sir J. Herschel comes to a conclusion analogous to that adopted by the author—namely, that it may very reasonably be doubted whether the distinction between such *Nebulæ* as are easily resolved, barely resolvable with excellent telescopes, and altogether irresolvable with the best, be anything else than one of degree, arising merely from the excessive distance of the stars, of which the latter, as compared with the former, consist. Although Sir J. Herschel's views are thus far modified with respect to the basis of his father's beautiful and striking speculations, he does not therefore entirely reject the conclusions to which these pointed, but states the case thus: "Neither is there any variety of aspect, which *Nebulæ* offer, which stands at all in contradiction to this view (his father's). Even though we should feel ourselves compelled to reject the idea of a gaseous, or vaporous, nebulous matter, it loses little or none of its force. Subsidence and the central aggregation consequent on subsidence may go on quite as well among a multitude of discrete bodies under the influence of mutual attraction and feeble or partially opposing projectile motions as among the particles of a gaseous fluid." Having thus drawn a distinction between the nebular hypothesis and the theory of sidereal

aggregation, he still notes the former "as a physical conception of processes, which may yet, for aught we know, have formed part of that mysterious chain of causes and effects, antecedent to the existence of separate, self-luminous, solid bodies." Now this is the language of a master in those powers of analysis which seem to embrace almost every subject in nature. It is the language of one who knows well that a very different law of attraction prevails, when the particles of matter are placed within inappreciable distances from each other, as in chemical and capillary attraction and the attraction of cohesion; that the cause of this departure from, or modification of, the law of gravity is as yet undiscovered and undefined; and that, as change in the law of gravitation takes place at one end of the scale, it is not impossible, in the words of Mrs. Somerville, "that gravitation may not remain the same throughout every part of space," and that the day may come, when gravitation, ceasing to be regarded as an ultimate principle, may be embraced by a still higher, more comprehensive law, of which that of gravitation shall only form a particular phase. As yet we know little or nothing of space, of the influences which pervade it, or of the ether, which, without checking the planetary motions, is the transmitting medium of electricity, light, heat, and gravitation between the planetary bodies. The few, therefore, who are masters of the mighty instrument analysis, see that the empire of laws affecting the material universe, so far from being known, is but very partially, and, if we may use the term, grossly scanned by the most able and subtle wielders of analysis—that power which is to the dominion of the physical laws of creation what Rosse's telescope is to that of space. Such persons therefore are slow to hazard even conjectures, otherwise than as lines of future inquiry, of possible future discovery in the great ocean of untraversed knowledge:—to them matter in its primordial state is not quite so easily disposed of as with our author, whose words on this subject we proceed to quote:—

"It will be seen, from what we have already advanced, that a sphere existed, consisting of water, holding soluble matter in solution and insoluble matter in suspension; and that this sphere revolved upon its axis, by which movement its insoluble matter was precipitated to its centre; that there was as yet no vital atmosphere, and no watery vapours, and neither light nor heat from the sun.

"The first objection which occurs to this doctrine arises out of the difficulty of conceiving the existence of fluidity in the absence

of heat—the sun, according to theory, not having yet been brought into its present relation with the earth as a *luminary*. It must be obvious, however, on mature reflection, that a body, containing in its bosom, both in solution and suspension, the material elements of all the mineral substances with which we are acquainted, could not possibly have been devoid of heat. The chemical combinations going on within it must, on the contrary, have evolved heat in very considerable quantities, and the temperature of the revolving fluid body would necessarily have been kept high. This heat was the natural effect of chemical action, and was altogether independent of the sun, because that luminary was not yet itself sufficiently perfect to enable it to diffuse active heat. The chemical heat evolved in the chaotic ocean was the *latent heat*, which all bodies appear to contain, and which remains inactive and imperceptible until called forth into its active state by chemical combination with other substances.

“Thus, for instance, a mass of carbonate of lime offers no indication of contained heat until a drop of acid is applied, when great effervescence immediately ensues, and considerable heat is evolved. This appears to take place independent of the sun, and is a proof that the primeval ocean might have been in a fluid condition without the aid of that body—it being a chemical compound, in which heat was evolved by vigorous chemical action going on within it. The heat thus produced would nevertheless have been quite insufficient to cause evaporation, and would have been confined to the waters in which it was evolved, imparting to them, perhaps, something of a thermal temperature, and causing an increased or more rapid precipitation of mineral substances. If, therefore, it be allowed that chemical heat can have existence independent of the sun, we shall find no difficulty in admitting the fluidity of the primeval aqueous spheroid: for that being a chemical compound, in which vigorous chemical action was going on from the first moment of its existence, must necessarily have been kept at a high temperature by the heat evolved.

“But we may in turn demand, from whence do the Nebulists derive their heat, the sun not being yet in existence?”—*Chronology*, pp. 24, &c.

Now this may have appeared as simple a mode of getting up the steam for our little tea-kettle, the earth, as any other the author could adopt; but, omitting notice of sundry assumptions, which will strike the scientific reader, it unfortunately does not bring us much nearer a satisfactory explanation than do the

sundries of his opponents. The Nebulists might turn round on our author and say, Why not extend to us the advantage of your unexplained agent, latent heat, for the benefit of matter in nebulous tenuity, as easily as assume it for yourself in behalf of matter more aggregated, in a state of solution or of suspension in your supposed menstruum? The question would be perfectly pertinent; as also it would be fair on the part of the Nebulists to contest the author's assumptions where, speaking of the nebular hypothesis, he says, "Is it not evident that the intensity of heat necessary to produce this extreme state, must, at some former period, have pervaded all space? How, then, did refrigeration commence?" Space and its ether are not so easily filled and disposed of: and who knows the laws and generation of heat, the laws of matter at the "other end of the scale," as before noted, and the laws of interaction between electricity, light, heat, ether, and matter in infinitesimal particles, at inappreciable distances? With a great furnace pouring forth daily over our heads its almost incalculable supplies of heat, and producing almost every motion observable on the surface of our globe, we are so far from having approached to a comprehension of the modes of action and means of supply of this great, unfailing magazine of light and heat, that Herschel, speaking of the sun, says:—

"The great mystery, however, is to conceive how so enormous a conflagration, if such it be, can be kept up. Every discovery in chemical science seems to remove farther the prospect of probable explanation. If conjecture might be hazarded, we should look rather to the known possibility of an indefinite generation of heat by friction, or to its excitement by the electric discharge, than to any actual combustion of ponderable fuel, whether solid or gaseous, for the origin of the solar radiation:—"—and, in a very suggestive note, he adds, "Electricity traversing excessively rarefied air or vapours, gives out light, and doubtless also heat:—may not a continual current of electric matter be constantly circulating in the sun's immediate neighbourhood, or traversing the planetary spaces, and exciting, in the upper regions of its atmosphere, those phenomena of which, on however diminutive a scale, we have yet an unequivocal manifestation in our Aurora Borealis?" *Mutatis mutandis*, much of this is applicable to the question of the generation and maintenance of the internal fires of our sphere: and we quote this eminent man, not because we are ourselves, or consider him, what the author would designate a Nebulist, but because we wish our readers, who may not have

given the subject much attention, not to suppose that the use of the words chemical operation or latent heat brings them much nearer the mark than any other set of phrases, thus applied, would.

The fact is that, according to his range of scientific vision, man is very apt to call in creative agency. As he ascends with slow and toiling step the mountain side, his horizon expands; first the valley of his house, which circumscribed alike his views and thoughts, is seen to join the plain; then the latter opens out; presently, it is seen to be dotted with woods, villages, towns; a little higher still—and, when he looks down upon the expanse of plain, he has lost sight altogether of the home from whence he started: but the sun now gleams upon distant rivers, whose sources he knows to spring from the mountain range on which he stands, and he sees them sweep majestically through the champaign country which they fertilize: higher still, and the summit is reached, and from thence the mighty ocean may be seen, forming a distant horizon, which appears to melt into and blend with the very heavens. Reader, if you are of the privileged few who attain that height, and you hear the whisper of intellectual pride, “all these things will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me;”—beware, and look above you. The home of modest thought and piety may indeed at the moment seem beneath you and out of sight; but the heavens are as far above you as ever, and, though they appear to blend with your horizon and to join the earth, yet rest assured that that old problem, “Knowest thou the ordinances of Heaven? Canst thou set the dominion thereof in the earth?” remains to be solved. Most who reach that dizzy height confess this truth—that, as they rise, though they see further, the horizon expands, and to grasp and comprehend nature seems more and more impossible to mere human intellect. They can trace, or fancy they can trace, the impress and continuous action of the laws of God for the universe of matter to more primordial conditions than persons of smaller attainments may be able to do; and therefore they will naturally be inclined to call in creative agency at a point further removed than those of minor acquisitions and more contracted scientific vision: but both are probably almost infinitely distant from the truth—the mark they aim at. Given the earth in the state in which our author assumes it, and some of his remarks, with reference to the Wernerian and Huttonian theories, merit attention: but we merely indicate a fact of intellectual idiosyncrasy when we observe that those of higher

flight and stronger wing in the regions of science would naturally, when putting their hands to cosmogony, have recourse to creative agency at more primeval stages than those at which our author makes his stand. We have no intention by our remarks of deciding, at his expense, in favour of Analysts or Nebulists. An accomplished mathematician wields indeed a powerful instrument, which, like Babbage's calculating machine, sometimes produces unlooked-for results; but when we read of their formulæ being held "emblematic of omniscience," as condensing into a few symbols the immutable laws of the universe, we cry, "hold, enough." On the contrary, we regard these formulæ as *mechanical* aids to man's limited powers of continuous and comprehensive thought, as the pegs on which he hangs trains of reasoning, and as emblematic of the impotency of human intellect to grasp, unaided, the meanest fragments of the wisdom of omniscience. We would simply warn our readers, to whom we very heartily recommend Captain Hutton's work, to take a wide glance at the field of science, always, however, bearing in mind that in science, as in religion, a cardinal principle is humility.

We shall not dwell upon our author's Biblical criticism, or his strictures on Dr. Buckland, Kirby, and others: they appear to us frequently sound and judicious. Here, as elsewhere, the author demolishes more easily than he constructs, not an uncommon characteristic of theoretical geologists, and inseparable from the very nature of their subject—systems, as the author correctly observes, approaching perfection by degrees, and seldom by leaps. In company with the Rev. J. Pye Smith, however, our author does take a leap, which it is here advisable to notice.

"In endeavouring to prove the high antiquity of our earth on evidence derived from astronomy, the Rev. Pye Smith observes, that the light by which Sirius is seen by us, moving at its known velocity of 192,000 miles in a second, is at least six years and four months in its passage to our system. By applying the equation which Sir W. Herschel had established, he brought out that the brilliant Nebulæ, which only that telescope (referring to a four-foot reflector telescope) can reach, are distant from our system by a number of miles, to express which in common arithmetical numeration requires twenty figures, of which the first are 11,765,475, the 11 denoting trillions, and the other numbers billions; the remaining part of the sum being much more than 948 thousand millions. This almost unmanageable number is expressed by Sir W. Herschel as above $11\frac{3}{4}$ millions of millions

of millions of miles! It follows that the light, by which those bright objects become visible to us, cannot have been less than one million and nine hundred thousand years in its progress. Now it is fully in accordance with the statements of holy writ to believe that the heavenly bodies may have existed through ages, previous to the first day of Genesis, although they did not give light to our planet before that day. The text, it must be observed, insists upon nothing more than that light had not yet visited the earth: but it does not declare that the bodies, from which that light was eventually to proceed, were not already in existence. The application, therefore, of evidence derived from astronomy proves indubitably the great antiquity of those material elements from which this system was at length elaborated; and it will be perfectly consonant to reason, and in accordance with Scripture, to believe, that the creation of the material elements of the earth was contemporaneous with the creation of the elements of the heavenly bodies, and that all were left under the guidance of certain natural laws to progress towards the state which would eventually fit them to form our present solar system, and for which they were evidently not prepared before the first day. Our planet, therefore, and the heavenly bodies, existed together through the undefined beginning (although not precisely in their present relation to each other), until such time as each had become prepared to assume its proper functions in the system, when, having been perfected, their light would then first have reached or been intercepted by the aqueous spheroid. That period, as the Bible and reason lead us to believe, was the particular point of time spoken of as the first day, when light was, as regarded our earth, to all intents and purposes created. But while the light of Sirius is said to be six years and four months in reaching the earth, and while the light of the brilliant Nebulæ is one million and nine hundred thousand years in reaching it, that of the Sun arrives in only eight minutes. If, therefore, no light reached the earth before the first day, when the effects of the Sun became apparent, it must necessarily follow, that all light had arrived at the same state of perfection on the first day, and consequently, that the light of the heavenly bodies being simultaneously apparent on that day, must prove that of the elementary materials 'of the heaven and the earth' were created at the same time, as the Bible and astronomy teach us to believe;—and that the duration of the period styled 'the beginning' must have been at least long enough to admit of the light of the Nebulæ reaching the earth

on the first day—which will give to the strata, from the centre of the planet up to the highest of the *primary* rocks inclusive, an age of no less than one million and nine hundred thousand years before the first day began; and as throughout that period no organized beings could have inhabited it, there was evidently a time, as the Scripture and Geology disclose, when neither vegetable nor animal life had existence upon the globe.”—*Chronology*, pp. 64–67.

Granting, for a moment, that the calculation, in the foregoing passage, of the time required in order that the light of the brilliant Nebulæ observed by Herschel should reach the earth be a correct approximation, what would be the author's calculation for the fainter Nebulæ, which, nevertheless, in Lord Rosse's telescope, form such sublime and brilliant clusters of stars? It would be no difficult matter to double, or even treble, the period assigned. When the time comes, as may be reasonably anticipated, that Lord Rosse's instrument is far surpassed, and more distant Nebulæ are discovered and resolved, what then will become of the foregoing calculation, and the argument the author subsequently bases upon it? We are not prepared, however, to admit that it is even a correct approximation to the actual time taken by the light of the brighter Nebulæ in reaching the earth. Sir J. Herschel, in the last edition of that invaluable treatise, his *Outlines of Astronomy*, Art. 803, gives a much more moderate estimate of the period required, in order that the light of a star in the galaxy, having the intrinsic brightness of a star of the sixth magnitude, may reach the earth. Two thousand years is the time which he allows: and his calculation appears, though rough and pretending to no mathematical nicety, to be a fair one, founded on as sound a basis as circumstances permit. Either way, however, if we adhere to the formula and its application, which the Rev. J. Pye Smith uses, and bring it to bear on the nebular discoveries of Lord Rosse's telescope—or adopt the sounder and more moderate estimate of Sir J. Herschel, what, in either case, becomes of the comparison, instituted by our author, between the historical and the geological, chronology? We must let the writer speak for himself.

“We have likewise adduced proof from the facts of astronomy, founded on the transmission of light from the heavenly bodies, to show that the duration of the beginning, in which the materials were deposited, out of which the volcanic and primary rocks were subsequently elaborated, was no less than 1,900,000 years: and from these data we may now perhaps be enabled to determine

what has been the lapse of time between the termination of that period and the current year.

“It appears, according to Dr. Buckland, that there are eight distinct varieties of the crystalline unstratified rocks, and twenty-eight well defined divisions of the stratified formations. Taking the average maximum thickness of each of these divisions at 1,000 feet, we should have a total amount of more than five miles; but as the transition and primary strata very much exceed this average, the aggregate of all the European stratified series may be considered to be at least ten miles.* Now, according to the views set forth in the earlier pages of this essay, it will be seen that all the primary and volcanic products belong to the period which elapsed previous to ‘the first day’ of the Scriptures, while the sedimentary or fossiliferous strata belong to the subsequent periods; therefore, in estimating the time which has elapsed since the first day, we have only to consider the thickness of these latter deposits. Consequently, the primary, or azoic, divisions of Dr. Buckland’s statement, which he appears to estimate at about one-half of the whole thickness, will have to be deducted; and we shall then have about *five miles* for the thickness of the rest. If, then, half the mean diameter of the globe, or 3,956 miles, *minus* five miles of fossiliferous strata, were deposited in 1,900,000 years, how long a time would it require to deposit five miles? The answer is 2,404 years, 5 months and 15 days.

“But, as this term is seen to embrace the whole of the tertiary or post-diluvian deposits, it will be necessary to inquire into the probable thickness of these strata.

“On this subject it must be observed that much uncertainty prevails, ‘for some of the formations which contain exclusively the remains of marine animals in certain situations contain, in other situations, river or lake shells, with wood and the bones of land animals. It is, therefore, probable that, while the waters in one lake or basin might be saline, those in another lake might be fresh; and *two contemporaneous formations* may hence contain *very different organic remains*. As the London clay and plastic clay and sand, taken together, equal or exceed in thickness the beds of plastic clay, *calcaire grossier*, and gypsum in the Paris basin, the London clay may properly be regarded, not as identical with the *calcaire grossier* and gypsum, but as their geological equivalent. While the beds of limestone and gypsum were depositing in the

* Bridgewater Treatise, p. 37.

Paris basin, the London clay might be deposited in the London basin; and this may explain why many species of marine shells in the London clay are similar to those found in the *calcaire grossier*.* "Now the Rev. J. P. Smith furnishes a table, which shows a thickness of 2,520 feet for the whole of the series; but as this includes the strata both of the Paris and London basins, which are held to be equivalent, it is evident that this amount will have to be reduced—a fact, indeed, which he himself pointed out, since he informs us that 'all the tertiary beds must not be understood as being successional; for many are mutually equivalents in different districts, for example, the London clay and the Paris gypseous rocks.'† The thickness of the strata, as given by this author (who, be it remembered, leans wholly towards the indefinite chronology of modern geologists), is 1,000 feet for the London strata, and 360 feet for those of Paris. Retaining, therefore, the larger amount, and expunging the lesser, the entire thickness of 2,520 feet will be reduced by 360 feet, leaving 2,160 feet for the remainder. It is even more than probable that many of the strata of central France would, on a careful examination, be likewise expunged, and the reader is therefore requested to bear in mind that this calculation can lay no claim to exactitude, for with such rough and uncertain data an approximation to the truth is all that can be aimed at; still the coincidences elicited are so truly remarkable that we may fairly venture to pronounce the Scripture chronology to be undoubtedly the true one. The question then now stands thus:—

"If five miles of strata were deposited in 2,004 years, 5 months, and 15 days, how long a time would it require to deposit 2,160 feet? The answer is 194 years and 12 days.

"Now, deducting this period from the age found for the whole series, we have—

Years.	Months.	Days.
2,404	5	15
Minus 194	0	12
<hr style="width: 50px; margin: 0 auto;"/>	<hr style="width: 50px; margin: 0 auto;"/>	<hr style="width: 50px; margin: 0 auto;"/>
Or 2,210	5	3

for the time which elapsed between the first day and the Mosaic deluge, or an agreement, within fifty-two years, with the age assigned by the chronology of history! A trifling discrepancy

* Bakewell's Introduction to Geology, p. 369.

† Rev. J. P. Smith on Geology and Scripture, p. 374.

which, taking into consideration the extreme difficulty of obtaining an accurate measurement of the various strata, may, in conjunction with what has already been urged, be fairly appealed to as affording positive evidence of the strict truth of the Scriptural chronology, and of the total untenability of the indefinite and unorthodox chronology of modern geology.

“Thus we have the historical and geological chronologers supporting and substantiating each other in the following satisfactory manner, namely :—

HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY.

	Years.	Ms.	Ds.
From the first day to the commencement of the tertiary or post-diluvian era*.....	2,262		
From the deluge to the birth of Christ.....	3,216		
From the birth of Christ to the current year.....	1,849		
	<hr/>		
	7,327		
	<hr/>		

GEOLOGICAL CHRONOLOGY.

From the first day to the commencement of the tertiary or post-diluvian era.....	2,210	5	3
From the deluge to the termination of the tertiary period.....	194	0	12
From the tertiary period to the birth of Christ.....	3,021	11	18
From the birth of Christ to the current year.....	1,849		
	<hr/>		
	7,275	5	3
	<hr/>		

or a discrepancy of only fifty-one and a half years between the two chronologies, and which, moreover, is seen to arise solely from the difficulty of obtaining an exact and accurate measurement of the various strata. Thus the coincidence of the conclusions, arrived at by such very different means, is so truly remarkable, as to fix this chronology as the true one; and we are consequently at liberty to declare that the chronology of creation, engraven in legible characters on the strata of the earth, is absolutely and positively identical with the chronology of Scripture history; thus clearly and substantially proving what every well-regulated mind will be prepared to expect, namely, that the word of the ever-living God is established beyond a doubt upon the testimony of his works.”—*Chronology*, pp. 473–479:

Now the whole of this train of argument and comparison is based upon the application of an equation, established by Sir W.

* This is according to the chronology of the Septuagint.

Herschel and applied by the Rev. J. Pye Smith, and upon an avowedly incorrect series of assumptions, or approximations to the supposed thickness of the strata composing the earth's crust. We have before shown Sir J. Herschel's more moderate estimate of the time required for the light of Nebulæ to reach the globe; and it is needless to note in detail the author's loose estimate of the thickness of the earth's strata. We are convinced that the writer was not aware how such equations are established, and still less aware how they may be applied by different minds: otherwise, even if all his material data had been exact and absolutely certain, he would never, on such grounds, have written so dogmatically. We have a great respect for the powers of analysis; but it is well known that in their application to questions of physical science a tentative course has sometimes necessarily to be pursued in the formation of equations. How vast the very field of the theory of equations! How complicated their application to physical problems! How easy to err! Let mathematicians say and write what they please—but very much of the *ἐμπειρία* enters into the modern analysis, and its application to complex problems in physical science. Who, really conversant with the matter, would base the positive evidence of the strict truth of the Scriptural chronology upon the application, made by the Rev. J. Pye Smith, of a tentative equation established in Sir W. Herschel's day, to the light of the Nebulæ?

Whilst bringing together, because intimately connected, the second and the thirtieth chapters of the Chronology of Creation, we have passed over the great body of the work; but this was necessary, in order to lay before the reader its rash hypothetical line of argument—a very towering structure to be based on a formula. We now revert to the earlier chapters of the work, and, passing over our author's views with respect to the creation of light; the sun's non-visibility on the first day of the Mosaic account of Creation, and the proofs of its existence on that day; also, the formation of the firmament on the second day, as the result of the sun's action and of natural laws—all subjects on which much might be written, with reference to Captain Hutton's views—we hasten to make the reader slightly acquainted with what the author considers his new theory—the elevation of land, simultaneous with corresponding depressions at the Antipodes. We give his own words:—"Although it is generally admitted that where elevation has taken place, there too must an attendant depression, or subsidence, ensue, yet no writer seems to have con-

sidered it probable that such subsidence was *the result* of corresponding up-heavements, or elevation of strata, on the opposite or antipodal surface of the earth; and yet this would appear, from the tendency of the foregoing remarks, to be likewise necessary to the production of dry land; for, as we have seen that neither up-heavements from the centre (Fig. 1), nor superficial depressions (Fig. 2), when taken singly, could possibly have produced the desired object, it becomes necessary to inquire, whether their conjoint effects might not have done so. Let us then look into the probability of this apparently new theory.

“If we suppose that, simultaneous with the elevation of a mountain range on our surface, a depression at the antipodes were to occur, it seems to be then apparent, that the depth of water, being diminished in a degree corresponding to the magnitude of the disruption, would cause some dry land to appear above the surface of the water,—namely, the summits of the uplifted strata.”—P. 127. After referring to a diagram in illustration of this supposition, the writer proceeds to remark:—“It may possibly be objected that if upheavements took place, as here supposed, the mountains would still be liable to re-sink as soon as the exertion of volcanic force had ceased. The results of the movement are, however, in this instance, very different from those which would follow the mere outburst of matter from the centre. No continuance of heat is required to give stability to the mass upheaved, nor is any internal hiatus liable to be formed; the mass is still solid from its summit to its base, and no sooner does the exciting cause of the up-heavement cease, than the heat decreases; the fused mass hardens or solidifies; the rocks which had been subjected to the influence of heat become more consolidated; and the hollow created—which is at the antipodal base in the depth of the ocean—is instantly filled with a dense volume of water, which nothing but a counter volcanic movement can displace. Thus the mountains, being so firmly based, cannot re-sink without the express exertion of that power which gave them birth.

“It may be necessary, however, to guard against the possibility of any objection being raised to this view, on the plea that the elevation of one portion of the surface, and depression of another, would, if equal in their respective amounts, merely neutralize each other, and so preserve the original depth of water unchanged.”—*Pp.* 128–129. After again referring to the diagram, the author proceeds:—“To those who have paid due attention to

the subject, the truth of this line of reasoning must, we should imagine, be fully apparent ; for it is a well-ascertained fact in geology, that the volcanic and plutonic rocks traverse the whole of the strata from unknown internal depths, to some height even above the superficial strata: these igneous products proceed from the central regions of the earth, and could their dykes and columns be laid open by a section, they would appear rising up in lengthened masses like gigantic trees, throwing out their branches in every direction towards the surface. It is easy to perceive, therefore, that the antipodal depression, consequent on the escape of this matter from the centre, will contain more water than the matter ejected at the surface has displaced, for not only is the igneous mass protruded at the surface, but it extends from that surface downwards, to an unknown distance ; while, therefore, the centre has poured forth this enormous mass, *the elevated portion only* has displaced the water, and, consequently, the depression will contain, not only that which has been so displaced, but likewise a quantity equal in volume to the column which proceeds from the centre to the surface. Granting, therefore, the accuracy of the views here contended for, we have still to show by what natural laws the land was made to emerge from out of the waters."—*Pp.* 130–131.

Here we think the author has been misled by his own diagram. Does he mean that an enormous mass of plutonic and volcanic matter can be protruded into the superficial crust of the earth without causing displacement and elevation ? We suppose that he does not. On the contrary, here and elsewhere, the train of argument always is that the intrusion of igneous matter from the action of subterrene fires causes upheavement and shattering of strata. The column, which proceeds from the centre to the surface, must, before reaching the surface, displace something upon the author's hypothesis of prior sedimentary deposition ; that something displaced must be upheaved ; more or less (whatever the quantity of injected igneous rocks) the surface sedimentary strata must be affected ; and any change of level, from a mountain range to a ledge of sea-covered reef, taking place in these formations, alters the bed of the original ocean, and displaces water. The depression, according to the writer's theory, cannot at least contain exactly as much as is displaced at the surface by the combined operation of injected igneous rock and upheaved strata.

The only part of the theory which appears to us new is the as-

sumption, without proof, that depressions *must be antipodal*. Here, again, we have failed to discover any reason for the assigned phenomenon, except the author's diagram, which seems to us to have induced error in more ways than one. It has long been known and stated, that it was possible to divide the globe into two hemispheres, the one containing nearly all the land, and the other nearly the entire ocean; and various views have been propounded respecting the elevation of the main mountain ranges of the earth, their general directions in the Old and in the New World, and the phenomena which were likely to accompany the rapid or the slow upheavement of such masses. But, with reference to the pressure of the atmosphere on the globe of the earth, and the tidal oscillations to which its surface is exposed, as also the perturbations due to the varying actions of the masses of the sun and moon, men had not traced any inevitable connection between the rise of Plutonic or volcanic masses in one hemisphere, and corresponding depressions at the antipodal point of the diameter of the earth—that diameter being about 8,000 miles. This is a conclusion which may, upon the face of such a diagram as that given by the author, wear a greater air of reason than when a more correct notion of the magnitude of the masses on the earth's surface, with respect to its own size and diameter, is steadily kept in sight. We will again borrow the clear language and lucid illustration of Sir J. Herschel:—"The highest mountain hardly exceeds five miles in perpendicular elevation: this is only one 1,600th part of the earth's diameter; consequently, on a globe of sixteen inches in diameter, such a mountain would be represented by a protuberance of no more than one-hundredth part of an inch, which is about the thickness of ordinary drawing-paper. Now, as there is no entire continent, or even any very extensive tract of land, known, whose general elevation above the sea is anything like half this quantity, it follows, that if we would construct a correct model of our earth, with its seas, continents, and mountains, on a globe sixteen inches in diameter, the whole of the land, with the exception of a few prominent points and ridges, must be comprised on it within the thickness of thin writing-paper; and the highest hills would be represented by the smallest visible grains of sand.

"The deepest mine existing does not penetrate half-a-mile below the surface: a scratch or pin-hole duly representing it, on the surface of such a globe as our model, would be imperceptible without a magnifier.

"The greatest depth of sea probably does not very much exceed

the greatest elevation of the continents; and would, of course, be represented by an excavation, in about the same proportion, into the substance of the globe: so that the ocean comes to be conceived as a mere film of liquid, such as, on our model, would be left by a brush dipped in colour, and drawn over those parts intended to represent the sea: only, in so conceiving it, we must bear in mind that the resemblance extends no farther than to proportion in point of quantity. The mechanical laws, which would regulate the distribution and movements of such a film and its adhesion to the surface, are altogether different from those which govern the phenomena of the sea."

We are far from considering the solidity of our planet to be so satisfactorily and indubitably decided as the writer of the *Chronology of Creation* does. Ours is a surface knowledge of the globe, as the above admirable illustration will have shown to our readers; and we can experiment upon the laws of compression of solid bodies only within very confined limits—and those on the surface of the earth. What do we know of the laws of compression through the 4,000 miles to the earth's centre? If we calculate according to the *known* laws of compression, we obtain somewhat astounding results, even for the densities of air and water, let alone rock, after traversing a mere fraction of the 4,000 miles. Whether such extreme condensation of material substances is at any points met and held in equilibrium by the increased elasticity, consequent on the very high temperature of the central ignition, is matter of pure hypothesis; but the solidity, or the cavernous structure, of our planet is very far indeed from being a settled question. Philosophers have, therefore, naturally been in no hurry to connect mountain chains with antipodal depressions by a movement throughout the whole diameter—that is, by a movement of 8,000 miles of matter, of the conditions of which they were necessarily ignorant.

Humboldt comprises the multifarious phenomena connected with plutonic and volcanic action in one conception—the reaction of the interior of our planet against the crust and superficies. In dwelling upon the features of this constant antagonism, and entering upon a very interesting general description of Plutonic and volcanic exhibitions of force, it is clear that he entertains little or no doubt of the existence of very extensive cavernous conformations, along (what may be termed) the lines of conflict between the crust and the interior. Speaking of the gradual upheavement of whole continents, so far from basing them on solid

matter, his words are, "*wie der Bergketten auf langen Spalten,*" i.e., "like the mountain chains upon (or over) long chasms;" and, after noting the rapidity of earthquake oscillations and subterrene thunder, as transmitted through the solid strata of the earth, and as independent of the chemical composition of the rocks forming the strata of mountain regions, or of those which are the sub-strata of alluvial plains, he attributes the modification, which the earthquake wave has been observed to undergo on reaching mountain ranges, to their *mechanical* structure. He says, "Where the latter (the earthquake wave) courses regularly along a coast, or at the foot and in the direction of a mountain chain, occasionally is observed, and that for centuries, an interruption at a certain point. The undulation proceeds onwards in the depths; but, at these points, it is never felt at the surface. The Peruvians say of these unmoved superior strata, *that they form a bridge*. Since mountain chains appear up-heaved over chasms, so the sides of these vaults may favour the undulation, when parallel to the chain; but sometimes (mountain) chains cut across the earthquake wave perpendicularly." He then proceeds to give instances: but it is unnecessary to prolong the quotation, as our object was only to warn our readers against dogmatically asserted assumptions, and to show them that the man, who, more than any living, has made the phenomena of volcanic agency his study, and whose acquaintance with the mountain ranges of the Old and New World is more extensive than that of any other scientific traveller, holds language not at all consentaneous with that of the author whose work is under consideration.

We cannot set aside the views of Humboldt lightly, nor can we those of Herschel, where he says—"Astronomically speaking, the fact of this divisibility of the globe into an oceanic and a terrestrial hemisphere is important, as demonstrative of a want of absolute equality in the density of the solid material of the two hemispheres. Considering the whole mass of land and water as in a state of *equilibrium*, it is evident that the half which protrudes must of necessity be *buoyant*; not, of course, that we mean to assert it to be lighter than *water*, but, as compared with the whole globe, *in a less degree heavier* than that fluid. We leave to geologists to draw from these premises their own conclusions (and we think them obvious enough) as to the internal constitution of the globe, and the immediate nature of the forces which sustain its continents at their actual elevation; but in any future investigations which may have for their object to explain the local

deviations of the intensity of gravity from what the hypothesis of an exact elliptic figure would require, this, as a general fact ought not to be lost sight of." We wish that Sir J. Herschel had condescended to expand his suggestion, and, in his own clear lucid language, had explained more at length the conclusions at which he points:—but we think his meaning sufficiently indicated to admit, without presumption on our parts, of his observations being considered to accord generally with those of Humboldt. The two start indeed from very different points, but they arrive by their several routes at one and the same inference—a cavernous conformation under the crust of the earth.

We leave Kirby and the writer of the *Vestiges of Creation* to the mercy of our author, as well as Penn and other Mosaical geologists, from some of whom, however, Captain Hutton makes interesting excerpts, and applies them with ingenuity to the development and support of his own views. Our article has already extended to such a length that we will not attempt to trace these views further than to say that on the whole we think the author's attempt to reconcile the Hexaameron Mosaicum with the present state of geological science the best that it has been our fortune to peruse. Our readers will have seen that we think it faulty; that we do not consider the writer successful in establishing some of the hypotheses on which his system is based; and that we think him hasty and confident in many assumptions, on which he pronounces very dogmatically. But there is much worth reading in the book; facts are grouped under new aspects; and, if the author is not very satisfactory in constructing his own edifice, he demolishes the airy structures of others much more efficaciously.

Josephus remarks upon the triple character of the writings of Moses, the enigmatical and the typical being two, that *ὅσα δ' ἐξ ἐυθείας λεγέσθαι συνεφέρει, ταῦτα ῥητῶς ἐμφανίζοντος*,—"where straight forward speech was useful, those things he manifested clearly." The distinction is just, and, as might be expected, nowhere more apparent than when the Decalogue, the word and hand-writing of God, is compared with the law which, though the word of God, was essentially typical; whilst the promise "it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel," was deeply enigmatical. Yet, even in the Decalogue, the word of God condescends to language suited to man's understanding, and speaks of the great and infinite one, in whom is all power, and by whose will all things exist, as a jealous God. Jealous of man? No; no one in his senses so comprehends it, though the meaning is as

clear and palpable as language could make it, and any one attempting to render it more intelligible runs imminent risk of stultifying himself, if not his readers. What, then, were the six days, the Hexaemeron of the Lord, and his Sabbath? To a creature like man, whose foot is upon a sphere which revolves round its axis once in twenty-four hours, there are, under existing circumstances, night and day; but to the Creator, from whom have emanated the ordinances of Heaven and its starry hosts, what are His day or night? and time—how does He measure it? Yet if it be His purpose to convey to man, with a practical view to man's welfare, a notion of the Creator's active creative agency, during periods of the eternity passed, and of comparative rest from that creative agency, how could this be done in language suitable to man's comprehension, and having reference to man's measure of time, and to his capacity, and that of other organic beings his servants, for continuous hard labour? Thoroughly precise and clear in its specific application, there is no reason why the law for the observance of the Sabbath may not have combined, like other portions of the Levitical Law, the utmost precision of terminology with an enigmatical and typical base and sense. The injunction to man is clear; its beneficial operation indubitable, both bodily and spiritually; and the terminology express as to man; but, as regards the Creator, it may be symbolical. To borrow a mathematical illustration, the Hexaemeron may be a time formula, suited to man; but the development of which may transcend not only his intellect, but that of far higher orders of beings. We do not say that this is so; but that for any proof to the contrary it may be so. We *know* that "He hath made every thing beautiful in his time; also He hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end."

Now this is always the aim of the geologist: but whether they speculate like Plato on the overwhelmed Atlantis—like Montaigne on "l'impression que ma riviere de Dordogne faict de mon temps"—or like modern geologists on everything in the range of science—Faust's words ring upon the ear ominously:—

Da steh' ich nun, ich armer Thor!
 Und bin so klug, als wie zuvor;
 * * * *

Und sehe, dass wir nichts wissen können!
 Das will mir schier das Herz verbrennen.

V.

EXTRACTS FROM ARTICLES ON THE EAST INDIA
COMPANY AND ITS CHARTER.

(Written for the *Calcutta Review* in 1851 and 1852).

WHAT is the best administration for India in relation to its own welfare and prosperity, and to its connection with Great Britain? We hold that the interests of the two countries are intimately blended, and that, circumstanced as both are, any policy which places these interests in antagonism is neither sound nor wise. Providence has thrown upon the British nation the heavy responsibility of an empire numbering many millions of souls; and, according as our rule proves beneficent, or the reverse, will England herself derive advantage or loss, honour or disgrace, the admiration or the contempt of that world which has always regarded India as one of the most enviable of possessions. In the scheme of Divine providence the judgments upon nations appear more sure and unfailling than upon individuals. Retribution follows misgovernment with an iron step, and crushes with inevitable ruin the children and children's children of an oppressing nation. Strange as it may seem to some of our readers, this idea is prevalent amongst the millions of India: and we have heard the speech of an intelligent and wealthy Hindu, when he witnessed a long course of unscrupulous conduct and successful corruption in a high British functionary—"Well, if the English send us such men as these their days are numbered: they will not long be allowed to keep this country." So spoke one who could enlighten, on several important subjects, any Commission sent to India. The speech was spoken in bitterness at what was passing before his eyes, and therefore was not of general application; but it proves that, no matter what a man's religion may be, when he sees the great principles of integrity and justice departed

from, there arises at once the internal assurance of an avenging arm; and the conviction paves the way for the coming retribution. We err greatly when upon differences of creed, or the existence of gross superstition, we found arguments hostile to clearness of vision with respect to temporal matters. The Hindu, the Mussulman, the Buddhist, the Parsee, sees his way shrewdly enough in worldly affairs: and, in arrogating for the servants of the East India Company clearer powers of perception as to the real feelings, wishes, and interests of the multiform classes under their dominion, there is more of the presumption arising from a superficial acquaintance with the people than of deep views and knowledge of their characters.

In support of the institutions which the British supremacy has imposed upon India there is far too great a tendency on the part of our functionaries to disregard, and indeed to despise, the judgment of the very people for whom these institutions are framed, and who can best judge in many respects, though possibly not in all, of their adaptation to the wants of the community, and their favourable or unfavourable operation. We have always observed that the more intimately a European officer became conversant with the real views and opinions of the various classes with whom duty brought him into contact, in direct proportion to his ability and soundness of judgment were the moderation and modesty with which he pronounced upon the result of the measures of our administration, as viewed from the platform of the native mind, habits, and associations. Few men can place themselves on that platform; and few have the skill or the patience to sound the views of the people under them. It is far easier to assert the excellence of our rule, to arrogate all wisdom and integrity for the instruments of that rule, to blacken the native qualities, and to pronounce them disabled from forming tolerable opinions, even in their temporal concerns, by falsehood, superstition, and their concomitants, exaggeration, and dark ignorance; but this is as great a blunder as to dream that the Hindus are pure, simple, innocent souls, qualified for a terrestrial paradise. . . . The Hindu mind is calm, temperate, clear and subtle in all appertaining to its temporal concerns. It is searching in the observation of individual character; watches with all the attention of deep self-interest the course of our administration, and the working of our measures.

It does not, however, follow as an inevitable consequence that

the subversion of all native Governments, the destruction of native States and Rulers, and the thorough extinction of all elements for the natural and gradual development of institutions in harmony with the habits, feelings, and state of civilization of the millions of India, are to be regarded as no hardship on the native races. Foreign domination must ever be a hardship: and, the more marked the difference in the language, creed, character, and civilization of the dominant race, the more severely, because on a greater variety of points, will the yoke press upon the necks of those on whom it has been imposed by conquest. It cannot but gall them in a thousand ways: and Peel evinced a statesman-like apprehension of the truth when, in connection with our rule in India and the welfare and contentment of its vast population, he, early in his career, urged it to be our duty "to atone to them for the sufferings they endured, and the wrongs to which they were exposed, in being reduced to that rule; and to afford them such advantages and confer on them such benefits as may, in some degree, console them for the loss of their independence." It may suit the purpose of a panegyrist Historian,* circulated by the Court of Directors throughout India, to endeavour to invalidate the wisdom and acumen displayed in these remarks, by drawing a very exaggerated contrast between the beneficence of British rule and the cruelty and oppression of native tyranny; it may also not be impolitic on the part of a Secretary† in the Foreign Department to array the vices of Muhammadan princes, the instability of their sway, and the evils which the Moslem rule entailed upon the country, now under the milder and more intelligent supremacy of a Christian power: but such pictures as the latter author has given, though tolerably truthful and correct so far as they reach, by no means shake or controvert the views of Peel. At the utmost, they show that, to a certain degree, greater in intention than in effect, our administration has evinced a disposition to study the welfare and prosperity of the conquered masses over whom its supremacy had been established, and from whom the revenue for the maintenance of that supremacy was to be derived. But it is not in human nature that gratitude for minor self-respective benefits should have the power to quench the hate of foreign dominion, still less to render the burthen of a foreign yoke tolerably agreeable. To argue in this manner would betray such an oversight and neglect of the deep, ineradicable

* Thornton

† Elliot.

principles of human nature as could only be reasonably ascribed, either to very gross ignorance and an utter inexperience of men, or to a blind, self-interested desire to ignore the existence of feelings inseparable from man's nature. No one thoroughly conversant with the secret political history of India, even during the last ten years, will have been able to close his eyes to facts which, at times, brought uncomfortable evidence of our real position in India—proving that, however laudable were many of the intentions of the British Government towards the dusky millions under its sway, it had neither struck root into the feelings nor into the affections or confidence of the people whom it had enjoyed the opportunity of most effectively befriending; and that, on the contrary, their sympathies were in unison with the hopes and wishes of the discontented classes whom our rule and system has cast into poverty and insignificance, and whose hostility is only the deeper and more heart-corroding, from the necessity for suppressing and concealing its ebullitions.

Granting all that can, with any truth, be alleged of the superior integrity, the more impartial justice, the higher intelligence, the more perfect organization, the greater security to person and property, which characterize British supremacy—and granting that our debt of fifty millions (a considerable part of which is owed to chiefs, who, in times of financial embarrassment, were rather compulsorily induced to advance large sums on the security of Company's paper, and to rich natives) enlists a certain number in favour of the permanence of our power;—these admissions do not warrant the assumption that our rule is popular; that our institutions harmonize with the temper and habits of the people; that the higher classes are at ease, contented with their position, and well disposed towards those who have superseded them in the management of the country. The case is notoriously the reverse of all this. Any check to our arms—any reverse, such as the memorable one at Kabul—or even any at all doubtful and resultless battles, such as Hardinge and Gough fought with the Sikhs—prove at once how quaky are the foundations of the Anglo-Indian empire. However much the panegyrists of its beneficent character may feel inclined to indulge in laudatory declamation upon the hold it is acquiring of the minds and feelings of the people, of the respect and affection they bear towards a power, distinguished by a mild and conciliatory exercise of authority—these self-administered gratulations must be taken at nothing more than they are worth, unless it be wished, at some critical period,

to rue the confidence placed in rhodomontades. On such an occasion, the ruler who built on these illusions would soon be taught, that, over large tracts, not the faintest echo responsive of such feelings reverberated from the breasts of the people; that, where most favourably disposed, the cultivators, the village communities, which form the great mass of the population, entertain but a passive feeling of favour towards their European masters; and that anything like an active, spontaneous outburst of loyal sympathy in support of our administration is alike foreign to the character and habits of the class, and to the depth of good will entertained towards our rule.*

How is it possible that matters should be otherwise? Up to the present time, whether willingly or unwillingly does not much affect the question, encroachment and conquest have been the distinctive attributes of the Anglo-Indian Government. Chief after chief, state after state, has been subdued; until, with the exception of a few subordinate isolated principalities, whose prolonged existence is felt to be a pure act of grace, the whole of India, in its entire length and breadth, has submitted to our authority. An Empire, won thus rapidly by the sword, cannot, however much it may be desiderated by the conquering race, at once efface the remembrance of its origin, or easily conceal the conditions of its existence. The imposition of a few ephemeral institutions, modelled upon the exemplars of a high Western civilization, and to which the spirit of Eastern manners has not, as yet, had time to adapt itself, only bring into stronger and more violent relief the antagonistic moral and intellectual states of the ruled and rulers. Speak to well-informed natives, by which designation we do not mean English-crammed Babus of Calcutta, but men of experience and observation among the chiefs and people, at a distance from the immediate circles of the Presidencies, and from such inquire their views and opinions of our power. Will they dwell on our system of jurisprudence, on the purity of our courts, on the knowledge and impartiality of the Company's judges and subordinate ministerial officers, upon the lightness of our revenue assessments, and the great public roads and canals of irrigation, which either have been constructed, or are in course of construction? Not one in a thousand will allude to any of these things: but they will say that we are masters in the art of war;

* The occurrences of the Sepoy Mutiny, which came upon us some years after this paper was written, afforded a very striking proof of the truth of my father's words.

that discipline and military organization were unknown prior to the advent of the British; that our military institutions are incomparable, and by native states inimitable:—they will add, too, that truth, as compared with themselves, is sacred among Englishmen; and that we are faithful to our engagements. The generosity, the justice, the beneficence of the British rule, an Englishman is disappointed to find, are generally left to his own suggestion as topics: and he learns speedily that, however he may have flattered his imagination on the subject of our paternal sway, the sword, in the minds of chiefs and people, is the symbol of the Anglo-Indian dominion; that its nine pounders are the orators, who have, up to the present time, spoken most intelligibly to the people: and that, although our general character for truthfulness and good faith is acknowledged, all the hallucinations as to gratitude for comparative security of person and property, respect for integrity and impartiality, are mere moonshine—and that too, faint of ray, a complimentary reflection from his own suggestive inquiries and questions.

Public feeling will, of course, vary; for some parts of India were rescued by the British arms from a state fast verging on anarchy; and in such portions of the country, the memory of those evil days, even where not fresh, has not as yet been altogether worn out:—but though it has been our alleged policy everywhere studiously to defend the rights of the ryot, and put down all tyranny or oppression practised upon the people; and we have, therefore, in some degree taught the latter to look to us as disposed to be the defenders of the poor, and to arbitrate equitably between the weak and the powerful, yet in so doing we have alienated a large and very influential class, without, at the same time, supplanting them in the hold which from similarity of language, habits, and sometimes creed, they still maintain over the minds and feelings of the masses. We have struck little root in the lower strata of native society; though, on the whole, the best feeling towards us is to be found there: but the great distance between those classes and ourselves, and the intervention of classes decidedly hostile, who intercept, neutralize, and distort the current of action between the British functionary and the populace, weaken extremely, where they do not succeed in annihilating, the bonds of sympathy, confidence, and good will, which might otherwise already have attained to some strength in our older provinces.

This may not be a flattering representation of the position we

occupy in India; but it is a natural consequence of the rapid, all-crushing energy of our sweep to supremacy, and of our state, as a highly civilized, conquering race, having little in common with the conquered, and separated from, and raised above, them by language, creed, morals, manners, and the affluence derived from the subdued. There has not been the time or the opportunity for the rise and spread of a class of impressions resulting from wise, liberal unselfish, legislative measures, and from the operations and the blessings of continued peace. Providence may, indeed, reserve for the Anglo-Saxon race the honour of stereotyping such impressions ultimately on the minds and hearts of the heterogeneous millions of India: but, under this supposition, our rulers will not further or expedite the attainment of the great end of their mission in the East by ignoring the realities of their present position, and by colouring to their fancy the actual feelings of the native community. Renowned as conquerors, and not unknown as tax-gatherers, it would not be wise to count, as yet, on having realized any great capital of popularity. The Anglo-Saxon in India moves upon the surface; darkness is upon the face of the deep beneath him; and it remains to be seen whether he will be given that spirit and wisdom which can alone enable him to form, enlighten, and mould into a higher state of moral, intellectual, and physical civilization the chaotic mass of people—ay, of nations—which acknowledge his supremacy.

The state of society and of civilization, which pervades the many millions of India, calls for a simple, cheap, expeditious administration of justice. Ours is neither cheap nor expeditious. Indeed, it has become so complicated a system that the people are never presumed to understand it, whilst the pleaders and the subordinate ministerial officers are perfect adepts at making a profitable use of its intricacies: and, consequently, the latter classes prey upon the ignorance of the people to a degree but little apprehended, and often very unwillingly admitted, by the European judicial officers. Now as a remedy for the complex evils of our police and judicial system, India does not want a more elaborate, bar-trained set of European functionaries, with ideas of law and equity derived from that Angean stable which the genius of a Bentham and the labours of a Brougham have hitherto failed to weed of its gross fallacies and inconsistencies, and chaotic maze of sinister and noxious influences. Eng-

land is herself struggling to recover somewhat of the natural and simple system of justice from which she has so far and fatally wandered. Her County Courts—her as yet futile attempts at systematic registry—her insufficient throes to shake off the incubus of a Court of Chancery, whose rules and practice of equity are to the nation synonymous with expense, vexation, and hopeless delay—are all warnings against plunging India into the meshes of a system from which our own country is, with slow, toilsome, doubtful success, striving to disentangle itself. India needs no such system, nor any approach to it. On the contrary, that system must serve as a beacon to warn our stately vessel off from the shoals and rocks of the Law Ocean of old England—an ocean of such perilous and uncertain navigation that no insurance offices have been as yet bold enough to do business with the unfortunate craft that are forced upon its treacherous waters.

* * * * *

The greatest curse that could be inflicted upon India is the development of that law system of which the independence of the barrister and the boldness of counsel may be incidents, but most certainly are not necessarily resulting consequences. . . . If there be one thing more dreaded under our rule than any other, it is this very English legal machinery, as exemplified at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay: the mere name of the Crown Courts is a terror—and a terror that from these foci has diverged and spread far and wide over the breadth of the land. The natives of India, of any education or observation, are as much alive to the evils of the English legal machinery as the editor of the *Spectator*, when he penned an editorial, entitled “Equity swallowing up law;” for they have had cruel experience of the working of the English system.* * * A simple code of laws, in lieu of an indigested mass of regulations; courts of judicature adapted to the social organization and condition of the people, which our present courts most decidedly are not; a simplification of the whole system of procedure, and the incorporation, to a much larger degree than at present, of the system of Panchayet—are essential to putting some stay to the present anarchy of law, and to the harvests of vile, intriguing, case-causing Vakils. Increase, rather than diminish, the powers of the Judges’ and Magistrates’ Courts; cease to nurse and foster an endless system of appeal; make the people in greater measure settle their own differences, as they did of old everywhere, and now do over large tracts of India, by

Panchayet; quash litigation by developing, instead of crushing, the most effective institution that the genius of the people could have devised for thwarting litigious intriguers. What the Courts of Reconciliation are to Denmark, Panchayets have from time immemorial been to India. Well may Sleeman say, "The people are confounded at our inconsistency; and say, where they dare to speak their minds, 'We see you giving high salaries and high prospects of advancement to men who have nothing on earth to do but to collect your revenues and to decide our disputes about pounds, shillings, and pence, which we used to decide much better among ourselves, when we had no other court but that of our elders to appeal to.'"

Our system has overlooked a fact to which all history bears testimony. As evil pervades mankind, and, according to the religion, the climate, the country, the physical and psychological condition of the people, adapts itself with wondrous pliancy to infect the mass as much as possible; so, in conflict with evil, and endeavouring to subdue it, are those principles of virtue, which, whencesoever derived, enter more or less into all ethical and religious systems, and, backed by the interests of the majority, which are always in antagonism to individual rapacity and violence, base their mode of action upon the structure of society, and the general habits and condition of a people. Accordingly, in no two countries, with the same object in view—the discovery of truth—do we find precisely the same means adopted for eliciting it. There is a national, as well as an individual idiosyncrasy. The *moral* of every people is the composite production of so many different elements that it would be as vain to look for exact similarity of character in any two nations as in any two persons. We English are too fond of putting our hats and long-tailed coats upon every people we meet with on the face of the earth; forgetting that where they already enjoy turbans, dhotis, &c., the symmetrical harmony of the whole cannot be more remarkable than the felicity of adaptation. We are so wedded to our own institutions and their forms that our eyes are closed to the merits of other systems, which are the birth of the physical and moral conditions of a people to which our own nation bears no analogy. The consequences are well set forth by Holt Mackenzie. "We are everywhere met by people complaining of the authorities set over them, and the authorities complaining of the people. The longer we have had the district the more apparently do lying and litigation prevail, the more are morals

vitiated, the more are rights involved in doubt, the more are the foundations of Society shaken, the more has the work of civil Government become a hopeless, thankless trial, unsatisfactory as to its immediate results, hopeless as to its future effects." What was a true picture in 1830 we will vouch for being as accurate in 1851. One-and-twenty years, instead of amending, have deepened the shades of this terrible sketch of our rule—and this, too, in spite of many very noble efforts on the part of individuals to stem the torrent. There is too much of centralization in our judicial system; too little has been left to that best of all modes of maintaining security of person and property, the instrumentality of the people themselves. This was the agency to which the native system of police and the institution of the Panchayet trusted for the administration of a vast mass of civil and criminal business, which is now drawn to our courts as a focus: a dung-heap would, perhaps, be a somewhat more correct simile; for there the mass accumulated, and, leavened with perjured witnesses and sordid, unscrupulous Vakils, wholly unchecked by the control of local public opinion, became a mass of hopeless corruption—differing from a dung-heap, however, inasmuch as it may and does infect, but cannot manure, the district, its operation present and future being unmixed evil. Why throw out of gear, as we have done, the sanative action of local opinion? It is the only one which operates effectually among the millions of India. Public opinion, in our sense of the word, they have none; but local and class opinion is all influential with them; and the Panchayet, as an institution, is founded on the instinctive perception of this characteristic of the people. Accustomed to the broader action of a public opinion having a far more comprehensive base, we have lost sight of a normal element of the character of a purely agricultural and very poor people, much attached to their land and their neighbour village communities, but not caring a straw for any opinion beyond the sphere of the small circle which comprehends their sympathies and interests. Starting from a higher stage of civilization and more complex relations, we have overlooked a radical difference between ourselves and the people whom we govern. Take them in their own social atmosphere, surrounded by its own checks and influences, and the cultivator of India is as truthful as any other peasant; indeed, on some points and occasions, singularly more so; but remove him from his atmosphere to one where he feels free from the circumscribed, but all-potential, social opinion, which forms the

very rule and essence of his mind and habits, and you at once strip him of the only real principles which actuate his conduct in life. In a word, our system is a failure, because it ignores the fact that in India there is as yet no such thing as public opinion among the millions; with them local opinion is all in all.

Centralization of power is essential to our supremacy; but centralization of authority in the administration of civil and criminal justice, though often confounded with the former, is a wholly distinct affair, and is in direct antagonism to the abnormal condition of a pauper agricultural population, with whom local, and not public, opinion is the mainspring of life. Simple as this distinction may seem to those, who, like the writer, have passed years of life amid the cultivators of India, and lying, as it does, at the very root of any scheme for the due police and judicial administration of such a people as we have to deal with, yet, there are no indications that this simple elementary consideration has ever either been applied or kept clearly in view.

One point must not be lost sight of, or blinked from subserviency to the cant of English prejudices. It is of great political importance, though the fact is overlooked, that civil and political employment should be open to military men. Not only does this circumstance incite the army, generally, to the acquisition of the Eastern languages and to a knowledge of the people; but it insures to the British Government, by their employment in such charges, military men practically conversant with the character and habits of our vast population; it forms a class of officers of a high stamp, men fit to cope with such emergencies as might, at any unforeseen moment, arise in an empire constituted as that of India. Overweening security is out of place; those who know our position best avow its *internal* dangers, and confess the precarious nature of our footing. At a moment when least expected, there may be need for a class of men, who, to the professional confidence of experienced officers, knowing what the sword can do, unite an intimate acquaintance with the country and its institutions. These are the men for times of peril; and the Indian Government should always have them at command. They are as cheap, and, when properly selected, as efficient a civil machinery as the Government can obtain: and, though we do not go the length of Colonel Sutherland, who advocated one united service for India, for which those entering it should be trained in the first instance to habits of military

life, because, in our opinion, such a united service would be too exclusive: yet, undoubtedly, the example of the Arracan, the Tenasserim, the Saugor and Nerbudda, and the Punjab territories, proves how extensively such machinery may be applied, not only beneficially to the people, but with financial and political advantage to the Government. The same reasoning applies more strongly to the political department, in which, as Mr. Elphinstone justly observed, military experience is an essential element of an efficient political officer's training.

Haileybury should be abolished, and candidates for the civil appointments in the gift of the Directors should either be passed College-men, whose standing and ability would thus be known, or, if not College-men, they should be made to go through the ordeal of an examination before independent examiners. We advisedly say passed College-men, because we think it a great misfortune both to men themselves and to the service, when they come out too young and half educated: it prolongs a (to the State) very expensive period of probation and of empirical acquisition of knowledge, at the cost, not only of the Government, but also of the people. It would of course be easy to ensure that the College course had comprehended the study of the principles of international, civil, and criminal law, and that the wide subject of jurisprudence had entered largely into the line of study. With this provision, the usual collegiate course and its concomitant rivalry with the foremost youth of the nation would far out-balance any supposed advantages from matriculation in such an institution as that of Haileybury, and would furnish functionaries of far higher promise.

In the structure of this colossal Empire the army is the iron column and rafter that forms the skeleton, and braces the whole vast edifice together; it is therefore both its strength and its weakness—its strength, if sound and well arranged; its weakness, if there be faults in the casting and in the *equilibrium* of the parts. The question whether the armies of India should become in name what they are in fact, the armies of the Crown, is one of very grave moment, not with reference to the change of name, for that in itself might be made a high compliment to the armies who, on so many hard-fought fields, have borne the Royal colours to victory; but with respect to the organic changes which might follow the transfer. Managed with attention to the present constitution of these armies, and to the peculiarities of the con-

ditions of service in India, the change might be highly advantageous for England, and no detriment to India,—on the contrary, a benefit. But effected under any narrow spirit of class or service jealousy, the result might be rapidly evil. For England it cannot but be a great disadvantage, in case of necessity, that the Crown, instead of having the whole of its armies from whence to select instruments, should be limited to a small portion, and that thus the country should be deprived of the services of trained and experienced men, because two-thirds of the British army, and a far larger proportion of its artillery, are designated Company's troops. It is evident that, had the Indian armies been Royal ones, in the course of reliefs, exchanges, and the like, there would have been now, in case of conflict with any European foe, many an experienced officer available in England—a matter of no small moment in every arm; for of all trades war is that in which experience is most indispensable, and usually most dearly bought. Though devoted to India's welfare, we are national enough to wish England to derive every possible advantage from this great school of soldiery; and provided this were not done at the expense of the efficiency of the Indian armies, and of the good feeling which fortunately pervades them, nothing but satisfaction could accrue from a measure calculated to improve the position of every man and officer in them, and to render available to the Crown a greater mass of military experience. Wisely, generously, and judiciously, however, the measure must be carried out, otherwise the present anomalous arrangement is under present circumstances best and safest.

Instead of entertaining apprehensions that the interests of the Indian army would suffer by that body becoming an integral part of the Royal army, we anticipate the very reverse; and are confident that in case of war in Europe her India-trained officers would occupy an analogous position to the Africa-trained officers of the French army; and England would have as large a field from which to select the men of established skill and courage as is enjoyed by any European state. France may boast of her African generals and officers; Russia of those who have served in the rough school of the Circassian frontier and in Hungary; Austria of the soldiery that saved the empire when revolt seemed the spirit of every province; but the men who have fought against Afghans, who have shared in the bloody conflicts with Sikhs; who have seen war in marshy Pegue, on the arid plains of the Punjab, and amid the iron ridges of the Hindu Kush

and the Suffeid Koh, need not hesitate to compare their apprenticeship to the profession of arms with those who, in the West, have learnt their craft amid other scenes and circumstances. The transfer of the army of India to the Crown needs, however, a more careful disquisition; a mere casual notice in the midst of other subjects cannot do the question justice, for it demands a grave, deliberate, and impartial review of the whole circle of its many most important bearings and associated difficulties.*

* It will be noticed that these remarks were penned some years before the outbreak of the Crimean war; and further, that as early as this my father not only realized the danger of the existing system from a national point of view, but also foresaw the possibility of the mistakes which were made when the measure he was advocating came to be carried out.

VI.

THE BURMESE WAR.

(Written for the *Calcutta Review* in 1852.)

THE year fifty-two of a century is clearly not the fortunate one for the kings of Burmah. One hundred years ago the Peguers, under Bonna Della, to use Syme's most peculiar and original Burman orthography, took Ava, captured Dweepdee, the last of a long line of Burman kings, and flattered themselves that Pegue was henceforward to be the capital of the empire. Probably Dweepdee felt as little grateful on that occasion to the "renegade Dutch and native Portuguese," through whose assistance this consummation had been brought about, as his present Burman majesty does at this interesting moment to General Godwin and his "renegade" English, as the lord of the white elephant doubtless considers them. The triumph of the Peguers in the eighteenth century was, however, but short: for Alompra arose, and turned the tide of victory in favour of his Burman followers. The reins of empire soon fell from the hand of the Peguan monarch, and—if we are to believe the meagre records of that period—the rise of Alompra, and the humiliation of the Peguans, were in part ascribable to the covert friendship and assistance of the English factory at Negrais.

A century sees the aspect of Eastern affairs altered wonderfully. A hundred years ago Clive and Lawrence, pitted against the able Dupleix, had a hard struggle to maintain, and the petty clandestine aid which the Negrais factory could afford the Burmans, probably a little powder and some untrustworthy muskets, scarce forms a greater contrast to the force and its equipments now at short notice hurled against them, than does the narrow footing made good on the shores of India by the valour of Clive and Lawrence, to the modern Anglo-Indian Empire in its gigantic magnitude. The Burman humiliation of 1752 was not destined to

be of long duration, and the gentlemen of the Negrais factory soon repented themselves of the countenance given to the Burmans. The change of policy was too late for the Peguers, the star of Alompra was in the ascendant, and the Burmans were quickly freed from a hated yoke. So far as the Peguers are concerned, 1852 promises almost as hopefully for them as when Bonna Della took Ava; for, although General Godwin has not as yet accomplished that feat, Rangoon, the city of Alompra's founding, is once again in the hands of the English, and if the next cold weather sees our flag on Amerapoora, the Alompra will be found with difficulty, who, with his Burmans, shall be able to strike those colours and plant his own. Indeed, the "sun-descended king," and his "multitude of umbrella-wearing chiefs," must by this time feel rather uncomfortable as to the issue of a contest which the former war with the British taught them to be hopelessly unequal, and of a very different character from the wars with the "Elder Brother" of China, to which Burmans are rather fond of adverting.

If not too much occupied with the internal troubles of his own empire, the "Elder Brother" must, too, we should think, be participating in the uncomfortable emotions to which the "Younger Brother" must now be a prey; and as the Department for Foreign Affairs is seldom wholly asleep among the celestials, the vermilion pencil has probably before this been penning a despatch, if not to the "Younger Brother dwelling in golden palaces to the westward," at least to the Tsoun-tu of the Yunan frontier, to watch well the gold and silver road, and to keep a sharp look out after the "red-bridled barbarians," who, though not now "madly careering the celestial waters" in hostile array, threaten to acquire a dangerous proximity, in fact, to touch the South-Western frontier of China. The Tsoun-tu, as in duty bound, will be furbishing up and adding to the fierceness of the indescribable dragons and unclassified tigers, on the jacket breasts and backs of the great military officers, and will be exciting the courage of his brave soldiers by visions of peacocks' tails, and red, blue and white mandarin buttons. We are not scholars enough to know whether those queer combinations of strokes at every imaginable angle, called Chinese characters, would reveal to an experienced eye the tremors of a nervous penman; but if the Tsoun-tu of the Yunan frontier chanced to observe a want of firmness in the strokes of the vermilion pencil, when it warned him to be on the alert against the English, the fact would be pardonable. That power, which, step by step, wherever in the East it has set its foot, has not only

subdued its neighbours, but gradually annexed their territories; that power, whose mission on earth seems to be to belt the sphere with its colonies and possessions, must seem to the "Elder Brother" fast encircling his celestial empire, and drawing around it a web of ominous strength and structure. Lord Gough's operations in the Yangtse-kiang, and the humiliating peace which redeemed the empire of China from immediate dissolution, have left the English posted conveniently for aggression along the seaboard from Canton to Chusan; Labuan, the Straits Settlements, and the Tenasserim and Arracan Coasts, are the links of the chain; and now if Amerapoorá shall be occupied, and the golden and silver road between Yunan and that capital open to the English, the doom of the celestials will appear certain. Lord Ellenborough when he prescribed, that on no pretence whatever permanent footing on the continent of China was to be established, saved that empire for awhile from the rapid dismemberment with which our successes threatened it; but the foresight which dictated such instructions seems never to have contemplated what the wielder of the vermilion pencil must now regard as a not unlikely consummation, that in the course of the expansion of our enormous Indian empire, its boundaries may shortly be conterminous with those of China on the south-west; and that in spite of all precautions to the contrary, the outposts of our battalions, and the gay-liveried, fantastically-flagged, and ill-armed masses of China, may soon again come into awkward juxtaposition. The "Elder Brother" may well feel a horror creep down to the very extremity of his right regal pig-tail when he receives the news that we are again soldiering in Burmah; visions of Chin-kyan-foo and Nankin will disturb the sacred pillow, whilst the ghosts of the long line of chests of dollars, which left the Royal Treasury as a *douceur* to the outside barbarians, will haunt His Majesty's dreams.

It may be reasonably doubted, too, whether the sensations of other "Younger Brothers," besides the unhappy one of Ava, will continue to be of the most agreeable description. There must be a flutter among all the trans-gangetic monarchs, who will feel that if the eagle builds its nest in the midst of them, whilst brood after brood of its young are finding shelter along the cliffs of the circumjacent seas, they may look to having their royal feathers seriously ruffled ere long. Such anticipations as these, with the near example of the Rajah of Sarawak's ability in establishing himself in a chiefship, will hardly favour Sir J. Brooke's negotiations with the Prince Chou Fao, unless indeed

fear outweigh jealousy, and the dread caused by the fate of Burmah stimulate the Court to facilitate access to Bangkok and Siam. Chou Fao is said to be an intelligent man, and to have men around him who understand English; and if by chance any of these should bring to his notice that the English Press, when drawing attention to Neal's work on Siam, already speak of that empire, "should the conduct of the Burmese be such as to compel us to take possession of their country," as the "only independent state between our boundary of the Indus on the west, and Hong-Kong on the east," Chou Fao, although he may smile at the geographical knowledge which ignores Cochin-China, will think that coming events cast their shadows before, when the gentlemen of the Press conclude that "sooner or later we must have to deal with the Siamese as close neighbours, to be regarded as friends or foes." The Cochin-Chinese, those wary folk, will be doubly jealous and apprehensive, and the Shans of all denominations, who are wedged in amid Burmans, Chinese, Siamese, and Peguers, will be well on the alert to side with the strongest, and to place themselves under the protection of those whom, at the moment, whether from proximity or power, it may be most expedient to court and flatter.

Whether it is destined in the counsels of Providence, that our empire shall be largely extended to the eastward, it is not for us to determine; but knowing what has been the course of events hitherto, how regularly our being brought into collision with Asiatic Powers has issued in the absorption of their territories into our empire, it becomes our rulers in the first instance, and all British men in the next, to be well advised of the ground on which they stand, when they assume a hostile attitude towards their neighbours. The venerable hero now at the head of the British army once declared that a great nation ought never to engage in a little war; and judging from the past history of our Indian empire, it would seem that we cannot do so; for however small a war may seem in its commencement, however apparently insignificant the causes that bring it on, it expands in magnitude as it proceeds, and stretches out in its issues to results that at the beginning could not have been foreseen. Being now then fairly embarked upon a war with the Burmese empire, it is a question in which every Briton is concerned, to inquire what are the grounds on which hostilities are declared on our part; whether we be the aggressors or those on whom the aggression has been made; and if it be clearly made out that we have suffered injuries and wrongs,

whether redress might not have been attained by any other means less deprecable than an appeal to arms. Into this inquiry we need scarcely say that no consideration of the possible or probable effects of the annexation of a greater or smaller portion of the Burman territories on the state of the people ought for a moment to be permitted to enter. It may be quite true that the King of Burmah is mad, that he is a great tyrant, and that it would be a great blessing to the people to be delivered from his yoke, and transferred to the gentle sway of our own beloved sovereign. It may be quite true that blessings, physical, intellectual, moral, and religious, would result from our conquest of Burmah; but into the inquiry as to the justice of our cause none of these considerations must be allowed to enter. The question is only this,—had we good reason for declaring war against Burmah? Or rather, was it absolutely necessary for us so to do?

For the prosecution of this inquiry we gladly acknowledge at the outset that the Blue Book before us affords ample opportunity. The statements of Lord Dalhousie are distinct and straightforward, and we read them with a strong conviction that they are the deliverances of a man who feels that he has nothing to conceal. Another point in connection with this Blue Book, which we may mention as worthy of all commendation, is the promptitude of its issue. According to the rate at which these things have sometimes been managed, Burmah might have been conquered and annexed, General Godwin might have taken his seat in the House of Lords as Baron Martaban, and Lord Dalhousie been converted into the Duke of Amerapoor, before the British public had the means of forming any judgment as to the real causes of the war. Whereas, in the present case, the whole proceedings, down to the despatch which left Calcutta on the 6th April, are laid before Parliament on the 4th June. This is as it should be.

Since 1826 we have been at peace with the Burmese, our relations with them being regulated by a treaty concluded at Yandaboo, on the 24th February of that year, and a commercial treaty signed at Ratanapara, on the 26th November, and ratified by the Governor-General, on the 1st September, 1827. By the seventh article of the former of these treaties it is stipulated that, "in order to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two Governments, it is agreed that accredited Ministers, retaining an escort or safeguard of fifty men, from each, shall reside at the durbar of the other, who shall be permitted to purchase or build a suitable place of residence,

of permanent materials." We are not aware whether this article of the treaty was ever implemented by the residence of a Burmese Minister at the Governor-General's durbar. A British Minister did reside at the Burmese Court: but the practice was discontinued a dozen years ago, in deference to the feelings of the King of Burmah. Of this discontinuance we find the following account in a volume entitled *Treaties and Engagements between the Honourable East India Company and the Native Powers in Asia*, published by a former Under-Secretary to the Government of India:—

"Agreeably to the seventh article of the Treaty of Yandaboo, Major H. Burney was, on the 31st December, 1829, appointed British Resident at the Court of Ava.

"In March, 1837, a revolution broke out at Ava, and in April the Prince Tharawadi deposed the king, his brother, usurped the throne, and shortly afterwards put to death the heir-apparent, most of the royal family, and all from whom he apprehended opposition. He denied that the Treaty of Yandaboo was binding on him, contending that it was personal with the ex-king. His conduct towards the Resident was unfriendly in the extreme; in consequence of which Colonel Burney removed the Residency to Rangoon. Towards the close of the year Colonel Burney retired from the office of Resident, in which he was succeeded by Colonel Benson.

"The new Resident was treated with marked indignity by Tharawadi, who evinced great repugnance to the residence of a British officer at his Court, and revived the arrogant pretensions to objectionable ceremonial. In consequence of the inimical and insulting treatment experienced by the Residency, it was removed to Rangoon, and eventually withdrawn altogether in January, 1840. Since this time all communications with the Burmese authorities have been conducted through the Commissioner in the Tenasserim Provinces."

For twelve years then all negotiations with the Court of Burmah have been conducted through the intervention of the Tenasserim Commissioner, and accordingly it was through Colonel Bogle that complaints were, in June of last year, transmitted to the Government of India, of gross injuries inflicted on two commanders of British vessels by the Governor of Rangoon. As the fact of these injuries is not disputed, and as it will be allowed by all that they were of so gross a nature that the British Government was bound to demand such satisfaction as could be given to its injured

subjects, we shall not dwell upon the particulars of the injuries themselves. Upon receipt of the representations of Captains Lewis and Sheppard, backed by testimonials from the merchants residing at Rangoon, the President in Council, after communicating with the Governor-General, who was then absent from Calcutta, intimated to Colonel Bogle that Commodore Lambert had been instructed to proceed to Rangoon, with full instructions to demand reparation for the injuries and oppressions to which Captains Lewis and Sheppard had been exposed. Now this is the first point which is open to question. Why was the usual course of procedure departed from? Why was not Colonel Bogle ordered to conduct the negotiations in the usual way? Lord Dalhousie's answer to this question is the following:—"The absence of any accredited Agent of the British Government at the Court, or in the territories of Ava, increases the difficulty of dealing with such cases as these. Experience of the course pursued by the Burmese authorities towards former Envoys seems, at the same time, to dissuade the Government of India from having recourse to the employment of another mission, if the object of the Government can be accomplished in any other way." We quite agree that the sending of an Envoy in terms of the treaty, merely with a guard of fifty men, would have been tantamount to the sacrifice of the whole fifty-one, and would have led infallibly to the involving of us in an internecine war with Burmah, which it seems to have been the sincere desire of the Governor-General and the Government to avoid if possible. But we do think that it would have been well if the ordinary channel of communication had first been tried, and Colonel Bogle had been instructed, without any demonstrations of hostile intentions in the first instance, to make a firm and decided demand upon the King of Burmah for the dismissal and punishment of the offending officer, and ample pecuniary compensation to the aggrieved British subjects. It is not at all likely that such a demand would have been complied with, but it would, we think, have been better that it had been made, and made in this way. But Lord Dalhousie thought that the more decided method of sending at once an armed Envoy, a "Cromwellian Ambassador," would have the effect of intimidating the Burmese authorities, and so avoiding the necessity of actual recourse to war. And this truth and justice compel us to say, that if Lord Dalhousie's expectation had been realized—and the expectation was not an unreasonable one—and the Burmese authorities had submitted at once to his demands, no fault would have

been found, either by others or by us, with the way in which he had advanced these demands. It would, therefore, be unfair to blame him merely because the event has not accorded with his reasonable expectation; but we cannot help regretting that the usual means had not been tried and exhausted before recourse was had to so extreme a measure as the despatch of an armed flotilla to Rangoon.

To Rangoon, however, did Commodore Lambert proceed, in command of Her Majesty's Ship *Fox*, and the Honourable Company's Steamers *Tenasserim* and *Proserpine*. Captain Latter accompanied the Expedition as interpreter. The Commodore was instructed, in the first instance, only to demand pecuniary compensation from the Governor of Rangoon for the injuries inflicted on Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard; but he was ordered, in the event of such compensation being refused, to forward a letter with which he was charged from the President in Council to the King of Ava, in which His Honour stated his conviction that the King would at once condemn the conduct of the Rangoon Governor, remove him from his office, and order the due compensation to be rendered. On the Commodore's arrival off Rangoon, however, he received such representations from the British subjects resident at Rangoon that he took upon himself to deviate from his instructions, and to decline entering into correspondence with the Governor; he therefore despatched the letter of the President in Council to the King of Ava, and sent Captain Latter to Calcutta to explain his reasons for departing from the orders under which he proceeded on the service entrusted to him. And here the next question occurs—was this deviation from his orders justifiable on the part of Commodore Lambert? Of this our readers will be able to judge after they have perused Captain Latter's statement of the reasons that induced him to act as he did:—

CAPTAIN LATTER TO MR. HALLIDAY.

Calcutta, December 6, 1851.

“With reference to your request that I should draw up a statement, for the information of the President in Council, of the matters which I have been charged by Commodore Lambert to communicate to the Government of India, I will commence by giving a simple account of what occurred from the time the Expedition anchored off Rangoon until I left.

“As Her Majesty's ship *Fox* was proceeding up the river with the

steamers *Tenasserim* and *Proserpine*, and on the day before we arrived off Rangoon, and at a spot some considerable distance from the town, a boat came off to the frigate, containing a Mr. Crisp, an English resident at Rangoon, with a message from the Governor, asking for what purpose the Expedition had made its appearance in the river? Commodore Lambert replied that he came for the purpose of making a communication to the Governor of Rangoon, on certain matters which he would not then allude to. He also requested Mr. Crisp to ask the Governor to appoint a day and hour to receive the said communication.

“The next day we arrived off Rangoon, when, after some time, Mr. Crisp wrote off to say that the Governor had appointed next day but one, Thursday, at 11 o'clock, to receive the communication, and fixed the Custom-house, which was close to the wharf, as the place of meeting; his own house being some two and a half miles inland. The whole of the remainder of Tuesday passed, and a portion of Wednesday morning, without any of the British subjects or Europeans coming off to the frigate, and information was conveyed to the Commodore that the Governor had threatened to cut off the heads and to break the legs of all the foreigners, British or others, who went down the wharf to welcome the frigate. I consequently obtained the Commander's permission to land, entirely alone, and unarmed, so as to give no cause or excuse for misinterpreting my mission, to call upon some of the English residents and others, and to procure information of what was going on, as from their total non-appearance, and no communications having been made from the shore to the frigate, there was no knowing but any mishap might have occurred. I landed accordingly, and sent the frigate's boat back. No obstruction was made to my landing, further than a slight attempt to make me enter the Custom-house, which I knew they would have interpreted into my having entered the frigate in the Custom-house books, just as if it was a common merchant ship. This I easily avoided. I consequently proceeded to visit several of the English residents, and they said that no boats would go off from the shore, they having been prohibited, and they likewise mentioned the threat given out publicly by the Governor.

“On my way up, however, from the wharf I met Mr. Crisp coming down the road, who stated that he was going off with a message from the Governor to Commodore Lambert, requesting the Commodore to unmoor his frigate, and to move a few yards lower down; in fact, among the mercantile shipping, the frigate

having been moored a little above them, and in the middle of the stream. As I was on shore at the time, the Commodore sent for Mr. Edwards, my clerk (who, as you are aware, was for many years the confidential clerk with the former Residencies), who was intimately acquainted with all the usages and etiquette of the Burmese Court, and asked him whether there was anything in the spot his frigate occupied that its occupation should militate against the religious feelings or etiquette of the Court or people of Burmah. Mr. Edwards replied that nothing of the kind was the case, and that it was only their usual way in trying to commence a quantity of petty annoyances, such as were employed in cases of the former Residents and Agents. The Commodore consequently declined moving his frigate.

“Several of the British inhabitants came off with me, and then stated their case to the Commodore.

“During that day information, which appeared quite satisfactory to the Commodore, was brought off that the Governor of Rangoon had sent for the Nakodah, or native captain, of a native Madras ship, a British subject, and had fined him 150 rupees for having lowered the flag of his vessel as the frigate passed up, in compliment to the Commodore’s broad pendant. This appeared a second instance of what may be styled something like impertinence.

“On that day (Wednesday) the British subjects, who had come off, having made their complaints known, *vivā voce*, to the Commodore, were told to put them in writing, which they did in apparently a somewhat hurried manner.

“Early next morning two or three of the English residents came off with information that during the night information had been sent to them by one of the Governor’s Council, to warn the party who were about to land to be on their guard, as the Governor had mooted the subject of seizing the officers who landed as hostages, and if the whole Expedition did not leave immediately to threaten to cut off their heads; and what looked strange was, that the Governor of Rangoon had that night changed the place of meeting from the Custom-house, near the wharf, within a few yards of the frigate, to his own house, some two and a half miles inland, and he never sent any notice of this change. Of course, as the threat of seizing the deputation which was to land came in a very vague manner, not the slightest notice was taken of it. But, in the meanwhile, the Commodore, having weighed everything that had occurred, thought it advisable to suspend the discussion

of his original demand, viz., an apology and compensation for the ill-treatment of Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard, captains of British merchant ships, and to have a written letter delivered to the Governor by Captain Tarleton, commander of the frigate, and myself, stating that he, the Commodore, had intended to have communicated with the Governor of Rangoon on certain specific complaints made against him of maltreatment of British subjects, but that since his, the Commodore's, arrival in the Rangoon waters many fresh instances of his, the Governor's, misconduct towards British subjects had been brought to his notice, and that he, the Commodore, thought it his duty to take other measures than those he had at first intended to pursue.

“This letter was translated by me into Burmese. We landed, went to the Governor's house, escorted by some of the English residents and traders. I read aloud to the Governor, first in English and then in Burmese, the letter, and Captain Tarleton delivered it. The Governor made his appearance in a somewhat informal dress; being dressed in nothing but common white clothes, and smoking a cheroot; whilst all the under governors were in their Court dresses. This was the more to be remarked, because the Governor has several gold crowns, which he wears on state occasions. The European officers were, of course, in full uniform. The Governor wished us to stop and sit down, but Captain Tarleton thought it more prudent to say that we had only been charged to read and deliver the letter to him, and that we had received no instructions about holding any other communication. We then bowed, withdrew, and returned to the frigate. We received no opposition either going or coming.

“The Commodore thought it advisable to send up to the Court of Ava the letter of which he was the bearer, from the Government of India to the King of Ava, together with an explanatory one from himself to the Prime Minister. These letters, viz., to the King and the Prime Minister, were made over to the deputation sent by the Governor of Rangoon on the next day (Friday) on board the frigate, with his answer to the Commodore's previous communication. The Governor of Rangoon's answer contained merely a simple denial of ever doing any injury to British subjects. The person to whom the said letters were entrusted was represented by the deputation to be the Governor's confidential representative, and that any communication made to him was equivalent to being made to the Governor himself.

“I will now proceed to state the reasons that Commodore Lambert

expressed for deviating from his first intentions of demanding an apology from the Governor, and pecuniary reparation to Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard. They were, that the fresh complaints he had received of the Governor of Rangoon's misconduct to British subjects, some of which appeared to him well founded and deserving of notice, proved, in his opinion, that the Governor of Rangoon was unfit to be entrusted with the lives and property of British subjects; and he, the Commodore, appeared to think that when the Governor-General came to know of these fresh instances, he, the Governor-General, might not consider the taking satisfaction for merely Messrs. Lewis and Sheppard's cases sufficient, but might wish to take further steps.

"The Commodore likewise considered the two or three dubious and improper instances of the conduct of the Rangoon Governor towards his frigate and flag showed an inclination to give annoyance and irritation, and that there was much more chance of any discussion coming to a happy and peaceful termination, and no collision taking place, if held with a new Governor than with the present incumbent. Thus he made his removal a preliminary to entering into any discussion."

We think these reasons are sufficient to justify the course that the Commodore adopted, and we believe our readers will think so too. This course was approved of by the Governor-General; who thus stated his views, both in regard to that course, and as to the measures to be adopted in the event of either of several contingencies.

Fort William, December 27, 1851.

"Having regard to the additional long list which was delivered to you, of unwarrantable and oppressive acts committed upon British subjects by order of the Governor of Rangoon, as well as to the personal bearing of that functionary towards the Commodore of the squadron, and of his obvious intention of resorting to the usual policy of the Burmese Court, by interposing endless delays, and disregard of official communications addressed to him, His Lordship is of opinion that you exercised a sound discretion in cutting short all discussion with the Local Governor, and in transmitting at once to the King of Ava the letter addressed to His Majesty by the Government of India.

"Thirty-five days have been allowed for the receipt of a reply from the King, and it is desirable that you should, in the mean-

while, be furnished with instructions for your guidance in every contingency that can be foreseen.

“ Either the King will send a reply, complying with the demand of the Government, by a removal of the Governor, and a payment of compensation to the parties whose cases have been taken up by us, or the King will give no answer, either from the known arrogance of that Court, or from his being kept in ignorance by his servants of the letter addressed to him, or lastly, His Majesty will refuse to concede to the terms of the Government of India.

“ If the King should recognize the justice of our representations, and should comply with them, all difficulty will be happily removed for the present; it will only remain to guard, if possible, against the recurrence of similar causes of complaint for the future.

“ The statements contained in the memorial presented by the British subjects of Rangoon must be received with caution; not having been made the subject of complaint at the time, these additional cases cannot now be made the groundwork of an increased demand for compensation. But it may reasonably be concluded from them that the cases of Captain Lewis and Captain Sheppard are not isolated instances of oppression on the part of the Governor, but that there has long been a systematic course of oppression pursued by him, and habitual violation of rights and treaties.

“ The removal of the present Governor, therefore, will hardly be a sufficient guarantee against the renewal of such conduct by his successors. His Lordship conceives that a British Agent must be placed at Rangoon, in pursuance of the treaty, with the guard of fifty men allowed by the Seventh Article. His influence should further be sustained, for some time to come, by stationing a war-steamer, well armed, in the river of Rangoon, which will probably ensure his being treated with respect, and will, at all events, provide for the personal safety of himself and British subjects in the town, in the event of the Governor proceeding to extremities.

“ If, on the other hand, the King of Ava should refuse to concede the just demands we have made, or should fail, within the ample time allowed, to give any answer to the letter of the Government of India, whether through arrogance, indifference, or the intrigues of his servants in keeping the letter from him, this Government cannot tamely submit to the injury and the insult it has received in the persons of its subjects.

“At the same time, while it is the imperative duty of this Government to maintain the rights of its people, secured by solemn treaties to them, it is a duty not less imperative that the Government should endeavour to obtain redress by the least violent means, and that it should not have recourse to the terrible extremity of war, except in the last resort, and after every other method has been tried without success.

“If the King’s reply should be unfavourable, the only course we can pursue, which would not, on the one hand, involve a dangerous submission to injury, or, on the other hand, precipitate us prematurely into a war which moderate counsels may still enable us with honour to avert, will be to establish a blockade of the two rivers at Rangoon and Moulmein, by which the great mass of the traffic of the Burmese Empire is understood to pass.

“To bombard Rangoon would be easy, but it would, in his Lordship’s judgment, be unjustifiable and cruel in the extreme, since the punishment would fall chiefly on the harmless population, who already suffer from the oppression of their rulers, even more than our own subjects.

“To occupy Rangoon or Martaban with an armed force would be easy also, but it would probably render inevitable the war which we desire in the first instance by less stringent measures to avert.

“An armed ship of war should remain off Rangoon, or near enough to receive British subjects, should they be threatened. If, however, the aspect of affairs, on the receipt of the King’s reply, should be menacing, his Lordship thinks that British subjects should, for security sake, be brought away at once, when the blockade is established.”

Within the prescribed five weeks a reply was received from the King, stating, that in accordance with the demand of the President in Council, the Governor of Rangoon had been recalled, and promising that his successor should be charged to make strict inquiries as to the injuries alleged to have been inflicted on British subjects, and to decide their claims “according to custom.” Thus far, then, matters appeared to be proceeding favourably; and it seemed as if the presence of the flotilla had produced the effect contemplated by Lord Dalhousie in its despatch. But these appearances were speedily dissipated. The new Governor arrived at Rangoon on the 4th January; and at once offered an evidently studied insult to the British plenipotentiary, as we ought now to

designate the Commodore, by refraining from intimating his arrival to him. Whether this was by order from the "Golden Foot," or whether it was that MAHAMENGHLA MENG KHANNYGYAN (!) chose to do a little of the "Bahadur" on his own account, is one of those historical secrets which will never be solved. At all events Commodore Lambert sent Mr. Edwards, the active and trustworthy assistant interpreter attached to the Expedition, to ascertain when it would be convenient for the new Governor to receive a communication from the Commodore, stating that the Commodore would personally wait upon the Governor as soon as the matters at issue were adjusted. The reply was as satisfactory as could be desired, Mahamenghla, &c., &c., would be only too happy to receive any communication from Commodore Lambert, whenever it might suit his convenience to send it. In fact such friendship seemed just about to spring up between Mahamenghla and the Commodore as promised to put that of Pylades and Orestes to the blush for ever. The following day (6th January) was fixed for the delivery of the letter; and on that day Commander Fishbourne, R.N., accompanied by two of his officers, and by Captain Latter and Mr. Edwards, proceeded to the Government House. They were refused admittance, on the plea that the Governor was asleep. On their insisting that he should be roused, his Secretary, after much parley, professed to go into his apartment, and returned with a message that he would see Mr. Edwards, but no one else. Again they averred that the Governor was asleep, and again they stated that he was willing to see Mr. Edwards. After a great deal of discussion, in the course of which Mr. Edwards appears to have had a dagger pointed at his breast, and the officers were refused any shelter from the rays of the sun, except that afforded by a shed erected for the accommodation of the lowest class of suitors at the Governor's Court, the discussion came to an end by the withdrawal of the officers. On reporting to the Commodore the reception that they had met with he was naturally indignant. He resolved to have nothing more to do with this man. He declared the Rangoon river, the Bassein, and the Salween above Moulmein to be in a state of blockade; he wrote to the King, to the effect that he would hold no further communication with the Governor of Rangoon, without special instructions to that effect from the Governor-General; and he seized a ship belonging to the King, which was lying "conveniently" in the Rangoon river, "by way of reprisal."

Now, while we think all sensible men must approve of the other parts of his procedure, this last act, the seizure of the ship, does seem to us matter of regret. The Governor-General thinks it necessary to vindicate the commencement of active hostilities, and does so on such grounds as these:—

“ If it be objected (says he) that the main cause of the present rupture appears to be but a question of form ; that a great Government may well afford to treat such petty slights with indifference ; and that it would be wise for the Government of India to pass by unnoticed, as well the offence itself as the present refusal of apology for it, rather than to be drawn by it into the evils of a war with Burmah, I desire to record my fixed conviction that the Government of India will commit an error, perilous to its own security and at variance with real humanity, if, acting on this view, it shall yield to the pretensions of the Burmese, and shall now patch up a hollow and unsubstantial peace.

“ Among all the nations of the East none is more arrogant in its pretensions of superiority, and none more pertinacious in its assertion of them, than the people of Burmah. With them forms are essential substance, and the method of communication and the style of address are not words but acts.

“ The conduct of the Governor of Rangoon towards the British officers, on the 6th of January, would have been felt as ignominious by the lowest officer at his durbar, if he had himself been subjected to it. The ignominy inflicted on these officers, if it be not resented, will be, and must be, regarded as the humiliation of the power they serve. The insult has been persisted in to the last. The form of address in the letters of the Burmese officers has been that employed towards their inferiors ; and in the conveyance of their official communications a studied disrespect, the most elaborate insolence, have been exhibited.

“ Were all this to be passed over, and friendly relations to be renewed, the ground thus gained by the Burmese would be fully taken advantage of ; the oppressions and exactions to which British subjects at Rangoon have been exposed would be redoubled ; the impracticable discourtesies which have been the steady policy of the Government of Ava since the conclusion of the treaty of 1826, and which have driven away one British Envoy after another from Ava, and subsequently from Rangoon, (till for many years past there has been no representative of this Government in Burmah at all), would be habitually practised

towards the agent who may be placed at Rangoon; and within a very brief period of time the Government of India would be reduced to the same alternative which it has now before it, of either abandoning its subjects, and acknowledging its inability to protect them, or of engaging in a war; on which it would enter with the disadvantage of having, by its previous concessions, given spirit to the exertions (Qu. exactions?) of the enemy, and strengthened their already overweening confidence in their means of successful resistance."

Now, we are neither Cobdens nor Malmesburys, to deny altogether the validity of this defence. It would have been most injurious had Commodore Lambert overlooked this insult offered to his officers, and his official communication sent through them, and had he gone on treating with the Governor of Rangoon as if nothing had happened. We fully agree with Lord Dalhousie, then, that Commodore Lambert could not pass over this act of studied contumely without notice. But to have noticed it *in some way*, and to have avenged it *in the special way* in which Commodore Lambert did avenge it, are two things altogether different; and while his Lordship's pleading fully covers the one, it does not, in our estimation, extend to the other of these essentially different things. As the King had so promptly disavowed the conduct of the previous Governor of Rangoon, we think he was entitled to an opportunity of stating whether he approved of the doings of this one; and it does seem to us that no evil would have resulted if the Commodore had done all that he did, with the important exception of the seizure of the *Yellow Ship*, and had made a peremptory demand of the King that he should command the Governor to proceed on board the *Fox*, accompanied by the principal native inhabitants of Rangoon, and a deputation of the British subjects resident therein, and in their presence, and in that of the officers of the squadron, to make to Captain Fishbourne, and the officers who had accompanied him, such an apology as Commodore Lambert should dictate to him. Whether the "Golden Foot" would have acceded to this demand or not we cannot determine. Very probably he would not; but his refusal would have put us into a more *comfortable* position in a national point of view than that which we actually occupy. And after all it is far from impossible that the King would have complied with such a demand. We see no reason to believe that the removal of the original offender from his Government was not

done in good faith; and it is not difficult to suppose that his successor, when dressed in his new authority, and at a distance from the Golden Foot, may have acted a part the very opposite to that which he was instructed to act.

The seizure of the King's ship was then the first act of war on our part. On the 16th the Commodore moved his flotilla down the river, in order to carry out the blockades that he had announced, the *Hermes* having the seized ship in tow. The *Fox* was fired into from the stockades on the bank, and from a large fleet of gun-boats in the river, and then it was that British gunpowder was lighted, and a volley of shot and shell made short work of the enemy's gun-boats. After making arrangements for carrying out the blockade of the several rivers the Commodore proceeded in the *Hermes* to Calcutta to arrange the method of further operations. In the end of January the Governor-General reached Calcutta. The *ultimatum* of the British Government was communicated to the Governor of Rangoon, and the authorities of Ava, as follows:—

1. "That the Government (Qu. Governor?) should transmit a written apology for the insult to which the British officers had been subjected at Rangoon on the 6th of January last."

2. "That he should pay immediately the sum of 9,900 rupees demanded as compensation to Captain Sheppard and Captain Lewis."

3. "That he should consent to receive, in due and fitting manner, the Agent who should be appointed under the treaty of Yandaboo."

These terms being rejected, it was finally announced to Commodore Lambert, on the 13th February, that the Government of India had "determined to proceed at once to exact, by force of arms, the reparation which it had failed to obtain by other means." Such troops as could be spared were ordered to proceed to Rangoon, and Lieut.-General Godwin was appointed to the command of the Expedition.

The question now, after securing Moulmein and Arracan from insult, which was promptly done, was, which of two courses to adopt. With the aid of Her Majesty's ships, and of the Bombay and Bengal Steam flotillas, it was in the power of the Indian Government at once, by the taking of Rangoon and the occupation of the seaboard of Pegue, to strike a blow which might have the effect of intimidating the Court of Ava, and of inducing

it to submit to our demands; or, by waiting until the end of the monsoon, that is, for eight or nine months, operations on a large scale might be organized and undertaken, with a whole dry season available for their successful completion. The first plan held out the prospect, if the Court of Ava were intimidated, of an immediate settlement of the quarrel: and as it was well known that the Governor-General contemplated returning to England, there were weighty public and private motives to induce him to adopt that course which held out the hope and chance of a speedy pacification. On the other hand it was clear that with every exertion the force requisite to strike an effectual blow could not rendezvous at the mouths of the Irrawaddy before the beginning of April, and that therefore forty days were all that could be counted upon for military operations; that the enemy, conscious how limited the time was before the setting-in of the monsoon, usually about the 10th of May, might, though the chief places in Pegue were taken, not be sufficiently humiliated to force him to succumb; that then, though Rangoon, Martaban, Bassein, and even Prome might be captured, our troops must remain inactive amid the swamps of Pegue for seven months, and would have to be there maintained at great cost and no small risk of destruction by disease; and that ultimately, in November, in order to resume operations and bring the war to a close, additional forces must be brought into play, and the second plan be thus superadded to the first, without any real advantage having been derived from the earlier operations; the cost of the war in men and money being thus much enhanced.

The question was of importance, and required a more thorough knowledge of the policy and power of the Burmese than was possessed by our Government. The experience of the former war was, however, against the probability of our views being attained by immediate operations at the mouths of the Irrawaddy, for though success was pretty certain with respect to the capture of Rangoon, and of any other petty places on the coast or delta of the Irrawaddy we chose to appear against, yet there was no analogy between the blockade or the taking of such places and similar energetic measures against the river mouths and harbours of a civilized mercantile people. A Burman king thinks no more of removing a town than a British army in India thinks of striking its tents; and he requires to feel the pressure of events near to himself in order to be influenced. The capture of a far distant

town is too remote a stroke to operate on the nerves of the monarch at the capital. Such a blow is more likely to exasperate than to intimidate; for danger being remote, an insult of the kind irritates the pride of an arrogant barbarian. Where there is a just appreciation of relative power such a stroke might bring the weaker party to reason at once; but the conduct of the Burmese authorities had not been indicative of any capacity on their parts correctly to estimate our resources, as compared with their own. Nor is this surprising, when it is remembered that since the close of the last war they have had no opportunity of watching the change which a steam navy produces, as respects facility of operations in Burmah. The great advance made in this branch of the public service has vastly increased our powers of aggression against such countries as Pegue; but there had been nothing to bring this fact practically home to the senses of the Burmese or their king. They had remained exactly as they were in 1824-26, both mentally and physically; and their irregular and ill-armed levies are not a whit improved either in armament or organization. Their stockades are the same—their war-boats exactly what we first found them a century ago. Stationary themselves in every thing, and devoid of the opportunity of watching others in consequence of their own isolation, it is not surprising that they should entertain the notion that we are exactly the same warriors we were before. They could not be expected to calculate on the facilities we have acquired in the course of a quarter of a century. Steam has given wings to whole regiments—ay, to overwhelming batteries of the heaviest artillery as well as to regiments—and of this the Burman would have no idea from anything he had witnessed.

An argument in favour of early operations, and a sudden stroke, may have been deduced from the terror which the exhibition of our increased facilities of aggression might be expected to produce; but such a lesson is not general, and it takes time to uproot a permanent stationary idea from the mind of a whole people.

Considerations of economy, of the health and efficiency of the troops, and of complete results, were opposed to littoral operations in the month of April; it was a choice between certainty on the one hand and chance on the other. The Press, both in India and in England, has expressed itself very stringently against those who advocated certainty in preference to chance; but it may be doubted whether any single individual knowing the Burmese, their

country, its climate, and our own available resources in men, sided with the Press. All correct elements of calculation usually resorted to in estimating the relative values of projected military expeditions were undoubtedly put aside, when a chance of immediate success, with its accompanying drawbacks in case of failure of object, was permitted to outweigh a somewhat deferred certainty, comparatively free from the serious inconveniences attending the other course. But, after all, this is a matter of opinion; and we ought to admit that it is much easier to condemn a plan when it has been adopted and has failed than to choose between two plans which are candidates for adoption.

War once decided upon, there was no lack of energy on the part of those entrusted with the preparation of the Expedition. Our establishments, naval and military, gave good proof of their service qualities, and showed that at a moment's notice, if war be the object, they are ready.

Meanwhile, however, judging from the report of an officer despatched to the Aeng Pass, the direct route on Ava across the Arracan mountains, it does not appear that any signs of warlike preparation in the districts around the capital of Burmah were observable. The traders were passing between the two countries, now in a state of war, exactly as if nothing had happened to disturb their peaceful relations, and those coming from Amrapoorra said nothing of rumours of war.

At Rangoon, however, besides the blockade, which injured ourselves far more than the enemy, the state of affairs was very different from that in the neighbourhood of the capital. More shots had passed, and the Governor-General's letter had to be conveyed under a flag of truce. It was received with some show of respect, though the reply on the 2nd February was communicated in very humble guise—a common person in an ordinary canoe conveying the Governor's answer, that as the Governor-General had not approved of the Commodore's measures at Rangoon the Woongee could hold no further communications with him, though he was prepared to negotiate with another Commissioner. A royal letter to Colonel Bogle, the Commissioner at Moulmein, was to the same effect, and requested that some other than Commodore Lambert might be authorized to treat. The Governor-General, who had arrived in Calcutta on the 29th January, aware by these proceedings that it had become futile to entertain hopes of an amicable arrangement, pressed forward with vigour the naval and

military expedition on which he relied for bringing to a speedy termination this most undesirable state of affairs. At the same time, as a last chance of averting war, a letter was addressed to the King of Burmah, and delivered through Colonel Bogle to the Woongee of Martaban. A bombastic harangue to the Burmese who received the letter was listened to with perfect indifference, and made far less impression than would have done the simple statement that if an answer accepting the terms offered by the Governor-General were not received by the 1st April hostilities would commence.

On the 7th March the Bombay squadron of war-steamers was at anchor in the Madras roads. By the 29th March the last of the vessels and steamers conveying the Bengal division of the force had put to sea; but although the final orders for embarkation reached Madras on the 25th, the Madras contingent were not on board until the 31st, and consequently did not reach the rendezvous, the mouths of the Rangoon river, until the 7th April.

The Bengal squadron and troops had all reached the rendezvous on the 2nd April, and General Godwin, finding that no tidings of the squadron from Madras were to be obtained, decided, in communication with Admiral Austin, who had reached the day previous in Her Majesty's ship *Rattler*, to proceed at once to capture Martaban, a weak place on the Burman bank of the river, opposite to Moulmein, the British station on the Salween. The General, immediately on arrival in the Rangoon river, had despatched Captain Latter on board the *Proserpine* with a flag of truce, to ascertain whether a reply from the King had been received, the 1st April having been the day fixed as the period, after which, were no answer received to the Governor-General's letter, hostilities would commence. The flag of truce was not respected, but fired upon, and Captain Brooking, the commander of the *Proserpine*, had to return the fire of the stockades, and to withdraw his little vessel, which he skilfully effected, blowing up a magazine of the enemy, and otherwise doing severe execution, in return for the insult to the flag of truce. No doubt, therefore, could be entertained of the resolve of the enemy to try his strength with the British forces, when the movement on Martaban was decided upon.

Sending on, upon the 2nd, the *Proserpine* to Moulmein, to give notice of projected movements, Her Majesty's steamers *Hermes*, *Rattler*, and *Salamander* left the Rangoon river at daybreak of

the 3rd April, and reached Moulmein at noon of the next day. General Godwin immediately issued orders that the troops destined for assaulting Martaban were to be in readiness for embarkation by 4 P.M., and by that evening a wing of H.M. 80th, a wing of H.M. 18th, a wing of the 26th Madras N.I., with detachments of Bengal Artillery and Madras Sappers, in all about 1,400 men, were on board.

Martaban is in itself a most insignificant place, and provided the steamers could be brought into position, so as to admit of the effective play of their artillery it was not possible for the Burmese to defend the place. Approach to it, however, is difficult, and though Captain Brooking of the *Proserpine* knew the river well, and led the way, yet the *Hermes* grounded.

The *Rattler*, however, after putting General Godwin on board the *Proserpine*, managed well, and taking up a position at a little upwards of a couple of hundred yards from the town defences, opened a destructive fire. Meanwhile the *Proserpine* was engaged in taking the troops from the larger steamers and in landing them, keeping up at the same time a constant fire with her guns. The enemy, loosely estimated at 5,000 men, offered no resistance, and the place was taken, with only a few wounded on the side of the British. Having garrisoned the place with the 26th M.N I., and some Madras Artillery, the General took with him the wings of the 18th and 80th Regiments, the company of Bengal artillery, and some Madras sappers, and again reached the rendezvous of the Rangoon river on the 8th.

Whilst the movement on Martaban was taking place Commodore Lambert, having with him Lieut.-Colonel Coote, and three companies of the 18th Regiment, was finding work for the *Fox*, *Serpent*, *Tenasserim*, and *Phlegethon* in destroying stockades up the Rangoon, river and thus disembarrassed the approach from the Bassein creek nearly to the King's wharf at Rangoon of these river defences. On the 5th several stockades were thus taken and burnt, without any casualties. These bonfires were so effectual that General Godwin afterwards could scarcely find a trace of where the stockades had stood.

The General, on the 8th of April, had the satisfaction of seeing the Bombay squadron and the Madras division of troops at the rendezvous. He thus found available for operations the following force, naval and military, which we copy from the lucid abstract of the Rear-Admiral's Secretary, Mr. G. P. Martin :—

HER MAJESTY'S SHIPS.			
Rattler	130	Men	11 Guns.
Fox.....	298	„	40 „
Hermes....	120	„	6 „
Salamander.....	135	„	6 „
Serpent	125	„	16 „
A Gun-boat.....	10	„	1 „
	<u>818</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>80 Guns.</u>

BOMBAY STEAM SQUADRON.			
Feroze	230	Men	7 Guns.
Moozuffer	230	„	7 „
Zenobia... ..	200	„	6 „
Sesostris.....	135	„	4 „
Medusa	60	„	5 „
Berenice.....	97	„	1 „
	<u>952</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>30 Guns.</u>

BENGAL STEAM SQUADRON.			
Tenasserim.....	80	Men	6 Guns.
Pluto.....	86	„	7 „
Phlegethon.....	86	„	6 „
Proserpine	86	„	6 „
Enterprise.....	70	„	2 „
Fire Queen. . . .	70	„	2 „
Mahanuddee.....	22	„	4 „
	<u>500</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>33 Guns.</u>

TROOPS.	
H.M.'s 18th Royal Irish	850 Men.
H.M.'s 51st Regiment.....	900 „
H.M.'s 80th Regiment.....	460 „
Five Companies of Artillery..	517 „
Bengal 40th N.I.	}2,800 Men.
Madras 35th N.I.	
Ditto 9th N.I.	
Gun Lascars	70 „
Two Companies Sappers and Miners.....	170 „
	<u>5,767 Men.</u>

ORDNANCE.	
8-Inch Howitzers	2 in No.
24-Pr. ditto	6 „
9-Pr. Guns.....	8 „
	<u>16 Guns.</u>

Making a total of Ships of War.....		19
Men.....		8,037
Guns.....		159

Fourteen transports (7,888 tons) and the King of Ava's ship, were the adjuncts to the above force, and carried coal, commissariat, ordnance, and engineer stores. One of them, the *Tubal Cain*, of 787 tons, was employed as an hospital ship.

The 9th being passed in making dispositions, on the 10th the fleet, advancing up the river, came to anchor below the Hastings' Shoal. On the 11th, as the tide served, the vessels crossed the shoal, and were soon engaged in silencing the stockades, and subsequently in storming and burning those on the immediate bank of the river. This important day's work cleared the approaches to Rangoon, and secured the orderly and undisturbed landing of the troops at daybreak of the 12th.

By seven o'clock General Godwin had on shore, and ready to advance, H.M.'s 51st, H.M.'s 18th, the 48th Bengal N.I., and

some of his field-pieces—and with this portion of the force he contemplated that morning storming Rangoon. When the column advanced it did not proceed far before guns opened upon it, and skirmishers showed themselves in the jungle. Here it was discovered that a strong stockade, called in the last war the White House Picquet, lay just in the way of the advance. Four field guns immediately opened upon the work; whilst a storming party of four companies of H.M.'s 51st advanced, under cover of the jungle, to the assault. The experience of the last war had been lost sight of. The critical moment in attacking a stockade is when you break forth from the jungle, and come upon the open space cleared around it; once there, the quicker you close upon the work, plant your scaling ladders, and assault, the better; the head of the column, if this be smartly done, suffers little, and the stockade is carried, with a few casualties among the rearmost sections. Hesitation, however, or a halt at the edge of the jungle which you have cleared, entails a certainty of loss, and often a failure. Judging from the despatches, there seems to have been a momentary check, for Major Fraser, of the Engineers, mounted alone the enemy's defences, and his gallantry "brought around him the storming party."

It is evident that this unexpected taste of the enemy made the General bethink himself of the remainder of his force, and of the possibility of the battering guns being of use in the attack of the main position at the Dragon Pagoda. More destructive than the enemy, the sun had struck down Warren, St. Maur, Foord, Griffith, and Oakes, some of his leading and most valuable officers; and all were suffering from fatigue and exhaustion; rest, rations, and reinforcements were necessary before the more serious assault on the Pagoda could be attempted. Bivouacking, therefore, on the ground, the remainder of the 12th and all the 13th were passed in landing the battering guns and the other portion of the force, and in making preparations for the advance early on the 14th. Whilst the troops were thus bivouacked for a couple of days the flotilla was not idle; the Dragon Pagoda proving to be within reach of the shells of the shipping, a magazine was blown up in the main position of the enemy on the 12th; and the fire continued at intervals throughout the day and night of the 13th with precision and with very formidable effect. Almost the first shell sent into the place on the 12th was said to have burst in the Governor's house, and to have wounded him in the leg; and not only was a magazine destroyed by the bombard-

ment, but during the nights of the 12th and 13th the whole of the new town was burnt by the fire from the shipping. There was no cover from this destructive bombardment, and of the 25,000 men whom the enemy was said to have had in his works on the 11th large numbers fled during the three days that the fleet was pouring its shot and shell into every work and stockade that its far-reaching fire could search. None but the bravest of the enemy remained until the 14th, and these, too, necessarily much dispirited by the desertion of so many of their combatants, the loss and destruction of so many stockades, the conflagration of the town, and the immeasurable superiority of the British artillery afloat.

General Godwin, having profited by the lesson he had received at the White House Stockade, and having also given time for the naval bombardment to take full effect, had with him at day-break of the 14th H.M.'s 80th and 18th, and the 40th Bengal N.I. and six field guns. H.M.'s 51st, and the 35th Madras N.I. in reserve, and the 19th Madras N.I., kept open the communications with the shipping. The heavy guns were to be moved by men, and this, the hardest service of the day, the artillerymen and a detachment from the fleet of 120 men under Lieutenant Dorville were to perform.

The new town of Rangoon has been thrown back from the original position on the river bank, to a distance of about a mile and a quarter; it is, as described by the General, nearly a square of about three-quarters of a mile, having at its northern side the Pagoda as a sort of citadel or stronghold. The direct road from the river to the Pagoda "comes up to the south gate running through the new town," and it is probable enough that the enemy expected to be attacked by that road, and made preparations accordingly. Except on the north and east sides, where the Pagoda Hill came into the lines of defences, the town was surrounded by a strong stockade, consisting of stout timbers, sometimes in triple row, backed by a horizontal layer, and the whole braced together so as to form a strong revetment to an earthen rampart varying from fourteen to sixteen feet high, some twenty feet in thickness, and surrounded by a good ditch.

General Godwin's plan of attack was, avoiding the defences of the town, to circle round to the north-east side, when, if he carried the Pagoda, Rangoon was his without more trouble.

Giving the town as "wide a berth" as he could, he drew up his troops at about 800 yards from the eastern side of the Great

Pagoda, under cover of some hillocks, and there patiently awaited the arrival of his battering guns. As soon as these reached him, and were put into position, their fire opened on the eastern entrance of the Pagoda, and with such effect that the already intimidated enemy were driven from their defences. Captain Latter, observing this, suggested that the assault should be instantly given, and volunteered to show the way. Godwin resolved to carry this into execution, and forming a storming party of a wing of the 80th, two companies of the 18th, and two companies of the 40th B.N.I., ordered Lieut.-Colonel Coote to storm the Pagoda. The column had to march over the 800 yards, exposed to such fire as the enemy might have the courage to pour upon it; but their confidence was gone, and except the last volley, which killed Doran and wounded Coote, as the stormers with a wild hurrah rushed up the steps and mastered the position, the defence was feeble and ill-conducted. The enemy's ninety-two guns of various calibres, and eighty-two wall-pieces, were evidently no match for the 159 well-served and abundantly-furnished pieces of the naval and military expedition. Our loss, 17 killed and 132 wounded, during the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th, proves that the Burmese are still what Munro designated them in 1824, when he says "the military character of the enemy is far below that of any of the Indian native powers."

This is not written with a view to derogate from the merit due to our forces engaged. On the contrary, the very handsome terms in which the Governor-General in Council expressed his unqualified approbation of the brilliant service performed was graceful and just; for gallantry, fortitude, and endurance were exhibited by both officers and men. We would only moderate the ebullitions of admiration for the courage and conduct of the enemy which grace the military despatches, and which the returns attached to those despatches do not corroborate.

We are not disposed to be over-critical, for, on the whole, General Godwin has done his work well. A few questions, however, suggest themselves to the peruser of his despatches on the capture of Rangoon. How came the White House Stockade to prove a surprise? Was it prudent to have started, contemplating the storm of the Great Pagoda, with only half his force, and no heavy guns, as he did on the 12th? The fact is that the momentary check, and the first brush with the enemy at the White House Stockade, by making the General more circumspect, and leading him to give ample time on the 12th and 13th for the naval bombardment to produce its full effect, whilst he was causing his

heavy guns and troops to be disembarked, probably prevented a doubtful issue at the Great Pagoda on the 12th. However inferior your enemy, he is never despicable in a defensive position for the strengthening of which ample leisure has been at his command.

Between the 14th April and the 17th May the General appears to have been occupied in putting his troops under cover, and preparing for the monsoon; at the same time finding amusement for the troops in an active search for booty, in the course of which they evinced an iconoclastic zeal that would have gladdened the heart of a Leo the Isaurian. Beyond the detachment of two companies of H.M.'s 51st to reinforce Moulmein, and a fruitless chase after the Rangoon Governor on the 6th, 7th, and 8th, nothing of any importance was done until the detachment destined for Bassein embarked on the 17th May. It consisted of 400 of H.M.'s 51st, 300 of the 9th Madras N.I., 67 Madras sappers, and the naval brigade and marines of H.M.'s frigate *Fox*. The steamers *Sesostris*, *Mozuffur*, *Tenasserim* and *Pluto* formed the squadron, and reaching Negrais on the evening of the 18th, at daylight on the 19th the Expedition proceeded up the Bassein River. At four o'clock in the afternoon the enemy's works came into view, and half an hour sufficed to bring the flotilla to anchor opposite a Pagoda in the centre of the enemy's defences. This had been effected without a hostile shot having been fired; and the 51st, being quickly disembarked, was also permitted to land without opposition. An attempt at a parley was, however, interrupted by a discharge from the line of works; upon which the Pagoda was forthwith carried, and also a mud fort of some extent, but incomplete. At the latter Major Errington and several officers and men were wounded; but the casualties were on our side few, whilst the loss of the enemy appears to have been considerable, the fire from the shipping being as usual most destructive.

Bassein being thus taken with small loss, and a garrison of 160 men of H.M.'s 51st, and 300 of the 9th Madras N.I., with two howitzers left there, the remainder of the troops re-embarked, and on the 23rd May again reached Rangoon.

The arrival of the 67th Bengal N.I., on the 10th May, had somewhat strengthened General Godwin's hands, and enabled him to take Bassein, and garrison it, without seriously weakening himself at Rangoon. Bassein is a point of importance in the military occupation of Pegue, both with respect to the command of the navigation of the noble river on which it is situated, which forms

one of the main arteries of the delta of the Irrawaddy, and also with regard to the proximity of the southern extremity of the British Provinces on the Arracan coast. With Martaban, Rangoon, and Bassein in his possession the General has established a good base in Pegue; and as he captured at Bassein fifty-four guns, besides thirty-two wall-pieces, he has materially reduced the Burmese artillery resources, having, in the course of these operations, stripped them altogether of one hundred and fifty-one pieces of ordnance of various calibres, and one hundred and twenty-two gingals or wall-pieces.

Into Bassein he had to throw additional artillerymen, and the remainder of the Madras 9th N.I.; he was therefore scarcely able to spare any considerable strength of men from Rangoon for distant enterprizes, though the fulness of the river, were not the inclemency of the moonsoon a serious drawback, was much in favour of an advance to Prome. Such an advance is the only event in the history of the war that has as yet transpired; but as the details have not been distinctly given, and the result seems to have been confined to the taking of an outpost, it is not necessary to enter into any detail respecting it. The Governor-General has also visited the seat of war, but for what special purpose, or with what present or prospective result, has not transpired. The troops seem to have been kept in good health and spirits. Captain Latter has been placed in charge of Rangoon as magistrate, and the people, who fled away on our taking possession of the place, have returned in large numbers.

Hitherto all military operations have been conducted under the support of an overwhelming fire from the shipping; the Burman artillery, mostly of small calibre, ill-provided, ill-served, and scattered over a series of extensive works, was evidently no match for the concentrated fire of heavy shot and shell which our well-appointed floating batteries could pour into any work that had the misfortune of lying within reach of the river. Not only is there no secure cover for the defenders of the stockades from our formidable projectiles, but with singular ignorance the Burmans have not had the ordinary foresight to supply their temporary or permanent works with tolerably safe magazines. Wherever, therefore, the shot and shell of the shipping can search a work, it is evident that a few rounds teach the enemy that it is untenable, and therefore it is hastily abandoned. So long therefore as our steam flotilla can co-operate, and the enemy chooses to place himself in positions favourable to the combined action of our land

and floating forces, the game must needs be easy. It remains to be seen whether they will alter their system of defensive positions, and with what spirit and what judgment the war, as it ceases to have the delta of the Irrawaddy for its theatre, will be conducted.

The Court of Ava probably calculates on being able, during the monsoon, to organize the means for a defensive campaign, to open before the British forces shall be reinforced. There has as yet been no indication that, humiliated by the losses they have undergone, the Burman Court inclines to concession; and therefore it is pretty clear that that extended and costly war, which the Governor-General sought to avert, has yet to be undertaken, and that the King of Ava, not driven to despair by our successes, will be busily engaged in preparing for the struggle which awaits his kingdom and himself. His arrogance and confidence may be based on a very undue estimate of his own power and resources as measured with those of his enemy; but neither his arrogance nor his confidence seems shaken, and knowing this, there is now no option but to prosecute the war at the right season vigorously to a speedy issue. There can be little doubt that, with the means which can be concentrated for such an operation, and with our present knowledge of the countries on the Eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, Amerapoorá should be in our hands by the end of January, 1853, or at latest in February.

Then, however, will come the question, how to dispose of the conquest. The Indian Press are, and have been, unanimous in the cry for annexation. From the first the whole weight of the local Press has been unhesitatingly cast into the scales on the side of war, with a view to extension of empire and the appropriation of territory. Judging by his movements, by his repeated endeavours to obtain by negotiation attention to his demands, and by his clear statements contained in the Blue Book, which it is impossible to read without a conviction of the honesty of their writer,—the only man who seems to have been really desirous of a peaceable arrangement of differences has been Lord Dalhousie. Too far from the scene to check affairs in their commencement, to watch and effectually curb the early progress of events, the initiative was taken, differences took form and mould, affairs were in fact in train, before they could come before him; but as soon as they were brought under his eye he seems to have comprehended at once the “solemnity” (it is his own expression) of the crisis that had arisen; and while he did all that could be done to avert the

horrors of war, he exhibited the greatest energy in arranging for its effective prosecution when it was seen to be inevitable. How far the decision of the question of annexation or non-annexation may be left to him, we do not know; but our earnest hope is that either he, or whoever may have the "solemn" task of making the arrangements consequent on the war, may act in the same spirit which he manifested while yet there was a hope that it might not be necessary to imbue our hands in Burman blood.

We do not enter upon the question whether we have any *right* to annex Burmah; it is enough for us that no *wrong* would be done by our not annexing it, and so the question is left to be argued on the ground of expediency. Now it is well that the British public should understand clearly what the annexation of Burmah presages—nay, entails. It may be stated in few words:—the rapid establishment of an empire extending from Arracan to Chusan, including, of course, Siam, Cochin-China, and the Shan States. The acquisition and completion of our colossal Anglo-Indian Empire has taken just a century; the appropriation of the other, the general limits of which we have now stated, will not require so much as half that time, for we already encircle it with outposts, and, thanks to steam and our Indian empire, the means and opportunities of aggression are much facilitated. Allowing for such moderation and circumspection as will satisfy the conscience of the English public, half a century is about the maximum that may be allowed for the agglomeration of an Indo-Chinese empire. During this half century about a dozen wars will be forced upon us, every one of which we will have to go through with, however sincere be our profession of a non-aggressive policy. Meanwhile there is one small item to be borne in mind. Let any of our readers take a Macculloch's *Geographical Encyclopædia*, or any other decent work of reference which pretends to statistical information, and having made a rough approximation to the population of the Anglo-Indo-Chinese empire, which is to gain its "natural limits," say from A.D. 1880 to A.D. 1900, let us have an estimate of the European troops requisite, horse and foot, first for the winning, and then the preservation of these vast regions; and also let us have a guess at the increase to our navy essential under such circumstances. Assuming the population of India at 140 millions, and that during the last ten years the European troops, Royal and Company's, have averaged 35,000 men, it needs no great amount of sagacity to ascertain the probable increase to the British army, when at least 300 millions more (some would say 400 millions),

have to be overcome and to be placed under its control. No one acquainted with the emigration returns of the British Empire will doubt the power of the nation to supply the raw material of soldiery for an additional 70,000 men, or even for another 100,000; nevertheless, many grave considerations are involved in this necessity (which will be inevitable) of having a European army in Asia of from 100,000 to 130,000 men to maintain at all times in complete efficiency. Unlike India, most of these countries would fail in at all meeting the expenses of conquest; and therefore, although the analogy may hold good as to the moderate proportion of European troops that might be sufficient to control the vanquished millions, it by no means follows that the ratio as to revenue would be maintained. Not until we held the tea-producing country, as well as its opium feeder, could there be a hope of balancing receipts and expenditure; and before that condition could be attained we must have passed through from thirty to fifty years of chronic war expenditure. Now where are the financial means to be found for such a protracted expenditure? There is no elasticity in Indian taxation, and you cannot with safety swell its territorial debt to a much higher figure. England, therefore, would have to advance the funds for the conquests, the prospects of which the Calcutta Press hails with such unfeigned and unanimous delight. Imagine the feelings with which a Chancellor of the Exchequer would rise in the House of Commons and explain that, though with great inconvenience to the available defensive means of England, considerable reinforcements had been despatched to the Cape, and a heavy expenditure incurred in that colony; yet as these exertions had failed to bring the Kaffir war to a successful termination, further sacrifices of men and money must be endured, in order, by a vigorous prosecution of hostilities, further to compel the savages of Southern Africa to desist from ravaging and destroying Her Majesty's Colony at the Cape. That at the same time it was imperative for the House of Commons to exercise a wise foresight, and to enable the Government to provide for the exigencies of the public service in another quarter of the globe. That the House was aware that Her Majesty's colossal, but unconsolidated Indian Empire employed one-fourth of her standing army, and that—with reference to the extent of those possessions, the many millions under our sway, the unsettled disposition of some of the late acquisitions, petty hostilities with hill tribes on the North-West Frontier, the disordered condition of some of the Native States in the heart of our empire,—that fourth

of Her Majesty's standing army was not a man in excess of the wants of the public service in India. That the latter country could not therefore safely spare permanently a large portion of Her Majesty's regiments for the conduct of a war in Burmah, and for the ultimate annexation of that country, and that provision must be made not only for supplying the European troops withdrawn from India, but also for reinforcing the army in Burmah, as further and more extensive operations must be undertaken, the capture of Martaban, Rangoon, and Bassein having failed to compel the Court of Ava to make reparation and accept our terms. That the House must be perfectly aware that the conquest and the permanent occupation of Burmah would give us an entirely new frontier, would bring us into contact with China, the Shan States, and the kingdoms of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and that as our neighbourhood could not fail to excite the utmost apprehension and jealousy, the force in Burmah must be kept on a footing calculated to impose respect on the border nations, and to ensure the security of the new conquest. That properly speaking, the war had not arisen from any differences between the Government of India and the Court of Ava; there had not, as in the last war, been any invasion of our Anglo-Indian territories, or any refusal to give satisfaction for encroachment. The present hostilities had arisen out of the claim advanced by the commander of an English merchant vessel; the demand for the indemnification of his losses had been made by a British ship of war, and it was not the Company's flag, but Her Majesty's, which had been insulted and fired upon. The war therefore was not undertaken with reference to the interests of Her Majesty's Anglo-Indian Empire, but essentially with respect to the mercantile interests of British subjects, and the protection of trade, and consequently the cost of the war, of the permanent occupation of Burmah, and of securing the new conquest against impending contingencies, could not fairly be made a charge on the territorial debt of India, but must be borne by the British nation. That the House must therefore liberally meet present exigencies, and also provide for future inevitable contingencies!

It has lately been seen, in the case of the Militia Bill, with what opposition a very inadequate measure for the defence of Great Britain has been received, and with what difficulty a measure indispensable for national safety was passed. The reception which would be given to such a demand as that we have sketched, a demand for permanent increase to the British army, with a view

to Asiatic conquests, may be easily anticipated; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be a bold man who should hazard his position and influence on such a proposal. The visions of a chronic state of Asiatic war, with the certainty of present heavy expenditure, and of a very faint and remote probability of ultimately balancing receipts and outlay after the public debt had been swelled to a large amount, could not, however skilfully coloured, prove gratifying to a British Parliament. That body could not be blinded to the eventualities of the new career of Asiatic conquest on which the Government was embarking, and the drain upon the public purse which it must open.

But then, it is said, that if we do not annex Burmah the Americans will. We think the consideration of expense of men and money, that we have supposed likely to weigh so powerfully with the British Parliament, will weigh still more powerfully with the American Congress. But should it be otherwise, and the Americans should establish a footing in Burmah, prepared to take advantage of the first outrage that should be committed on their citizens as a ground for a war of annexation, we cannot see what great inconvenience would arise to us from the proximity of such a Power.

Again it is said that the annexation would be only postponed, and would require to be carried into effect ere long, unless the necessity were averted by the energy of the Americans. Now to this it is a sufficient answer that we have been at peace with the Burmese for twenty-six years; although we were culpably negligent in abandoning the rights which were conferred on us by the treaty of Yandaboo. And there is no reason to believe that, with a good arrangement, and with the experience we now have in dealing with native Powers, a permanent peace might not be secured.

Once more it is said that the transference of the Burmese under our sway would be such a blessing to them, and would produce such blessed effects, by introducing civilization and the gospel amongst them. Now this may be all true; but yet we are not to do evil that good may come; and we believe that the annexation of Burmah would be an act of injustice on our part—as well as an act of great impolicy. We yield to none in our anxiety for the extension of civilization, and the spread of the gospel; but not even for such an end would we employ means inconsistent with that noble precept which embodies at once the concentrated essence of civilization and of the morality of the

gospel, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them."

Averse as the present Governor-General was to this war, one most untimely and unpropitious from every point of view, and which he evidently knew to be such, there can be no doubt that now there is no option left to the Indian Government but to prosecute the war to a speedy conclusion with the utmost vigour, as soon as the season arrives. When this shall have been accomplished, and the Court of Ava sufficiently humiliated, we trust that the British Government will pause before, in obedience to the cry of the Calcutta Press, the annexation of the Burman dominions is decided upon. All our reasonable objects may be otherwise attained, and though the prospect of another series of rapid and brilliant conquests, ending in the formation of a colossal Anglo-Indo-Chinese empire, may be flattering to the pride and restless ambition of many, the true interests of European England call for caution, ere she embark upon so gigantic a career of further extension of empire and of debt. She is but too vulnerable already almost in every quarter of the globe; and her present possessions, disproportionate to her army, tax her means to an extent beyond which her Parliaments are evidently violently averse to proceed—to an extent that disinclines her Parliaments from efficiently providing for the security of her own shores from invasion. Both with reference to the advocated annexation of Burmah and its conquest, we close in the words of one of those admirable articles for which the *Times* is famous, applying them, however, in a wider sense than did the writer, to the whole Indo-Chinese Peninsula:—"Although we do not apprehend any effectual resistance to the force of the British arms, it is only reasonable to acknowledge that more may be awaiting us than we contemplate at present."

VII.

INDIAN TREATIES.

(Written for the *Calcutta Review* in 1865.)

It is about a century ago (1768) that the East India Company expressed the utmost concern at finding themselves involved in a chaos of treaties and engagements. All their views and expectations were then confined within, that is to the eastward of, the Curumnassa; they had become perfectly alive to the value of the Bengal Provinces, for the Dewany of which they had in 1764 obtained the Firman of Shah Aulum; and when explaining to their Governors the policy which they wished to be pursued, they announced distinctly that the Dewany of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, with the possessions held in those provinces, were the utmost limits of their aim on that side of India; whilst on the coast the protection of the Carnatic, and the possession of the Circars free from all engagements to support the Soobah of the Deccan, or even without the Circars, provided British influence could keep the French from settling in them, satisfied their aspirations on the Coromandel Coast. The bounds of their ambition on the Bombay side were the Dependencies thereof, the possession of Salsette, Bassein, and the Castle of Surat, the protection of which was easily within the reach of our power since they could mutually support each other without recourse to any alliance whatever with Native States. Exceedingly jealous of the too apparent reluctance to recall the Brigade advanced to Allahabad, they pressed for its immediate withdrawal, and enjoined that when this were done, and there should be a cessation of the heavy works going on in the fortifications at Fort William, the Behar boundary was to be surveyed, and either strong lines or a fort with magazines was to be constructed, so as to afford a secure place for the Brigade on the frontier, and a depot of stores to enable the troops to take the field at once whenever occasion required.

The occupation of Chunar by a sufficient garrison, if its cession could be obtained, entered into their outline of the general military position which it was held desirable to establish. Most emphatically, however, did the Company object to passing these bounds, for fear of being led on from one acquisition to another, till the British power would find no security but in the subjection of the whole, "which by dividing our forces would lose us the whole, and end in our extirpation from Hindostan." Not content with this lugubrious prophecy, the Company were specially bent on deterring their Governments in India from entertaining the very dangerous idea that the way to preserve peace was to be the umpires of the balance of power in Hindostan, "a principle that may involve us in every way from Delhi to Cape Comorin." On the contrary, it was prescribed that "one invariable maxim ought ever to be maintained, that we are to avoid taking part in the political schemes of any of the Country Princes,"—that they were to be left to settle a balance of power among themselves; that their divisions would leave the British provinces in peace; and that engagements and alliances were as a rule to be studiously avoided. When it is remembered that ten years before, in 1758, the Court had written to their Governor at Fort William,—“We have only to add that if you depend upon ever having a force of two thousand Europeans in Bengal, as has been most strenuously desired, you will be certainly deceived, for if even the present situation of public affairs would admit of such a measure, the employing so great a number of ships as is requisite for so great an embarkation is big with a thousand difficulties too obvious to mention,”—it is not surprising that in 1768, when their Governor at Madras had entered into an alliance with the Soobah of the Deccan and the Mahrattas in order to depress the power of Hyder Ali, pledging Government at the same time to furnish a subsidiary force of 761 Europeans and 5,000 sepoys, besides a payment of nine lakhs of Rupees for the Sircars, the Court should have viewed such proceeding with dismay, should have lectured their Governor on the policy into which he was plunging, and should sound a warning note against the chaos of Treaties and Engagements, the vision of which was looming disagreeably upon their sight. “Your loving friends,” as the Court styled themselves, had a keen eye to their investments and to their purely mercantile interests, and they foresaw and distinctly enunciated that no success in war could possibly compensate the losses that would arise from the tranquillity of their provinces being disturbed. It must be admitted that there

was sound practical wisdom in their analysis of the policy which their Governors were originating ; and that in the following extract they evinced a clear perception of the conditions under which, if such a career were embarked upon, the struggle for empire in India would have to be waged. "From what appears in your proceedings, we think we discern too great an aptness to confederacies or alliances with the Indian powers, on which occasion we must give it you as a general sentiment that perfidy is too much the characteristic of Indian Princes for us to rely on any security with them ; but should you enter into a treaty to act in concert with them in the field, one of our principal officers is to command the whole, a pre-eminence our own security and our superior military skill will entitle us to."

The prediction that the policy then inaugurating, and to which they demurred, would lead to the extension of our empire from Delhi to Cape Comorin has in the course of a century been fulfilled ; and that the part of the prophecy foreboding a calamitous issue to such expansion of dominion failed of its accomplishment in 1857 is due to the fact that during that crisis our trust lay, not in our alliances with Native Powers, the most friendly of whom were playing a waiting game, but in the stalwart courage of our British troops. Under Providence, it is to a general observance of the principle thus early laid down by those sagacious old merchants that their woe-weighted prediction did not entirely come to pass, and that at the close of a century our rule extends unchallenged from the Himalayah to Cape Comorin. The chief disasters which have chequered that century occurred when the golden principle thus early delivered was departed from ; so that both in our reverses and in our successes the maxim of the "loving friends " has met with confirmation.

In the present day, when 80,000 British troops are quartered in India, the grave admonition that if in Bengal they depended on *ever* having 2,000 European troops they would certainly be deceived, reads as curiously as does the avowal of perturbation into which the Court were thrown by the chaos of Treaties and Engagements in 1768. A glance at the volumes published by Mr. Aitchison* will show that the business of Indian Treaty-making was then in its infancy, and that it was early in the day to take fright at the activity of our eastern diplomacy. Still,

* A collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds, relating to India and neighbouring countries.

here again the "loving friends" had good grounds for their apprehensions, for at that period the trade of Treaty-making proved so lucrative, that there was a tempting premium on the extension of our political relations with such Native Chiefs or States as could afford to pay; and as men were in those days fully as anxious to return to England as they are now, without being quite as scrupulous as to the means by which this end was to be attained, such passages as the following reveal that the Court had reason to dread that other than purely political causes instigated the proneness to negotiation which they regarded as big with danger. "We cannot take a view of your conduct from the commencement of your negotiations for the Sircars, without the strongest disapprobation, and when we see the opulent fortunes suddenly acquired by our servants who are returned since that period, it gives but too much weight to the public opinion, that this rage for negotiations, treaties, and alliances has private advantage more for its object than the public good."

Besides the more sordid class of minds against which these remarks were aimed, the Court had, however, in their service men of the mould of Clive and Warren Hastings, and minds of their stamp viewed affairs on the spot with a different eye from that of the corporate body in the city. A servant of the Company who could act as set forth in the following extract was not likely to be impeded by an overwhelming fear of responsibility:—

"In 1759 an armament of seven ships from Batavia unexpectedly made its appearance in the mouth of the river. Jaffier Ally had secretly encouraged the Dutch to send this force. Being afraid of the power of the English, he wished to balance that of the Dutch against it, while the latter were eager to share in the wealth which the British had acquired in Bengal. Clive, though sensible of the responsibility he would incur by attacking the forces of a friendly power, was satisfied that if he allowed the Batavian armament to join the garrison at Chinsurah the Nabob would throw himself into the arms of his new allies, and the English ascendancy in Bengal would be exposed to serious danger. To prevent this, he obtained from the fears of the Nabob a mandate, directing the newly arrived armament to leave the river. Under the authority of this order, and the pretext of enforcing it, Clive caused the Dutch to be attacked both by land and water. They were completely defeated on both, and all their ships were taken. A Convention (No. IV.) was then signed, by which the

Dutch agreed to pay indemnification for losses, and the English to restore the ships and property."

Though this transaction wound up with a treaty enjoying the sanctimonious heading "au nom de la Trinité très sainte," and, as became a document opening with so much unction, was accompanied by very fine-drawn and equivocal assertions and distinctions on both sides, it must be allowed that whilst the Dutch met their match in their own crooked ways of action, there was an essential antagonism between the qualms of conscience so safely indulged by the gentlemen that sat "at home in ease," and the latitude and elasticity of conscience which, to their servants in conflict with insidious friends and wily foes, black or white, was almost of necessity imposed by the instinct of self-preservation. The sweep and pressure of circumstances was too strong for such feeble barriers as were presented by the well-meant attempts of the Court to limit the aims of their Governors to present possessions and lucrative investments. As a consequence, though a very moderate-sized octavo volume would in 1768 have contained the whole of our Indian treaties, seven stout octavo volumes now barely suffice, after all possible condensation, to lay before the world the series of political engagements which have marked the growth of our supremacy in the East, and the literal accomplishment of the hardy prophecy of 1768.

Doubtless the Secretary of State and his Council will receive Mr. Aitchison's seven volumes with very different emotions than those with which their predecessors of a century back would have hailed a single volume. Such a compilation has always been a desideratum, and the partial attempts previously made to meet the want have been, though valuable, isolated and inadequate. No one could say where some treaties were to be found; and for others search was requisite in different and some of them bulky compilations. No one work existed of a convenient and handy form complete in its contents.

It is not, however, the Government of India alone or its servants who will profit by this remarkable publication, the intrinsic value of which is by no means confined to the facilities of reference which it affords to those whom it more immediately concerns to be conversant with our political relations in the East. It will have a wider sphere of utility, and when once known in England, will be found by Members of Parliament a complete and very im-

partial epitome of the rise and consolidation of our Indian Empire. If treaties and engagements be regarded as in themselves the mere skeleton of the body politic, needing, in order to have form and substance, a clothing of flesh and muscle, the introductory notes to each chapter or series will be found invaluable aids to this process of giving shape and substance to the bare frame-work. Though luminous to the well-read, they are necessarily severely concise; so much so, indeed, that although a person conversant with the works devoted to the different epochs of Indian history will be at once conscious of the labour which these prefatory remarks must have cost the author, an ordinary reader might skim them over with a very inadequate conception of the mass of reading which underlies them, and which has been most unsparingly fused down in the process of condensing into the most moderate space consistent with an indispensable amount of information. The style, too, is clear, brief, and unpretentious. No marginal references or foot notes act as finger-posts to the long and often weary roads over which the author must have travelled. Such adjuncts, however demonstrative of the labours of the writer, would have overladen the margin with a multiplicity of numbers, dates, and names; and would have injured the simplicity without adding to the official utility of the work—an object of which the author never seems for a moment to have lost sight. Hence, too, a studious avoidance of comment or discussion on moot points of policy; beyond a virile tone of thought and an incidental observation here and there which is indicative of aversion to the weak and puny policy of trimming times, there is an utter absence of partisanship—a stern impartiality and freedom from bias, whether of prejudice or of theory. We are mistaken, however, if even an ordinary reader would fail to observe the precision with which a long chain of political events is uncoiled without break or hitch, and without sacrifice of perspicuity to the rigid condensation of matter which was manifestly the self imposed law under which Mr. Aitchison composed his monograph outlines of the history of our relations with separate States. A second perusal of any of the introductory chapters, and at the same time an occasional dip into the various works dealing with isolated portions of Indian history, would soon lead such a reader to enlarge his estimation of the scope and value of these carefully elaborated epitomes, and as he went on with the process, he would soon discover, more especially if he compared part with part, that he had the means of tracing not only the existing form assumed

by the body politic, but the various stages through which it passed before attaining its present gigantic proportions.

Group for instance the introductory remarks to Part 1, Vol. 1, Bengal, with those headed "the Carnatic," Part 2, Vol. 5; a close resemblance will be found in the importance which at one period of our history attached to our relations with those subordinate Chiefs, the Nabobs of Moorshedabad and of the Carnatic. Of the two the Soobahdaree of Bengal, from the natural wealth and resources of the province, and from its being the outlet to the sea for the traffic of the great Gangetic plain, was a superior Lieutenantcy to the Carnatic, which was only one of the subdivisions of the great Soobahdaree of the Deccan. But there was this in common to the two Nabobs, that being Lieutenants of the Empire on the seaboard, they were early brought into contact with the rival European nations who sought to establish a lucrative trade with India, and were eager to secure for their commercial factories privileges and protection. Hence a prominence was long given to our relations with these Nabobs which was disproportionate to their real position among the magnates of the Mogul Empire. After once our power had struck root on the coasts of India and safe points in connection with the sea (the true base of operations for a maritime power like England) had been made sure, then the transient importance of these Nabobs rapidly faded, and shrunk into insignificance as we came into contact on our frontiers with the greater and more substantive Powers. That there was a just conception of the subordinate position of these Nabobs is proved by the fact that both for the Dewany of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and for the grants made in the Carnatic, Firmauns or Altumgah Sunnuds were obtained from the Mogul in 1765. Clive, like Warren Hastings, had been bred in the Madras School, where, as Mr. Aitchison remarks, "the struggle for supremacy hinged upon the contest of two rivals for the Nabobship of the Carnatic," and he applied the same policy to the Dewany of Bengal; and with like results, though with a speedier issue, as to the fate of the Nazim and his family. Our author with respect to him observes:—

"Syef ô Dowla was succeeded in 1770 by his brother Mobarik ô Dowla, with whom a new Engagement (No. XII.) was made. By this engagement the Nabob's stipend was fixed at 31,81,991 rupees. This is the last Treaty which was formed with the Nabob. The office of Subadar had now become merely a nominal one, all real power having passed into the hands of the Company.

In 1772 the stipend was reduced to sixteen lakhs a year, at which rate it is paid to this day."

He then dismisses them to the inheritance of the shadow of a name to which Warren Hastings doomed them. We find that it was not until thirty years later that the Nabob of the Carnatic became a pensioner stripped of all power. Mr. Aitchison gives a succinct account of the end of this Nabobate, about which, as it has struggled hard to occupy the attention of Parliament and to enlist the sympathies of the British public, our readers may like to refresh their memories. "On the fall of Seringapatam, a treasonable correspondence was discovered, which had been begun by Mahomed Ali and his son with Tippoo Sultan shortly after the conclusion of the Treaty of 1792. The object of this secret correspondence was most hostile to the interest of the British Government. It had been continued by Omdut-ool-Omrah as late as the year 1796, and was in direct violation of his Treaty obligations. Inquiry was instituted which fully proved the guilt of the Nabob. The British Government therefore declared itself released from the obligations of the Treaty of 1792, which had been thus flagrantly violated, and resolved to assume the government of the Carnatic, making a provision for the family of the Nabob. Omdut-ool-Omrah died on the 15th July, 1801, before the conclusion of the proposed arrangements." Out of these transactions originated the final decision of the Government that the title, privileges, and immunities of the family were at an end. We doubt whether the advocacy of Dr. Travers Twiss will be potent enough to reverse a decision which has been some ten years in force, and to be successful in re-establishing an empty pageant, profitable neither to Azim Jah himself nor to the State. We cannot help thinking Dr. Travers Twiss exceedingly unfortunate in the selection he has made of a martyr, and that he might have chosen far more promising grievances for a Quixotic support.

There can be no doubt that the same end awaits the close of the title of Nabob Nazim of Bengal, which, without any exceptional reason in its favour, has so long been permitted to survive its congener, the Nabobate of the Carnatic. The endeavour to maintain a stilted position on the strength of ancestral offices is a pretension which under a Mahomedan rule would long since have collapsed: attendance at the Royal levees in refulgent kinkaub, and a discreet use of shawl presents, will not long stave off the inevitable oblivion; and it has been due to the ignorance as much as to the pseudo-tenderness of British sentiment that

the vitality of such empty phantoms of departed greatness has been somewhat unreasonably protracted. The error was a venial one, though if anything similar had been attempted in behalf of those whose names had been prominent in England's history, ridicule and mockery would have trampled such pretensions to the dust. The time has, however, arrived when the descendants of the families of the Nabob of the Carnatic, of the Nabob Nazim, of Tippoo, and of the King of Oudh, cannot too early realize the necessity of accepting a position in Native Society analogous to that occupied by the noblemen of England with respect to its commoners. They cannot hope for a higher or more honourable one; the framework of society and of our administration does not allow of their holding any other; and it will, when fairly accepted, enable them to train and educate their sons in a manner which would fit them for employment and render them useful instead of useless and isolated members of society. There is small hope of so desirable a change as long as baseless pretensions are nourished.

To return to the subject of our early relations with Native States, Clive seems to have been carried by his instinct for empire further in practice than he in his outline of policy to be pursued admitted. Not content with the Imperial Charters for the Dewany and the Carnatic, he looked further, and anticipating collision and conflict with the Nizam of the Deccan as imminent, he had the audacious foresight to provide himself with a Sunnud or Firmaun from Shah Aulum, which was thus noticed in a letter dated 27th April, 1768, addressed by the Select Committee to the Madras Government:—

“The blank Firmaun obtained from the king for the Soobahship of the Deccan shall, according to your desire, be kept with all possible privacy; though, should Nizam Ali (as it is very probable he may) obtain information of this circumstance, it would, we imagine, be productive of a good rather than a contrary effect, as we conceive the knowledge of our superior influence in the empire would increase the awe which our superiority of strength has already inspired him with, and his dread of this instrument reserved in our hands for a future occasion would probably outweigh any sentiments of resentment or jealousy arising from his reflections on our policy.”

Mr. Wheeler, in his interesting Report on the Records of the Foreign Department, remarks that the astounding fact of such a document is certainly unnoticed by any historian of India. It

was probably kept "with all possible privacy," and never having been used may have accompanied many other valuable documents to England with Clive's Papers; for judging from a Despatch of 1798 Clive was rather in the habit of retaining valuable documents in his own possession. The passage is curious, and although not new to the public, bears reproof as being connected with the exposure of the incitements to treaty-making at that period.

"We have lately been informed that Lord Clive had in his custody clear and certain proofs of seven lacks of rupees being paid by Cossim Ally to our servants for making the Monghyr Treaty, and His Lordship having acknowledged that he is in possession of some information upon that subject, we have in reply thereto requested that he will transmit the same to us together with all the Papers in his possession relating to the private negotiations of some of our servants at the time of the revolution in favour of Cossim Ally Cawer, to be deposited with the Court of Directors, and also any other papers that may be in his custody tending to set those transactions in their true light; for as those proofs came to His Lordship's hands when he was in a public station, we deem them public papers and as such ought to be transmitted to us."

Had the Sunnuds or Firmaun existed among the archives of the Foreign Office in Calcutta, Mr. Aitchison would not have omitted so important a document; and as Mr. Wheeler also failed to discover it when overhauling the Records of that office, this singular historical relic, if extant, lies buried among the Clive papers in England.

Bold as was Clive's action in this matter, and of course not at all in conformity with the injunctions of his merchant masters in England, yet his sketch of a policy was far more cautious, and may even call up a smile in the present day when read in the light of the state of affairs in 1865; but on the eve of his departure to Europe in 1767, with a political horizon black with threatening clouds, the man of audacious action was sobered by the contemplation of the circumstances and difficulties which his successors must encounter.

"The first period in politics which I offer to your consideration is the form of Government. We are sensible that since the acquisition of the Dewany the power formerly belonging to the Soobah [*i.e.* Nabob] of these provinces is totally in fact vested in the East India Company. Nothing remains to him but the name

and shadow of authority. This name, however, this shadow, it is indispensably necessary we should seem to venerate; every mark of distinction and respect must be shown him, and he himself encouraged to show his resentment upon the least want of respect from other nations.

“Under the sanction of a Soobah, every encroachment that may be attempted by foreign powers can effectually be crushed, without any apparent interposition of our own authority, and all real grievances complained of by them can, through the same channel, be examined into and redressed. Be it therefore always remembered that there is a Soobah; that we have allotted him a stipend which must be regularly paid in support of his dignity, and that though the revenues belong to the Company, the territorial jurisdiction must still rest in the chiefs of the country, acting under him and this Presidency in conjunction. To appoint the Company’s servants to the offices of Collectors, or indeed to do any act by an exertion of the English power which can equally be done by the Nabob at our instance, would be throwing off the mask—would be declaring the Company Soobah of the provinces. Foreign nations would immediately take umbrage, and complaints preferred to the British Court might be attended with very embarrassing consequences. Nor can it be supposed that either the French, Dutch, or Danes would readily acknowledge the Company’s Soobahship, and pay into the hands of their servants the duties upon trade, or the quit-rents of those districts which they may have long been possessed of by virtue of the Royal Firmaun or grants from former Nabobs. In short, the present form of Government will not, in my opinion, admit of variation. The distinction between the Company and Nabob must be carefully maintained, and every measure wherein the country Government shall even seem to be concerned must be carried on in the name of the Nabob and by his authority. In short, I would have all the Company’s servants, the supervisors excepted, confined entirely to commercial matters only, upon the plan laid down in the time of Aliverdy Khan.

“It will not, I presume, be improper in this place to observe that you ought not to be very desirous of increasing the revenues, especially where it can only be effected by oppressing the landholders and tenants. So long as the country remains in peace, the collections will exceed the demands; if you increase the former, a large sum of money will either lay dead in the Treasury, or be sent out of the country, and much inconvenience arise in

the space of a few years. Every nation trading to the East Indies has usually imported silver for a return in commodities. The acquisition of the Dewany has rendered this mode of traffic no longer necessary for the English Company; our investments may be furnished, our expenses, civil and military, paid, and a large quantity of bullion be annually sent to China, though we import not a single dollar. An increase of revenue therefore, unless you can in proportion increase your investments, can answer no good purpose, but may in the end prove extremely pernicious, inasmuch as it may drain Bengal of its silver, and you will undoubtedly consider that the exportation of silver, beyond the quantity imported, is an evil which, though slow and perhaps remote in its consequences, will nevertheless be fatal to the India Company. This point, therefore, I leave to your constant vigilance and deliberation.

“The subject of moderation leads me naturally into a few reflections upon Military affairs. Our possessions should be bounded by the provinces; studiously maintain peace: it is the groundwork of our prosperity; never consent to act offensively against any powers, except in defence of our own, the king’s or Shuja-Dowla’s dominions, as stipulated by treaty; and above all things be assured that a march to Delhi would be not only a vain and fruitless project, but attended with certain destruction to your army, and perhaps put a period to the very being of the Company in Bengal.

“Shuja-Dowla, we must observe, is now recovering his strength, and although I am fully persuaded, from his natural disposition, which is cautious and timid, and from the experience he has had of our discipline and courage, that he will never engage against us in another war, yet, like most of his countrymen, he is ambitious, and I am of opinion that as soon as he shall have formed an army, settled his country, and increased his finances, he will be eager to extend his territories, particularly by the acquisition of the Bundelcund District formerly annexed to the Soobahship of Illahabad. It is even not improbable that he will propose an expedition to Delhi and desire our assistance, without which, I think, he has not courage to risk such an undertaking. Here, therefore, we must be upon our guard, and plainly remind the Vizier that we entered into an alliance with him for no other purpose than the defence of our respective dominions, and that we will not consent to invade other powers, unless they should prove the aggressors by committing acts of hostility against

him or the English, when it will become necessary to make severe examples in order to prevent others from attacking us unprovoked. With regard to his Delhi scheme, it must be warmly remonstrated against and discouraged. He must be assured, in the most positive terms, that no consideration whatever shall induce us to detach our forces to such a distance from this country, which produces all the riches we are ambitious to possess. Should he, however, be prevailed upon by the king to escort His Majesty to that capital without our assistance, it will then be our interest to approve the project, as it is the only means by which we can honourably get rid of our troublesome royal guest.

“The Rohillas, the Jauts, and all the northern powers are at too great a distance ever to disturb the tranquillity of these provinces. Shuja-Dowla’s ambition, the king’s solicitations, and the Mahrattas, these are the three grand objects of policy to this Committee, and by conducting your measures with that address of which you are become so well acquainted by experience, I doubt not that the peace of Bengal may be preserved many years, especially if a firm alliance be established with the Soobah of the Deccan, and Janoogee, the Naugpoor Rajah, be satisfied with the chout proposed, to which, I think, he is in justice and equity strictly entitled.

“The Mahrattas are divided into two very great powers, who at present are at variance with each other, viz., those who possess a large part of the Deccan, whose Chief is Ramrajah, well known in the Presidency of Bombay, and by some of the gentlemen in the direction, by the name of Nanah, and whose capital is Poonah, about thirty coss from Surat; and those who possess the extensive province of Berar, whose Chief is Janoogee, and whose capital Naugpoor is distant from Calcutta about four hundred coss. These last are called Rajpoot Mahrattas, and are those who, after the long war with Aliverdy Khan, obliged him to make over the Ballasore and Cuttack countries, and to pay a chout of twelve lakhs of Rupees. With Janoogee it is our interest to be upon terms of friendship, for which purpose a Vakeel has been despatched, as appears upon the Committee proceedings; and I would recommend your settling of the chout with him agreeably to the plan I have proposed, viz., that we shall pay sixteen lakhs, upon condition that he appoint the Company Zemindar of the Ballasore and Cuttack countries, which, though at present of little or no advantage to Janoogee, would in our possession produce nearly sufficient to pay the whole amount of the chout.

Whatever the deficiency may be, it will be overbalanced by the security and convenience we shall enjoy of free and open passage by land to and from Madras, all the countries between the two Presidencies being under our influence; but I would not by any means think of employing force to possess ourselves of those districts: the grant of them must come from him with his own consent, and if that cannot be obtained, we must settle the chout upon the most moderate terms we can.

“The Mahrattas of the Deccan can only be kept quiet and in awe by an alliance with Nizam Ali, which has already in part taken place, and I have not the least doubt that the Soobah’s own security, and the perpetual encroachments of the Mahrattas, will soon make him as desirous as we are of completing it. When this measure is brought to perfection, not only the Deccan Mahrattas, but Janoogee also, will have too much to apprehend from our influence and authority so near home, to be able to disturb far distant countries, and Bengal may be pronounced to enjoy as much tranquillity as it possibly can, or at least ought to enjoy, consistent with our main object, security.

“With regard to all other powers, they are so distracted and divided amongst themselves that their operations can never turn towards Bengal.”

Yet this sketch of a policy, prudent as it was for a Clive, did not meet with the approbation of the Directors, who in a general letter dated 16th March 1768, paragraph 8, expressed the following opinions:—

“We entirely disapprove the idea adopted of supporting the Soobah of the Deccan as a balance of power against the Mahrattas. It is for the contending parties to establish a balance of power among themselves. Their divisions are our security; and if the Mahrattas molest us, you must consider whether an attack from Bombay, which being near the capital of their dominions, may not be preferable to any defensive operations with the country powers on your side of India.”

Both Clive and the Court, but still more the Court than Clive, lost sight of the fact that in proportion as the power of the Company made itself felt, it must become more and more impracticable arbitrarily to restrict the field of English political and military action. The posture of affairs at Madras, Bombay, and Bengal was calculated to excite the apprehensions of the higher Chiefs of India; the Nabobs of the Carnatic and of Bengal had already suc-

cumbed; and matters had reached that stage at which it was vain to expect that the crescent power of the Company could either be viewed with indifference or allowed to repose undisturbed by the jealousy of Hyder and the Mahrattas, kindled as it was by the breath of our envious European foes. We had struck too hard for our blows to be easily forgotten or forgiven. Could they honestly and effectively combine, the time had arrived for a coalition un-animously bent on the extinction of our nascent superiority. But then it equally stands to reason that a confederacy composed of the substantive Powers, Hyder Ali, the Nizam, and the leading Mahratta chiefs, the Bhonsla, Holkar, Scindia, and the Peishwa, left small option to a statesman like Warren Hastings, who saw that to the English it was becoming a struggle for existence as well as for empire, and who was not of the mould to be daunted by the difficulties which might shackle but could not intimidate his spirit. From this period dates the compulsory expansion of our relations with Native States, though measures had to be shaped so as to harmonize ostensibly with the tone of feeling in England, as well as to cope with the exigencies of a critical and undefined position. The advance of British power and influence had, therefore, still to be cloaked, and hence Warren Hastings first gave form and stability to the system, afterwards more fully developed by the Marquis of Wellesley, of imposing the presence of a Resident and a subsidiary force at Native Courts. What has been lately said of diplomacy in Europe, namely, that it is armed reason, he felt to be absolutely true in the East, where diplomacy without force at hand to back it has small chance of success. From his time the Company may be said, though cautiously at the commencement, first to step upon the scene with the tread of a sovereign and substantive Power, and to pass from treaties with the littoral Nabobs of the Carnatic and of Bengal to treaties with Powers of a higher order.

As an instance of successful diplomacy, the negotiations with the Bhonsla may be quoted, which led to the Treaty of 1781 (No. XVIII.). This broke up the confederacy, and though the issue was favoured by the diversion caused by the rise of the Hill chiefs of Cuttack, and by the dissatisfaction of the Bhonsla at the neglect of his claims to Gurrah Mundelah by the Peishwa, yet the success was mainly due to the wisdom and foresight of Warren Hastings. Well might he write with evident satisfaction at the result:—

“The mere fame of an alliance betwixt the English and the

Government of Berar will have a great effect. We shall no longer be considered as sinking under the united weight of every State in Hindoostan. The scale of power is evidently turned in our favour, and this is of more importance than would well be imagined in Europe, where the policy of nations is regulated by principles the very reverse of those which prevail in Asia. There, in contests between nations, the weaker is held up by the support of its neighbours, who know how much their own safety depends on the preservation of a proper balance. But in Asia the desire of partaking of the spoils of a falling nation, and the dread of incurring the resentment of the stronger party, are the immediate motives of policy, and every State wishes to associate itself 'with that Power which has a decided superiority.'

It will be observed that the treaties of this period partake of the character of engagements between equals; that they are free from provisions trenching on the independence of the Mahratta States or the Soobahs of the Empire, and that they even comprise obligations on the part of the English which place this latter in the position of inferiority inseparable from the payment of tribute.

Compare for instance such an article as the following taken from the Treaty of 1768 :—"As the English Company do not intend to deprive the Mahrattas of their chout, any more than the Soobah of his peshcush, which used to be paid from the Carnatic Bala-gaute, belonging to the Soobahdarry of Viziapore, now or lately possessed by Hyder Naique, it is hereby agreed, and the Company willingly promise to pay the Mahrattas regularly and annually without trouble for the whole chout, as settled in former times, from the time the said countries shall be under the Company's protection as Dewan; provided, however, that the Mahrattas guarantee to the Company the peaceable possession of the said Dewany; to this end the Nabob Ausuph Jah promises to use his best endeavours, jointly with the English and the Nabob Wolau Jah, to settle with the Mahrattas concerning the chout of the said countries, how and where it is to be paid, so that there may be no disturbances hereafter on that account between any of the contracting parties or the Mahrattas,"—with that of 1798 (No. VIII.), which we are tempted to give *in extenso*, as marking from the greater stringency of its provisions that during what we have termed the transition period the English power had passed from a state of doubtful to a condition of positive and acknowledged superiority.

We shall however confine our extracts from this remarkable

Treaty to the 3rd, 6th, and 7th Articles, which suffice to bring into strong relief the contrast between the character of the engagements of the two epochs.

ARTICLE 3.

“The proposed reinforcement of subsidiary troops shall be in the pay of this State from the day of their crossing the boundaries. Satisfactory and effectual provision shall be made for the regular payment of this force, which, including the present detachment, is to amount to six thousand sepoys with firelocks, with a due proportion of field-pieces, manned by Europeans, and at the monthly rate of Rupees 2,01,425. The yearly amount of subsidy for the aforesaid force of six thousand men, with guns, artillerymen, and other necessary appurtenances, is Rupees 24,17,100. The said sum shall be completely discharged in the course of the year, by four equal instalments; that is, at the expiration of every three English months, the sum of Rupees 6,04,275 in silver, of full currency, shall be issued, without hesitation, from His Highness’s treasury: and should the aforesaid instalments happen to fall at any time the least in arrears, such arrears shall be deducted, notwithstanding objections thereto, from the current kist of peshush payable to His Highness on account of the Northern Sircars. Should it at any time so happen, moreover, that delay were to occur in the issue of the instalments aforesaid, in the stated periods, in such case assignments shall be granted on the collections of certain districts in the State, the real and actual revenue of which shall be adequate to the discharge of the yearly subsidy of the aforesaid force.”

ARTICLE 6.

“Immediately upon the arrival of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the whole of the officers and servants of the French party are to be dismissed, and the troops composing it dispersed and disorganized, that no trace of the former establishment shall remain. And His Highness thereby engages for himself, his heirs, and successors, that no Frenchman whatever shall ever hereafter be entertained in his own service, or in that of any of his Chiefs or dependants, nor be suffered to remain in any part of His Highness’s dominions; nor shall any Europeans whatever be admitted into the service of this State, nor be permitted to remain within its

territories without the knowledge and consent of the Company's government."

ARTICLE 7.

"The whole of the French and sepoy deserters from the Company's service that may be in the French or any other party of troops belonging to this State, are to be seized and delivered up to the British Resident: and no persons of the above description are to be allowed refuge in future in His Highness's territories, but are, on the contrary, to be seized without delay and delivered up to the British Resident: neither shall any refuge be allowed, in the Company's territories, but sepoy deserters from the service of His Highness shall, in like manner, be seized and delivered up without delay."

During those thirty years, as the authority of the Court of Delhi and the power and prestige of its emperors vanished, expiring at last under Mahratta predominance, our Treaties underwent a change of tone, which, though in part modulated by the uncertain sounds of the political trumpet of successive Governors-General, and more especially by the Quaker-like blasts of Lord Cornwallis, was attributable to the weight which our arms and influence were acquiring amid native powers rivals for supremacy. By no means underrating the virile policy of Lord Wellesley, and its effect on the tone and substance of our Treaties, we must yet look to deeper causes than to those minor and surface-like eddies of the current of public opinion in England on the convictions of Governors-General in India. The march of events and the force of circumstances were predominant over all mere secondary influences. This detracts in no way from the merit of Lord Wellesley and the men of his school, for he had the sense to appreciate the necessities of his position, and instead of running counter to them, from a pusillanimous dread of what might be thought in England, he accepted the responsibility of founding a great empire on the débris of a crumbling one, and braved the danger, by no means an imaginary one, of acting in accordance with the grasp of his own statesmanlike perception of the opportunity.

Properly to comprehend the position of affairs during the transition period, which was the harbinger of Lord Wellesley's rule, the thread of historical events on the Bombay side, and the oscillations

of fortune on that coast, must be studied. The compact but lucid remarks which precede the Peishwa and Scindia groups of Treaties are admirably adapted to give a bird's-eye view of this portion of our Indian Annals; and when it is remembered that as late as 1782 it was through the mediation of Scindia and under his guarantee that the Treaty of Salbye was concluded, and peace restored between the Peishwa and the English, it will be easily understood how up to that time and even later our negotiations with native states trenched but partially on their individual independence. Lord Cornwallis, influenced by the views which prevailed in England, views to which he in theory at least made his own policy subservient, managed to observe in his letter to the Nizam of the 7th July, 1789, and in his Treaties of 1790, the rule of reciprocity to an extent which disappeared from the Treaties of 1798, when Lord Wellesley, ceasing to deal with the Nizam as an equal, imposed conditions which sealed the dependence of the Nizam, and stamped his future position as one of purely subordinate alliance with the Company's Government.

From 1798 to the close of Lord Wellesley's administration in 1805 is an epoch from which the history of British India takes a fresh departure. It was the era of subsidiary alliances, of the annihilation of Tippoo's power and of French ascendancy, and of the dissolution of Mahratta supremacy. It was the epoch when the chimera of a balance of power among native states, and of the Company remaining a neutral spectator of the desolation of India by the ruthless plunderers Holkar, Scindia, and the Bhonsla, was found by experience to be an hallucination utterly incompatible with the imperious necessities of the times.

Lord Wellesley and the men of his school saw clearly the fatuity of the principle of neutrality and forbearance which had been the dream of the home authorities and the incubus of their predecessors. Though compelled in some measure to respect the prejudices, based on the misapplied analogies of European international law, which pervaded their countrymen and even the Statesmen of England, yet, they shook free from servile submission to what was felt to be wholly inapplicable to the turmoil around them, and the stern requirements of the circumstances in which they were placed. They did so, too, with a wise perception of the inexpediency of wholesale annexation of native states, and with a well-pronounced conservative policy in their favour. But nevertheless, they saw distinctly that amid such active and aggressive elements of conflict the English power must either rise

predominant, or sink under the withering blight of Mahratta anarchy. The antagonism between the aims of Mahratta or even of Mahomedan rulers, a much superior and more civilized class than the Mahrattas, and those of English rulers was a pitting against each other of the principles of evil and good. It was the spirit of cruelty, rapine, and anarchy in conflict with that of order, justice, and peace. Granting that the element of ambition existed on both sides, the ambition of the one was devilish, that of the other humane and Christian: side by side two such hostile principles of Government, if the chaos of the one can be called Government, could not exist: one or other must prevail, and fortunate it was for India that Lord Wellesley and the men of his school were not blinded by pusillanimous theories. They saw clearly the nature of the duel upon which they were entering, accepted its alternative, and shrunk not from the bold avowal that on the supremacy of the English power hung the future welfare of India. We have already alluded to the dictum of a former Governor-General of India that diplomacy is armed reason. If the definition have truth in Europe, where the relations among Christian and civilized states are of that nature that it is in the interests of peace and of an amicable understanding that the armed support which forms the back-ground of diplomatic controversy should studiously avoid any threatening display, the definition has much more truth in the East, where diplomacy in order to be successful demands a more overt display of the material strength and support which underlies diplomatic action. To make good the ground gained during Lord Wellesley's administration, and to secure that the formal engagements entered into with native states should not prove waste paper, it was necessary at that critical juncture to develop the system of subsidiary forces introduced by Warren Hastings. Henceforward a strictly limited power was alone conceded to the Mahomedan and Mahratta Chiefs; for the future their position was to be one of subordination; they had passed from sovereignty to the abnegation of sovereign powers; from independence to dependence; and it was not to be supposed that so radical a change could have taken place without the Mahratta leaders more especially feeling chafed and humiliated. If the great battle of order against anarchy was not again to be fought, it was essential that the treaties exacted from the native powers at this period should have a firmer seal than that of the parchments on which they were written, and that the tortuous minds and the tortuous policy of these restless and

intriguing chiefs should be curbed by the presence of agents of the English properly supported.

Lord Wellesley, however, had hardly turned his back upon India when the exploded fallacies of a balance of power among native states began again to sway the minds of some of our Indian officials, and even as late as 1810 there was a resuscitation of the idea in connection with a proposal from the Bombay Government for the acceptance from the Guicowar State of a sum of money in commutation for the territory ceded to the British Government by that state. When making this proposal the Governor of Bombay and his Council discussed the policy of the restoration to the native states of the territories held in virtue of our subsidiary engagements and of the re-establishment of a balance of power among them, with a view of our return to the policy of forbearance and neutrality, and to the narrow limits of our former possessions. The reply of the Court of Directors is a dispatch admirably written, and full of sterling good sense; it may have passed away from the minds of even historical readers, and as it deserves to be saved from oblivion, having been the seal of approval to Lord Wellesley's policy, we shall offer no apology for refreshing the memories of our readers with an extract from this most able state paper.

“The relinquishment of the territories which we hold in virtue of subsisting Treaties with the Guicowar State is therefore simply a question of political expediency, and this proposition has nothing to distinguish it from the more comprehensive scheme of restoring to the rest of our allies the territories which they have ceded to us in lieu of subsidy, except that the proposer of the scheme admits that it is the most objectionable part of it.

“We are well aware of the dangers attendant upon too extended dominion, and we have not to learn that an addition of territory is not unfrequently a subtraction from real power. There are circumstances also peculiar to an Eastern Empire which have led us to regret the necessity of spreading over a wide surface that ingredient of our military force which it is most difficult to supply. But we are not convinced by the reasonings which have been adduced in favour of the voluntary contraction of our territorial limits, that our situation would be at all improved by such a measure; placing out of view all the embarrassing questions to which it would give rise between us and our allies, the inconveniences which it would bring upon a great number of our servants by depriving

them of their present employments, and the inhumanity of handing over to Native rapacity and misrule a numerous population who, we trust, are prospering under the benign influence of the British Government; supposing in short the scheme to be as easy of execution as its most strenuous advocates could desire; we should still be of opinion that it would not secure the objects which it professes to have in view, namely, the re-establishment of that balance of power which is said to have formerly existed, the extinction of those feelings of secret enmity and jealousy, which our paramount domination has excited in the minds of the Native Governments, and the stability which our power would gain from such an improvement in the disposition of our neighbours as well as from the concentration of our Military force.

“ You have shown to our satisfaction that in order to place the Native States in that situation which would constitute this projected balance of power, it would be necessary to restore not merely the cessions voluntarily made by our allies as the price of our protection, but also the territories gained by conquest from the Mahrattas in the late wars. We concur with you in opinion that even such a concession would utterly fail to satisfy their desires or conciliate their good-will. The policy of a measure of this description would be too refined for the comprehension of the Native Courts, and consequently our conduct would be attributed to motives more conformable to those by which their own proceedings are ordinarily regulated. The contraction of our territorial limits would be considered as a symptom of declining power, and unless, in establishing a nearer equality among the Native States at the expense of our own territorial dominion, we could at the same time eradicate from the minds of Native Rulers that lust of conquest which is inherent in their political system, and substitute in its place just and moderate principles and a disposition to submit implicitly to the obligations of public law as recognized and interpreted by the authority of the British Government, nothing can be more evident than that the balance would be destroyed in less time than was required for adjusting it. It surely could never be intended by the projectors of this scheme that after having bestowed such elaborate pains and made such large sacrifices in establishing a balance of power in India, we should abstract ourselves entirely from all attention to the concerns of surrounding States and be thenceforth solely occupied in administering our own affairs; this would be not only impolitic but impossible. We therefore should not be exonerated from the duty of watching, as

heretofore, the proceedings of those States, and of interfering in their differences. If we fail to effect the accommodation of those differences by amicable means, we must then as before have recourse to arms, and supposing the result of our efforts to be as successful as they have formerly proved, we should be gradually reconducted to our present situation.

“By adopting the scheme of abandoning our recent conquests and acquisitions we should therefore at the best impose upon ourselves the labour of retracing our steps with all the responsibility, disgrace, and risk, of having by a short-sighted policy occasioned the contentions, devastation, and confusion which would ensue from a voluntary dereliction of the commanding position we at present occupy.

“In every view which we can take of the scheme in question, it appears to us calculated to produce any effect rather than that security, stability, and tranquillity which it professes to have for its objects, and we are persuaded from deep and anxious reflection that the only course which true wisdom and sound policy prescribe is strenuously to maintain that ascendancy which a long course of events (the result of accident or necessity rather than of design or choice) has given to our power in the East. We, therefore, could not by any means entertain a proposition which, in requiring us to resign a considerable extent of territory, would in our view require us also to forego that paramount dominion which appears to us to afford the best security for the general peace of India, and which will also enable us more effectually to crush any new combinations which may be formed against our power.”

It is not our intention to follow closely the changing phases of our general policy, or the traces which its oscillations and consequent inconsistencies have left on the text of our treaties. Our readers, with Mr. Aitchison's work before them, will easily, in spite of his commendable reserve and scrupulous abstinence from controversy, perceive that he is no admirer of the retrograde policy which bore ill fruit under Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Barlow, and later still, under Lord William Bentinck, broke down and brought discredit on the Anglo-Indian Government. The theory of non-interference, applicable enough to independent states beyond our frontiers, has repeatedly failed when attempts have been made to carry it out strictly with respect to states which are incorporated in the circle of British India. Instead of being conservative of such Native Chiefships it has proved their destruction. Their ex-

tirpation would infallibly be secured, and that in the shortest time, by leaving them to their own suicidal courses: public opinion would then soon grow impatient, and force the Government to wipe out administrations which were a disgrace to humanity. Without entering fully into the question of non-interference the fallacies and the dangers which it involves could not be shown. For this there is neither space nor time; but it enters within the scope of this article to point out that, whilst over one large and important class of native states, namely, those of Central India and the Deccan, our relations had passed from equal to unequal alliances and had reduced them to dependencies, the states of Rajpootana, owing to a clause in the Treaty of 1805 (No. XVI.) with Scindia, were long artificially isolated and exempted from our supremacy.

Mr. Aitchison notes the fact thus:—

“The system of non-interference which was introduced on the accession of Lord Cornwallis, left the States of Central India and Rajpootana a prey to the Pindaree freebooters, who gained in strength as the Mahratta power decayed. They soon ventured to extend their depredations into British territory. No line of defence and no disposition of troops could protect the country from their incursions under the system of warfare which they pursued, and Government was therefore led to form a general system of political alliances for the entire suppression of the Pindarees. The Treaty of 1817 with Scindia removed the restriction which had been placed upon the formation of alliances between the British Government and the Rajpoot States, and left Government free to enter on new relations with them. The object of the treaties to be formed with them was the establishment of a barrier against the predatory system, and against the extension of the power of Scindia or Holkar beyond the limits which Government designed to impose on it by other measures. It was not at that time proposed to acquire the power of exercising any interference in the internal administration of the Rajpoot States, but to subject only their political measures and external relations to the control of the British Government, to secure to Scindia and Holkar the tribute payable to them in the event of these chiefs entering into the policy of the British Government, and to secure to the British Government such pecuniary aid as might be adapted to the means of the several states respectively, in order to indemnify the British Government for the charges incidental to the obligation of protecting them.

“Arrangements on this principle were made with the states of Oudeypore, Jeypore, Jodhpore, Kotah, Boondee, Kerowlee, Banswarrah, Doongurpore, and Kishengurh, and the relations of Government with the more distant states of Jessulmere and Bikaner were improved, but without the establishment of the same intimate connection as with the other states.”

Upon the removal of this artificial barrier, which the British Government had observed with all good faith, though it was a proviso in support of the Mahratta pretensions to dominion over Rajpootana, our relations with the Rajpoot States assumed a similar aspect in general with those instituted with the states of the Deccan and Central India; the main difference being that there was no necessity for stationary subsidiary forces in Rajpootana. All the essential provisions which strip a state of the attributes of independent sovereignty were however carefully introduced into the Rajpootana treaties. These stipulations may be concisely stated as abrogating from the Rajpoot chief the right to make war, to negotiate with any chief or state without the sanction of the British Government, to entertain English or European subjects of any other nation without the consent of the British Government; and as imposing the obligation to furnish troops according to their means on the requisition of the supreme power, to pay tribute, and in the case of Tonk, to disband its army and to deliver up to the British Government guns and military equipments. In a word these treaties amounted to a surrender of all sovereign rights in return for the protection of the English Government, and its engaging to leave the Rajpoot chiefs, their heirs and successors, absolute rulers of their own territories, without any introduction of the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the British Government. By 1818 the protection and the supremacy of our Government had been extended in terms more or less precise over the whole of Rajpootana, and thus, except on the line of the lower Indus, all India was under the accepted protection and the acknowledged supremacy of the Company's Government. Though the Punjab was not in the category of protected states, being beyond our frontier, the Cis-Sutlej States had from 1809 been under our protection, and were by Ochterlony's proclamation of 1811 brought more positively under the control of the Company's Government. Practically therefore, by 1818, the mass of native states comprised within the natural boundaries of India, except the Punjab, Buhawulpore, and

Scinde, were dependencies, and had ceased to exercise independent sovereign powers.

We are particular in dwelling upon this fact, because it is impossible to peruse the Blue Books laid before Parliament, or the published despatches of our leading political officers, and even of some of our Governors and Governors-General, without remarking that the transition from a state of reciprocity, and of dealing with equals, to a condition of affairs in which the English Government as supreme dictated terms which reduced the native states, formerly claiming to be treated as independent sovereignties, to the position of feudatory and tributary dependencies, was frequently not sufficiently kept in view. The tendency to this error was increased by the Supreme Government occasionally reviving the policy of non-interference, and pushing it to an extent which could only be defended on the supposition that the native states to which it was applied were on a footing of perfect equality with the Company's Government. Whenever, from motives of narrow and short-sighted expediency, the British Government thus endeavoured to shirk the responsibilities of its position, and drew back from the legitimate exercise of its own superior functions, it followed of necessity that there should be uncertainty and no small amount of contradiction in the theory and practice both of the Government itself and of its political officers. Concurrent with this manifest source of error was the circumstance that the generality of treatises on international law are, from their European origin, conversant with the status and relations of the independent sovereignties of Europe; whilst the works of American jurists, derived in a great measure from European prototypes, are naturally devoted to a consideration of the application of the principles thus derived to the relations of the federal states among themselves, or of the federal Government itself in connection with foreign powers. The older authorities on international law seldom had any reason for dwelling upon the position or the rights of mere dependencies; they either make very transient allusion to them, or pass them over altogether. The influence of the authors available on the subject of the *Jus Gentium* was therefore calculated to lead our Indian political officers unconsciously to adopt and to apply to the exceptional and subordinate position of our native chiefs, views, rules, and of course language, only properly applicable to the status *inter se* of sovereign and independent powers. Very grave errors and serious embarrassments may be traced to these combined sources; for not

only were our own agents misled, but occasionally the misuse of terms implied admissions of which native chiefs were quick in taking advantage, and upon which they based and advanced pretensions quite incompatible with their relative positions. Besides being misled themselves, our political officers therefore not unfrequently fostered grave misapprehensions on the part of native rulers.

Nor will this tendency to misapply the vocabulary and the principles of international law appear extraordinary to any one moderately conversant with the writings of later jurists. Refer for instance to Austin's chapter in which he reviews the definitions of sovereignty given by Bentham, Hobbes, Grotius, and Von Martens of Gottingen; and where after criticizing the insufficiency of their definitions he proceeds most laboriously to state his own. A perusal of that chapter brings at once the conviction that even among jurists there had up to that time been a good deal of haziness of thought on this important subject of sovereignty. It cannot be surprising therefore if the use of language, very inappropriate to the actual relations existing between the Supreme Power and its subordinate feudatories, was to be found, not alone in the mouths of the political officers, but even in the despatches of Government and the Court of Directors. Occasionally, where political officers wrote of the native rulers to whom they were accredited as if they had been kings of France or emperors of Austria or Russia, the fact was in part ascribable to the latent desire of not diminishing the reflected importance which is derived from the dignity and power of the Court to which a diplomatic officer is deputed. But though sometimes self-importance, and at others misapprehension of the real position of native chiefs, coupled with a laudable desire to do them all possible honour, affected the style of political officers, yet, such a passage as the following, which indicates the strange vibrations of our policy, affords both a key and an apology for the mistaken tone and language which often vitiates their despatches:—

“ A fundamental principle in the arrangements made by the British Government in Bundelcund was originally declared to be the confirmation of the chiefs of that province in the possession of such parts of their ancient territorial rights as were held under Ali Bahadoor's Government, on condition of their allegiance and fidelity to the British power, their renouncing all views of future aggrandizement, and their abandoning such parts of Ali Baha-

door's conquests as had been resumed by them subsequently to his death. It was also resolved to form arrangements with some leaders of plundering bands, who were not hereditary chiefs, but whose hostility was directed solely to the object of obtaining subsistence, and to grant these persons some territory, with a view to the pacification of the country. At first it was the policy of Government to leave the protection of their territories to the chiefs themselves, and to exact no tribute or revenue from them. In several of the engagements executed in 1805 and 1806, it was therefore distinctly stipulated that the chiefs should renounce all claim to the aid and protection of Government. Experience, however, soon showed the necessity of departing from this principle, and of declaring the Bundelcund chiefs to be vassals and dependants of the British Government. But it was never the intention of Government to establish its laws and regulations in the states of these chiefs; and to remove all doubt on this subject, these states were declared by Regulation XXII. of 1812 to be exempt from the operation of the general regulations and from the jurisdiction of the Civil and Criminal Courts. The particular clauses of the engagements made with the chiefs which imply a right of jurisdiction on the part of Government, have ever been understood to convey exclusively a right of political jurisdiction, that is to say, a right to interfere for the settlement of disputed claims, differences, and disputes of any kind, not through the channel of the courts of justice, but through the agency of the representative of the British Government in Bundelcund."

When in 1805 and 1806 Government reversed its policy, and negotiated with petty native States to obtain their renunciation of the protection of the British Government, the retrograde step was an attempt to restore them to independence by casting upon them the duty of self-protection, and it was accompanied by the enunciation of corresponding principles. Under such circumstances the political officers could scarcely avoid reflecting the views, however, mistaken, which influenced and guided the policy of their Government. On such occasions the mischief does not cease with a change to a sounder policy. Government and its officers, after being for some time committed to an erroneous course, cannot at a stroke cast off its trammels. The traditions of office remain in the native chief's bureaux as well as in those of the agents of Government, and where there is a revival, as was the case in Lord William Bentinck's time, of the policy of non-interference, its ad-

vocates ransack the records of previous years for precedents based on the errors of 1805 and 1806. It thus becomes very difficult effectually to weed official correspondence of exploded and obsolete opinions.

We have said that the political language of Government and its officers was coloured, not alone by the verbiage of a defunct policy, but also in no minor degree by the accident that as European International Law dealt only with the relations of independent and sovereign political bodies, its language was not adapted to the consideration or treatment of an entirely different kind of connection, namely that which exists between a supreme power and its subordinates. The technical terms in which to clothe such relations have to be created; and it was palpably easier to misapply those in use with reference to independent States than to coin new ones to meet the position and the obligations of dependencies. We have not far to turn for late instances of the misuse of the vocabulary of the European Law of Nations. A more glaring instance can scarcely be adduced than one which is given in Mr. Aitchison's work, where the words "full sovereignty" occur in the Sunuuds or Charters granted to the Sikh Protected Chiefs, Putteeala, Jheend, and Nabha. It is a complicated error. There is first the very important question whether powers of full sovereignty can be at all conferred; whether they are not matter of fact dependent on the actual and the undisputed power of a substantive State;—next, whether the Governor-General, or the Secretary of State, are in any possible way competent to confer such powers;—especially when their grant is *pro tanto* an infringement of Her Majesty's sovereignty rights, not supported by any expression of opinion on the part of Parliament;—then there is the absolute incompatibility of such powers with the fundamental status of those chiefs as laid down by the Proclamations of 1809 and 1811;—lastly, there is the statement that the original documents are in Persian, that the English-Persian is of no validity, and that the words "full sovereignty," are a false and exaggerated rendering. We have not space to enter into any discussion of those various questions, but when in 1860 a blunder of the kind could be committed, no wonder that during earlier periods a frequent misapplication of significant terms should occur. The proper vocabulary did not exist, and men will risk much in official correspondence to eschew tedious and repeated forms of periphrasis which

are contrary to the idioms of our language and to the temper of our people.

At no small risk of being wearisome to our readers we must allude to the other inconveniences which attend a misuse of words, conveying the idea of rights which are non-existent in the subjects to whom the terms are applied. No better field or more golden opportunity could be offered to those bent on creating political capital at the expense of the Anglo-Indian Government, and we are only surprised that this rich mine has not been more greedily worked. A further inconvenience is the inflation of native chiefs, due to the inspiration of false ideas, and the tendency to foster notions of independence pretty certain to encourage a wilful opposition to the wholesome advice and beneficial influence of the Supreme Government, a course pregnant with danger to the stability of native administrations. Finally, there is the inconvenience of helping to misguide English statesmen, a race not over-disposed to give time and thought to the investigation of India affairs, and who are very ready to take as admissions on the part of the Anglo-Indian Government any abuse of terms, however palpable, into which either the Government or its agents may fall. In the present day, when the habit has been encouraged of looking beyond the Government of India to the Home Government, and to the floor of the House of Commons, even too of the Upper House, as an arena for intrigue and the agitation of ridiculous pretensions, the Government and their political officers cannot be too precise and careful in the language they use. Yet the difficulty which besets their being so should be fully acknowledged. Where are they to look for an accurate and accepted phraseology, free from associations or false analogies which are inseparable from the employment of the common terms which have currency and are derived from the International Law of Europe? It might be ill-naturedly put as an instance of the utter indifference of England to its Indian Empire, that there has been no attempt whatever to analyze the relations existing between the Supreme power and its subordinates. One of the last writers, Twiss, cannot be fairly blamed for neglecting a subject which did not come within the scope of his work; as it only professed to treat of the Law of Nations considered as independent political communities, fault cannot justly be found with the summary way in which he dismisses the consideration of the dependent States of India. Yet what could be more meagre than the following

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passage, which is all that he deigns to devote to the status of our native chiefships ?

“The Native States of India are instances of protected dependent States, maintaining the most varied relations with the British Government under compacts with the East India Company. All these States acknowledge the supremacy of the British Government, and some of them admit its right to interfere so far in their internal affairs, that the East India Company has become virtually sovereign over them. None of these States, however, hold any political intercourse with one another or with foreign powers.”

Leaving out of consideration the strange fact that in 1861 a writer of Twiss's ability should write of the East India Company as a still existant sovereign body, we have the characteristic fact that, whilst ten lines are sufficient for the notice conferred on the political relations of Native States with the supreme British power, two full pages are assigned to the principality of Monaco, and two full pages to the Lordship of Kniphausen.

It is useless to quote other authors, for, except Austin, none attempt honestly to grapple with the status of semi-sovereign States, a designation to which he objects. Even with Austin, however, India is wholly ignored. This may have arisen from the want of such a work as Mr. Aitchison's at the time Austin wrote, for he was too profound a thinker, and too honest a one, to shirk the discussion of the relations of dependent States. Accordingly, it is in his writings, more than in those of the generality of authors on the *Jus Gentium*, that guiding principles and an approach to correct phraseology may be obtained. Some of his generalizations are very remarkable, and it might almost be imagined that he had the history of many Native States in view when he penned such a passage as the following:—“Most, indeed, of the Governments deemed imperfectly supreme, are Governments which in their origin had been substantially vassal; but which had insensibly escaped from most of their feudal bands, though they still continued apparently in their primitive state of subjection.” Had Austin had in his eye the *soobahs* of the Delhi Empire, or the robber Mahratta chiefs, the Peishwa's Lieutenants, no description could be more accurate.

After a careful dissection of the distinction of sovereign and other political powers into such as are legislative, and such as are executive or administrative, he arrived at the conclusion that of all the larger divisions of political powers, the division of those powers into supreme and subordinate is perhaps the only precise

one, and that "a society political but subordinate is merely a limb or member of a society political and independent;" and, with respect to the rulers of such communities, he says:—"The powers or rights of subordinate political superiors are merely emanations of sovereignty. They are merely particles of sovereignty committed by sovereigns to subjects."

It would have been well had these axioms of Austin's been better known by some of our Indian political officers; they would then have been restrained from the loose employment of terms far more comprehensive than was properly applicable. When a writer of Austin's ability lays down the principle that "there is no such political mongrel as a Government sovereign and subject," and that the political powers of a Government deemed imperfectly supreme, exercised entirely and habitually at the pleasure and bidding of the other, are merely nominal and illusive, it is to be regretted that both on the part of Government and its officers greater attention should not have been paid to accuracy of expression.

These remarks are made in no other than the most friendly feeling to Native States, and from the conviction that the course most conservative of their permanent interests is that which prevents their rulers from entertaining chimerical notions of their footing with respect to the Supreme Government: a just apprehension of their real position will show them the wisdom of avoiding opposition to the onward start which India is at length making under British rule, and the expediency of identifying themselves and their States with the progress now effecting around them. By thus making common cause with the British Government in its beneficent exertions, their own abiding interests will be far better fostered than by the indulgence of empty pretensions. The English Government neither wishes to curtail their honours or their possessions; the adoption and succession Sunnuds entered in Mr. Aitchison's work are proof of its disinterested desire for the perpetuation of the rule of its subordinate allies and feudatories. The only thing which can now be fatal to them is gross misrule, and its consequent isolation from the policy of the Government of India, namely, the rapid improvement of India and its races. The days of the annexation policy are passed, and nothing but gross and obstinate dereliction from the obligations and duties of their position can henceforward endanger them; but they must honourably discharge the trust devolved upon them, for it will not be to their advantage to evoke the exercise of such remedial measures

as those which Lord Elgin was compelled to adopt at Oodeypore. If the days of annexation are gone, so, too, are the days of gross cruelty and tyranny; for British supremacy can neither tolerate nor cloak such abuse of administrative powers under the ægis of its protection.

Some of our readers may be disposed to accuse us, in our previous observations, of combating an ideal danger; but a reference to Mr. Aitchison's remarks on Kattywar must disabuse them of this suspicion.

“The discussions with the Peishwa, however, were ended by the Treaty of 1817, by the 7th Article* of which he ceded to the British Government all his rights in Kattywar; and since the agreement† in 1820 with the Guikwar, by which he engaged to send troops into Kattywar and to make no demands on the province except through the British Government, the supreme authority in Kattywar has been vested in the British Government alone, *firstly*, in its own share acquired under the Treaty of 1817, and, *secondly*, in the Guikwar's share by virtue of the above agreement. In the districts known as the Panch Mehals,‡ however, which had come under the direct rule of the Guikwar, and in Okamundul, which, after its conquest by the British Government, was ceded to the Guikwar by the 7th Article of the Treaty§ of 6th November, 1817, the internal management is conducted by the officers of the Guikwar.

“It was soon discovered that the Kattywar Chiefs, partly from their pecuniary embarrassments, and partly from their weakness and the subdivision of their jurisdictions, were incapable of acting up to the engagements which bound them to preserve the peace of the country and suppress crime. On the other hand, the British Government was fettered in its efforts to effect an improvement in the administration by these very engagements which it had mediated when the country was under the authority of the Peishwa and the Guikwar, and when the substitution of the direct control of the British supremacy for that of the native governments had not been contemplated. These engagements, besides considerations

* See Vol. III., p. 79.

† See Vol. III., p. 342.

‡ Amreele, Dharee, and Danturwar, in the Kattywar Division; Korinar in South; and Dumnuggur in Gohelwar.

§ See above, p. 330.

of financial and political expediency, prevented the subjection of the chiefs to ordinary British rule, and no course of reform was left open save to introduce a special authority suited to the obligations of the British Government, the actual condition of the country, and the usages and character of its inhabitants. Inquiries which had been instituted in 1825 showed that the Kattywar chiefs believed the sovereignty of the country to reside in the power to whom they paid tribute; that before the British Government assumed the supreme authority, the Guikwar had the right of interfering to settle disputed successions, to punish offenders seised in chiefships of which they were not subjects, to seize and punish indiscriminate plunderers, to coerce chiefs who disturbed the general peace, and to interfere in cases of flagrant abuse of power or notorious disorder in the internal government of the chiefs. Based, therefore, upon these rights of the supreme power, the British Government, in 1831, established a Criminal Court of Justice in Kattywar, to be presided over by the Political Agent, aided by three or four chiefs as assessors, for the trial of capital crimes on the estates of chiefs who were too weak to punish such offences, and of crimes committed by petty chiefs upon one another, or otherwise than in the legitimate exercise of authority over their own dependents. Until the year 1853 every sentence passed by this Court was submitted to the Bombay Government for approval; but now sentences not exceeding imprisonment for seven years do not require the sanction of superior authority. There are five chiefs in Kattywar, viz., Joonagurh, Nowanuggur, Bhownuggur, Poorbundur, and Drangdra, who exercise first-class jurisdiction, that is to say, have power to try for capital offences, without permission from the Political Agent, any persons except British subjects; and eight, viz., Wankaneer, Morvee, Rajkot, Gondul, Dheral, Limree, Wudwan, and Palitana, who exercise second-class jurisdiction, that is to say, have power to try for capital offences, without permission of the Political Agent, their own subjects only.

“Notwithstanding these efforts to reform the administration of Kattywar, there has been little improvement in the condition of the country. The social and political system of Kattywar is described as a system of sanguinary boundary disputes, murders, robbery, abduction, arson, and self-outlawry. Upwards of two hundred persons are said to have voluntarily made themselves outlaws and to subsist professedly by depredation. Although about eighty of the petty states which existed in 1807 have been

absorbed in other states, yet, from the constant sub-division of possessions by inheritance, the number of separate jurisdictions* has risen to four hundred and eighteen, and in the majority of these the jurisdiction claimed is over two villages, one village, and often over a fraction of a village. A scheme is now under the consideration of Government for the re-organization of the administration, by classifying the petty chiefs and defining their powers and the extent of their jurisdiction, dividing the country into four districts and appointing European officers to these districts to superintend the administration generally, and more particularly to try inter-jurisdictional cases and offenders who have no known chief, or who are under such petty landholders as may be unable to bring them to trial."

Can the *reductio ad absurdum* be carried to a greater length than the idea of independent jurisdictions over fractions of villages? Were an English jurist to push the theory in which some of them revel (that the king is the fountain of justice and the source of executive power) to the extent that every bailiff, keeping himself awake as Beadle of the parish church by warming his cane on the backs of sleepy charity school boys, exercised independent sovereign powers, the theory would be thought extravagant. Both are, however, equally logical deductions from the assumed premises, and the cane of the Beadle is probably as efficacious an emblem of the sceptre as any which a Thakoor glorying in sovereignty over the sixteenth part of a poor Kattywar village could display. In the case of this province it would not be difficult to trace back to Colonel Walker's misuse of terms the whole long chain of a mistaken policy in stereotyping, under the influence of an erroneous lead, the preposterous pretensions of petty chiefs to the exercise of sovereignty rights over separate and (so-called) independent jurisdictions. It might thus be

* In Jhalawar	102
In Kattywar Proper	151
In Muchoo Kauta	2
In Hallar	47
In Soruth	7
In Purda	1
In Gohelwar	51
In Ond Surwya	37
In Babriawar... ..	20
Total	418

shown that for a long series of years Government has been engaged in exorcising spectres of its own raising, but which, unfortunately, are easier raised than laid again, where, as is the case with our system, even errors are crystallized with sober good faith and always find most conservative supporters.

The wise and conciliatory policy of Lord Canning was not without some counterpoise. The liberal rewards granted were not always very well proportioned to the real services rendered in 1857; on the contrary, some of the rewards were excessive, others misplaced, and there was some truth in an adage then current, that the most profitable of all lines was that of a native chief playing a waiting game and drawing it so fine that the odds were great whether a halter or the collar of the new order was to adorn his neck; for those who played that game usually came out not only white-washed but profusely belauded and rewarded, whilst the idea was fostered by the eagerness to praise and recompense that but for the support of these lukewarm allies we should in 1857 have been driven to our ships. Flattering as the idea was to the dignity and importance of native chiefs, it is not surprising that to the present day some of them labour under the fallacy that this notion had, in their own individual cases, an astounding amount of reality. There is a corresponding estimation of the inordinate value of their own meritorious services, and of the depth of the eternal obligation under which the British Government lies to these Paladins, and how very ill requited they have been in comparison with rival claimants for the liberality of Government. Each one of them lifted the English cause out of the mire; and but for his peculiar exertions and heroism our case was hopeless. A very large amount of bladder-like sound and inflation is the result, and it may be doubted whether a single chief, however generous the British Government may have been, was either content or grateful. On the other hand, however, Lord Canning's policy, by the assurance it gave that annexation formed no part of our future scheme of administration, softened down the nervous apprehension in which native chiefs lived. During Lord Dalhousie's reign the dread of annexation reached a point of extreme tension; and the events of 1857 justifying severity on the part of the British Government, the magnanimous policy of Lord Canning came as a surprise; and though each chief was discontented with his own share of the bountiful return made for small services, and growling comparisons were frequent, yet, in

spite of these pettinesses, there was produced a general impression favourable to the disinterestedness of the British Government. The incubus annexation was removed, and free from this nightmare fear the chiefs breathed freer. No better proof of the altered state of feeling could be adduced than that many of the chiefs, Scindia and Jeypoor at their head, have agreed to cede full rights of sovereignty over land taken up for railway purposes. This has been done with a view of enabling the British Government to legislate for the maintenance of security to person and property along the lines of rail, which before long will traverse the territories of so many of our dependent chiefs; but indispensably necessary as this cession is, and manifestly to the advantage and interest of those who have wisely made it, yet we venture to assert that but for the confidence in our intentions due to Lord Canning's policy and measures, no such concession would have been willingly made by a native chief. It would have been regarded, as it is still by some, as being the introduction of the small end of the wedge, and would have been opposed and resisted accordingly.

This brings us to the consideration how far, judging from such concessions as are above noted and from the abolition of transit duties recorded in Mr. Aitchison's work, native chiefs are becoming sensible of the immense benefit which they and their subjects are deriving from the trade which the English power has brought to the shores of India, and the wealth which has in consequence flowed into the country. Do they value as they ought the advantages which accrue to them from the enterprise and the ability of the European commercial community? Without in any way derogating from the qualities displayed by the Parsees, who, on the Bombay side, have established their pre-eminence, and are also elsewhere distinguished as enlightened and successful merchants, it must be allowed that with few exceptions the trade and commerce of India owes everything to the genius and daring enterprize of our own countrymen, and but little to that of its own native sea-faring merchants. Is there any due appreciation of the benefits conferred on our Indian dependencies by their connection with the greatest commercial country of the world through the agency of a large body of intelligent British merchants engaged in bringing India, as it were, into contact with every region of the globe, by opening her ports to the free influx of the products of Eastern and Western nations? We think that there is a dawning perception of the

great utility of our dominion from this point of view. The visits of native chiefs to Calcutta and Bombay have lately been more frequent, being facilitated by the railways, and it is impossible but that the sight of such a ship-laden river as the Hooghly, and such a magnificent harbour as Bombay, must excite reflections in the minds of native chiefs and their followers calculated to allay their prejudices against a race which they have usually only known through its official representatives, and necessarily therefore under relations not the best adapted to smooth down pride ruffled by a sense of imposed subordination. There is a wide distance however between the superficial impression which such flying visits may make, and anything approaching to intercourse with the leading members of our great commercial capitals. Time must elapse before native chiefs, fully alive to their own interests as they on some points are, can be expected to share the enlarged views of our commercial men, and cordially to co-operate by suitable measures in a vigorous expansion of the trading facilities of their subjects.

A net of railways will rapidly develop the commercial intercourse and exchange of produce of provinces, and will thus tend to amalgamate their interests; but it will also effect good by destroying the isolation which fosters the jealousy of distinct jurisdictions. It will inevitably undermine in some degree the attitude of permanent bristling hostility to each other which they now assume and jealously maintain. Still, we must not miscalculate the revolutionizing power of railways, for although their effect may be great in both the above respects, and their influence immense in the general improvement of India, yet it will be long before an entire blending of the constituent parts of this vast and heterogeneous empire can take place. By our treaties and engagements we have conserved and crystallized administrative rights which will endure long after the improved state of intercourse makes the inconvenience of numerous jurisdictions vexatious. It is needless to add, that whatever the inconveniences that may hereafter arise, they can only be surmounted by the voluntary co-operation of the native chiefs with whom our compacts stand; and as our engagements will be observed with scrupulous good faith, it must be the work of time and of an advanced stage of education and civilization before native rulers are likely either to see the necessity or admit the expediency of conforming their laws and system to those of our own provinces. It must on this point be borne in mind that we

are ourselves building up, under the general control of a supreme legislature, different minor circles of presidency jurisdictions, each with a rapidly augmenting volume of local laws emanating from them as distinct though subordinate foci of legislation; so that even according to our own example, influenced in practice by a dread of over-centralization, there will be nothing absolutely incongruous in the separate jurisdictions and distinct "*coutumes*" of Native States. The immense area of the empire and the dissimilarity of its races will be the best apology for the protracted continuance of such a status; much however will be gained if the broad features of our Civil and Criminal Codes be accepted. To a certain extent this is already the case, for the principles of our jurisprudence and their embodiment in simplified Codes have already to a moderate degree permeated the administration of justice in Native States and coloured their practice. Nor is this at all surprising, for as these states have no institutions in which either judicial or revenue officers can obtain the training which can alone qualify for a satisfactory discharge of such duties, their rulers are frequently driven to select their head judicial officers, and sometimes their revenue ministers, from the native functionaries who, having served a long apprenticeship in our Courts and Provinces, have as it were graduated in law and revenue systems. Under these circumstances, whatever the extent to which such men may be forced to mould their own views in submission to the traditions and the practice of the executive systems over which they are invited to preside, the principles on which they act are based on their previous training, and the experience they have acquired that its principles were sound and universally applicable. The influence of such men is not wholly transitory. Gradually, though almost imperceptibly, they inoculate with sounder principles the offices into which they are introduced, and bite, so to speak, into their traditions.

Again, during minorities, the Supreme Government being responsible for the administration of chiefships, the opportunity presents itself for the introduction of wholesome reforms, and of improvements of every kind. Now minorities, as the students of Indian History well know, are not of infrequent occurrence, and there are few things which, after scrutiny, prove more creditable to the integrity of the British Government, and to its honour, than the faithful manner in which it discharges its duty as the guardian and protector of its minor feudatories. A great deal depends on these occasions on the wisdom and the

administrative ability of its agents, who, in the trust management of such territories, are forced to bear in mind that, as the administration must revert on the minor coming of age to the machinery which the native ruler will be able to command, the improvements introduced must not surpass the capacity of the instrumentality with which they are ultimately to be worked. Otherwise all will crumble and disappear the moment the strong hand and will of the agent is relaxed. Of course under these conditions great judgment is required, and of a sort which no regulation training can impart, being of a higher order; but it is by thus judiciously taking advantage of opportunities that an impulse is given to the administration of Native States which keeps them, if not abreast of, yet not hopelessly lagging behind, the advance of improvement around them. It is at such times that the sounder principles of our Civil and Criminal jurisdiction strike root; and that once into practice, and fairly accepted by the people, the attempt to eradicate them arbitrarily becomes both difficult and discreditable. Where the education of the Chief is well managed during a minority, he is not likely when he comes to power to be so short-sighted or prejudiced as to incur the odium of subverting what tends to the content and good will of his subjects. Popularity is something even in Native States. There is thus a fair and reasonable prospect, one way and another, of Native States being gradually confederated in the acceptance of the broader principles of our judicial system, Civil and Criminal, though there may long remain great diversity in the mode of applying the axioms of jurisprudence thus derived. For a long time to come our Codes may be to Native States what the Roman law was to the provinces of France which did not recognize it as having the force of law, but were governed by their own "*coutumes*." As the Roman law prevailed in numerous provinces of France, and guided the judicial tribunals of these "*pays du droit écrit*," so in India our own provinces, whose tribunals will be guided by our Codes, may be regarded as "*les pays du droit écrit*," whilst the Native States will be much in the position of "*les pays coutumiers*," where, though the civil or Roman law had not the same force as in "*les pays du droit écrit*," yet it was in a qualified sense the normal law of France, being of that general authority that where the "*coutume*" or common law of the province was mute, the Roman or civil law, if in point, ruled to the exclusion of the application of the "*coutume*" of any other province. A French jurist, speaking of the civil law, says, "*Ubi ad subortas lites et quæstiones nihil*

“provinciali lege cautum est, forensem semper jurisprudentia Romana facit paginam, ad eamque perpetuo, quasi ad sacram ancoram, certissimamque in expediendis controversiis semitam, decurritur cum sit certissima quaedam velut amussis ad interoscendum quid æquius, melius; tradit verò de communibus vitæ officiis praecepta quæ alibi non reperias.” In similar terms many a Native State, when applying the principles of our Civil and Criminal Codes, will speak of the labours of our jurists long before our system of law is literally accepted as valid in such territories. Practically, however, there may be brought about sufficient assimilation to prevent any very severe friction or antagonism; and we have an instance in the acceptance of the Thuggee and Dacoitee Department, with its special agency, of an imperial institution stretching the web of its police and informers over native states as well as our own provinces. Indeed, it may now be regarded as having its separate machinery and system continued rather with the view of being a connecting link between our own police and that of Native States, in order to combined action for the suppression of the widespread fraternities of Thugs and Dacoits, than as intended solely for their extirpation in our own provinces. That has been tolerably well effected in British India as far as Thuggee is concerned, but the seeds of it are rife elsewhere; and its organized bands finding shelter in Native States around would soon start upon a fresh career of activity and crime were it not for the vigilance of this exceptional department.

We cannot, however, shut out eyes to a difficulty which the development of railways and free and rapid intercourse with different parts of India is certain to raise. The number of European British-born subjects employed in India and traversing it in every direction is already much increased, and will, with the advance of railways, be much more so hereafter. The question, therefore, will soon have to be solved how, with reference to British-born subjects in Native States, law can be brought to bear. The way out of this difficulty would be much disembarrassed provided the imperial supremacy of the Crown in India be accepted as a reality, and the supreme legislature empowered by Parliament be authorized to deal with the question in the manner in which it can alone be competently met; but if there be any shrinking from this position, and a narrowing of the power of legislation for British-born subjects in deference to subordinate and dependent territorial jurisdictions treated *pro hac vice* as sovereign and independent, then we foresee very serious impediment to this

growing danger being effectually grappled with before an adequate solution come to be forced upon the Home and the Indian Governments by the occurrence of grave events.

We do not feel warranted in prolonging this article by a further digression on the probable future of Native States. Everything will depend on their gradually coalescing, dove-tailing as it were, with the onward progress of British India. They form a large part of the area of the empire, and enjoy various degrees of capacity for improvement, but no one who has traversed them will deny the fact that they present an immense field for improvement. Aware that some of them lie under great disadvantages as to soil and position, we are not disposed to draw invidious comparisons between our own more favoured provinces and those of Native States; at the same time we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there are those among them who enjoy considerable advantages in soil, products, and population, and who nevertheless make but very indifferent use of these favourable circumstances. Some are still inflated with a disproportionate idea of their own importance, and have not yet shaken free from the old Mahratta dream of supremacy. This leads them to waste their means on the maintenance of forces for which they can have no possible use, except as in 1857 to show to the world how entirely unequal they are to control the military mob they collect around them when a crisis arrives. Whilst battenning upon the resources of the State, impoverishing its treasury, and crippling it from useful and reproductive expenditure, armed mobs of the kind here alluded to are a source of weakness rather than of strength, and present a delusive show of force which crumbles at the first touch of conflict; and which, from the instinct of such bodies being a chronic state of hostility to the British Government, have a tendency to compromise their chiefs with the supreme power. Enough for purposes of State, and the enforcement of the authority of the chief in his own territory, is all that Native Governments can require; and everything beyond this is a costly, and may prove a ruinous, error.

Mr. Aitchison's prefatory remarks would easily lead us into digressions of a more extended character, but though we are aware that we have done but scant justice to our author, and could follow many other lines of thought which his volumes suggest, we feel that already the patience of our readers must have been unduly taxed by the length at which we have dwelt on points which, however important in themselves, can scarcely be said to

command general interest or to admit of being treated otherwise than in a dry manner. We cannot, however, part from the author of the Book of Treaties without complimenting the competition civilians on this the first fruits of their literary labours. It redounds to the credit of the whole body, and it will be accepted as a happy omen of what may be expected from them. Whilst the old class of civilians probably closed their literary exhibitions with Mr. Muir's valuable work on the life of Mahomed, a work which has most deservedly added to the reputation of Mr. Muir, and is in every respect a worthy legacy from the Haileybury order of civilians, we hail with pleasure the proof afforded by Mr. Aitchison's work that the competition men threaten a most honourable rivalry with their predecessors; and that judging by the first fruits the public may look forward with considerable assurance that the ability and talent which marked the old school will not be found to degenerate with the new.

VIII.

LIFE OF A SOLDIER OF THE OLDEN TIME.

(From Notes sent to the *Friend of India* in 1870.)

COLONEL ALEXANDER HAUGHTON CAMPBELL GARDINER was born of Scotch and Irish parents on the borders of Lake Superior, and served five or six of his early years in the American Navy. His mother, whose family went from county Mayo in Galway, was the daughter of Major Haughton, an enterprising traveller, who lost his life in Africa; and this led to young Gardiner being educated in the "Ould Country," at a well-known Jesuit College near Maynooth. In 1813, when about five-and-twenty years of age, he went to Cairo, and from thence through Syria, joining a party on its way to Trebizond. He next took ship for a small port on the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea, and travelled from thence to Astrakan, where he was lucky enough to find a relative, an engineer, who was there in charge of a staff of English and Scotch engineers. Here he remained till 1818, when his relative was killed by a fall from a horse; and the young adventurer was once more set adrift. He took passage in a native merchant ship for Astrabad, in company with a German named Dotterweiss. In the winter of the same year he went, still in the German's company, to Herat, where the party met a Khokand Vakeel returning from the Court of Persia to his own Court at Khokand. The German was induced by the Vakeel to go with him; Gardiner, however, fought shy of the man, not believing in him nor liking him; and, happily, being unwell also, he escaped a snare. He soon after sent a messenger to make inquiries at Teheran, as he had heard that Messrs. Ventura, Court, Allard and Avitabile had good service there. The man returned, saying that they had all left, and had taken service in the Punjab. Gardiner's fever grew worse, and, in a helpless state, he joined a caravan of pilgrims returning from Mecca. With them he marched to Khiva. From Khiva he crossed

over to the Caspian, and then returned to Astrakan. Three marches from Khiva he again met Dotterweiss, whom some Moollahs had circumcised by force, and who now, in the bitterness of his heart, vowed never to return to Central Asia. He went away to Orenburg as a mineralogist. Gardiner remained in Astrakan till 1819, when, having recovered from his fever, he started for the Punjab, making his way again to Khiva, and from thence to Oratuppa and Khojend, on the left bank of the Jaxartes or Sihun.

From Khojend he returned to Oratuppa and found a large Kirghiz camp of the Kipchak tribe—great marauders, but the best soldiers in Asia—and he paid his respects to the Khan, who seems to have been scarcely worth the compliment, for Gardiner's horses, twelve in number, were stolen that night, and re-picketed close to the Khan's tent. He begged to have the horses restored, but the Khan swore that they were his own, and in fact that he had had them for years and years. Colonel Gardiner and his party then "adopted the custom of the country," and lay hid in ravines for four or five days and nights, biding their time and opportunity. Finally they stole twelve horses of the Khan's. Being hotly pursued, and marching by night, they passed the Jazzak Fort, and crossed the Zarafshan River east of Samarkand; went down to the Oxus to Huzrat Imam; and remained concealed to the north-east of Koondooz. After two or three days they crossed the river and went south-west into Meer Ali Morad's Koondooz country, and reached the Khawak Pass. Crossing the Pass they came into the Panjsheer valley, near Istalif; and there they met a large body of cavalry, who took them to pay their respects to Abuboola Khan, son of Azim Khan, once Governor of Kashmir and ruler of Kabul, elder brother of Dost Muhammad. He offered them service, on equal terms, and in a brotherly way, and his kindness induced Colonel Gardiner to agree. The Khan said that his father died of grief at losing Kashmir; and that he himself had been imprisoned by Dost Muhammad, but had escaped, and was then doing his best to harass Kabul, which Dost Muhammad held. Colonel Gardiner remained with Abuboola Khan till about 1826, having for pay all the duties levied by himself on the Khawak and Ghorebund Passes and roads. He and his companions lived night and day in the saddle, and at one time Dost Muhammad could not stir half a mile from Kabul for the dread of them.

In the course of this arduous service Colonel Gardiner was badly wounded. Abuboola Khan was fond of drinking, and a foe to the Moollahs; Dost Muhammad courted them. In 1826 the Moollah

party beat Colonel Gardiner and Abuboola's men after two or three sharp actions. They were fairly beaten, and Abuboola himself advised and requested them to disperse. Colonel Gardiner retired by the Khawak Pass, and struck for Jerm, near Fyzabad, in the Badakshan country, on the banks of the Khaksu river. He then crossed the Oxus, east of Jerm, on blocks of ice fastened together and covered with grass, to bear their horses over. The party then went into the Shakh Durra country, and from thence struck up the Darrun, but finding the country too difficult, they returned to Jerm, where they received a good price for their horses,—the stolen ones being capital animals. They then went up the Durra and on to the Pamir steppes. Being well treated by the Kirghiz, Colonel Gardiner remained a whole winter with one of their Chiefs. Their hospitality was unbounded; the only difficulty he found was to break away from them. He left by the Dasti Allai valley, lying between the Akdagh and Karadagh ranges, where the wild fruits he says were equal to garden fruit in Kashmir. At the base of the Akdagh range he met with two old Poles, long inhabitants and now well-to-do merchants in those parts, who were bound for Yarkund, and he and his party joined their caravan. When they reached the first Chinese post the travellers were put down as camel-men, and so escaped, reaching Yarkand in safety. There they encamped fifteen days between the Fort and City, according to the Chinese order. Here Gardiner joined a Pilgrim caravan for Mecca. He put on Haji dress, &c., and reached Leh, from whence he was sent with five or six others to collect pilgrims; and while on this errand he visited the Punkong Lake and village of Chussal. Having collected the pilgrims he returned to Ladak, and from thence went on to Srinuggur. When they reached the foot of the Zoolala Pass, near the village of Mutyan, a violent earthquake came on, which killed eleven or twelve thousand people in Srinugger. The stench was frightful, and the people were afraid to bury the dead. He stopped at the Mihmanghur,* near the Dhul gate. Diwan Kirpa Ram, of Koonjah, was Governor of Kashmir at the time for Runjeet Singh. Two or three days after the earthquake a kind of distemper broke out; people fell with vertigo and nausea, and their bodies turned black. The natives fled in all directions.

At this time the city was still under the influence of Afghan merchants and others, from whom Colonel Gardiner heard that Abuboola Khan, or Hubeeboola Khan, was again in the ascendant,

* Guest House.

and the adventurous soldier decided at once on joining his old Chief. Accompanied only by a Hindoo traveller and three or four Moslems, he went by Scopur, Cheloor, Kylas, and across the Indus at Boonjee to Gilgit, and thence to Chitral, on the Koonur river. He then sent his servants away with his effects down the river to Jellalabad, while the Hindoo and himself went into the Kaffiristan passes west of Chitral and south of the Dora Kothal Pass, and thence along and down the course of the Khamab or Kaffiristan river. He was accompanied by a priest, and was well treated, and only found it again difficult to escape from the hospitality. He went down the Kama River till it joined the Koorum and from thence to Jellalabad. When he approached Kabul he found that Abuboola Khan was nowhere and Dost Muhammad everywhere, and also that the Khyber tribes being up he could not pass direct to the Punjab. He decided on seeking service in Persia again. He marched by Ghuzni and to Kandahar. At Kandahar the Sirdars Sheredil Khan, Kohundil Khan, and Purdil Khan sent for his crystal hookah, a present from the old Poles, and demanded a ransom of one and a half lakh of rupees for the whole party of Khyberees, Jerras, and Mahomedans. Colonel Gardiner objected, and asked for help. They said they would give his party a parwanah to Herat. What orders were really passed by the Sirdars the party only learnt practically after they reached Girishk, where, after being invited as guests to a friendly meal, they were seized and imprisoned. After a few days the Khyberees and others were released, but Gardiner was kept for nine months a prisoner in a Tykhana of the Fort. None of the Khyberees would desert him when they were released, but went round to the Fakirs, excited sympathy in his behalf, petitioned the Sirdars continually, and finally obtained his release on condition, 1st, that he should not go to Persia, for fear of the Shah, 2nd, that he should give a Razee Namah that he and his people had been well treated. Goolam Russool Khan, of Ali Musjid, the head of his party, and some Teera men, proposed to return to Kandahar, and force the Sirdars to give them something to help them on their way. They returned to Kandahar, and applied to the Sirdars for aid; but it was flatly refused, still thinking the party had money. Goolam Russool then placed Colonel Gardiner in the charge of a Fakir three miles from Kandahar, and dressed the Colonel as a Shahzada. Gradually Sowars dropped in till he had drawn together 40 horse, and then he started on his journey, three marches on the Kandahar side of Ghuzni.

We take up the strange and eventful history of Colonel Gardiner at the time when he was once more making his way, through dangers and difficulties that would have appalled any ordinary man, to Kabul. In the course of this journey he met with a Kafila belonging to the Khans of Kandahar, and joined them; but in the end he seized and bound them, as they would have treated him and his party at the proper time. He took from them their Kashmir shawls, embroidered kullas, &c.—literally “spoiling” them—and then he made direct for Kabul to tell the story and throw himself and his party on the generosity of Dost Muhammad. The party travelled night and day, to outstrip the Kossids of the Candahar Sirdars, and riding direct to the Bala Hissar, they presented their arms, horses, and property to Dost Muhammad, and asked permission to tell their story in private to the warlike Chief. He heard them patiently, agreed that they had been badly treated, said they had done quite right to take the law into their own hands, and that, for his own part, he would not receive anything from them of their property, but that they must leave his country as soon as possible. He gave them two guides and sent them on their way. There must have been great self-possession and confidence in a man presenting himself, after the events narrated, to the ruler of Kabul; but Gardiner seems to have been indebted for life, and that many a time over, to his cool audacity, which never failed him for a moment, be the strait what it might. And it must have been an audacity modest withal, or the events of his wonderful life are very misleading, for do what he might, no one seems to have accused him of too great forwardness.

Dismissed by Dost Muhammad, Gardiner and his party marched to Bajour *viâ* Koonur, and they were kindly received and treated by Mir Alum Khan, then Mir of Bajour. At this time Syud Ahmed, called the Khaliffah, had brought together his bands of Hindustani Wahabee fanatics, and declared a religious war against the Sikhs. The Bajour men had to send a contingent to the general body, and Gardiner, whose views were those of a soldier of fortune, and who had no standard to call his own, thought himself bound to enter the field with his host for the time being. Accordingly he was put in command of a hundred and fifty men, with whom he joined the forces on the bank of the Indus. The action was begun by the Sikhs, who crossed the river on mussocks, and at once began a desultory fight, during which Syud Ahmed’s magazine, tied in cloth bundles, blew up, and carried the Syud

with it to the bosom of the Prophet. At least so it was said, for there were those who positively affirmed that they saw the Angel Gabriel descend through the smoke of the explosion and take away the Syud to where the dark-eyed young ladies awaited him above the clouds. When the leader fell his army dispersed and fled. Gardiner kept with the Punctar men, and rested with them two nights at Punctar, after which he went on to Bajour, where the booty was divided with the Khyberees. The adventurous soldier here received an invitation from Sultan Muhammad, eldest brother of Dost Muhammad, to take service with him at Peshawur, as his Chief of Artillery, or till his guns could be put in proper order. This was one of the most important epochs of Gardiner's life. He accepted the invitation, and for some months was kindly and honourably dealt with, being in every way treated as a guest at his host's table. Runjeet Sing, however, whom it was dangerous to offend, heard of this, and discovered all at once that he too had guns that needed looking after, and he demanded that Gardiner should be sent to him to Lahore. Refusal was out of the question, the Artillery chief was dismissed with presents and good equipment to his new service.

On the way to Lahore he met Avitabile and Allard at Wuzee-rabad, where they entertained him for about a week, and then dismissed him with letters of introduction to Raja Dyan Sing and Jemadar Kooshal Sing. The former showed him some shrapnel shells, and asked could he make anything of such things? He fired two or three, and they burst well, which delighted Dyan Sing so much that he took the successful artilleryman at once to Runjeet Sing, who gave him charge of the two guns and ammunition recently received at Roopur from Lord Auckland. The pay of Colonel Gardiner was Rs. 750 a month; and two villages also were assigned to him. Here he remained for from five to seven years, teaching the officers and men. Dyan Sing always kept sight of him, as of a prize, and at last having an order to form a picked force of 10,000 horse, foot, and artillery, he asked also for Gardiner, who was at once put in command of sixteen guns, which he held till they were captured at the battle of Sobraon. During this time he was almost constantly with Rani Chunda, and was present when she gave her famous reply to the PUNCHAYT deputies, who came from the Sikh army to ask her aid to cross the river and march *on Calcutta*. They came with only side arms, and were admitted to the Rani, who listened to them from behind her Purdah. Colonel Gardiner observed that while

they were talking the Rani was fumbling at her dress in an unusual way. Presently she drew off her pyjamahs and threw them among the deputies, with the cutting remark that she was quite ready herself to do the fighting, and that the Sikhs might wear the pyjamahs. On this they departed, as well they might. She would give them no aid. If they succeeded, *well*, if they failed, *well also*; she looked on their army as a deadly serpent to be flung at the enemy's breast; and whether it killed or was killed, the gain was hers. Such was her view, and she had courage enough to give it effect. She had taken charge of young Dhuleep Sing, and to some extent had given him a European education, had taught him to wear European clothes, to eat with knife and fork, and in many other ways to accustom himself to European habits and forms of society. Gardiner was there when Dhuleep Sing was proclaimed Maharajah, after that series of murders which left the Chiefship open. The soldier was then put under the command of Maharajah Golab Sing, and under that command he remained during the eventful two years that ended at Sobraon. He attended his chief to the meeting with Lord Hardinge and Lord Gough at Kussoor, and when Golab Sing placed himself at their Lordships' service, Gardiner did the same, and went on under his old colours to Lahore. With Maharajah Golab Sing he remained. He was sent up to Kashmir with Lumsden and Hodgson when they went by order of Sir Henry Lawrence to report on the fight between the Sikhs and Dogras. When Kashmir was cut off from the Punjab, and quietly handed over to Maharajah Golab Sing, Colonel Gardiner remained Chief of Artillery to the Maharajah of Kashmir; and there he has been ever since. The vicissitudes of those years have been startling, but the old soldier has calmly survived them all. It will be seen that our story is but a bold outline of adventures that ought to have a book to themselves, and it is to be regretted that the fuller papers entrusted to the late Mr. Cooper have not yet been made use of, and a more complete narrative been published of so extraordinary a career.

Still, even in outline, the story is of great interest, a life drama indeed, as full of incident and adventure as drama can well be. The story of Dugald Dalgetty is nothing to this, as it will be seen by the light of times to come. To take the two ends of the long tangled line is something wonderful, one end bright and sunny on the banks of Lake Superior in the Far West; the other end approaching where the chapter will probably close in lands watered by the Indus. And then the schooling in Ireland, and the teach-

ing in Lahore; the parting from home for ever, for a life from end to end of perils such as very few men have ever imagined, still less known. It is difficult, perhaps, to comprehend all the career, but much may be understood. There is no mistake about the high heart, the undaunted courage, the unflagging will. Colonel Gardiner's personal influence, too, must have been great—what is called magnetic, for how else could he have bound to himself for nine months, and he all the time a prisoner, men who seemed to have an interest in separating from him as far as possible? And how else could he have drawn to himself those sowars and others whom he led to Kabul and elsewhere? That such a man has been so little mentioned in the history of the times is a marvel. But we must remember that he was a man without a country, though England, or any country, might well be proud to claim him. Faithful to his standard, whatever it was, obeying without questioning military orders, he presented and presents, perhaps, one of the finest specimens ever known of the soldier of fortune. He must have been a man, too, who did not care to force himself into notice so long as he could push himself into employment; and the fact that he secured the respect and confidence of so many persons, of characters so widely different, is enough to show that besides being a bold soldier he was possessed of rare tact and skill—of qualities indeed which, if the love of adventure had been urged on by anything like an equal share of ambition, would have gone far to gather together the turbulent elements among which he lived, and make of them a more devastating flame than even Colonel Gardiner himself ever saw.

IX.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF RANK AND FILE OF BRITISH REGIMENTS OF CAVALRY AND INFANTRY SERVING IN INDIA. DATED THE 23RD MAY, 1865.

The principle advocated by the Commander-in-Chief, of making the expansion or the contraction of the strength of the battalion the basis for army augmentation or diminution, is one already frequently applied in India. It will therefore probably meet with ready acceptance if deemed by the Members of Council applicable to the present state of circumstances.

I am not disposed to regard the number of European battalions now in this country as permanently necessary for all future time. On the contrary, when the lines of railway communication are complete, and the people become aware of the enlarged sphere of rapid action which railways afford troops, it should become practicable to effect a reduction in the number of battalions. We are, however, far from this stage of railway development, and the people as yet ignorant, necessarily, of the greater activity and power which every mile of rail is gradually conferring on our forces. We are scarcely therefore in a position now, nor shall be for some time to come, to spare battalions. To the arguments brought forward by the Commander-in-Chief for preferring a reduction of rank and file I would add the following considerations:—

Since 1857 the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to rest the secure possession of India almost entirely on the European force. The stability of our administration, and the maintenance of tranquillity and order throughout the vast area of this country, depends therefore not alone on its being seen that European troops occupy obligatory points, but also on its being known that they are in sufficient strength to enable Government to crush at once any endeavour to oppose its authority. We must not

ignore the fact that the disaffected scrutinize numbers accurately.

It must not be quite overlooked also that Government would probably be miscalculating the effect of its measures if it counted on much good-will existing on the side of the Madras and Bombay native armies. It is said that the Sepoys of the Madras army are anxious, and perhaps naturally distrustful, about their future. They see the bands and messes of regiments broken up, and their officers acting as if the present state of things was not to endure. The men therefore are uncertain as to their fate, and regard with apprehension the fiat that may turn them from Regulars into Irregulars. At Bombay the reorganization cannot be said to have proved a popular measure among the class upon whom it fell. For the present, therefore, as designing persons are always on the alert to take advantage of any discontent which may afford an opening for their machinations, it would hardly be expedient to part with whole battalions from either of the minor presidencies.

From these few remarks it will be seen that I use the word "Peace" as applied to our condition of armed vigilance in India as having a different import from the same word "Peace" as applied to England, and that I think the European infantry should be in this country of that strength per battalion that if suddenly called into the field a regiment shall in actual conflict bring to bear a reasonable number of firelocks. I advert to what may be considered a mere truism, because the paucity of our native regiments and their weak strength in rank and file has very materially modified the circumstances under which European troops now take the field. Formerly, from the greater abundance of native troops, a great part of what may be styled the mere friction of military operations could be thrown on them, and the Europeans spared much harassing duty. This is no longer practicable to the same extent, and the result is that the European battalion exposed to this augmented friction of ordinary fatigue duties comes into fight proportionately weaker. In former days, when the establishment strength of regiments was higher than that now in force, a battalion was considered to answer expectation when it brought into actual fight from 600 to 650 muskets.

Now, making every allowances for the assumption that the Commander-in-Chief in his proposition does not contemplate war, and therefore omits the contingency of operations on an extended scale as foreign to his Excellency's estimate of probable con-

tingencies, so that the calculation has reference to a state of peace in India, thus putting lengthy lines of operation out of the question, and confining movement to limited spheres of action such as petty frontier or internal disturbances,—still, even under such a supposition of the most favourable circumstances, it may be confidently predicted that everything considered, a corps of 750 privates would seldom bring effective for actual conflict more than from 450 to 500 muskets. In fact, judging from past experience, the battalion of 750 privates establishment strength would scarcely ever bring into action the smaller of these two numbers. Even the ordinary casualties of a successful skirmish tell seriously on such a strength, and cripple the battalion considerably. Regarding a European regiment as valuable, not only as a symbol of power, but for the real fighting capacity which it may possess, I cannot avoid the conviction that the proposed strength of 750 privates is the lowest that may be found to suffice for the ordinary requirements of what is designated “Peace” in India.

I should scarcely have entered at such length upon this question were it not that the propositions of the Commander-in-Chief, supported by the Governor-General, point to the feasibility of a further reduction of battalion strength when the arrangements for the despatch of drafts, reliefs, &c., by the Suez route are complete.

Even if the arrangements by the Suez route were invested with greater permanence and security than they really can be, I should demur to encouraging the notion that peace in India is the same thing as peace in England; and that the peace establishment for battalions in England is suitable to those in India. But our hold of India depends not only on the adequacy of our European force for fighting purposes in ordinary times, but also that it be such that a mere temporary interruption to our command of the sea do not seriously affect or prostrate the efficiency of the force. I think it would be dangerous, in reliance on the Suez route, which in the present phase of naval armaments in Europe is especially exposed even to protracted interruption in case of sudden hostilities, to adopt the peace establishment strength of corps in England. However useful and advantageous the Suez route arrangements may prove, to risk the safety of India on their permanence seems inadvisable.

Further, on the prospect of war in India, or in the East, likely to cause the serious employment of a part of the battalions forming the garrison of this country, the strength of such regiments

and of any likely to come into play as reserves should be reinforced from England, and raised as rapidly as possible to a more efficient strength than 750 privates. Any Government would be culpable that neglected this obvious precaution, and it is palpable that the question of barrack and hospital accommodation will not safely bear to be narrowed down by calculations based on the minimum of 750 strength, still further reduced by the deductions which admit of being made on various accounts. It will be better to assume a higher strength as the basis of calculation, so that the work when done may suffice for any but exceptionally high requirements. A very contracted provision of barrack and hospital accommodation may, bearing in mind public feeling on this subject, as well as the health and comfort of the soldier, result in future heavy expenditure.

The reduction proposed for the European cavalry will render the corps weak for real use if called out even temporarily into the field; but it is feasible without much prospect of present inconvenience to the public service.

X.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED REDUCTION OF THE ARTILLERY IN INDIA. DATED THE 6TH JULY, 1865.

When considering the question of artillery reductions recommended by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Colonel Adye, it may be as well to reiterate what was before remarked when touching on the proposed reductions of the strength of the infantry and cavalry of Her Majesty's Forces serving in India. Peace in India is very far from being an identical state with peace in England. It resembles somewhat an armed truce liable at any moment to be disturbed, and it therefore imposes a different military condition from that which characterizes the position of Her Majesty's troops serving in the midst of the resources in men, cattle, and material which a great and rich country like England places on emergency at once at the disposal of its Government.

2. In India we are far from our resources in men and material; we have long and difficult, and some of them warlike frontiers

to watch and to control; we have also the internal tranquillity of a large Empire, peopled by races uncongenial with ourselves, to maintain; dependent states, incorporated with our own territories, to awe and keep in order; and there is further the possibility of having external, and, so to speak, offensive, operations forced upon us in self-defence. Peace in India, therefore, means, as before stated, armed vigilance.

3. It is true that the different parts of the Indian Empire are being connected by main lines of railway, and that these, when complete, should cement our hold of the country; but they are far from being as yet complete, and even when finished they will leave large areas of country unintersected. The military value of our railways is therefore but partial, and must not at present be over-rated.

4. Again, though it is the case that, with few exceptions, there now exist no native powers that can bring into the field any great force of artillery, and also, though pretty certain that the artillery spread over native States, however large in the aggregate, is not likely to be arrayed against us in hostile combination, yet it must not be altogether ignored that the States of Gwalior, Holkar, Jeypore, Ulwur, and one or two others possess a respectable number of guns, and that a portion of these are in a state of tolerable organization and efficiency. Thus Gwalior will now have forty-eight field guns, Jeypore has sixty-nine, Holkar twenty-four, Ulwur fifty-two.

5. A moderate degree of consideration may be given to such circumstances; but it is more important not to forget that the problem of the secure occupation of India, with the smallest possible numerical strength of European troops, involves as a necessary consequence that they shall have the support of an adequate body of artillery. It is this arm which practically quadruples the strength of weak regiments, and enables them to cope with vastly superior numbers. A ratio of guns to troops, therefore, which may be suitable enough to standing armies in Europe, serving for the most part in their own countries, is by no means necessarily applicable to the peculiar position of our European troops in India.

6. Further, in the event of war on a serious scale, the necessity would be imperative for an increase to the strength of the native army. A sudden augmentation of the kind gives neither well-trained nor very reliable troops, and, as a rule, such battalions, even when fully officered, need a stronger support of artillery than

would be necessary with more veteran battalions. General Chamberlain's observations on the inadequate strength of the native corps, even for such a mere frontier affair with border tribes as that at Umbeyla, shows that the strength of the native regiments is quite unequal to the requirements of a protracted campaign. If our weak Punjab corps, the best in our service and close to the frontier, were, after a skirmish or two, reduced to the predicament stated by General Chamberlain, it is manifest that in the event of war there must be a considerable and sudden addition to this portion of Her Majesty's forces; and that, what with the rawness of the troops, the dangerous paucity of European officers on the irregular system, and the mutual ignorance between them and the men hurriedly raised, a counterpoise to so many sources of inherent weakness must be sought in the number and efficiency of the guns.

7. From every point of view, therefore, the question of artillery reduction demands the gravest consideration, and that it be not carried to an extent which underrates its special importance in this country, I shall proceed to the statement of such reductions as appear to me safe and feasible; and if I differ from the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief and Colonel Adye in the incidence of the reductions proposed, it is not without long and careful attention to this most important element of our military power, which, from 1838 to 1857-58, I had opportunities on service, both in and out of India, to observe closely.

8. In Bengal there are at present 12 batteries of horse artillery; Madras and Bombay have four each; so that altogether 20 batteries of horse artillery are serving in India. Colonel Adye proposes a reduction of two, and thus reduces the total to 18 horse artillery batteries,—a number which I think much in excess of our wants. The horse artillery is a costly branch, and when in excess of its specialty requirements, it is not, as compared with field batteries, so useful as the latter. In point of fact, the instances are exceedingly rare in which a field battery, properly horsed, is not equal to perform all that the horse artillery is ordinarily called upon to do in action.

9. To provide for such rare instances, which, if the arm is properly used, can only occur in support of European cavalry or native cavalry brigaded with Dragoons, horse artillery batteries might with advantage be considered as generally an adjunct to the Dragoon regiments, and their numbers be limited to the number of Dragoon regiments employed in India.

10. These regiments, if the late proposals are accepted in England, will, as I have previously remarked, be rendered weak for actual service in the field; and hence a sufficient reason for insuring them, as far as practicable, the support of artillery deemed specially adapted to be associated with cavalry. As there is no arm which requires in the field nicer judgment in the handling, none more frequently committed by the want of it, and none the check or repulse of which involves greater discredit when this occurs with our European cavalry, I think that the horse artillery batteries intended to co-operate with it should be well manned and well horsed. I am opposed, therefore, to Colonel Adye's suggestion to reduce the number of horses from 178 to 150. In case of external war, the complement of men and horses would have to be increased to war strength in the batteries destined to move beyond our frontiers; but the present establishment of men and horses would be ample for ordinary requirements.

11. As there are now 11 Dragoon regiments serving in India, the horse artillery batteries could be reduced from 20 to 11; but for the sake of adapting our requirements to the organization of the royal artillery, the number of batteries might be fixed at 12,—the complement of two brigades.*

12. Even if the eight horse artillery batteries were replaced by as many field batteries, this would effect a saving of $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs. This substitution would not, however, be necessary, as I shall proceed to show, and consequently there would be a reduction of expenditure on this one branch of about $8\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs on pay, allowances, and charges, independently of commissariat and other charges.

13. In Bengal the stations for the Horse Artillery Batteries would be—

Benares	1
Lucknow	1
Meerut	1
Muttra or Agra	1
Umballa	1
Sialkot	1
Rawal Pindi	1
Pesháwar	1
			Total	...	8

* This may be the complement of horse artillery batteries for the brigades in India, even if the lower number of five batteries per brigade be adopted in England. If this were made a difficulty, then I would reduce the horse artillery by two more batteries, so as to have only ten in India, or two brigades.

IN MADRAS.				
Bangalore	1
Secunderabad	1
			Total	2
<hr/>				
IN BOMBAY.				
Kirkee	1
Mhow	1
			Total	2
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The grand total for India would thus be 12 instead of 20.

14. With respect to the field batteries, the reduction in Bengal, which would lose so large a proportion of horse artillery, should be less trenchant than that proposed for the sister and more costly branch. It will have been seen from what has previously been said as to the status of our European and native infantry, that I attach the greatest possible importance to having a sufficiency of field batteries well manned and well horsed; and though willing to carry the reduction of batteries of horse artillery much further than contemplated by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Colonel Adye, I find myself quite unable to accompany Colonel Adye in his proposal to reduce the field batteries in Bengal from 23 to 16. On the contrary, after a careful consideration of the existing number of field batteries and of the stations occupied by them, as compared with Colonel Adye's proposed distribution of the 16 field batteries he would retain, I see great objection to carry out the proposal for stripping several important places of Artillery. The batteries at Sitapur and Hazareebaugh might perhaps be best spared from their respective stations; but in that case they should be moved, the one to Meerut and the other to Peshawar.

15. With respect to the heavy batteries, I cannot but think that their number might without detriment be reduced, and their armament modified. I can comprehend the use of having one at Lahore and one at Gwalior; but I see no advantage in placing one at Peshawar, or at Meerut, or at Lucknow. Three might be reduced and the two retained be better adapted for their special purpose, which I take not to be at all mainly as siege batteries, but as batteries of position to accompany our infantry, and afford it a support against superior masses or against guns, and a support of so destructive a character that no native troops or guns can stand against its fire.

16. I am, however, of opinion that, in order to secure to the two heavy batteries maintained thorough efficiency in this their main function, the complement of men to each battery should be raised from 95 to 164, the strength of the field batteries, and that the armament of each heavy battery should consist of—

4 18-pounders.

2 8-inch howitzers for line of battle, leaving the two 8-inch mortars and the two 5½-inch ones either in park, or, if at all kept with the battery, placed among its waggons.

17. This reduction would set free two battery complements of 95 men each for other employment. The men with the third battery reduced would, with 44 men from the above two batteries, supplement the two retained, and raise their complement to the required strength.

18. At Gwalior Scindia has some heavy guns; and though his late application for elephant harness and equipments for two 18-pounders has not been allowed, he will find no difficulty in supplying himself with what he wants on the pattern of our heavy battery equipments; and I think it expedient that our heavy battery at Gwalior should preponderate over anything of the kind that Scindia can bring into the field. It must be remembered that his 48 field guns and his two or three 18-pounders are concentrated at the Lushkur, and that a very considerable force of Infantry and Cavalry is there in support of this artillery. Those who witnessed the advance of Littler's Brigade, and the loss it sustained at Maharajpore, will not despise Scindia's Mahratta and Hindoostanee gunners.

19. The heavy batteries of Madras and Bombay should be maintained. They have but one each, and both are well placed,—one being at Mhow and the other at Secunderabad. The latter ought certainly to be on the footing I have ventured to suggest for the two Bengal heavy batteries. That at Mhow, perhaps, need not be so, though, in case of necessity it would be advantageous, having all four heavy batteries of the same strength and armament

20. With respect to mountain batteries, I am not at all disposed to undervalue the expediency of the Royal Artillery acquiring experience in this peculiar branch of its proper service. But, if I am not mistaken, the experiment of manning a mountain battery with Europeans was tried some time back at Peshawar, and was discontinued. With reference to the frontier posts of the Punjab, where alone much experience is likely to be had, they are held

by native troops, and no European battery should be without European support. It would, of course, be feasible to surmount this objection by infringing to some extent an accepted principle of artillerists, and giving the battery such a complement of men that practically it might be to a moderate degree sufficient for the purpose of being cantoned with native troops at frontier posts, and of meeting the riskful contingencies to which guns are exposed in mountain warfare,—be self-reliant. But this would render the battery expensive, for it could not have less than the full field battery complement of 164 men to answer this condition. When it is considered that men and officers must be picked for this service, that the men would have to be relieved constantly as the training began to tell on them, that the posts on the Indus frontier are not healthy, that the commissariat arrangements would be more difficult and costly, and that suitable barrack accommodation must be constructed, it seems doubtful whether the advantages would compensate Government for the cost of such batteries. Peshawar would not, in my opinion, be suitable ground for training such a battery. Darjeeling would be better, but with small chance of actual experience. The Trans-Indus frontier posts are, in every practical respect, the best for forming such a battery to real mountain work and warfare, but I have sketched the objections to placing them there; and as it would in my opinion be ridiculous to have mountain batteries only such in name, not in essentials, I hesitate at making any recommendation for the substitution of European mountain batteries in lieu of those now existing.

21. For similar reasons to those already assigned as militating against European mountain batteries, I see practical difficulties in the way of substituting Royal Artillery field batteries in the place of the Punjab field and garrison batteries. The latter are cheap, occupy posts far from healthy or well adapted to European troops, and, though weak in guns, are sufficiently strong supports to the regiments of the Punjab Force which occupy our advanced frontier posts.

22. With respect to the Hyderabad Contingent artillery, the subject of substituting Europeans for native artillerymen in its field batteries was well considered when the report of the Hyderabad Commissioners was before Government in 1862. It will be remembered that Sir Hugh Rose, in a minute of considerable length, strongly advocated the abolition not only of the artillery, but of the whole Contingent. He quoted despatches from the Resident, Colonel Davidson, in which, more than once, that officer

had proposed the substitution of European for native gunners; and Sir Hugh Rose contrasted these strong recommendations of Colonel Davidson, as Resident, with those which he made subsequently as one of the Hyderabad Commissioners, in which he was in favour of the maintenance of the native batteries of the Contingent. After much discussion of the merits of the question, both in its political and in its purely military aspect, the resolution of Government was opposed to any further excision of the native element, whether in the subsidiary or in the Contingent Force, with a view to the substitution of European troops; but the batteries were reduced from six to four pieces of field ordnance.

23. The Government was moved to this resolution on political grounds, partly in deference to the jealousy of the Nizam at any modification of pre-existing arrangements, especially the cantoning elsewhere than Secunderabad of European troops in outlying stations in his Highness's territories; partly in consequence of the difficulties which had lately been incurred in the negotiation of a treaty, and the inexpediency, when affairs had at last been settled, of leading the Nizam to entertain misapprehensions as to our views and intentions by overtures for a re-opening of further questions.

24. The military reasons were,—the cost of European batteries, the want of European support from them in stations occupied by the contingent alone, the inexpediency of European artillery being used on all sorts of petty occasions in which the Contingent troops are called out, and their inaptitude for such irregular service in the heart of a Native State.

25. My own opinion of the contingent artillery is not very favourable; but the arguments which prevailed in 1862, both political and military, are scarcely at all changed; and the influence of the present Resident, Mr. Yule, though great with the Nizam and his minister, might fail to render palatable a proposition such as must be made were the idea entertained of replacing the contingent batteries wholly or in part by Royal Artillery field batteries. There is nothing in the Treaty of 1853 which is opposed to such a substitution, for its terms are general, and the artillery may, according to the letter of the treaty, be either European or native; but when it was framed, native troops were evidently contemplated, not European, and the concurrence of the Nizam ought, as a point of good faith, to be obtained before a radical change of the kind suggested by Colonel Adye could be carried out. I see, however, no objection to the opinion of the

Resident, Mr. Yule, being asked before this point be finally decided.

26. I now turn to the proposals made by Colonel Adye with respect to the artillery for the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, and must premise that it would be essential to consult both those Governments before any decision could be satisfactorily adopted.

27. Having laid down the general principle which should guide the strength of the horse artillery in India, and struck off two batteries from each of these presidencies, I pass on to the consideration of the Field Batteries.

28. Here I would call the attention of the Council to the fact that, in addition to the arguments already advanced for not weakening the number of field batteries in Bengal, should be borne in mind that the contemplated conversion of the Madras native infantry from regulars into irregulars renders it even more necessary in Madras not to weaken the artillery too much. I concur with Sir W. Denison and Sir Hope Grant in the opinion that the Madras sepoys and native officers are not well adapted for the irregular organization to which it is contemplated to subject them: as a race they are neither so warlike nor such good natural material for soldiery as the men of the north of India. Such firmness as they may have shown on actual service was mainly due to their European officers; when these are reduced to the strength allowed on the irregular system, the Madras infantry will, *pro tanto*, lose a main element of its efficiency for fighting purposes. The re-organization on the irregular system will, in my opinion, thus render the Madras native army an inherently and constitutionally weak one, both in peace, in the sense the word is used for India, and in war. The mettle of these troops on the new organization (if it be carried out) may any day be tested either in Burmah or in the Nizam's country by a sudden outbreak of hostilities, more or less serious and requiring immediate action. In either case it would fall on the Coast Army, associated with Her Majesty's British troops, to meet the occasion, and feeble as the Native battalions will be in every respect, they will need the support of ample artillery. Except, therefore, that a battery may perhaps be spared from Secunderabad, where I propose that the heavy battery should be much strengthened, and that a field battery may also perhaps be spared from Bangalore or Cannanore (not from both places), I do not feel disposed to think that the Madras presidency can safely be reduced to a lower number of field batteries. I am, however,

in favour of reducing the native horse artillery battery at once, as proposed by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his minute of 20th June, on this special battery.

29. With respect to Bombay, the same arguments apply as to Bengal and Madras. Wherever the irregular system is applied, or likely to be so, it is futile to attempt to conceal from ourselves or others that the system, if adhered to, must fail under the strain of war.

30. Under such circumstances, a formidable artillery support may stave off evils in the early part of a campaign and afford time and opportunity to strengthen the system before it breaks down. Under this view of the essential weakness for war purposes of the new organization of the native armies I attach immense importance to the royal artillery being in good strength, for it will, in case of sudden tension being brought on the system now in vogue for all India, prove a mainstay and some counterpoise to radical weakness in other arms. I am consequently opposed to the amount of reduction of field batteries proposed for Bombay. I cannot think that Kurrachee should be stripped of its field battery; Sholapore might perhaps spare a field battery; Belgaum is more doubtful; so, too, Ahmedabad. Possibly, however, the Bombay Government might agree to the reduction of two field batteries, though that is open to doubt.

31. With respect both to the Madras and the Bombay armies, it must be remembered that upon these Coast armies must fall any beyond sea expeditions of a military kind, and that to reduce them below a certain point will paralyze this function of the Coast armies. Eminently costly and undesirable as trans-sea operations are, policy demands and imposes upon India the necessity of being able to command, and prepared, if need be, to enforce respect on other shores than its own.

32. It should be understood that, in speaking of horse artillery and field batteries, the gradual substitution of rifled ordnance in both branches is contemplated. The change when complete will greatly increase the real positive strength of the batteries, and will confer on the artillery a far higher relative value than the same number of smooth-bore field pieces in the ordinary batteries conveys. Still as the European regiments are to be at the minimum strength of 750 rank and file, and the Native infantry at a minimum strength also, besides being on the irregular system, the augmented efficiency due to rifled ordnance can only

safely be regarded as a necessary compensation for the weakness of other arms of the military service.

33. With reference to the *personnel* of the artillery, which, both for horse artillery and for field batteries, is rather in excess of our peace (in India) requirements, reduction is unadvisable; because in case of serious war, either external or internal, and the employment of artillery with forces taking the field for such campaigns, it would merely require the addition of two guns per battery, for which the *personnel* is ample, to allow of the batteries not taking the field detaching half batteries to occupy adequately for the nonce the places of the batteries sent on active service. Four Armstrong or rifled guns thus detached would be quite equal to an ordinary smooth-bore battery of six guns. I am not in favour, however, of increasing the number of horses to field batteries beyond the present strength of 110; for, in the event of impending campaign, there would always be time to augment the number of horses, both with the batteries to take the field, and with those which had to fill up the gaps by detaching half batteries. The complement of men might, however, with advantage be raised to 164, for they cannot be got on the spur of the moment, and such a strength would meet on emergency the temporary expansion of batteries from six to eight guns.

34. I would observe further that, in recommending so large a reduction of the heavy batteries I contemplate that in due course of time the 18-pounders and 8-inch howitzers will be replaced by whatever rifled ordnance, whether 20-pounder Armstrongs or any other kind of gun of like calibre, may be accepted in the British service. Meanwhile the armament that is proposed would render the heavy batteries retained amply formidable for all practical purposes, and they could await, after more pressing demands had been answered, the substitution of that higher calibre of rifled ordnance which would restore them to the same relative position with respect to the 12-pounder Armstrong field gun as they now hold to the 12-pounder field battery of smooth-bore brass ordnance.

35. I have not as yet noted that I concur with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the proposal lately made with reference to the Eurasian Native Christian Battery. If this battery be turned into a mountain battery of the strength proposed, there can be no necessity, when the operations in Bhootan are over, for continuing the existence of the Assam Local Battery.

36. From what has preceded, it will be seen that the reductions I contemplate as feasible are as follows:—

Positive reduction of batteries.

Horse Artillery	8
Heavy Batteries	3
Assam Local Battery	1
					Total	12*

Possible reductions in addition.

FIELD BATTERIES.						
Madras	2
Bombay	2
					Total	4

36. I omit as more doubtful any modification of the Punjab batteries and of the Hyderabad Contingent batteries.

37. The positive reductions, if the Assam Local Battery be omitted from account, are the same in number as in Colonel Adye's proposals, but are differently constituted, as I do not touch the field batteries in Bengal, though reducing very heavily the horse artillery. There can be no question but that the reductions thus proposed will effect, with less detriment to the aggregate strength and power of the royal artillery in India, much greater saving of expenditure than Colonel Adye's scheme.

38. Moreover, if a regiment of Dragoons can be spared, and the organization of the horse artillery in India must be squared down to the peace establishment of England of five batteries per brigade, than Bengal could spare without risk or inconvenience two more batteries of horse artillery. The four field batteries must depend on the opinions of the Madras and Bombay Government; but should they concur in the reduction of two field batteries in each presidency, then the saving effected would of course greatly exceed that due on Colonel Adye's propositions, and that with less deduction from the effective power of the royal artillery, which really lies in the field batteries.

39. The heavy and field batteries reduced would furnish garrison batteries to the presidencies effecting the reductions. The horse

* If the Native Troop of Madras Horse Artillery be included, the total would be thirteen.

artillery should be reduced at the next relief, so as not to disturb the current Military Estimates of the Home Government.

40. With regard to the reduction of officers of artillery, I am unable to concur with the proposals of Colonel Adye and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. These proposals appear to lose sight of the fact that the Government is under as great an obligation to keep good faith with its artillery as with its infantry officers, and that the senior officers of artillery have already suffered a heavy disadvantage as a consequence of their amalgamation with the royal artillery, which, whilst it profited and will profit from all augmentations, is in a much more favourable position, present and prospective, than the cadres of the artillery of the old Indian armies. The Secretary has shown the inaccuracy of some of the statements and calculations made by Colonel Adye, and has treated this subject very fully in paras. 48 to 73 inclusive of his note. I concur generally with his remarks; and without recapitulating the arguments he has lucidly brought forward, I on the same grounds arrive at the conclusion that no other reductions can be equitably carried out except by the limitation of appointments to the subaltern grade, and by abstaining from seconding the captains and subalterns who receive appointments tenable by officers without quitting the artillery. This and a more liberal system than has hitherto been in vogue of employing artillery officers in staff appointments would speedily reduce the excess of officers to a limit not more than sufficient to cover the many demands which the peculiar requirements of the service in India and its reliefs now impose.

41. It must not be inferred, because, throughout this minute, the eventuality of war is contemplated, and the capacity of our forces to meet it considered, that I distrust the chance of peace, external and internal, being generally maintained for some years to come. Nor would I have it supposed that I rely for the tranquillity of our provinces and the loyalty of Native States wholly on the physical force at the disposal of Government, irrespective of the character of its policy and general administration. I do neither. But at the same time I am confident that the continuance of external peace and of internal order and security is based on the conviction entertained by those who scrutinize our position very closely, that we have the power at hand to coerce the hostile or refractory; and I know that there is no part of our strength more dreaded in this respect, or more carefully counted and observed, than the number, strength, and distribution of the British batteries of artillery.

XI.

MINUTE ON THE QUESTION OF HILL SANITARIA FOR EUROPEAN TROOPS. DATED THE 27TH JULY, 1865.

A perusal of the report of the Sanitary Commission, the minute of Sir Hugh Rose and its appendices, the subsequent minutes of his Excellency Sir W. Mansfield, and of the Governor-General, will show that this question is one in which political and purely military considerations are somewhat in conflict, and that consequently it is one in which a balance must be struck between the two classes of requirements. The aim must be to reconcile as far as practicable the necessities of our political position in this country with the utmost attention to the health, efficiency, discipline, and organization of the British regiments serving in India. Manifestly, in striking a balance between such complex considerations, there is room for great variety and diversity of opinion, but unless I am mistaken, discussion is narrowed and decision simplified by the relative importance of the matters to be combined.

The primary object is the secure and tranquil occupation of the country. However momentous sanitary considerations may be, they must on this point be admitted as of secondary importance. A contrary view makes the occupation of the country an inconsistency.

Subject, however, to this primary condition of a secure and peaceful hold of India, is the secondary one that the hold of this great country be effected at as small a cost of European life as possible, and that in making use of the hill climates to assist in attaining this object, it be done with as little detriment to the organization and discipline of the troops as possible.

The plains cannot be evacuated in favour of the hills without imperilling in a thousand unforeseen ways the peace and prosperity of our own provinces as well as the stability and order of the dependent Native States intermixed with our territories. If the empire is to be tranquil all the great strategical points, as well as some of minor military though of much political importance, must be held in a manner to deter and prevent attempts against our power or authority. This primary fact involves as an imperative necessity that the mass of the European troops in the

Bengal presidency must be stationed in the plains, and that it is only such portion as may not be required to maintain order that can be permanently cantoned in the hills.

Here the question fairly arises whether two or two-and-a-half regiments out of thirty-three are all that could be safely placed in the hills. I am disposed to think that without risk two more infantry regiments might be permanently cantoned in the mountains. The ratio of hill to plain stations would thus be raised very considerably, and the relief of whole regiments whose general health had been shaken in the plains would be much facilitated. Dr. Beatson observes that the really bad climates in the plains may be stated as nine in number.* Of these nine, Calcutta is usually the station of regiments about to return to England, and the insalubrity of some is not so constant but what others would occasionally have to be substituted in their place. Still, taking nine as the number of really bad climates, and four-and-a-half as the number of regimental hill stations, seven-eighths of the Infantry, and all the Cavalry and Artillery must remain exposed to the climate of the plains. Stations like Hazaribagh, Rawul Pindi, and Roy Bareilly, of approved salubrity, and others such as Meerut, Umballa, and Sialkot, of fair healthiness, should not be confounded absolutely with other plain stations, so that it may be said that of the 33 regiments one-third are in bad, one-third in indifferent, and one-third in good climates. Amongst the latter $4\frac{1}{2}$ might be hill stations. Under such circumstances there is a good deal of scope for timely reliefs of shaken corps, and I doubt if at present more could safely be done.

There remains the question of convalescent *depôts*. I attach great weight to the arguments of Sir Hugh Rose and Sir W. Mansfield against the abuse of detachments sent to the hills, for it stands to reason that a system which should, as a matter of ordinary course, detach from two to three hundred men a regiment annually to the hills, must prove detrimental to the discipline and training of the men, and operate prejudicially to the condition of every regiment subjected to such a process. I would therefore limit the use of the convalescent *depôts* to what was fairly necessary, and would avoid a systematic annual depletion of corps beyond that mark on a Sanitary Commission ratio which might be quite unnecessary to apply to many regiments. The

Calcutta, Benares, Allahabad, Agra, Morar, Delhi, Mooltan, Meeran Meer, Peshawar.

provision of accommodation at convalescent *depôts* for women and children should be on a liberal scale, and that for the men good and ample; but I do not think the barrack accommodation should be more than sufficient for the wing of an infantry regiment at each, with a rather larger proportion of married men's quarters than is due to a wing; for sickness often falls more heavily on the women and children than on the men. With six *depôts*,* for Jutogh may be regarded as an offshoot from Kussowlie, there would then be the following accommodation in the hills:—

Regimental Stations	4½
Convalescent Depôts	3
					<hr/>
					7½
					<hr/>

If taken in numbers of men:—

Regimental Stations	4,144
6 Convalescent Depôts, at 500	3,000
					<hr/>
				Total	7,144
					<hr/>

The Sanitary Commission took for 1863 a total strength of 46,643 men of all arms, but Colonel Norman informs me that the present establishment strength of the British force in Bengal is 40,498 of all arms. Deducting the strength of 4½ regiments there remain 36,354 men, and the convalescent *depôt* accommodation available would be over 8 per cent. on the 36,000 men. If the ratio be struck between 7,144 and 40,498, the result is well over 17 per cent., in fact nearer 18 per cent. on the whole force. The Infantry having 4½ regimental hill stations, which gives 13·5 on the Infantry strength, and these having 8 per cent. on the force in the plains at the convalescent *depôts*, would really aggregate 21·5 per cent. of its strength in the hills.

This mode of having over 17 per cent. of the European force in the hills is far less objectionable than having 20 or 25 per cent. in large detachments from regiments, and batteries, and yet would be more conducive to the general health of regiments, whilst still adequately meeting the ordinary requirements of regiments in the plains having to re-establish the health of convalescents. From the more frequent circulation of regimental hill reliefs the general health of corps would be better, and consequently the necessity

* 1. Murree. 2. Dalhousie. 3. Kussowlie and Jutogh. 4. Landour. 5. Naini Tal. 6. Darjeeling.

for sending up convalescents less. Eight per cent. would under such circumstances prove ample, for it is much in excess of the number now sent up.

I am aware that it may be alleged that the construction of two additional regimental stations in the hills would be costly. I fully admit this, but, on the other hand, as a set-off to the cost of barracks, roads, &c., must be put the saving of European life, and lightening the pressure on the recruiting resources of Great Britain. I am convinced that a European regiment from the Punjab, and one from the Meerut or Oudh divisions, might be safely placed in the hills, and as we are about to engage in the construction of proper barrack accommodation for the European troops, the real difference in the expenditure of placing two regiments in the hills or on the plains would be the increase of cost due to work in the hills and the construction of roads to the new stations. Of the two Infantry regiments at Pindi, nearly a whole corps has this year been in the hills; a considerable detachment was so last year; there can therefore be no doubt but that the Punjab would be equally safe with a regiment on the hills; just as little that a regiment might be placed at Tana Toongra (Pokri), or at Budraj, without endangering the North-Western Provinces, in which I include Oudh; and I think it will be admitted that the mode in which I propose to distribute the 18 per cent. of men in the hills will cause far less disruption of regimental organization and derangement of habits of discipline and training, besides being more beneficial to the general health of the army, than 20 per cent. drawn as proposed by detachments from every regiment and battery.

As railways are completed, and it becomes feasible to reduce our European force, it will be from stations in the plains, not from hill stations, that regiments will be withdrawn. When that day arrives the proportionate effect on the general sanitary condition of the army produced by $4\frac{1}{2}$ hill stations would increase to a degree which depended on the amount of reduction, but with augmenting beneficial effect as the reduction was greater.

My proposal, stated in few words, is, that over 17 per cent., nearly 18 per cent., of the European troops be provided for in the hills—10 per cent. by regimental hill stations, 8 per cent. by convalescent *dépôts*.

XII.

EXTRACTS FROM A MINUTE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE SUPPLY OF
ORDNANCE STORES FROM ENGLAND. DATED THE 14TH AUGUST,
1865.

12. I may here remark that I take exception to the proposition that "the batteries out here should be ready at any moment to be partially withdrawn, and to take part in European wars; and there seems no reason why India should not become a depôt for all our dependencies in the East, instead of, as at present, stores being sent out to them at great cost of time and transport from Woolwich." With respect to European wars, England should certainly rely on the Artillery reserve at Home rather than on the distant garrison of India, 8,000 miles from her own shores. Whilst, with respect to the Cape, Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, China and Australia, independently of strategical considerations, which are manifestly opposed to the suggestion, there is the further fact that it would be wholly unjustifiable to saddle India with the heavy expenditure inseparable from being made the gigantic arsenal from whence these outlying Colonies of the Crown are to be supplied. As far as the climate is concerned, there can scarcely be a worse for the custody of a large class of Ordnance stores; and England, so long as she retains her supremacy at sea, can with greater facility, and much more cheaply and efficiently, supply those Colonies from home, or establish depôts less remote from them than India. In another minute I have already shown that India has now much more horse artillery than is at all necessary, and I am just as strongly opposed to India being made to pay for a needless strength of the *personnel* as of the *matériel* of the British Ordnance Department, unless all in excess of her own requirements be made a charge against the Home Government. The India military budget has no right to bear the charge of a reserve of Ordnance and gunners to meet the possible exigencies of China or Australia, or the Cape, or any other Colony. If such a reserve be advisable, the Crown has in Ceylon a far better strategical point, with reference to all to the eastward, than any port in India itself offers.

14. It is advisable that certain vital points, peculiarly open to naval attacks, increase without delay their supply of heavy rifled ordnance; I allude to such important positions as Bombay, Kurrachee, and Aden on one side, Madras and Fort William on the other. A commencement has, indeed, been made both at Bombay and Madras; the former has eight, and the latter six, 110-pounders mounted, or ready to be so. But with reference to present naval armaments, and the use of steam, not only should better provision be made for securing from insult the places on our sea-board, which are in fact our maritime base for the support and supply of our forces in India, but there should further be early consideration given to our mercantile interests. From Ceylon to Bombay and Kurrachee on the western, and from Ceylon to the delta of the Ganges on the eastern, coast of India, there is not a single point of refuge where a merchant vessel could find protection from an enemy's privateers. On the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal it is the same; the whole coast from Mergui to Moulmein, and from Moulmein to Rangoon and Akyab, is open not only to insult from the attacks of light naval squadrons, but exposed to the depredations upon our mercantile marine, which privateers could carry on with perfect impunity. It is no answer to an exposition of this state of things to assert that the protection of our mercantile interests in the Indian seas depends on our naval means in these waters being adequate. In case of war with naval Powers, our commerce might suffer immensely from the want of a few points of refuge for merchant vessels. It did so formerly, when our naval superiority was far more unchallenged than would now be the case in the event of war; and since it has latterly vastly increased in value, whilst the facilities of preying upon it with comparative impunity are much greater, it seems incumbent on the Government to make some moderate provision auxiliary to its protection by the Royal Navy. I think, therefore, we must anticipate the necessity of requiring for our coast defences a considerable increase to the heavy rifled ordnance now in the country; and though a costly, it is certainly a necessary provision to make, both for the security of the places which are our maritime base for the possession of this country, and also for such points as, in the interest of our commerce, demand attention. The latter are few, but not the less important; and for obvious reasons there should be no great delay in affording to both classes of positions the security from insult which a respect for heavy rifled ordnance imposes on naval cruisers, whether regular or privateers.

18. I am entirely opposed to dependence on Woolwich or any other home establishments for a large class of stores which can be and ought to be made in this country. I will instance gunpowder, gun-carriages, limbers, and waggons, repairs to guns themselves and their equipments, harness, saddlery, and many minor articles, which can be equally well and much more cheaply made in this country, where manual labour is cheap, and where it is utterly inexpedient to keep, as must be done if India be made dependent on England, immense stores of perishable articles. It is vain to attempt to place this great Empire on the same footing as one of the petty Colonies dependent on England. It must, if we are to hold and keep it, be to a certain degree self-reliant. The contingency of a European or American war, and of temporary interruption to our command of the sea, should not imperil our position in India; such circumstances are precisely those under which we may have again to struggle for existence on the plains of India itself. It is futile to treat an Empire of this magnitude by the measures and ideas which are suitable to a petty dependency; and to square down our proceedings to a Woolwich standard of the notions of our requirements, appears to me puerile. I am therefore strongly in favour of maintaining in full and improved efficiency all Ordnance Factories, confining dependence on England to guns, projectiles, machinery, and special tools. India commands the best of saltpetre, of charcoal and of brimstone; why look elsewhere for gunpowder so long as these remain its constituents? India has an inexhaustible supply of hides of every kind, and of tanning barks, &c.; why look elsewhere for leather suited and adapted to a climate in which English saddlery, harness, and sewing of contract kind are proved to be worthless? We know by painful experience the utter inefficiency of English gun-carriages, &c., in this climate, and the superiority of the carriages, limbers, and waggons made of seasoned timber in India; why look elsewhere for such articles? Is the pedantry of assimilation to Woolwich in every minute particular incompatible with making use of the resources at our feet? The superiority of England lies in mechanical skill, not in the abundance or the quality of raw material, or the cheapness of manual or skilled labour. It is not to the Woolwich Select Committee that we owe rifled ordnance, but to the Armstrongs and Whitworths; and if our manufacturing establishments are to be raised to the mark to fit them for meeting the requirements of the new armaments, it is not by such committees as

can be assembled in this country that this object will be attained, but by the importation into our factories of skilled engineers, trained in the workshops of the great mechanics of England, and competent to point out, from their own knowledge and experience, what our establishments require to be supplemented with in order to fit them for the progress and improvement made in all branches of ordnance and small arms. I am therefore strongly in favour of the suggestion of Colonel Turner, with reference to the mode of improving these factories. I go further, however, and would suggest that some eminent engineer, whose labours have of late been devoted to the improvement of ordnance, be invited to go over our establishments and to report and suggest what it may seem necessary to provide, in order to adapt them to the growing demands, which even as auxiliary institutions the employment of rifled ordnance is sure to bring upon them. Our factories are not many, and it would be worth the while of Government to pay handsomely an eminent engineer like Armstrong or Whitworth, or any man they might select as of competent ability, to visit India in the cold and healthy season, when works in England are comparatively working slack; and, after an inspection of our few factories, to inform Government what was necessary to introduce in order to bring those establishments into harmony with the requirements of the modern Artillery.* One such inspection by an eminent practical engineer would be worth more to Government than the opinions of any amount of committees that could be assembled in this country, and it is worth paying for.

19. I am not disposed to think, bearing in mind the magnitude of this Empire, and the political inexpediency of our being dependent on one factory, whether of powder, gun-carriages, or anything else, that our factories are too numerous. Provided the factories are secured from insult by hostile naval squadrons, it is an advantage that they should be near the coast, and thus in easy communication with the sea. The paralysis of any one factory, whether from accident, treachery, or military disaster, is thus not irremediable, nor is the efficiency of the public service dependent on the workpeople of a single establishment. Whether or not the triplicate system of distinct Corps of Artillery had much to do with these separate factories for powder, gun-carriages, or anything else, is not here the question. They exist in more

* Any decision on the Cossipore Foundry should depend on the result of the suggested inspection by a competent engineer.

or less efficiency, and the real point at issue is, whether our position in India would be more or less secure by depending wholly on one, instead of having three, distinct *foci* of supply for such indispensable and vitally important articles as powder, gun and ordnance carriages, percussion caps, &c. There can only be one answer to this question. Centralization, uniformity, and assimilation to Woolwich patterns and the system of the War Office at home are all very well in their way, and no one impugns the advisability in a regiment of artillery that all practicable attention should be given to these conditions; but there is something higher and more important than these considerations, and even economy must bow to that something, which is, that the efficiency of our separate presidential armies and our hold of the country be not staked on a single distant *focus* of supply for those armies. No nation, not even England, within its own territories, is content to depend on a single source of supply for the vital wants of warfare. But if this be the case in countries where the Government is amid its own people and subjects, how much more essential is it where a Government is in military occupation of an immense conquest peopled by races whose repugnance to the dominant foreigners is notorious. Under such circumstances, triplicate *foci* of supply, in easy communication with the sea, are not more than is required by ordinary prudence.

20. It must not be imagined from the foregoing remarks that I underrate the importance in the artillery administration of uniformity of armament and *matériel*. On the contrary, provided these considerations do not usurp undue predominance, they demand most careful attention. Though not prepared to advocate that the Government of India should lay down the maxim that the successive recommendations of the Woolwich Select Committee, when approved by the Minister for War at home, are to be law out here, and that the local Governments are not to interfere, I am alive to the great disadvantage of the isolation of Ordnance establishments in India, their want of intercommunication with each other, and with the Ordnance Department in England, and the lack of a general control which shall harmonize progress, and secure all reasonable and not too tardy assimilation with the permanent advances made in the practical science of artillery in England. I am therefore very strongly in favour of the Inspector-General of Bengal being made Inspector-General of Ordnance and Magazines for all India.

XII.

MINUTE ON A PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT
NEWSPAPER.

(Dated the 25th January, 1866.)

Since the Press was practically set free propositions for Government of India *Moniteur* newspapers have repeatedly been brought forward, but on full consideration of the difficulties and the inconveniences attending such a Government organ, the proposals have always hitherto fallen to the ground.

Since the subject was lately broached in Council by his Excellency the Governor-General I have given the matter serious consideration, and the minute of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has still further called my careful attention to a question which I need scarcely add has often previously, under a variety of forms, presented itself for investigation.

Before proceeding to submit my own views I would note that I do not think that the existence of a Government newspaper would, in any appreciable degree, have influenced the course of events in 1857. So far as the Press was concerned, Government could not complain of the tone in which, prior to the actual outbreak of the mutiny and the insurrection, the English Press addressed itself to the endeavour of dispelling the assumed alarm of the Sepoy Army at alleged infractions on the part of the Government of caste sentiments. Alive to the danger which was impending, the English Press exerted itself to allay, as far as it could, such groundless apprehensions. It pointed out how utterly inconsistent with the character of the British Government the puerile modes ascribed to it for the subversion of caste prejudices were, and how malignantly prepenes were the accusations and insinuations which taxed the Government with resort to such imbecile manœuvres. The unanimity of the English Press on this head was far more likely to have had a favourable effect than could have produced the asseverations of a single Government organ, provoking, as such a newspaper would infallibly provoke, the opposition of the greater and most influential portion of the Press.

The fact is that the events of 1857 had a far deeper root than greased cartridges, or any other pretext paraded by the mutineers, or ostensibly adopted by insurrectionists. It is out of place here to enter at any length upon this subject, but it is pertinent to the question before us to observe that the views of the English Press can only permeate to the ignorant millions of India through an intermediate class, whose education, such as it is, has not rendered them particularly well-affected to their British rulers, and that in 1856-57 the use made by this class of the monopoly of the knowledge of English, of our administration, and its legislative measures, was to distort and to exaggerate with purposed venom. The few and the ill-disposed were thus able to excite the race-antipathies of the masses, and fanned their hatred by appeals to every prejudice and passion which could intensify disgust at a foreign race and rule. No single English paper, so long as the millions are what they remain, could have stemmed such a flood, and a Government paper would certainly have commanded even less reliance than an independent journal.

Sir W. Mansfield holds most strongly that there should be an accredited Government organ at each seat of Government after the fashion of the *Moniteur*. At the close of the minute his Excellency thinks it probable that such an authoritative newspaper should be published under the orders of the Government of India alone.

It will be admitted that whichever course were adopted, conflict between the Supreme and the Subordinate Governments being frequent and inevitable, such conflict would be both more embittered and more unseemly than at present. The Government of India would place its own story and views before the public through its *Moniteur*. Its writers would be well known, and a personal as well as a general element of digladiatory dissension would enter into the warfare. If the Subordinate Government had no official organ of its own, it would enlist the support of some of the local papers, and as these would be less shackled by the sense of propriety than the Government of India *Moniteur*, the latter must fight at great disadvantage. The information might be pretty equal on both sides, but the vigour and license would be all against the *Moniteur*. If each Government had its own organ less license might enter into the controversy, but hardly less of public scandal, and certainly not less of pabulum for the independent Press at the expense of both the Supreme and the Subordinate Governments.

Either way, the result must be that, the independent Press enjoying the sympathies of the people and Press in England, public opinion would be predisposed to favour the free rather than the official journals, and the latter would invest the unofficial Press with greater importance than it commands at present.

What now only ruffles as a passing skirmish would then be a set duel, and if the Government of India were defeated on the arena of the Press, into which it entered as an avowed combatant, the consequences would necessarily be much more damaging and disastrous than at present.

Further, the Government of India ventilating its views and opinions in the way proposed, might not unfrequently clash with the Home Government. Differences would then assume a much rougher aspect, and greatly to the detriment of the Government of India, when, after airing in the columns of the *Moniteur* its own views and opinions, it had to eat its own leek and modify its course and policy. To the Home Government, on which the defence of an Indian Administration devolves before the Houses of Parliament, no insignificant complications and embarrassments might arise from the vivacity of an Indian *Moniteur*. Suppose, for instance, Government organs had existed when Sir C. Trevelyan was Governor of Madras, and Lord Canning was Governor-General, with Mr. Wilson as Financial Member of the Council, who would be bold enough to predicate the result of the controversy that would have arisen?

Again, the Government of India is not always unanimous, and as the minority are sometimes right, though the Government newspaper must argue in the sense of the majority and try to lead opinion accordingly, it might ultimately prove to have been misleading public opinion, and the rebound under Blue Book revelations and Parliamentary discussion might prove destructive of confidence in its authority and wisdom.

The editor of a Government organ, if he is to cope with the unofficial Press, must be entrusted with a large discretion in treating of personal questions, appointments, removals, &c. What the Services may endure from an unofficial paper with indifference they would not bear from an accredited Government organ. For one case now ever brought before the Courts there would be twenty prosecutions, when every word smacking of defamation bore the stamp of Government, and was regarded as indelibly affecting an officer's character. On such occasions Government would practically be put upon its trial, and its assailants, com-

manding the ablest men at the Bar, might cause it much annoyance and disrepute. Take Mr. Buckle's case, for instance, and suppose a loophole given in the *Moniteur* for an action, where would the Government have stood in a prosecution before the High Court? In the case of the *Moniteur* of Paris it must be remembered that at its back is the unlimited power of the Emperor, and that the laws of France make a warning to an offending journal no mere matter of form or indifference. The French Courts of Justice having to administer the law of the Empire, *i.e.*, of the Emperor, are under very different circumstances from our High Courts in India. It is in my opinion very impolitic for the Governments in India to place themselves in positions where the High Courts can legitimately review their proceedings in their executive capacities, and counsel exercise its eloquence at the expense of the dignity and authority of the Government. Anyone who has watched events for the last thirty years will not pronounce this an ideal inconvenience; yet it is one to which a Government organ would certainly expose even the most cautious administration.

On some affairs a Government must be reserved, and it is on such questions that the Press is usually most solicitous of information and irritable at reticence. Silence now means nothing; but the case is different when a *Moniteur* is established with the avowed object of placing the right side of every question before the public. All must then be anticipated, or else explained and defended, otherwise reticence is construed into an admission that Government fears to face public opinion. The comments on the *Moniteur* of France should teach us what to expect if an Indian one be started.

The Press of India depends in a great measure on the support of the services and the mercantile community of the Presidency towns. It has no native public to speak of to which it directly addresses itself. As a rule, it represents the European classes, official and unofficial. For upwards of thirty years I have watched it, and have known how many of the official men who have risen to distinction owed in reality no small part of their success to the support which the Press gave them in return for information. It was a natural barter of countenance, praise, and hearty support for news and communications of more or less value. Whatever in other respects the consequence of this intimate relation between some of our public servants with the daily journals, the result was generally highly favourable to the Government, for it enlightened

the editors and brought them into sympathy with the labours and the intelligence of the working staff of the administration. Editors thus obtained a better comprehension of the real condition of the country than would otherwise have been attained in a Presidency town. Now, the tendency of Government organs would be to deprive the free Press of such aid, and to concentrate on the columns of the authoritative journal the writing powers of the ambitious men of the Civil and Military Services. The effect would be to separate the free Press from these sources of friendly relation with the administration, and consequently proportionably to increase antagonism. I do not think this desirable.

It cannot be denied that Government sometimes fails, as in the Bhootan contest, to carry with itself the support of the Indian Press, and it may occasionally be exposed to misrepresentation and even calumny; but there is to my mind more danger from entering the lists against all comers in the columns of a *Moniteur* than in patiently enduring a temporarily hostile Indian Press. That Press—I mean the Anglo-Indian, not the Native Press—has usually gone most wrong when it happened to fall for a while under the predominating influence of a narrow official clique. Under such circumstances it has at times proved signally malevolent, unscrupulous, and unjust, especially to individuals, but not therefore hostile to the Government. When free from such dependence it generally went right, and on the whole afforded Government a liberal and unsolicited support. That which has been notoriously the case when a newspaper fell under the influence of an official clique would, I think, be a danger inseparable from a Government newspaper, which must be guided by a clique, and one with great power and opportunity to carry out its animosities and prejudices. Individual cases of injustice would then render a Government far more unpopular than when an ordinary journal displayed such tendencies. The most unpropitious time for setting on foot a *Moniteur*, such as is proposed, is that when the Government may be supposed to wince under the diatribes of a hostile Press. It will be taken as a confession of soreness, weakness, and impotent resentment, and could not fail to give fresh life and vigour to the assaults of the free Press, which to a man would be arrayed against the Government and its organ.

Everything considered, it is wiser to trust to the soundness of the measures of Government and to the honesty of its intentions to secure a fair though it may be an intermittent support from the free Press than under the frail shield of an Indian *Moniteur* to

hold out a perpetual challenge and to foster a permanent antagonism. Such an authoritative newspaper, if dull, proper, and commonplace, would be the mark for ridicule and obloquy; if racy, bold, and censorious, it would be fiercely assailed in every way; under either supposition the end would probably be a collapse more damaging to the position of Government than can result from the occasional hostility of the local Press at present.

I omit allusion to the difficulty of securing competent editors, and of regulating the publication, so that the movements of Government should not affect it. Such minor contingencies as plant, movements, &c., might be met, but good editors are rare, and one bound to obey Government, an exotic not as yet produced on English soil.

The *Supplement of the Gazette* appears to me a channel not half enough employed as a means of giving early and even anticipatory information; but the orders of the Secretary of State have to be borne in mind when it is a question of promulgating official papers or information. Still I think that the utility of the Supplement might be greatly developed without exciting the antagonism of the free Press. There can be no reason against such a gradual utilization of the Supplement, which, in connection with the publication of papers of an official character, might give an introductory summary or explanatory comment—much as with Bills, where a statement is not thought out of place.

Interpellations, with a view to publicity, in the Executive Council can have no place under the existing Act of Parliament, and the circumstances of our position in India are unfavourable to any application of a mode of procedure which is as natural and easy in the representative body which practically rules England as it would be difficult to introduce in an assembly so differently constituted as is the Council of the Governor-General from that of the House of Commons.

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XIV.

MINUTE ON A DESPATCH FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA,
RELATIVE TO THE QUESTION OF PROVIDING FUNDS FOR THE CON-
STRUCTION OF IRRIGATION WORKS. DATED THE 13TH FEBRUARY,
1866.

In considering the despatch of the Secretary of State, dated 30th November, 1865, I think it should be remembered that of the 70 millions of railway capital, with its advantages of a 5 per cent. dividend guaranteed by the Government, and a share in prospective surplus profits, out of 36,000 contributors, only 777 are in India, and of these but 393 are natives of the country. In other words, the Native community do not hold even one per cent. of this immense amount of capital expended for the benefit of their own country. The whole mass of these many millions is provided by English capitalists.

2. Again, if we look to the public debt of India, which has the first claim on its revenues, and may almost be regarded as being as much under the guarantee of the English as of the Indian Government, we find it mainly in the hands of British capitalists. Four-fifths of the stock are held by them, and if it were minutely investigated, much of the remaining fifth, nominally in the hands of Natives, would be found lodged in securities through the political action of Government, or in its capacity as guardian of interests thrown upon its wardship, or as being the most incontestibly legal mode of investing trust property. Such an examination, if strictly carried out, would prove that the amount really held by Native capitalists, independent of any connection with Government, was practically very much smaller than a fifth, indeed very trifling. Whatever the cause, whether the much higher rate of interest realizable in India in ordinary commercial transactions, or the distrust and timidity with which the Native capitalist associates himself either with Government transactions or enterprizes in which Europeans take the lead, it is palpable that the state and prospects of the Indian money market must undergo a complete revolution before we can expect, in local undertakings for the advantage of India, the cordial and free co-operation of the

hoards of Native wealth. They seek other and more lucrative channels, where returns are not only very much higher, but more rapid, and where the management remains more entirely in the hands of the Native capitalist himself, not in the hands of unknown directors of banks, or of Government. Available capital is in fact in the hands of those well trained by habit to its employment to the greatest advantage, and is the monopoly of a skilled class who have facilities for large commercial investments of a rapidly reproductive character.

3. When the Indian is compared with the English money market the British capitalist, provided he can command the maximum rate of interest in England, which is very low as compared with India, and can secure this return on his investment by Government guarantee, and a prospect of a future share of profits which really enters very little into his calculation, is content with a far more moderate rate of interest than the Indian Native capitalist.

4. Under such a state of affairs it is not surprising that when the Secretary of State was requested to consider a gigantic scheme for the steady and rapid expansion of irrigation works in India to the tune of 40 or 50 millions of expenditure, which, from the looseness of the estimate, he probably thought might be doubled, he should remember whence the amount would have to be supplied. A practical statesman, responsible to Parliament for pledging the revenues of India, and to India and Parliament for measures affecting the value of Indian securities, besides having to be cautious how he trespassed on the field of his colleague the Chancellor of the Exchequer, namely, the English money market, might reasonably enough guard his acquiescence in the expediency of a vigorous prosecution of Indian irrigation projects by some regard to those financial contingencies which no Government in the east or west can ignore or neglect with impunity. The despatch of the 30th November, 1865, seems, therefore, open to more lenient criticism than it has met with for its caution and moderation.

5. In the 16th and 17th paras. advertence is made to other sources from which funds may be forthcoming in replacement of the abandoned one per cent. from the abolished income tax, and of course a financier was bound to make so necessary a conventional allusion to the resource of additional taxation. Evidently, however, the probability of having to raise a Public Works Loan is admitted, and all that is stipulated is the duty of the Govern-

ment of India to show precisely the irrigation projects it is prepared to undertake; the annual rate of expenditure, and their total cost; and in what way, whether by taxation or loans in India, or in England, these charges are to be met. Not, in my opinion, an unreasonable request.

6. The experience of railway capital, public funds, &c., impresses me with the conviction that, unless taxation be resorted to in a form that shall really reach Native capitalists, we must look to the English money market, and that 5 per cent. interest guaranteed for such time as the loan was not paid off, but with a fixed portion of the profits over 5 per cent. devoted to the extinction of the loan, would float it into ready acceptance among British capitalists.

7. I am opposed to Government entering into joint-stock speculations, for I anticipate nothing but unseemly disputes and litigation in such alliances on the subject of the division of profits; and that the result would be, that the connection of Government with such enterprises would end in Government being either the dupe or the victim of its joint-stock association. It is the bounden duty of Government to avoid embarking in a system which, under the cloak of its support as a shareholder, would aid speculators in rigging the market.

8. Should the Secretary of State shrink from sanctioning loans as wanted for the construction of well-considered remunerative works, then the Government would be driven to the employment of the agency of private companies. As English capitalists will only embark upon such undertakings on the prospect of higher profits than those yielded by ordinary means of investment in England and Europe, and on terms which comprise the free gift of the land by Government, and a monopoly of the waters of its rivers, it must be at the expense of the Government and the people that recourse would be had to such agency.

9. At the present juncture it seems, however, unnecessary to contemplate this latter alternative, or the way in which, with tempting profits to speculators, it can be rendered most advantageous to the people, and least likely to come into conflict with the rights of both people and Government; for in a despatch of the 30th December, 1865, when deciding on a practical question referred for his decision in the Department of Public Works, the Secretary of State takes the opportunity of reiterating:—

1st.—That, on a general review of the principles on which

Irrigation Works should be constructed in India, it has been decided that the employment upon them of the agency of private companies is not expedient.

2nd.—That the preferable course will be for Government itself to undertake them.

10. This seals the question ; for, as no one is better aware of the absolute dependence of India upon English capital for all such enterprises, it cannot be for a moment supposed that, in pronouncing Government agency the most preferable, the Secretary of State was not prepared to sanction that which can alone enable Government agency to act, viz., resort to the English money market, if necessary. It is futile to look to Native capitalists, or to the impoverished services of India for a large loan, and heavy general taxation for such local purposes is not equitable. Irrigation Works should bear their own burthen, and ultimately clear themselves. Loans raised in England, and applied under the control and the responsibility of Government, are the cheapest and the most certain and unexceptionable mode of securing, with a minimum of pressure on the Indian tax-payer, the means for the construction of reproductive works.

11. On the practical question of the efficient execution of such works it must be remembered that India has been a greater school than even Northern Italy, and that, consequently, it is here in India, and not in England, that engineers must be looked for who combine special experience in works of this class with a knowledge of the people, the country, and its resources. Without entering upon the Cottonian controversy as to the Ganges Canal, I venture to think it an error to speak of this discussion as waged between two distinct schools of engineers advocating different principles. The point at issue is a simple matter of fact, independent of schools or principles, and will, no doubt, be ably and impartially submitted to Government by the Committee lately appointed. The partizans in favour of the agency of private companies have, it is true, taken advantage of the conflict of opinion between Sir Proby Cautley and Sir Arthur Cotton, and have stimulated the discussion. But, rightly considered, this peculiar feature of the controversy only shows the pre-eminence in Irrigation Works of the Indian engineers. Had it been with regard to railways or harbours, the partizans of private companies would have sought elsewhere for leaders behind whom to fight their battle against the employment of Government agency. As it is,

they bid against the Government for the services of the skill and the experience of engineers, for whose training and proficiency, in a special branch, the Government has paid, and the result is that Government lose them exactly at the time that their engineers have become most valuable. The process will be much accelerated by the transfer, to a greater degree than has already taken place, of irrigational enterprises to the agency of private companies. Skill and experience in this special branch of engineering is not easily acquired; the opportunities are few, proficiency is rare, and, at the present moment, of great value to India. I am glad, therefore, that the Secretary of State is prepared to sanction the utilization of the ability and knowledge which the Government has fostered and can still command, and that he approves of the employment of such officers in those carefully and scientifically conducted surveys and investigations without which no project should be entertained. Each Government knows best the officers who have shown the highest qualifications for such inquiries, and who are available. The several Governments also are, or will become, aware of the irrigation works which seem most pressingly needed by the people. I think, therefore, that, without having any special staff, the evolution of such projects may safely be left to the growing requirements of the country, and to the zeal and interest which civil officers and experienced engineers are sure to take in the progress and welfare of the districts or provinces with which their duties connect them. In other words, I am not in favour of an exploring staff of engineers for such projects. It is too much the practice to write and speak as if, on the one hand, the supply of water available for purposes of irrigation at moderate cost was inexhaustible, but allowed to run to profitless waste, whilst, on the other hand, millions of culturable acres only awaited the utilization of the wasted water to render them mines of agricultural produce and wealth. Any one acquainted with India, and with the sparse population of large tracts, knows how chimerical the views which may be raised by such exaggerated pictures and statistics, and that there is immense scope for a most unprofitable outlay if undertakings are inconsiderately adopted, under the spur of excitement, on bold but vague generalizations.

12. The Secretary of State points out the true course, namely, the submission of well-considered projects, based on exact data, and carefully collected details, and thoroughly sifted by competent men. Some such projects Colonel Dickens reports to be ready, or nearly so. If these stand the scrutiny of Government here they

may be sent up to the Secretary of State as the bases for further and more positive expansion of reproductive works.* Their development will be so gradual that the apprehension of seriously disturbing the labour market may be safely put aside, and the same remark applies to the question of increase of establishments and expenditure of money.

13. It will be of extreme importance that the confidence of capitalists be based on something more than the interest which Government engage to pay on any loans they raise for reproductive works. None such should be undertaken of which there is not a real prospect of their becoming self-supporting, besides accomplishing the gradual extinction of the loans. General taxation, applied to the advantage of localities, is, under other conditions, hardly defensible; but the objection may be removed by the establishment of a Sinking Fund, and making the loans re-payable within a fixed period. Otherwise Government will be charged with getting money for works understood to be profitable, the profits of which they use and absorb for ordinary Imperial purposes. Without hampering the Governments with boards of trustees they should make arrangements so that capitalists might be periodically informed of the exact position of the works as to expenditure, profits, and the state of the sinking funds for the extinction of the loans.

XV.

MINUTE ON THE NATIVE CONVERTS' MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION BILL. DATED THE 24TH MARCH, 1866.

Had I been able to attend the discussion when the Bill to legalize the dissolution of the marriages of Native converts to Christianity is brought forward I should have previously moved amendments with a view to calling the attention of the Select Committee, and of the Council, to the course pursued in the Report of the Select Committee with regard to the Memorials from the Hindoos in various parts of the country; and the reasons assigned for forcing this Bill into law before the nature of the proposed measure has had time to permeate among the Hindoo

* The same with respect to well-considered projects from other Governments.

community except in a few favoured places. Also, I should have invited consideration to the very different way in which the representations of the Parsees, of the Church of Rome, and of Mahomedans, had been received and acted upon. As I am not likely to be able to attend the meeting of the Council when the Bill is brought forward I feel it right to put upon record, in the form of a minute, my objection to the mode in which the representation of Hindoos is treated, and to the principle which, if there be any, underlies the Bill.

The Hindoos are unanimous in the construction they put upon their Law, and it is remarkable that Dr. Duff, who is certainly as good authority on Hindoo Law as Mr. Muir on Mahomedan Law, concurs with them:—

“The result of our inquiries led us to conclude that, while a change of religion did not absolve any convert, male or female, from a previous lawfully contracted marriage alliance, such change, in the case more especially of conversion from Hindooism, entitled the unconverted party to treat the other (by Hindoo Law) as *civily dead*, and, consequently, as *ipso facto* repudiated.

“The first object, therefore, to be effected by legislation, as it appeared to us, was to establish some adequate means, in accordance with Native usage and Native feelings, for ascertaining the mind—the intention, the deliberate purpose—of the non-Christian or heathen party. This obviously involved the necessity of laying down some definite rules, with reference to age, proper modes of access and inquiry, the intimations to be given to the individual chiefly concerned, as well as to parents and guardians, the period allowed to transpire before a final judicial decision, &c., &c. But, when the fixed time for such decision arrived, our persuasion was that the simple plan for the Civil Power to pursue should be authoritatively to declare the case one of formal repudiation or divorce on the part of the non-Christian or heathen, who, by his or her law, was entitled to repudiate or divorce the convert who had lost caste. Of course, such a judicial declaration, duly registered, would leave the repudiated or divorced party free to contract another marriage.”

In the foregoing extract Dr. Duff clearly coincides with the views of the British Indian Association, as set forth by their Honorary Secretary, Jotendro Mohun Tagore; and they both distinctly point to the framing of a simple Law of Divorce framed on the Hindoo, not on the Christian, law or doctrine. This, too, was what all denominations of Christians asked for.

Manifestly such acceptance of the Hindoo Law and view of the question would remove any necessity for the Bill being highly complicated, full of delays and vexation, and based on a *quasi*-Christian foundation, to attain which a very ingenious device is resorted to.

As the words of Christ are too positive, clear, and inelastic to admit of evasion, a text of St. Paul's* is manipulated by the application of a canon of criticism, which is certainly not in harmony with the older canon of the Reformers of the English Church, viz., "neither may it (the Church) so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another." On the contrary, the canon of criticism adopted is one by which it is easy to educe that St. Paul is the apostle of divorce; and by the application of the same canon of criticism, any person of ordinary education, tolerably acquainted with Latin and Greek and the Roman Law, might prove the Apostle St. Paul a good deal more than the apostle of divorce, and might place others of the Apostles in very strange, and hitherto unsuspected, positions. Even if such a Bill be necessary, which, though attempted, is not by any means proved to be the case, for no Natives asked for it, I think it far from desirable that it should be based on the canon of criticism which puts into the mouth of St. Paul a formula of divorce from the Roman Law by the critic arbitrarily pronouncing a Greek word a homonym for a Latin word. The argument may be theological, but it is not logical, and instead of giving the solemn sanction of the Legislature to this new canon of Biblical criticism, I should prefer seeing the Hindoo construction of their law accepted, as has been done for the followers of Zoroaster, for those under the Papal canons, and the believers in the Koran. This acceptance of what Dr. Duff satisfied himself to be Hindoo Law would enable the mover of the Bill greatly to simplify it, and would remove the necessity for endeavouring to educe as Christian doctrine that where there is a Christian Mission in India the nearest Court must be a sort of Cresswell Cresswell Court to complement the action of the Mission. It does not seem desirable that the Christian Missionary should appear with the Bible in one hand and this Bill in the other as a sort of oriflamme under which he is to go forth among the heathen in fulfilment of that injunction which tacked on no such adjunct as distinctive of the Sacred Mission.

By keeping the Bill to the basis of the Hindoo Law all these anomalies would be escaped, and relief given where necessary.

* I. Cor., c. 7, v. 15.

XVI.

EXTRACTS FROM A MINUTE ON THE SAME SUBJECT. DATED THE
17TH APRIL, 1866.

It is hardly necessary for me to point out the essential difference between a Cabinet, representing a party, and having to carry out a party policy in the face of a watchful and often hostile opposition, and a Governor-General's Council, which is not constituted for party purposes, and in which consequently differences of opinion, as they neither endanger Parliamentary seats nor places under Government, engender no bitterness of feeling Opposition, for opposition's sake, is foreign to our Indian Administration, where every member of the Government feels individually too deeply interested in maintaining the power and authority of our rule, to allow of factious party feeling having the same play as the purely English Members of the Council trained in the school of Parliamentary Government may consider natural. This is a phantom which no one of Indian experience dreads. Hence it has always hitherto been regarded by the Home Government as desirable in the administration of this Empire to invite, rather than to check, a reasonable and temperate freedom of expression of opinion on the part of the Members of Council, more especially where great principles or interests were at stake. I do not think the character and utility of the Council would, in the estimation of the British public, be improved by a modification of the system in favour of the exclusiveness of the Legislative Department. Nor do I perceive how it is consistent with the invitation given by the preliminary promulgation of Bills to exclude discussion from the Legislative Chamber when often, and as very remarkably the case in the Converts' Re-marriage Bill, the form, matter, and names of Bills undergo radical changes, in deference to public representations from large sections of the community. Under such circumstances, the very principles, as well as the details, of Bills come under revision

Independently of the foregoing question a Bill of this kind, if at all necessary, should have been founded on a different basis, and one which would have admitted of the Bill being far

more simple in its construction and provisions. Whilst in harmony with the principle followed, of tolerantly accepting without too precise a scrutiny the laws and usages of the Parsees, the Roman Catholics, and the Mahomedans, it would have avoided the necessity for recourse in our Indian Legislative Assembly, where it seems a good deal out of place, to theological casuistry founded on obsolete Ecclesiastical Canons and Councils, upon the authority of which it would be equally easy to justify the Inquisition or the burning of witches. There would have been no need for straining the words of Luther, Calvin, and Melancthon, and the Presbyterian framers of the Westminster Confession, so as to apply them to a question which never entered their contemplation. Nor would it have involved enlisting the Church of England on the same side on the strength of the pastoral letter of the Bishop of Calcutta, but against the wise reserve of that Church, and in spite of the remonstrance of that learned and able man, Archdeacon Pratt, and the majority of the clergy who supported his views. Neither would it have been necessary to throw upon the High Courts of India the duty of deciding what this Bill ought itself to have decided, and would under the supposition have done, viz., the Hindoo law and practice with regard to the dissolution of marriage by conversion. There is sense in some of the remarks on this head in the accompanying memorial from the Hindoos of Allyghur, which has only lately reached me. As the Shastras and Vedas form no part of their legal training, it will be no matter of surprise, and certainly involve no reflection on the Bench, if the Judges of different High Courts pronounce conflicting decisions, for they are not Brahminical Colleges. It is plain that, wherever the Hindoos have had time to consider the Bill, they corroborate the conclusion at which, after long study of, and intimate acquaintance with, their law, customs, and actual practice, Dr. Duff arrived, and which I have quoted in my previous Minute; and I learn from able and observant Civil Servants, themselves favourable to the removal of the disabilities caused by our own previous legislation, that from the Punjab to the South of India, wherever, as in large cities, the scope and arguments of the Bill have filtered through so as to be understood, the Hindoos are discontent at the acceptance of the Mahomedan and the rejection of their own more ancient law and practice. Where there was a mode of solving the Converts' Re-marriage question without offence to the Hindoo community, with equal if not greater consideration to the unconverted party, and consistently with the

liberal principle extended to Parsees, Papists, and Mahomedans, I regret the laboured ingenuity with which doubt is thrown on the law and practice of the Hindoos in order to justify this complicated Bill, which, should at any time a sudden accession of conversions in a district take place, must either swamp the local Court, or prove nugatory from its cumbersome and tediously protracted system of procedure.



XVII

EXTRACTS FROM A MINUTE ON CERTAIN REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY OFFICERS OF THE BENGAL ENGINEERS. DATED THE 14TH MAY, 1866.

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I am not an advocate for increasing the proportion of civil engineers. Except a few, who after all have, with very rare exceptions, seldom risen above a respectable mediocrity, their introduction, however necessary within limits, has been a failure rather than a success, the inducement for competent men, civil engineers, to join the Department of Public Works being far inferior to the prospects which a career in England, or Europe, or America offers to civil engineers of any reputation and experience. India only draws very fourth-rate men as a rule. From the Staff Corps and other sources the supply is failing fast. The Corps of Royal Engineers holds out the best hope for supplying the wants of India; but it must be remembered that when the old Indian Engineers are cleared away those who succeed them from the Royal Engineers will not be tied to the country as the old corps were. Fewer of them will devote themselves to the country; reliefs and changes will be frequent, and there will be a necessity for a larger area of supply than under the old system. Though some disadvantage to India, it will be the reverse to England, which will profit by having in its Royal Engineers a considerable number of officers with more or less of Indian experience, with its concomitants of greater breadth of resource and more insurance to responsibility. From the imperial point of view, therefore, it is well to enlarge the supply of the Royal Engineers, for both India and England will profit, but I think England most.

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I am, however, further of opinion that it will in the end be the

most economical and satisfactory mode of meeting the requirements of India itself. Any one who has had really to turn his attention to the way in which works are estimated for and constructed in England, cannot fail to be aware of the latitude taken by civil engineers. The degree in which estimates are occasionally exceeded in India by its military engineers, and the cost of public works enhanced, is simply child's play in comparison with the practice in this respect in Great Britain. To the great body of the civil engineers of Great Britain anything like the rigid check and restraint of our Department of Public Works is unknown. They would submit to no such severe control and responsibility. This spirit pervades their schools as well as their practice, and it infects even the fourth-rate men who may be tempted to come to India. Only by the maintenance of a large proportion of military engineers can the stringent system of the Indian Public Works Department be prescribed, and the effectual control of Government have place. The discipline of the department in fact depends on the early training of the military engineers to habits of obedience to their superiors, and the deference of gentlemen and officers to authority. The tyranny, as my Right Honourable colleague Mr. Massey terms it, of the Department of Public Works will be vastly increased if this prevailing element, which really has its basis in habits of military discipline, be eliminated or even much weakened. A Civil Government does not in my opinion sufficiently realize the importance of this circumstance in a country like India, where there can be no field of selection among civil engineers, no competition such as in some measure exists in England, consequently little to qualify the professional independence of the class. Large as the Public Works grant now is, it would either have to be doubled, or only half the work would be got for the same amount if the discipline of the department, so to speak, were relaxed, and from a large influx of civil engineers trained in the English school the system which characterises the construction of Public Works in Great Britain took footing in India. Over the length and breadth of Great Britain, whether in its railway works, its docks, quays, harbour improvements, its roads, bridges, or its buildings of a public and municipal kind, no one who has not paid attention to the phenomenon can have a conception of the truly gigantic difference between the estimates of civil engineers and the ultimate actual costs of the various kinds of works. In India the occasional excesses over estimates are seldom very flagrant; they are in reality at the worst dwarfish

as compared with what is of constant recurrence in England, where the civil engineers revel in the ample resources of a rich country, and think nothing of hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling, where an Indian engineer dreads to contemplate an excess of a few thousand rupees. In invoking the spirit, practice, and the *personnel* of the civil engineers of England, I doubt if my honourable colleagues are alive to the consequences from an economical point of view of the fulfilment of their wishes

XVIII.

MINUTE RELATIVE TO THE RECOMMENDATION THAT SUBALTERNs SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY VACATE THEIR APPOINTMENT OF ADJUTANT ON PROMOTION TO A CAPTAINCY. DATED THE 12TH JUNE, 1866.

I am of opinion that appointments to regimental staff should, as heretofore, be entrusted to subalterns, who, on promotion to the rank of Captain, should vacate them.

I entirely concur in the expediency of restoring, as far as under the existing system may be possible, the regimental *esprit* of the army, but I fear that the proposal now submitted to the Secretary of State would not only cut both ways, but must operate more unfavourably in one direction than in the other, inasmuch as the stagnation of regimental staff appointments consequent on their protracted tenure by incumbents would not encourage officers to remain with regiments. To the few in possession the proposal would be an acceptable boon, but to the many expectants it would prove the reverse.

On the other hand, the service gains greatly in the general efficiency of its European officers by the circulation of these appointments among subaltern officers. Under the active supervision and control of commanding officers it forms the elder subalterns of the army, as nothing else in time of peace can, and it does so without any relaxation of the responsibility of command on the part of the commanding officer.

But where between the commanding officer and the native ranks there interposes an officer of standing who, as Adjutant, has had long and intimate intercourse with the native officers and sepoys, the resulting tendency will be not only to weaken the influence

and authority of the commanding officer, but also those of the wing and squadron officers.

Few things are more fatal to the efficiency on active service of a regiment, whether it be European or Native, than the eclipse of the legitimate authority of the European officers by that of an adjutant of long standing, which monopolizes under the shadow of the commanding officer the control of the regiment.

Where, as in foreign European armies, the regiment is in fact what would in our service be called an infantry brigade of three battalions, each as strong as, and in war much stronger than, one of our regiments, it is right enough that a field officer or a senior captain should be the staff officer to aid the Colonel, but in the battalion itself their systems do not practically differ from our own, and where they do, the English system seems to me preferable.

I hope therefore that before any change is made, the subject may be well considered in all its bearings, for it is one of considerable importance in its possible effects.

XIX

MINUTE ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE IRREGULAR SYSTEM INTO THE MADRAS ARMY. DATED THE 28TH AUGUST, 1866.

I am unable to assent to these despatches to the Secretary of State and to the Government of Fort St. George, though drawn up the Officiating Secretary in harmony with the note of the Governor-General, acquiesced in by the rest of the Council, and supported by a concurrent note by the Commander-in-Chief, also made use of in framing these despatches.

2. In the despatch to the Secretary of State, para. 2, the attention of Her Majesty's Government is drawn "to the opposition shown by the officers of the Madras Army, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, to the introduction of any changes, and their unwillingness to accede to any reforms of whatever description." This is a grave charge to bring against a Commander-in-Chief and a large body of British officers, and one not to be made except on strong grounds. Now, with respect to Sir Gaspard Le Marchant,

considering the alacrity with which he undertook, in the face of the opinions and minutes of his experienced predecessors, to introduce the Irregular system into the Madras army, this sweeping charge seems hardly merited.

3. Two instances are adduced as showing the timidity with which the British officers of the Madras army view the introduction of any changes however reasonable, but in one of these instances, if not in both, the real root of the opposition was not so much the objection to change or reform, but to direct interference on the part of the Government of India with the system of the Madras army without prior consultation with the Madras Government, and in supersession, as it were, of the authority of the Madras Commander-in-Chief.

4. We have lately had another instance of this jealousy of direct interference with the Madras command, and on that occasion, although Sir G. Le Marchant and Lord Napier were of one mind, that Madras troops in Madras stations should be under Madras regulations, both were really in favour of the measure, though apparently preferring their own rules for carrying it into effect. The same feeling predominated in the objections raised to the introduction of the rules passed under the Act for legalizing the application of minor punishments; although, as was right on the part of the Madras authorities, they pointed out in what respect the rules infringed the practice of their Native army, yet they suggested a mode in which the end would be attained without such infringement.

5. Whether this jealousy for the authority of the Madras command be carried too far or not, is not here the point, but even if assumed to be in excess, it should not be confounded with a set spirit of obstruction to real improvements, and it does not seem to me to warrant the extremely condemnatory charge brought in the 4th para., viz.—“This notorious unwillingness to any reform renders the officers of that army unreliable witnesses as to the effect of the changes on the minds of their native soldiery, seeing that their allegations are in no instance sustained by even the shadow of an overt act, or by accurate statements of the changes which have been introduced.” Among troops want of confidence and distrust of ultimate intentions may exist to a very considerable degree without suspicion breaking out into overt acts, or in other words mutiny; and the Madras authorities and officers would be much to blame if they waited to be taught the sentiments of their men by overt acts on the part of the latter. The Madras Govern-

ment and its officers are certainly in a better position for forming a judgment upon the feelings that pervade their troops than we are, and we have from an independent source, and from a very able, thoughtful and observing man, Mr. Yule, the Resident at Hyderabad, a corroboration which yields a strong support to the deliberate opinions of the Madras Government. I allude to the confidential letter No. 77 of the 9th December 1865, in which, after stating the circumstances under which wahabeeism has found scant resting-place among the men of the Nizam's Contingent, he proceeds to observe, "The Madras army are different. The sect has already taken root there, and it prevails in the districts with which a large portion of its army is connected. These facts alone would have prevented any order discouraging wahabeeism from being effectually carried out: even if the constitution of the army had remained unchanged, such an order would have led not to eradication, but to deeper disguise, and consequently greater strength. But the constitution of the army has been changed, and that too, in its most material point, viz, the connection between officers and men. The latter were always mercenaries, but they were willing and cheerful, and often affectionate mercenaries with officers whom they knew, and who knew them. They were liable to sudden outbursts certainly, in which their officers suffered, although they were not the cause of the dissatisfaction; but now they are mercenaries in the strictest sense of the word. They serve for hire only, and without any of the personal ties of long intimacy or affection or esteem with their officers which made their wages pleasant. I refer to the *Madras Gazette* and the Commander-in-Chief's general orders. They will show how few officers remain with their old regiments, and how inevitable a constant change of officers is, unless some modification takes place."

6. I have other equally strong and independent testimony on the subject, but I will not prolong this Minute by further quotations. Mr. Yule must be allowed to be a most impartial witness, and borne out as it is by testimony from a variety of quarters neither connected with the Madras army nor its Civil Service, I see no reason for doubting the general accuracy of Lord Napier's temperate summary as given in the 8th para. of his Lordship's minute. It must be remembered also that, according to the minutes of the Bombay Government, like causes have produced like effects in the Bombay Native army; therefore the Madras authorities are not singular in their views or their experiences.

7. At the conclusion of Lord Napier's 10th para. we are told

that in the course of time—"The native officer in command of a company will learn to fill his place. The soldier will learn to obey his native captain; all will go well in time of peace; when the strain of conflict comes (if I may believe my military authorities) the new organization will be altered and qualified so as to become a fighting organization." The only conclusion deducible from these aspirations for the future is, that at present the result of these measure carried out last year is to give Her Majesty a native army in which the native officer in command of a company does not fill his place,—the soldier does not obey his native captain;—an army which is at present without these rudiments of discipline, but which when they are acquired may do well *in time of peace*; but an army which when the strain of war comes is to have its new organization altered and qualified so as to become a fighting organization—a very clear admission that this costly army is not at present fit for fighting. I entirely concur with Lord Napier, and am certain that his prognostication, that before it can become a fighting army, the new organization will have to pass through a radical change, will have to be fulfilled.

8. Had the despatch to the Madras Government been confined to a general concurrence with the four reflections with which Lord Napier closes his Minute, and to an exposition of the fact that the principles therein laid down have been for the most part so carefully observed that at no previous period was the soldier of the Madras army in material respects better treated, I should have concurred in the reply. But I hesitate to pronounce incredible what Lord Napier, his colleagues, and the Madras military authorities solemnly assure us to be the fact.

9. The Madras military authorities and the Madras officers, so frequently taxed with a conservative feeling opposed to change, may retort on the ultra conservatism which defends a retrograde step, because it reverts to the organization which a century ago was the first step taken by Clive towards "regimenting" as he termed it the Madras and Bengal sepoys. They may observe that when this was done, the troops to whom the sepoys were opposed were ill armed and without any organization at all, so that Clive's "regimenting" them as he did, with about the same number of European officers as allowed by the irregular system, but with a much larger supply of European sergeants, placed the sepoys with their muskets on a far superior organization to that of the masses armed with sword, spear, and matchlock opposed to them, a mere rabble. That as the struggle of the British power for dominion

in India waxed warmer and our enemies were better armed and officered and learnt the requirements of war, our own organization was forced to improve and to retain the superiority. That, to go back to 1766 is to ignore a century of experience and the establishment of a great empire built on military success, and won by the heroism of the European, not of the native officers. That to quote the armies of Holkar and Scindia and Runjeet Sing, is to quote defeat, besides that in the case of the latter the Dogra battalions in the Summun Boorj, supported by the regular troops (who had no difficulty in quickly ridding themselves of the French officers and the best of the sirdars), are an instance of a purely soldier Government, the example of which told quite prejudicially enough on the old Bengal native army to render reference to its example now hardly expedient; whilst reference to the Nizam's Contingent is scarcely less fortunate, seeing that in 1857 the Resident at Hyderabad, Colonel Davidson, did not feel safe until he had sent the mass of it out of the Nizam's territory into that under the Agent to the Governor-General, Central India.

10. I cannot endorse the assertion that the irregular system had stood the test of much severe trial; on the contrary, it would be nearer the truth to say that it has invariably failed whenever exposed to the continuous strain of war. It failed with the Shah's force in Afghanistan, where the trial was a fair one. It failed as a system in 1857 and 1858, for it would notoriously have collapsed, but for the swarm of officers which the mutiny of the Hindoostani sepoy battalions rendered available for the Punjabee battalions and for duty, and but for the way in which Lord Clyde repeatedly recruited some of the Sikh corps with European officers, who, he told me himself, but for the extreme necessity of preventing the failure of these Irregular corps, could not be spared from their regiments. It failed at Umbeylah, where Chamberlain complained of the paucity of European officers, and where, petty as the operation was, the cry for European officers was so loud and urgent that Sir H. Rose, himself a staunch advocate for the new organization, ordered up sixty European officers. It was not tried seriously in Bhootan, though there too it was complained that the European officers were too few. In our greater wars it was never at all tried, for the fighting fell on the regulars, the irregulars, usually cavalry, being chiefly employed with convoys, baggage, patrol, and escort duties, and all that class of fatiguing and harassing ordinary duties from the wear of which it was desirable to

preserve the European and the native troops. I have shown the fallacy which pervades the instance of the Punjab Irregulars in 1857; European officers, escaped from mutineer regiments, were abundant at Delhi and elsewhere, and practically were available with Native corps, and for siege and other duties, and were so employed. The Punjab Irregulars in 1857 were therefore no criterion of a system which, if efficiency or loyalty depend on a paucity of European officers, failed miserably with the Gwalior, Mehidpore, Kotah and Bhopal Contingents, who proved just as unreliable as the Regular battalions.

11. If we are to accept as the perfection of an organization that of Clive in 1766, why omit the element which was so important a part of it, that when the European officers sent in their resignations on the batta question, Clive was prepared, if he failed to draw a sufficient supply of officers from Madras and Bombay, to replace the recusants by putting the European sergeants in command of companies. It showed that Clive even in his day, when the class of native gentlemen had not ceased to exist or to take part in military careers, was far too wise a soldier and politician to make them the backbone of his Native army by casting the command of companies into their hands. In the course of the struggle for supreme power in India, the Native States who were our rivals learnt the value of discipline and organization, and sought by the introduction of the European system under European adventurers to form their troops, so that they might cope with our own. To a certain extent they succeeded, but the difference in ultimate results when using the same material for soldiery was simply this, that, whereas they could only command a limited supply of European officers, we could obtain a larger supply of English officers, and by their aid and example imparted to our native troops the superior stability which they asserted on so many fields in support of our purely European troops, besides themselves occasionally achieving remarkable successes without the presence of other Europeans than that of their own battalion officers. Even then, however, wherever an enemy's battalions were pretty well officered with French or other European officers, we took especial care to insist on their dismissal, and to provide, in our treaties, against Native States reverting to the organization which rendered the native battalions officered and commanded by Frenchmen formidable.

12. It may be said that we have now no rivals in India, and that therefore a system which is economical, and answers the

purposes of peace, is all that we require; there is both truth and fallacy in this reasoning. It is true that we have subdued all rivals, and that the latter are our dependents. But to argue from that circumstance immunity from war is wilful blindness to the reality of the dangers of our position in India. War external or internal may be forced upon us at any time; and considering the difficulties under which we labour in recruiting our British troops on the voluntary system, the growing dislike to service in India evidenced by the exodus of the limited service men, and the probability of the withdrawal of European troops in case of England being at war and suddenly needing them, we, above all other nations of Europe, should be careful that our mercenaries in the East are well organized and well officered; for circumstances may force us to place much reliance upon them, and the more so as we cannot as a nation command an immediate and large increase to our British army; however great the emergency, it requires time, working through the voluntary system, to make even a moderate addition to Her Majesty's British troops. We have less difficulty in maintaining a supply of officers than of men, and that for obvious reasons, though this too has become dubious and difficult under the staff corps system.

13. The new organization, by which is meant placing the Native armies on the irregular system, has been introduced under the very favourable circumstance of having a large body of officers of more or less experience with sepoys from whom to choose, and I have no doubt that under such men, whether of the Bengal, Madras, or Bombay services, there will be no want of endeavour to do the utmost justice to the organization, and to prove themselves worthy of the selection. But it is a system which at present is in conflict with all military usages and experience. It ignores the value of Her Majesty's commissions. Captains command majors; majors command lieutenant-colonels; captains are doing duty officers, or, as they are now styled, wing-subalterns under lieutenants as wing-officers. There is a wholesale perversion of the military subordination of ranks; naturally enough, such a capsizing of military orders can only be productive of a desire in each officer to effect some change where he may find himself in a proper place and relation as to rank, for no mere arbitrary shuffling of grades will root out the military sentiment that it is incompatible with the intention of a lieutenant-colonel's commission that it should subject its possessor to be regimentally commanded by a captain or major. No one under such a system

looks to rising regimentally, and a spirit of change is characteristic of the whole organization, nor can it be much modified by the attempt which it is said Sir R. Napier is making to infuse a regimental spirit by ordinarily giving command and appointments to wing-officers in the regiment. When a system starts with disorder, and the putting aside of the honourable feelings which lead men to covet military rank, it wounds professional habits and sentiments, and fails to carry with it general support or goodwill. When in addition to the command of troops and companies passing into the hands of Native officers, the European officers are discountenanced from *interfering* the Native officers term it, *interesting* themselves with the men the European officers call it, it is easy to understand how it comes to pass that, although better paid than they were, the position of the European officer has become more negative and often irksome under some commanding officers. Power and influence have passed to the Native officer, and the European officer, with the exception of the one in command of the regiment, acts to a certain extent on sufferance if he seek acquaintance with the men.

14. No doubt it is in accordance with the feelings of human nature to love power and influence, and especially in harmony with military habits, to love command; and had this system been confined to a small proportion of the regiments of the Native army, say a fifth, it might have been an encouragement to the more efficient and ambitious Natives selected from other corps, and would have been less objectionable. But after the experience of 1857, when we owed so much to the fact that the Native officers had not, under the Bengal system, much of real power or habitual command, it is a curious experiment to transfer power and influence almost entirely to the Native officers. Had we a race of gentlemen bound to our Government by ties of interest and loyal affection, this wholesale transfer of power to the Native officers might be defended, though even then it would be dangerous; but the reverse of this is notoriously the case. We have transferred influence and direct control from the honourable, high-principled, well-educated English gentleman, to men who seldom command the respect or confidence of their companions, and who, as a rule—for the exceptions are few—are alike ignorant and wanting in sound principles of thought and action. It is these men who are to lead and command their companies in action, whilst the European officers act as mounted supernumeraries behind the line. I do not think that this is the way to have efficient merce-

naries. The system may be economical, and may answer in peace, but unfortunately armies are meant for war, and that is not economical which collapses under the mere touch of a frontier brush with ill-armed, ill-fed foes, and which would shrivel up before well-led and well-officered troops. I cannot be in any degree subservient to misleading the Home Government into entertaining any very exaggerated idea of the merits of a system which appears to me to have only one merit, viz., that of economy in peace, and to have every demerit which can attach to a system for a mercenary force, that too at a time when, from the craving desire everywhere operative in the East for the improved firearms of Europe—a craving which is sure to be satisfied in spite of our precautions to the contrary—we shall be forced to place better arms in the hands of our Native troops, and shall require far more intelligence on the part of officers in command of companies, and shall need to have our mercenaries far more in hand than has hitherto been the case.

XX.

MINUTE ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE IRREGULAR SYSTEM INTO THE MADRAS ARMY. DATED THE 19TH OCTOBER, 1866.

I should have added no more to the Minute already recorded on the subject of the letter addressed to the Madras Government, were it not that as the Minutes of his Excellency the Governor-General and of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief impugn some of the statements in my previous Minute, I feel it necessary to subjoin the following observations.

I too regret the opening of a discussion of the merits of the irregular system, but it was not opened by myself, but by remarks of his Excellency the Governor-General, to which I could not subscribe without aiding, contrary to my own opinions, in misleading the Home Government into a very exaggerated and fallacious estimation of the efficiency of the new organization. Evidently the Madras Government did not feel it their duty to allow the Home Government to rest in a fool's paradise on this most important matter, and I participate in a like sense of duty.

In the Minute of his Excellency the Governor-General, para. 11, he confounds the essential distinction drawn at the conclusion of

para. 13 of my own Minute of the 28th August. It will be remarked that I did not there call in question the power of the commanding officer of a Native regiment; that remains, with the exception of a late modification, precisely the same so far as the sanction of Government is concerned, as when the events of 1857 led to the re-investment of commanding officers with the fuller powers which they had exercised under the regular organization in its earlier days, and which ought never to have been taken away from them. In this respect, whether regular or irregular, the commanding officers had been placed on the same footing, and the irregular had no advantage on this head over the regular. Their powers were alike.

But this was not at all the issue raised by my concluding remarks in para. 13, where it is advanced that the position of the European officer has become more negative and often irksome under some commanding officers, and that power and influence had passed to the Native officer, whilst the European officer, *with the exception of the one in command of the regiment*, acts to a certain extent on sufferance if he seek acquaintance with the men.

Upon this most important subject it will suffice to quote, as indicative of the state of feeling, the opinions of the Committee, composed of Colonels Chamberlain, Cureton, and Fane, employed to prepare the draft of a Code of Regulations for the Native cavalry of the Bengal army. In their Memorandum No. 63, regarding the position of Native officers, after objecting to squadron officers, and assigning various reasons for the diminished popularity of the service, and the withdrawal of nawabs and shahzadas, they proceed as follows:—

“Para. 8.—The Committee consider the remedy simple. They advocate most strongly the necessity of making Native officers command their troops in the fullest sense of the word, responsible to and subject only to the orders of the commanding officer. They should be allowed to pay their men, to punish them, and to recommend them for reward, and if this be done, they will be perfectly satisfied. The service will again be popular, and they will offer no objection to the presence of junior European officers, if the latter are not permitted to interfere with them in their prerogative as commanders of troops.”

Para. 9 of the Memorandum goes on to propose the abolition of squadron officers, and the best mode of turning them into cyphers; the reason for such suggestions being, that “the evils

of interference are increased according to the zeal of an officer. When once permitted, it is difficult to control." Now, although these and other extreme recommendations were not accepted in their entirety by Government, yet the spirit which suggested them pervades, as an element that cannot be eliminated from the irregular system, both the Code for the Native cavalry of Bengal and that for the Native infantry. It is only necessary to turn to the sections on the duties for "second in command," "squadron," and "wing-officers," and "squadron and wing-subalterns," to be satisfied as to the comparatively inferior rôle which the European officers are to play under a system the tendency of which is to regard them as superfluous adjuncts, and which was only partially prevented from attaining its logical result of rendering the European officers a nullity and an incumbrance by the somewhat, as to the system, inconsistent interposition of Government to prevent such a climax of absurdity.

I am, unfortunately at issue both with the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief in their estimation of the views and writings upon this subject of the late Colonel Jacob of the Scinde Horse. Of Indian warfare he had little knowledge or experience, and the crudity of many of his opinions was so palpable that they refuted themselves. Like the opinions of the Punjab Committee in 1858 on the subject of army organization, coincident with Colonel Jacob's, they were the result of a confined experience based on a condition of things which the sweeping away of the Native regular army entirely alters.

There is now no such thing as selection of officers for irregular corps; there is an utter dearth of subalterns, and the staff corps of the presidencies are at that pass for the want of them that recourse is being had to various expedients and relaxations of the rules in order to recruit subalterns from Her Majesty's regiments if they will come, by abrogating precautions the object of which in their institution was to have some moderate security that only tolerably fit men would be taken. To talk of selection under such circumstances is a fallacy, whilst even on the score of economy it may be doubted whether a staff corps system which promises in a short time to render the ratio between field officers and other grades quite anomalous is a whit more economical than efficient in providing for the wants of the service.

The caricature given of the old regular system by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is certainly contrary to my own

experience. That experience can at any rate claim the humble merit of impartiality, for, as an Engineer officer, I had no other relation with artillery, cavalry, or infantry than that of watching their organization and witnessing their conduct in the field, and was by the force of circumstances an observer free from the partialities and strong prejudices which were to the full as rampant among the officers of Her Majesty's European forces on one hand, as among the officers of the Native army on the other. I can fairly say that in the campaigns in Afghanistan, against Scindia, in the Punjab, and during the mutiny in 1857, I was more fortunate than Sir W. Mansfield in my general experience of the efficient officering and creditable conduct of the regular regiments of the armies of Bengal and Bombay, and that I consider his Excellency's picture of the old system in his paras. 13, 14, and 15 excessively overdrawn and not consistent with the facts which came under my own observation.

I am not going to discuss whether old despatches and histories exaggerate the merits of the sepoy more than modern ones do the deeds of European and Native troops. Despatches are proverbial for not understating the merits of the troops, and I doubt whether in the present day they are in this respect much more scrupulous or reliable than those of the past. But the tendency of the advocates of the irregular system is to disparage to an unjust degree the conduct of the Native regular troops, who, for instance, with Littler's brigade at Maharajpore, and with Gilbert's division at Chillianwala, proved themselves up to a late date far from despicable troops, and that too when, as in the last-mentioned action, no very good example was set to right and left of them by European regiments.

I cannot agree with the Governor-General that the regiments had present twenty-five officers, or with the Commander-in-Chief that they had a worn-out lieutenant-colonel, a captain or two, a smart adjutant, and half a dozen beardless boys. Though the system had its abuses, on service the regiments were fairly enough officered, and frequently very well officered. The consequence was that, even when sharing on a hard-fought field a partial check with their European associates, they were rallied quite as quickly as the latter by their European officers, whereas a regiment on the irregular system is on such occasions, from the paucity and loss of its European officers, irrecoverable. Whether a day be successful or the reverse, the European officer can be depended upon. My experience of nawabs and shahzadas is not

such that I can regard them as reliable substitutes for the English officer, and if I doubt the fighting power of such a system, I have far more grave objections to its policy. Where absorbed and intercepted by Native officers, whether nawabs, shahzadas, or others, the clannish feeling will not centre in the isolated European commanding officer, whom, after such a process, it must reach, if at all, in a very diluted form. Real influence will inevitably centre, as has proverbially been the case in the Nizam's cavalry, in some one or two Native officers, whose power and control are as likely to be based on the sympathy of fanaticism as on anything else.

The Commander-in-Chief's tabular abstracts prove the correctness of what I observed as to the abnormal way in which officers were attached to regiments on the irregular system, and though this may be in process of amendment, yet, if reference be made to the Army Lists of the last four or five years, it will be seen that I understated the case.

I shall not touch at any length on the inconsistency of finding fault with a system which sent half a dozen young officers with a regiment into the field, and at the same time contemplates (admitting the weak point of the Irregular system) attaching raw hands, unknown to the men, as officers for meeting the sudden requirements of service with a Native corps. Nor shall I criticize the review of the military achievements of irregular corps; for from the time the sunyases walked over Clive's Police battalions on the irregular system to the present day, it requires some research to find out one or two instances that can be advanced as plausible exceptions to the uniform failure which has stamped the system when tried by the test of war. An analysis of the exceptions would show that they prove the rule. But my object is not so much to defend the old at the expense of the pretensions of the new system, as to guard the Home Government from supposing that the existing organization and system is one that can be depended upon for war purposes,—one that will work and last. It will do neither. The old system has been swept away, and its faults and merits are a thing of the past, but the faults and feebleness of the new organization are a thing of the present, and will force themselves on the attention of Government the moment any tension comes upon our Indian military system and establishments. Many years will not pass before the whole must be re-modelled—staff corps, irregular system, everything. The condition of affairs is that of a very weak

and very unsatisfactory state of transition, which carries with it the confidence of neither European nor Native; and my object is to prevent the Home Government arriving at the delusory conclusion that the system is perfect, the Madras and Bombay Governments wrong in their qualified estimate of its merits, and the superiority claimed for it in the letter to the Madras Government a substantial fact upon which the Home Government can pin its faith. I venture to think that if it should do so, it will not be very long before it is disagreeably undeceived.

XXI.

MINUTE ON A BILL FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF OUTRAGES IN THE PUNJAB. DATED THE 12TH SEPTEMBER, 1866.

I never liked this draft Act, because provocative of race and creed antipathies, and especially aimed at Mahomedans.

The reason for bringing it forward was the necessity of protecting, by a legal enactment which should sanction such exceptional mode of treatment, the occasional promptitude and vigour of our officials in punishing murders which arose from religious or political fanaticism, or from the combined operation of these two kinds of fanaticism, between which the alliance is often close and inseparable. The object in view was hardly the whole of the Punjab; it was rather the frontier, where crimes of this religious-political fanaticism were most common. The proposal of the Punjab Government goes much further, and would make the Act of general effect.

Our Penal Code, based on English sentiment and experience, has certainly omitted to class among its various kinds of homicide, murder committed under the impulse of religious or political fanaticism, or the mixture of the two. It is a crime of a distinct order, and one to which the English in India are especially exposed to be the victims, and from which the English in England may be said to enjoy perfect immunity. There is therefore good *primâ facie* ground for considering outrages of the kind in question as omitted from the Penal Code and as requiring special treatment.

When, however, regard is had to the magnitude of the Empire,

and the infrequency of the occurrence of assassinations motivated by religio-political fanaticism, it seems very inexpedient to promulgate a general Act on the subject which cannot fail to excite attention and to incite discussion among every class and creed of natives, besides affording much ground for controversy among the Press; for although the Act might be limited to the Punjab, it would be a universal precedent for all India, and would be regarded as extensible and applicable to other provinces whenever circumstances created apprehension. In times of panic it might be abused, and in times of peace and good order would not be a very creditable addition to our volume of law, seeing that it is dovetailing a summary, almost military, law process with the ordinary Criminal Law. It would not read well among our Statutes.

I am therefore in favour of a special treatment in opposition to the general one proposed by the Punjab Government, and would leave to the frontier authorities to deal summarily with such cases when they occurred.

I say frontier authorities, because usually, though not always, fanatical assassinations are committed by aliens, by men of tribes on our frontiers, but not our subjects. There really is no good reason why there should be more consideration to men caught red-handed, in the commission of a fanatical murder, because they fall into the hands of our civil officers, than is shown to the same class of men when the military come across a marauding party; these, who are stealing cattle or horses, are shot down or sabred without compunction as a sort of land pirates to whom it is inexpedient to show much consideration. Why the religio-political fanatic of the same class who comes into our territory to take human life instead of cattle should meet with more consideration is hard to conceive. Provided the assassin is caught red-handed from the deed, and the Deputy or Assistant-Commissioner record the case, the evidence, and the sentence, I can see no reason for his deferring the execution, or for the Government having any hesitation in approving the extra-legal action of its subordinate. With the latter rests the responsibility of showing his Government that his prompt action was justifiable, and called for by the circumstances of the case, and no Government would demur in approving the destruction of such an enemy any more than it would dream of censuring or punishing a cavalry patrol for roughly handling a set of plundering marauders.

When a fanatic is one of our own subjects, I think the case somewhat different, and the reason for summary trial and execu-

tion is less imperative. Even in such instances where the fanatic criminal was known to have a following, or to belong to a class such as the Akalees, prompt execution of the sentence may be just as necessary as where the assassin is an alien,* and should meet with the support of the Government.

I differ from the Punjab Government as to burning the bodies of culprits of this class. With the masses it enhances the effect of the punishment.

XXII.

MINUTE ON THE TALOOKDARS OF OUDH. DATED THE 9TH OCTOBER, 1866.

I have read with attention the Minutes dated in the margin.† As those of his Excellency the Governor-General, with the papers to which they refer, are circulated for the first time after the practical adjustment of the question at issue lately completed, I should hardly have thought it necessary to make any comment whatever upon these proceedings but for the circumstance that my name appears, as Secretary in the Foreign Department, to despatches upon this important subject both in Lord Elgin's time and in 1864, when the present Governor-General first took up the subject. Although the difference of course pursued in 1863 and 1864 would at once show that the despatches were no representation of my own views, yet, as this circumstance seemed to escape the observation of the public prints when they made free with my name, I feel it incumbent on myself to state at this stage of the proceedings, however briefly, what my own opinions have been, and are.

There is, however, another reason which renders this advisable. In his Excellency's Minute of the 18th September, 1866, the Governor-General expresses a strong opinion in favour of the political advantages which have flowed from the great policy pursued by Lord W. Bentinck and his successors from 1833 for the settle-

* In using the word alien, I mean an alien of a border Afghan tribe, whose plundering and murdering propensities have to be perpetually curbed—brigands by nurture and habits, and almost by nature—I do not mean ordinary foreigners.

† Governor-General's Minutes of 19th February, 25th June, 18th September.

Mr. Grey's Minute of 28th September.

ment of the land revenue and tenures in the North-West Provinces, and expresses the conviction that there is no real ground for the allegation which attributes to that policy the insurrectionary spirit which displayed itself in 1857 during the mutiny. Without discussing the question whether this be correct or not with regard to the North-West Provinces, it seems essential, in justification of Lord Canning's ultimate Oudh policy, to point out that the application of the North-Western Province system in Oudh produced very baneful results in 1857 and 1858.

Under the application of that system Mr. Jackson stated,* without any objection or disapprobation, that the Talookdars had lost under our summary settlement an average of one-half of the villages they held under the Native Government, and he added, apparently without any perception of what such an avowal involved, that the considerable portion "they (the Talookdars) retain is said to be as much as they were really entitled to, and under the regular settlements, when the claims of parties who have been dispossessed come under investigation, it is probable that they may be deprived of some of these." All Talookdars who had defaulted in revenue payments were, under the orders of Mr. Gubbins, to be placed under restraint in the civil jail, and the Mouzahwar system was a screw put upon recalcitrant Talookdars in exaction of the revenue of the summary settlement. It cannot be matter of surprise that, with half their villages gone, and an indefinite prospect that at the close of the period of the summary settlement [*i.e.*, the end of 1858] a good proportion more might be taken from them, the Talookdars were almost to a man hostile to our rule in 1857-58. If it be said that this was an abuse of the North-Western Provinces system, it must be remembered that Messrs. Jackson, Gubbins, Christian, &c., were all trained in that school, and some of them regarded as most efficient officers; and the fact remains indubitable that their measures were successful in rendering almost every Talookdar a bitter and a resolute enemy. Whatever it may have been or be elsewhere, it is out of the pale of discussion that the North-Western Provinces system failed in Oudh, and that, in order to restore peace, it was necessary to conciliate the Talookdars by reverting to the Talookdaree system and putting aside that of the North-Western Provinces. In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Honourable Mr. Grey's Minute advertence is made to Colonel Barrow's evidence as to the means taken to induce the rebel

* No. 1,593, of 17th November, 1856, paragraph 18.

Talookdars to submit to the British Government, and this, too, under the administration of Sir R. Montgomery, a very distinguished *élève* of the North-Western Provinces school, as shown by his report on the Cawnpore district. It was the review and the consideration of the broad features of the contrasted and conflicting Oudh policies of 1856 and 1858 which made me demur in 1863, after the Talookdaree system had been in force for five years, to any precipitate action subversive of the latter. Practically such a change involved a breach of faith, and any positive departure or modification of the Talookdaree system, as worked by Sir R. Montgomery, Mr. Wingfield, and Mr. Yule, seemed to demand clear and absolute instructions from the Secretary of State for India after he should have been in possession of, and should have deliberately considered, the progress and results of the Oudh settlements and the precise state of the question in 1863. There had been no cry against the Talookdaree system as introduced by our officers; no complaints against the Talookdars; no demand of redress on the part of under-proprietors; no claims to occupancy rights; no allegation by the ryots of Oudh, the sturdy agricultural peasantry from whom our old Native army had been mainly recruited, of such rights being overridden. *Quieta non movere* seemed under such circumstances the safest course to be pursued by the Government of India, unless positively and authoritatively overruled by the Home Government.

If a general view of the broader features of the policy of Government favoured the expediency of leaving what worked well alone, a consideration of particulars confirmed this opinion. In the North-Western Provinces, although the directions to settlement officers ruled that "when the two classes (superior and inferior) are of the same family or tribe, and mutually willing to maintain their connection, the former arrangement (*i.e.*, settling with the superior) is very much the best," yet it is notorious that the spirit in which the settlement operations was conducted was absolutely the reverse, and that the settlement was carried out in deliberate and purposed antagonism to the Talookdars. Now, putting aside the question whether it was a sound policy for the North-Western Provinces or not to depress and sweep away the Talookdars and to hunt up inferior rights as in abeyance, not lost, in order that persons who in anterior times might have been in a position to allege such rights should be preferred in village settlements and the Talookdar excluded, it was palpable that in the case of Oudh, where the Government had adopted the policy of maintain-

ing its old Talookdaree system with as few restrictions as possible on the Talookdar's rights over his estate, it would have been an egregious breach of faith to have introduced the practice of the North-Western Provinces. The law might, strictly speaking, be very nearly the same in both, but it was essential that the spirit in which it was applied in Oudh should be the converse of that which had prevailed in the North-Western Provinces. Under Lord Canning's Sunnud reservation, the rights of under-proprietors, or parties holding an intermediate interest in the land between the Talookdar and the ryot, were to be maintained as those rights existed in 1855, but the status of possession at annexation was not to be undermined, and the policy stultified by a quixotic search for antique rights which were obsolete, or fallen into disuetude. This, it seems to me, was the essential difference to be observed in the treatment of the under-proprietors of Oudh as compared with the mode in which the subordinate proprietors and Talookdars of the North-Western Provinces had been treated. The course pursued by Mr. Wingfield and Mr. Yule appeared steadily to aim at the equitable fulfilment of this end, viz., the record and preservation of under-proprietary rights existent at annexation without encroachment on the cotemporaneous rights and possessions of Talookdars; and there seemed no necessity for the intervention of Government in rectification of the spirit in which its avowed policy was being worked out.

I have seen no reason to modify this opinion, and consider that the Talookdars have evinced a most conciliatory spirit in the concessions to which they have acceded at very considerable sacrifice of their rights and interests. Their conduct is the more liberal that these concessions follow after the failure of the inquiry instituted in behalf of hereditary occupancy rights of cultivators. The Oudh Talookdars cannot but have felt that the result of the inquiry was a practical defeat of Government, and it is very greatly to their credit as a body of rich and powerful landholders that, abstaining from any resentment of a measure which, if successful, would have struck a serious blow at their position, they should thus, with considerable magnanimity as well as liberality, meet, at no trifling reduction of their future income, what they deem the wishes of the Government.

As neither in the course of the summary settlement of 1856, nor in the course of the settlement operations progressive in 1864, had there arisen any proof of the existence of occupancy rights of cultivators in Oudh, the expediency of instituting a specific inquiry

to elicit such rights was not to my mind made out. Of the existence of Mouroosee ryots in various parts of India I entertain no doubt; but of their non-existence in many large tracts of the country I am equally confident. In either case the ordinary operations of a land revenue settlement bring out the fact without the necessity for any exceptional inquisition. Considering the Reports of the Settlement Officers then before Government, and the concurrent testimonies of Mr. Wingfield, Mr. Yule, Mr. Currie, and others who had traversed Oudh and knew the province well, the probability was from the first so exceedingly strong that the result of the inquiry would only be a corroboration of the statements of the forenamed officers, that to my apprehension it was impolitic to expose the Government to the suspicion which the investigation aroused, and which the failure of the inquiry has by no means allayed, viz., the suspicion that the views of the Government of India had changed, and that there was a desire to undermine and assail the Talookdaree policy of Lord Canning. Had the presumption been strongly in favour of the existence of occupancy rights from the Reports of the Settlement Officers being in conflict with the views of Mr. Wingfield, the case would have been different; but as matters stood, Government were pretty sure to incur the rather humiliating result of having needlessly incurred the suspicion of the Talookdars. Although I acquiesced in the settlement of the Oudh questions effected by Mr. Strachey, it was without concurrence with the concluding paragraph of his Report; for I remain very painfully under the impression that the general result is not such as leaves the Government, as compared with the behaviour of the Talookdars, in a satisfactory or dignified position. It would, in my opinion, have been infinitely preferable to have avoided altogether a protracted conflict, for the close of which in a manner not altogether derogatory to Government we are more indebted to the liberal and, under the circumstances, rather magnanimous concessions of the Talookdars than to the perspicacity of Government.

I cannot conclude these few remarks without expressing my concurrence with the Minute of Mr. Grey.

XXIII.

MINUTE ON IRRIGATION WORKS AND RAILWAYS IN INDIA.
DATED THE 13TH OCTOBER, 1866.

The questions of terms and of agency may be discussed separately from the main one, and, though it may be necessary to touch upon both when adverting to the Minutes* noted in the margin, I shall not enter on these important subjects with the detail they deserve to be considered in when a final decision is pronounced as to the lines to be constructed.

I have read the above Minutes with care, and am glad that Sir Bartle Frere has done that which always appeared to me very necessary, viz., taken pains to show the comparative magnitude of the railway lines in India. He does this both in the text of his able Minute, and also in the sketch map of part of India upon which he has projected the skeleton maps of England and Scotland, Ireland, France, and Germany. This is an easy and an ocular way of conveying a definite impression of the scale on which the Government of India has to work, and should produce an effect on those who, in England, are apt to make light of the exertions already made, and to sneer at the circumspection with which the Government of India embarks on gigantic undertakings.

At the root of the question of an extension of railway enterprise, lie financial considerations, which, again, cannot be disunited from the very important consideration adduced both by his Excellency the Governor-General and the Secretary, Colonel Dickens, viz., which is the most necessary and the most profitable mode of investing available capital,—works of irrigation, or railway works?

There can be no question, in an agricultural country like India, of the value of irrigation works. Their importance to the welfare and prosperity of the people admits of no discussion, and wherever districts are peculiarly liable to drought, it is the duty and the

* The Minutes of the Bombay Government.
The Note of the Secretary, Colonel Dickens.
The Minute of his Excellency the Governor-General.

interest of Government to lose no time in the provision of suitable means of irrigation. The supply of water is, under such circumstances, a prime necessity. But when the subject is regarded from another point of view, and a more general and commercial one, namely, whether produce and portage of produce are in a suitable ratio to each other, then the preference given to the extension of irrigation works rather than to that of railway works becomes more dubious. We are as yet far from an equilibrium between produce and portage; for, as proved last year, the railway lines were choked, and traffic injured, because produce seeking the lines was far ahead of the means of transport. At present, therefore, I cannot give an unconditional pre-eminence to irrigation over railway works. Before doing so, I should like to see the equilibrium between produce and portage better established on the main railway lines now existing, and those lines completed. I concur, therefore, in the opinion that, so far as the Secretary of State may be able to influence the application of available capital, it should be directed to the completion and the doubling of existing main lines as a primary object.

I am far from thinking that the single lines have, with reference to the portage of traffic, been worked up to the maximum which, with sufficient plant and establishments, and more careful organization, might be attained; but, at the same time, I am convinced that improvement in these respects would not meet the large and increasing requirements of the public. It is essential to double the lines without delay, wherever, as in the case on the Bombay and Calcutta lines, there has been experienced a hopeless congestion of traffic.

Having always entertained, and expressed, the opinion that the lines of railway would, if executed by Government, have cost one-third less than has been the case in the hands of Companies, I should concur in the remarks made by his Excellency the Governor-General on this point without any qualification, were it not that I deem it more important to retain irrigation works in the hands of Government than railway lines. Of the two fields for the enterprise of European capital, that of railways touches the relations of the people to Government, in the revenue administration of the country, far less delicately and dangerously than is the case with irrigation works in the hands of Companies. Although, therefore, I should like to see one main railway line executed by Government, I would rather insist on the application of English capital, that preferred rendering itself available to Government, on

irrigation works, unless so freely and redundantly preferring Government as to admit of both applications, which can hardly be expected.

This brings me to the question—which of the three lines of railway should be at once taken up as the most important? Everything considered, I am in favour of the Mooltan and Kotree line. Although Kurrachee is far from being a good harbour, still the importance of bringing the Punjab and the whole line of the Indus frontier into easy communication with the sea-board, seems commercially, politically, and militarily, of extreme moment. I think the line of railways should be on the left bank of the Indus; and, having surveyed in 1838, from Ferozepoor to Roree along the left bank, I can corroborate Sir Bartle Frere's statement of the comparative absence of difficulties from Buhawalpoor to Roree. The cost of construction should be moderate, and it would not, in my opinion, be backward as a fairly paying railway. The prosecution of the surveys for the line might at once be sanctioned, and though, for obvious reasons, I think the left bank, or eastern side, of the river preferable in many respects, yet, if the result of the survey were to establish a great superiority of advantage by taking the line along the right, or western bank, of the Indus, it might be adopted; but the advantages must be more weighty than any that I can anticipate that would warrant preference being given to the right, or western, bank of the Indus.

I regard a line of railway from Lahore to Attock, on the left bank of the Indus, as part and parcel of our Indus frontier railway system, and should certainly consider it as only second in importance to the Mooltan and Kotree line. To my mind, it is an integral and necessary part of the Punjab railway system, which would be seriously incomplete without it. The whole of these Indus frontier railways should, if possible, be under one management and one Company.

However desirable the Delhi and Bombay line through Rajpootana, it is not, in my opinion, of equal importance with the completion of the Indus frontier group; doubtless it would be valuable, but lines passing through our own provinces, and linking these together in an efficient way, have certainly a preferential claim to construction with English capital. When the Indus group was complete, and the existing main lines to Calcutta and Bombay doubled, the Delhi and Bombay line by Rajpootana would be a proper undertaking.

In making these remarks it is presumed that the available capital for such enterprizes is limited, and that the drain on the English market is more likely to take to channels already known, and partially completed, than to wholly new ones. The success of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway, and the fair promise of the East Indian Railway, ought, I think, to secure this; and we know that, in August last, the Guaranteed Railways were in such favour in England that the one million for the East Indian Railway was raised at once without difficulty; but if the disposition for embarking on the Delhi and Baroda line were supported by adequate capital I do not think that financial considerations need prevent our allowing the commencement of this new line. It must be remembered that the charge for meeting the interest guaranteed on capital expended is a gradual one, and that, as the Indus and the Rajpootana lines reached their maximum of charge for guaranteed interest, there would be a corresponding diminution of interest charged on the East Indian, the Great Indian Peninsular, and the North-Eastern Bengal Railway. I apprehend no real financial pressure from the amount of interest that would fall due on Guaranteed Railways, and I entirely concur with the remarks of Colonel Dickens, that it is only by adequately developing Railways to meet the wants of the country, that their true end of affording cheap transit and enriching the country is to be attained, and that the true economy for India is to look more to increasing the income than to reducing expenditure.

At the same time, it being certain that, both for Railways and for Irrigation Works, we must look to English capital to enable the Government to push on judiciously the gigantic enterprizes which can alone accomplish the grand aim of securing for India the wealth which her great capabilities should command, the pace at which progress may be made towards this end must depend on the state of the Money Market in England, and the confidence which capitalists may have in Indian investments. On this point the Home authorities are the best judges, and must guide the action of the Government of India; but I think it may, without presumption, be observed, that as yet there has been no reluctance on the part of English capitalists to invest money in the Guaranteed Railways; and that, considering the far greater security which attaches to such employment of capital, and the immense amounts invested in Foreign Bonds of very indifferent security, there can be no reason to doubt that, with proper management, a decided preference would be shown by capitalists for Indian in-

vestments. I have always ventured to doubt the policy of placing restrictions on the employment of English capital on Indian reproductive works under the control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, when no such adverse restrictions were allowed to operate against Foreign investments, whether in loans, railways, or any other class of enterprize. The policy has greatly retarded progress in India without profiting capital in England. On the contrary, whilst the wildest schemes have for a time been floated on the English market, greatly to the ultimate loss and detriment of England, India has been practically excluded from the field, because Government was not permitted, even for reproductive works of irrigation, to raise loans under far more advantageous circumstances as to security than Foreign investments afforded. It has, to my mind, been a somewhat suicidal policy, both for England and India, and, as I would reserve the construction of Irrigation Works in the hands of Government, in consideration of the interests of the people of India, capitalists would have the security of the responsibility of Government, as well as the benefit of advantageous terms, were this unnatural and artificial restriction removed. It operates as a protection in favour of a very inferior class of securities, which often involve the British Government in disagreeable complications. No such embarrassments are contingent on the English Money Market being thrown more open to the Government of India, controlled by the Secretary of State in Council; and whilst, as a rule, the construction of Indian Railways might be left to the enterprize of English Companies, to whom the London Money Market is open without restriction, I despair of any sound or satisfactory progress in Irrigation Works, unless facility be allowed to the Government of India to compete for a portion of that redundant capital which for want of safer channels, such as those which the Government of India could provide, is forced to flow off into many a dismal and unproductive Foreign swamp. If a calculation were made of the loss which this restrictive policy has entailed on India, it would probably startle the statesmen of England. What it may cost India in future, if adhered to, is almost incalculable, and I fail to perceive what the advantage will be to England.

I should wish to see the completion and development of Railways and progress in Irrigation Works made, *pari passu*, as to mere construction: for Irrigation Works not only take time in construction, but also it is often a gradual process, the extension of

artificial irrigation among the cultivators after the works are completed. There is no such delay in the employment of Railways when finished, or even partly so; their use is, so to speak, instantaneous. Hence, under ordinary conditions of construction, the means of portage will be a little ahead of any increase of produce consequent on the extension of works of irrigation, which is a condition manifestly desirable. Whilst, therefore, omitting exceptional circumstances, I would not give unconditional preference to the rapid development of Irrigation Works as compared with that of Railways; the maturity of the latter is generally so much earlier attained than that of the former, that the equilibrium between means of transit and produce available for commerce is not likely to be seriously impaired by a judicious, gradual construction and expansion of Works of Irrigation. But this assumes a rapid doubling of existing lines, so as to remedy the existing disproportion between available produce and available portage by rail.

XXIV.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED INCREASE OF THE COVENANTED CIVIL SERVICE IN CERTAIN PARTS OF INDIA. DATED THE 20TH NOVEMBER, 1866.

I regret that the despatch in the Home Department, No. 79 of 1866, dated the 27th October, together with Mr. Monteath's Note, did not happen to be circulated before I left Simla on the 26th October. The circumstance will explain why my objections to the despatch have not been earlier recorded. Having for the first time seen it to-day (20th November), I beg that my non-concurrence with the recommendations of the despatch may be at once sent home by the mail about to proceed from Bombay.

Stated generally, my objections to the despatch are, that it is not sound policy to raise the proportion of covenanted civilians employed in the Punjab, Oudh, and the Central Provinces, from one-half to two-thirds—thus leaving only one-third to be divided between Uncovenanted Civil Servants and military officers selected for civil employment. In my opinion, neither economy nor real efficiency will be promoted by thus practically giving a monopoly to the Covenanted Civil Service at the expense of the uncovenanted

and military elements. As a Bureaucracy it is already quite strong enough for the interests of India, and no advantage can result from adding to its strength and numbers by the elimination of elements which qualify, to a certain extent, the natural tendencies of such a system. For such poor provinces as are some of the Non-Regulation Provinces, the substitution of covenanted civilians for the existing machinery of civil administration is synonymous with rendering the administration, as viewed in relation to the revenue derived from such provinces, extravagantly costly. The greatly enhanced civil charges of the Central Provinces is a remarkable instance in point.

That the Staff Corps system is failing to meet the requirements of the services in India is so well known that the admission made in the fourth paragraph of the despatch is not surprising; but, though quite conscious of the fact, I fail to see how a heavy reduction of the openings for employment in India is likely to encourage officers of Her Majesty's army to qualify themselves for service in this country. The measure must clearly operate most prejudicially against the officers of Her Majesty's army regarding India as an open field for exertion. It virtually ceases to be at all an open field, and no men of marked capacity and qualifications can be expected, under such circumstances, to sacrifice the cost of their commissions and their professional prospects in the British army in order to run the chance of picking up such few crumbs of civil patronage as will be left them.

I regard the proposal as simply tantamount in effect to the exclusion of officers of Her Majesty's army from India as any field of employment other than strictly military. I cannot deem this either desirable or politic, for it destroys one of the incidental advantages of the transfer of India to the Crown, and India ceases to be at all the same field to the Royal which it was to the Company's Army.

With regard to the reduction of the uncovenanted element of the public service—this, too, is, in my opinion, very impolitic; in fact, quite as much so as the reduction of the army derived element. For the recruits to the civil administration derived from this source are usually men of considerable experience and knowledge of the country, or else men of special qualifications. They are not by any means young raw hands needing years of apprenticeship before they are practically serviceable, but men who, besides valuable local, and sometimes official, legal, or fiscal training, and acquaintance with the people, have the sense

and discretion which years confer. There is, in my opinion, ample room in the civil administration of this great Empire for utilizing the experience and knowledge thus gained in the country when it is found conjoined with a good education, fair ability, and a high character. The fact that the combination of these qualities is found in a man who did not pass a competitive examination in his youth does not seem an absolutely reasonable disqualification from proving a useful servant of Government. The advantage of a mixed system is admitted in other departments, and it is difficult to comprehend why that which is good for the one should not be good for the other, and the spirit of emulation as wholesome in the one case as in the other.

Financially regarded, uncovenanted agency is economical; and whilst the tendency of the covenanted agency is to maintain a high standard of emoluments as the scale by which all salaries are to be adjusted, the tendency of the uncovenanted agency is to enable Government to establish a more moderate scale, and thus to check to some practical financial effect that perpetual reference to, and comparison with, a high standard of remuneration, which, as a habit of the services, is inevitable in the presence of a high scale of salaries as the leading exemplar.

XXV.

MINUTE ON THE PROJECTED OCCUPATION OF QUETTA. DATED THE
5TH FEBRUARY, 1867.

The Despatch to the Bombay Government, No. 69, of the 17th January, 1867, has, I hope, disposed effectually for the present of the projected occupation of Quetta, and from the unanimity of the Members of Government on this subject it may be anticipated that any future attempt to revive the proposal will hardly be seriously entertained unless much stronger reasons can be adduced than have as yet been urged in favour of advancing our frontier.

If it ever became advisable or necessary to occupy Afghanistan there can be no doubt that we are now in a position to execute such a movement with far greater facility and security than when

we advanced in 1838, with Scinde in the hands of the Ameer and the Punjaub a compact military Power under Runjeet Sing, both interposing between the small column launched into Afghanistan and its base of operations. With the Indus frontier from Kurrachee to Peshawur under our rule we are otherwise circumstanced than was the case when we marched to put Shah Shooja on the throne of Cabul, and we have only to accomplish that which I have always urged to be commercially as well as politically and militarily expedient, namely, the completion of what I have elsewhere termed the Indus group of railways, in order to secure to ourselves such a thorough command of that line of frontier as shall leave it entirely in our own discretion to operate below or above the Passes, as might be judged at the time most advisable. As a general rule, I concur in the opinion expressed by his Excellency Sir W. Mansfield in his able Minute with regard to the defence of the Bolan Pass (page 7), but at the same time it is easy to conceive circumstances which might combine to render the partial or the entire occupation of Afghanistan necessary as a theatre for offensive operations on our part in aid of Afghan resistance to invasion from the westward; it is a country admirably adapted for giving the fullest effect to the destructive warfare which Afghans, thus supported, could wage with small loss to themselves against hostile columns. This is one contingency, and a variety of others might be quoted as possible inducements to an advance beyond the Indus frontier. I shall not enter into an estimate of the probability of such remote contingencies; but admitting their future possibility, it will, I think, be all that political and military considerations demand if our lines of rail and river communication on the Indus frontier are rendered as perfect as it is easily in our power to make them, so that, without our at present incurring the risk of complications with Afghan or Belooch tribes and politics, it may yet be in our power rapidly to mass and securely to feed and support our forces, whether intended for operations above or below the Passes—wherever they may be sent on that frontier. The bare fact that such was the position of the British Government on the Indus frontier would not only prove a sedative to the turbulence of frontier tribes, but render any aggressive movements upon Afghanistan from the westward, or any hostile attitude on the part of the Afghans towards ourselves, dangerous to those who chose to provoke our power and means of striking.

Whilst, however, I am very strongly in favour of thus securing our position on the Indus frontier, I am as much opposed to the

occupation of Quetta now as I was when the late Lord Canning did me the honour to consult me on the same subject when war with Persia was inevitable. At that time General Jacob pressed on the Governor-General the expediency of occupying Quetta in force as a demonstration against Persia, and it was hardly concealed that the demonstration might with advantage be turned into something more than a demonstration, inasmuch as General Jacob pronounced that the occupation of the Persian sea-ports was only valuable as a diversion in aid of other operations, and that our demonstrations by sea, if no simultaneous proceedings were undertaken by land on our north-western frontier, would have no effect but to make Russia push Persia on the more vigorously in the direction of India. These arguments had produced some impression, not only on Lord Canning's mind, but on the minds of some of his Council, and there was a manifest disposition to adopt General Jacob's suggestion, and to detach a force to Quetta. I opposed this strenuously on the ground that, as a demonstration, it would prove inoperative as against Persia, though very effectual in embroiling us with the Belooch and the Afghan; and that if more than a demonstration were purposed, there must be a corresponding development of means, which would be costly in men, money, carriage, and supplies, even though the force had little else to endure than the friction of operations in so poor and difficult a country, and must necessarily divert a large and valuable part of our force from the more direct and effective operations in the Gulf. With the sea for our base and the command of shipping at our disposal, it was manifestly much more certain of effect to concentrate exertion on a landing in such force in the Gulf as to establish ourselves securely at a point which should make a good base for further operations if the Shah of Persia were not brought to reason by the opening successes against his sea-port and littoral provinces, than to reverse the plan of the campaign by making Quetta the real base of operations against Persia, and the action in the Gulf a mere diversion. Lord Canning finally rejected the suggested movement on Quetta, concentrated his efforts on the Gulf, and coerced Persia easily and at once. He thus avoided frittering away his force by detaching troops to Quetta, and avoided the drain on men and resources, which would have been as protracted as utterly inevitable had he been led into tedious operations across the breadth of the countries which intervene between our Indus and the Persian frontier—a drain which would have stripped him of the European

troops with which he met the events of 1857, and would have imperilled his position in that eventful year even more than was the case, for troops engaged on the projected line of operations from Quetta to Herat and onwards could never have been recovered in time for his necessities in India as were those set free from the successful operations in the Gulf of Persia.

It will be observed by those who have followed during the last ten years the series of events in Afghanistan that none of General Jacob's prognostications, as to the consequences of the non-occupation of Quetta, have had effect. On the contrary, had Dost Mahomed lived, he would have consolidated an Afghan kingdom hostile to Persia, holding Herat, and as jealous of Russian as of British influence or control. His death threw Afghanistan into the anarchy of a civil war; but as the competitors for power are thinned off in this fratricidal contest, we may expect the reins to fall into the hands of some one chief of the family who is capable of maintaining himself from Herat to Candahar and Cabul, and will be all the stronger and more fit for his position by the struggle he has had to go through. Be he who he may, the instincts of his race and position will impose upon him the policy of Dost Mahomed, and we shall gain nothing by an aggressive policy on the Indus frontier, whether in Scinde or Peshawur, calculated to irritate the jealousy of the Belooch and the Afghan. Any intervention now would be ill-timed, and is wholly uncalled for, and the restless longing of the Scinde frontier officers to escape into active life beyond their own proper boundaries must be firmly curbed.

If our position on the Indus frontier be one of unmistakable strength it will long paralyze aggressive presumption. I know that we could again seize Afghanistan if it were advisable or necessary, and that with our Indus frontier complete in its communications, parallel and perpendicular, no power on earth could shake us out of that country. I know, too, that, with the Afghans friendly and cordial, we could, without the actual seizure of the country for ourselves, organize its defence in a most destructive manner against hostile invasion; but neither alternative is at present imposed upon us as of the smallest necessity, and I am absolutely opposed to precipitating complications and plunging into certain difficulties out of respect for nervous apprehensions, the realization of which is, if it ever take place, remote, and can be met when the time comes whichever way may be most advisable, provided, in the meantime, we so per-

fect our position on the Indus frontier that offensive or defensive operations, whether above or below the Passes, are alike at our command.

Neither the people nor the country have altered since 1838, and any one who knows Afghanistan will not hastily or partially compromise troops in that country or in Beloochistan without any adequate motive, and on purely restless and visionary anticipations, which have in one case been signally falsified, and will, in all probability, be the same in the present instance.

XXVI.

MINUTE ON THE RECRUITING FOR HER MAJESTY'S ARMY, AND THE STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY FORCE REQUIRED FOR INDIA. DATED THE 5TH APRIL, 1867.

In a Minute of the 26th January last I pointed out, in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs, that, over and above the questions touched upon by the report of the Royal Commission on recruiting, the larger question of the possibility of any reduction being effected in the European or Native forces with which we hold India should be considered,—a call was made for returns with a view of placing at an early date before the Government of India and the Secretary of State the means of forming an opinion on this most important question.

2. Since the minute of the 26th January last was written there has been a motion in the House of Commons for a Select Committee to inquire into the duties performed by the British Army in India and the Colonies, and also to inquire how far it might be desirable to employ certain portions of Her Majesty's Indian army in our colonial and military dependencies, or to organize a force of Asiatic troops for general service in suitable climates. Her Majesty's Government acquiesced, and evidence has been taken and is now in course of being taken on this subject.

3. In the course of the debate the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for India adverted to the fact that no report of a committee could relieve the Government of India from the responsibility of having a sufficient number of British troops for the safety of this country, and to the expediency of the com-

mittee not resting content with oral evidence alone, without listening to the suggestions of the higher authorities in India, who could not be brought from their posts to give evidence.

4. Under these circumstances, it is to be regretted that the Adjutant-General's Department proved unable to furnish the returns called for on the 1st February, for the early submission to the Secretary of State of these returns, accompanied by the deliberate opinion of the Government of India, might have been in time to influence the report of the committee.

5. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the Adjutant-General's letter of the 18th March, 1867, by reference to round numbers readily available, supplies to a certain extent the information called for, and expresses his views on the general question of the strength of the military force, European and Native, with which we hold India.

6. With regard to the Native force, calculated at 122,000 men, it should not be forgotten that the police force, which now has a certain degree of military organization, and is provided with a proportion of fire-arms, numbers 126,000 men, exclusive of the police of Bombay. Assuming Bombay to have about an equal strength of police with Madras, the grand total of the police force may be taken at about 150,000 men. Attached to the force of 126,000 men are 59,700 stand of arms, muskets and carbines, besides swords, spears, &c. If we include Bombay there may be about 69,000 stand of fire-arms attached to the 150,000 men.

7. In a portion of this police force some of our best fighting classes enter largely, and besides the partial military training of the police, a part of the body was recruited by the entertainment of men discharged when reductions of military force took place. In the Bengal Presidency, therefore, probably too in Madras and Bombay to some extent, the present organization and training of the police admits of being applied to something more than the performance of ordinary civil duties. It is a rudimentary military body, and though in one sense much less formidable than the better armed Native troops, it is in another respect, unless thoroughly loyal, more capable of mischief, from its close and constant connection with the people, its intimate knowledge of the country and its resources, and its experience of our position as administrators. Although, as a rule, the masses view with dread and jealousy our police, and its unpopularity is notorious enough, yet the improved organization and training which has been found necessary for its efficiency certainly invests it with an

increased capacity for mischief if it turned against us. In so far, therefore, as organized native levies, though we cannot do without them, may be perverted into a source of weakness instead of strength, the 150,000 police, with their 69,000 stand of firearms, must be added to the 122,000 men composing the Native armies. Viewed in this way, our European force of 61,000 men yields a ratio of one European soldier to four and two-fifths natives of organized bodies, military and police.

8. It should also be remembered that whilst the events of 1857 led to the reduction of the Native armies from 256,000 to 122,000 men, in repair of what his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief designates the too great confidence in native loyalty, we have lately entered on an experiment, the very essence of which is a vastly increased confidence in native loyalty. I advert to the present organization of the Native armies, and the system of confiding the command of troops and companies to the Native instead of the European officers. The result of this experiment remains to be seen, and in the meantime, as we have only 16,000 Europeans more than were in India in 1856, a good portion of this excess being also really due to the substitution of European for native artillery, it would hardly be judicious to reduce the strength of our European troops below 61,000 men of all arms.

9. With regard to the Native armies, I am very sure that the native army of Bengal cannot be reduced further. It barely answers the twofold purpose of relieving the European troops from a trying class of duties which would tell heavily on their sanitary condition, and of occupying posts and stations for which they, the natives, are better suited than British troops. Further reduction of Native force is really synonymous with an augmentation of our European troops, and would inevitably issue in that result if it were attempted. As it is, the assembly of an insignificant force for such affairs as the Sittana or Bhootan campaigns involves a movement of native troops which disturbs half the presidency. For operations on a larger scale the Bengal native army is wholly inadequate,—any effort of the kind would have to be accompanied by a large and sudden augmentation, and an interval more or less protracted during which Government must fall back on the militarily organized police as a reserve.

10. Nor are the Madras and Bombay Native armies capable of much reduction. Their reserve, if it deserve the name, is but small. For instance, the force with which Major Merewether wishes Abyssinia to be invaded would be scraped together with

difficulty, and as the operations proceeded and reinforcements had to be sent, the strain on the Bombay Native army would be greater than it could temporarily bear unless the Madras troops again took charge of the Bombay as well as their own presidency. On Madras falls the occupation of Burmah and the contingencies to which our possessions in that quarter expose us. Reductions in either of the coast armies are certainly possible, but very far from expedient at the present moment, when both armies may have to furnish their contingents of native troops for expeditions beyond sea.

11. Instead of reducing the Bengal Native army, it needs to be strengthened, not by augmentation of numbers, but by bringing our advanced posts on the Trans-Indus frontier into more perfect and rapid connection with their supports. This can only be done by completing the Indus frontier lines of railway, so that from Kurrachee to Lahore, and from Lahore to Attock, there may be no break. The march of events in Afghanistan and Central Asia renders it daily more and more imperative, if we are to maintain peace and order on our frontier, and are to impose respect for our power, that both friend and foe, internal or external, shall be convinced that if our policy demand it, we have the means of rapidly throwing a formidable force on any point of that long and difficult frontier.

12. I am well aware that it is a favourite commonplace topic to expatiate on the duty of the Government of India, by its educational and other beneficent measures, to make the chiefs and people of India appreciate the advantages of our rule, and thus reconcile them to our foreign dominion. I am the last person to discourage either educational or any other civilized measures having the welfare of the chiefs and people of India as an object. But I cannot conceal from myself that there is in this rather rhapsodical fashion of talking about India a contempt of the experience of history which is remarkable. Probably no country might have profited so much from British conquest as Ireland; yet, in 1867, after a protracted period of exceptionally liberal and conciliatory treatment, the aim of which was to blend the political life and welfare of Ireland with that of England, we hear of Fenian risings and atrocities, and of the active operations of troops to put down rebellion. With great naval means on the spot, and the flower of our British army at hand, there will be no difficulty in suppressing this attempt at rebellion, and I only allude to this event to recall to mind that if England, dealing with a race so closely allied with her own people,

finds it difficult to control the Irish, it should not be matter of surprise if in a distant and foreign conquest such as that of India the sympathies of chiefs and people, whether Hindoos, Buddhists, or Mussulmen, are not truly in favour of the conquering race, but would prefer wresting from them an Empire of such grandeur and magnitude.

13. It may be a question, and a very real question, though the contrary is usually assumed, whether, as India grows in wealth and intelligence, and becomes alive to its own capabilities and strength, and has it at the same time carefully dinned into its ears that England spares her European garrison with equal difficulty and reluctance, there may not arise a much more general doubt of our power to hold India than that which is already nursed by some of our more ambitious and discontented feudatories. To external rivals for dominion in the East the rapid growth of India in riches and prosperity must operate as an additional incentive. Unless, therefore, that advance in wealth and importance be accompanied by an adequate force to secure our foreign dominion from the suspicion or the reality of weakness, it can hardly be regarded as an increase of strength. As we cannot change the conditions under which this great Empire was acquired, namely, the conditions which accompany distant foreign dominion with all its concomitant dangers, it seems to me irrational and contrary to all ordinary laws, that as that foreign conquest becomes more and more valuable, both internally and externally, we should expect it to require less force for the support of our Government. However India may expand in all forms of material prosperity and of mental cultivation and intelligence, and all this be mainly due, as it undoubtedly is, to her connection with England, I fail to see that these circumstances alter the real character of our rule, namely, that of a distant foreign people, inevitably an offence to the more ambitious spirits of India. In other words, we rule, and must continue to rule, by superior force; and the growing wealth, knowledge, and importance of India, provoking as they must the cupidity and envy of internal and external enemies, form no good or sufficient reason for any undue diminution of either our European or our native forces.

XXVII.

EXTRACTS FROM A MINUTE ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF NATIVE TROOPS
OUT OF INDIA. DATED THE 29TH MAY, 1867.

6. State whether there are any special difficulties that would hinder the races you have named from undertaking garrison service beyond sea, either in respect to religious prejudices or social habits; and whether these difficulties are insuperable in their nature, or could be overcome by an increase of the advantages offered to the soldier?

With respect to question 6, quite independently of considerations of creed, race, and moral habits, there is one point common to every race in India, which is greatly opposed to their permanent employment as mercenary troops out of India, or out of the countries bordering India and within easy reach of its shores, such as Burmah. The practice of early marriages is, it may be said, universal; and although there may be differences in the degree to which wives and families are actually present with the native troops of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in their military cantonments in India, it is merely a question of degree. They are nearly all married men, with families dependent upon them for support; and much moral turpitude attaches to the sepoy who neglects the maintenance of his family. They may be always with the soldier, as in the Madras army or, more partially so, as in the Bombay army, or, comparatively speaking, rarely so, as in the Bengal army; this is a point depending much on the habits of the particular army, and the districts and races from which recruits are drawn, as also on the areas over which the cantonments of the various armies are dotted, and our reliefs and the distances marched over; still the normal fact remains the same and pervades the whole, namely, that the responsibility of wives and families lies, as a rule, upon the whole body of our native troops; and that their social habits and feelings have, on this point, to be met either by the families being with the men or *by frequent and long furloughs to their homes*. This is a condition essentially different from the present constitution of our own European army, and it is one of those radical conditions which render all comparison difficult. Where such a condition exists incidentally to a certain extent, as in armies formed on the Prussian system, the necessity of accepting the considerations it imposes is met by the short periods of service, and the arrangements which seldom called out the second and third lines, or reserves, save in case of absolute urgency. Now this is a very material consideration, and one imperatively essential prominently

to keep in view when the idea of employing Indian troops at a distance from India is discussed. No Indian experience is required in order to give weight to such a vital consideration, and any members of the Select Committee who have a practical acquaintance with the feelings of Prussian or French married conscripts of the line are as able to form a judgment as an officer of Indian experience, except that the latter superadds a knowledge of points of character due to creed and caste, which greatly intensify the dislike of the Mussulman, the Hindoo, and the Sikh to protracted service beyond seas. Those who know French troops, or indeed any European troops but our own English line, must be aware of the feelings with which they embark for service beyond seas, and of the aversion they entertain to shipboard. French officers make no secret of the fact, as one which is a point of remarkable difference between the French and the English soldier. Intensify this feeling fifty-fold and you have the measure of the Mussulman's aversion to being long separated from his family; intensify the feeling a hundredfold, and it may approach the deep disgust and sense of defilement with which, from a caste point of view, the Hindoo regards board-ship life and service beyond seas and separation from his family. The aversion of the Sikh, if of a respectable village family, is hardly less than that of the Mussulman. Of any of these three main classes of our native subjects, the "Free Lances," or material for such, are very small in number as compared with former times. This is a consequence of the peace, the internal peace and good order of the empire, the security to life and property, and the greatly increased value of land; the old state of things, and the habits it engendered, has passed away; but even when the Mahrattas under the Bhonsla, Holkar, or Scindia, could sweep with hordes over the country, or the Pindarees pass over it like locusts, destroying everything, the "Free Lances" of all these worthies had India for their field, not lands beyond the ocean; and in no country in the world, considering the extent of its coast and the great value of its products, has the spirit of adventure at sea been so little developed as in India. Its agricultural millions are essentially land-loving people, and the sea, or service beyond seas, repugnant to their social habits, to their creeds, caste feelings, and every aspiration of their lives for the present, or, in the case of the Hindoo, for the future. Except the off-scourings of the cities, the "Bud-mashes" of towns or cantonments, not by any means fit material for soldiery, I know of no class whose repugnance to protracted

service beyond seas could be compensated really by such an increase of advantages to the soldier as would be within reason, and not render their employment more costly and troublesome than is at all contemplated by those who propose the measure. The scum of our cities and cantonments is not worth enlisting at any price—they are worthless; and even “Budmashes” would demand pay and advantages quite disproportionate to the value of their services, for in peace they would be a nuisance, and in war a weakness.

10. What is your opinion of the expediency of employing Indian troops in these Colonies * in time of war, either in substitution for Europeans, or as a supplement to them?

11. Could they be sufficiently relied upon for such a service as materially to lighten the strain to which the military resources of Great Britain are subjected in time of war?

* South Africa, Mauritius, Ceylon, Hong Kong, West Indies.

With regard to questions 10 and 11, we have employed Native troops in Egypt, the Mauritius, and China in time of war; and, if properly organized, I see no reason why native troops should not again be made useful when associated with the European troops for active operations in any of those quarters. Although their aversion is great to *protracted* service, mere garrison service beyond seas, under the emergency of war, with its prospects of reward, promotion, and foreign service claims, the feeling is different; it is regarded as an exceptional incidence of their contract, a necessity which justifies Government in employing regiments beyond sea, and which, when the regiments are not too long absent from India, confers renown and credit, besides usually being accompanied by more solid advantages. In hot countries, Native troops, properly officered, may be of great utility as auxiliaries to the European troops. Much of the wearying fatigue duties of an army can be better taken in hot countries by the native than by the European troops. The mere friction of war in trying climates falls heavily on English troops, and much of this destructive friction can be avoided where Native troops are a component of the force. Their utility in this respect is great, quite independently of their fighting power or value.

14. Would the effect of garrison service in these Colonies, in time of peace, upon the loyalty and general disposition of the native soldier after his return to India, be advantageous or otherwise?

With respect to question 14, my previous reply to question 6 will have shewn that the expatriation of Native regiments for garrison service in the Colonies would not, in my opinion, prove popular with our Native troops or their connections in India. Therefore, so far as loyalty depends on the measures of Government being acceptable to the people, it hardly seems likely, considering the possibility of Colonial Governments occasionally failing to understand the temper, prejudices, and peculiarities of native troops from India, that the result should be increase of loyalty here. Every cause of discontent which arose in a colony

would be echoed and exaggerated by their relatives in India, and its Government would, though powerless to interfere, be held responsible for the treatment its native subjects met with when beyond its control.

In reply to question 15, I must remark that India has no Native troops redundant, and that to introduce a system of Colonial service, and of Colonial reliefs, would necessitate a large increase to the Indian Armies, and many consequent sources of augmented expenditure which the Colonial Military Budgets would not meet. Moreover, such a system of Colonial service and reliefs would render our service very unpopular, and commanding officers would

find the recruiting more difficult than it is at present; for the men know that, at the expiration of three years, they can now obtain their discharge if they please, and do so to an extent of which commanding officers complain much; but such a facility for obtaining discharge could not endure compatibly with a system of Colonial service and reliefs, except at great cost and inconvenience if maintained, great discontent and distrust if abrogated. I am therefore of opinion that it would be better to raise regiments in India exclusively for Colonial service, and quite distinct from our existing Indian armies, the present organization of which is, in my opinion, unsuited to Colonial service. The British Government could organize and officer these regiments as it pleased, and would have to bear all the expenses of raising, of furloughs, of pensions, &c. I do not think either course advisable: but of the two the raising fresh regiments, unhampered by the traditions of our Native armies, unsaddled with Native commissioned officers, and having to conform to a system which must mould and adapt itself to the exigencies of a distinct service, seems far the more preferable course. Her Majesty's European regiments who have served or are serving in India could provide the nucleus of European officers having some acquaintance with native soldier classes, on which to build up gradually such fresh regiments. It must be fully understood that the experiment would be a serious one.

I have answered question 25 previously. It is a matter which actual experiment can alone prove. As far as India is concerned, the feeling of our Native armies since 1857 is that they are not trusted; and the introduction of Chinese, African, or Malay troops would augment this feeling, and do harm. In India we are better

15. Would it be better—
 (a.)—In the interests of India,
 (b.)—In the interests of the Colonies above named—
 to take for such a service regiments from the Native Indian Army according to their turn, or to raise fresh regiments in India specially and exclusively for Colonial service

25. State your opinion as to the policy of employing, either in India or in the Colonies, troops recruited from the Chinese, Malay, African, or other races not Indian, distinguishing between considerations of a military, civil, and political character?

without such foreign troops, upon which no greater reliance could be placed than upon our own Indian races, whom it is not good policy thus to alienate. Nor would the substitution of such troops enable us materially to reduce our English garrison. If the magnitude of the Indian Empire, the millions it contains, and the growing wealth of the country are considered, the European garrison of India is, in my opinion, moderate, and not more than a country like England can and should bear without murmur. On the contrary, what with the alienation of the Indian troops, and the resentments that might crop up, besides the peculiar temper of Chinese, Africans and Malays, which render them in some respects more difficult to manage than Indians, whether Hindoo or Mussulman, we should be compelled to maintain an equal, if not superior, European force to watch the experiment.

XXVIII.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED DESPATCH OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO ABYSSINIA. DATED THE 10TH JUNE, 1867.

In the absence of everything approaching to reliable information I should not have hazarded any remarks at all on Major-General Coghlan's memorandum, had it not been for the request of his Excellency the Governor-General. In deference to the Viceroy's wish, but with a painful sense of the want of all data on which to proceed, I venture to offer the following observations:—

It is related by historians that the Negashi of Abyssinia invaded Yemen in the year A.D. 525 with 60,000 men, conquered the province, and held it until A.D. 575, that is for half a century. In A.D. 525 the conquering army crossed from the Abyssinian coast apparently from the Anesley or Massowah harbours, and landed at Ghalifica, on the Arab coast. For fifty years they maintained their conquest, and reinforcements had therefore continually to be provided from Abyssinia. This single fact proves that the communication from the plateau of Abyssinia to the seaboard, by the routes leading on the harbours of the coast, cannot be insuperably difficult for the march of considerable bodies of men. If in A.D. 525 an Abyssinian monarch could march down 60,000 men, and cross them over to the Arab coast to avenge the persecution the Christians had suffered, I cannot deem the features of the country so

altered in the present day that, with our command of means, it should be a matter of insurmountable difficulty to push a well and suitably equipped force into Abyssinia.

At the same time, I am bound to say, after a careful perusal of Major-General Coghlan's scheme for an Abyssinian expeditionary force, that it affords no information upon points absolutely essential to be known in the event of military operations being undertaken. It relies, in fact, on a series of preliminary inquiries to be made by a staff of officers to be deputed to Massowah for the purpose of collecting the very information which, considering our now long possession of Aden, ought to have been available, and in the possession of the Political Agent at Aden. For instance, in 1854 there was an expedition to Berbera under Burton, Herne, Strogan and Speke, and after journeys by Burton and Speke the party met in April, 1855, at Berbera, and though the final result of the expedition was unfortunate, yet a good deal of information must have been collected as to the resources of the Somali country in cattle, sheep, ponies, and other kinds of produce. Moreover, subsequently, since 1856, our relations with the Somali coast have been so continuous at Aden that some positive knowledge of the resources of the Somali coast and that trending south to Zanzibar ought to be known. North of Massowah also, the resources of the Nubian coast should by this time have been ascertained, and it ought not to be absolutely problematical whether we can rely or not upon the tracts above adverted to for a supply of slaughter cattle and sheep, and also of baggage animals.

Major-General Coghlan's memorandum concludes with the hope that the preliminary arrangements for the acquisition of information may, on coming to the knowledge of King Theodorus, induce him, through fear of impending consequences, to liberate the captives unconditionally, and to sue for an amnesty. This I would fain hope may by good fortune happen; but it is a very dubious supposition, especially if our procedure be such as to imply an alliance, overt or concealed, with the Turco-Egyptian power.

By the latest reports from the captives in Abyssinia we know that the available force now under the direct control of Theodorus is much reduced, and that it was in course of daily rapid diminution. At the same time there is a general concurrence on the part of those conversant with the existing state of feeling in Abyssinia that the hatred to the Turco-Egyptian rule is so great, and the national antipathy so ingrained, that whatever steps may be taken for retrieving the captives and coercing Theodorus, we have been

repeatedly warned against our operations assuming the semblance of alliance with Turco-Egyptian support or aid, for that such an impression might rally the Abyssinians to something like union, and could not fail greatly to strengthen Theodorus. It is impossible to judge how far this may be a correct representation of the national feeling in Abyssinia; but some incidental remarks by the eminent traveller Baker, who passed some time in an Abyssinian province before he started for the Albert-Nyanza exploration, are a weighty confirmation from an independent source of this alleged virulent national feeling. As at present informed, therefore, it may be politic to avoid any line of procedure that might be construed to indicate an offensive coalition with Turco-Egyptian designs on Abyssinia.

In a rough way the Turk claims the coast as far as the Straits of Bab-el-mandeb; but unless I am misinformed, he holds nothing lower down than Massowah Island, which, according to Coghlan, we could not use without the permission of the Turkish Government. It would seem preferable, even at some disadvantage, to select a port such as Anesley Bay, where no such previous permission was necessary, and possible complications with the Turco-Egyptian Government were avoided. As the old road to Tigré came to Anesley Bay, there can hardly be a doubt that it is a practicable line. In a late despatch Lieutenant-Colonel Merewether spoke much more favourably of the route from Amphilla than does Major-General Coghlan. It is no doubt a bad roadstead, and not comparable as a harbour with Anesley Bay; but it is nearer to Tigré, and it is questionable which of the two routes is the better for troops advancing on Tigré. As a demonstration, as well as with a view to operations, it would be advisable to institute inquiries as to both routes.

The essential difference between such an expedition and that to the Persian Gulf under Sir J. Outram must not be lost sight of. The latter expedition had, as its first object, to strike a blow on the coast, and by the occupation of Bushire, and the operations at the head of the Gulf, to threaten, though not to undertake, an advance from the coast on one or other line of operations. It was expected, as proved to be the case, that the Persian Government would be brought to reason by the occupation of Bushire and the operations at the head of the Gulf; and it was only in case of disappointment in this respect that more serious operations were contemplated. The case is very different with regard to an expedition into Abyssinia. The blow to be struck is not one on the

coast, but involves a long and probably difficult march from the coast to the plateau of Abyssinia as a preliminary to effective action against the Negashi. A *sine quâ non*, therefore, is, that whatever force is thrown on shore from the ships at the head of Anesley Bay, or at Amphilla, shall be so equipped with carriage cattle for stores, camp equipage, baggage, spare ammunition, and ordnance park stores, besides sheep and cattle for slaughter, that a rapid advance from the coast may be feasible. There must also be the means from time to time of throwing forward additional supplies. Now, granting that no wheeled carriage, except that of the guns, is allowed, and that the arrangements are such that everything else for the army is carried on the backs of animals, such as camels, mules, ponies, bullocks, &c., such a mode of equipment, involving daily loading and unloading, necessitates not only a large number of animals, but also men to take care of them; and all, man and beast, must be fed. The first consideration, therefore, must be the organization of ample means of transport; for nothing is either more useless or helpless than a body of troops thrown on shore without means of movement.

Where there are no data whatever as to the available supply of carriage cattle, and nothing is known of the routes, it would be expedient so to organize the force as to combine, as far as possible, a maximum of efficiency with a minimum of transport; for it is the means of transport that will probably be the difficulty throughout the operations. A force composed as follows would answer the foregoing conditions from the moderate strength of Europeans proposed; but bearing in mind the wear and tear of a long advance over such a country as must be traversed, the column, a weak division, is of minimum strength in natives also.

COLUMN TO ADVANCE FROM THE COAST UPON TIGRÉ OR THE PLATEAU OF ABYSSINIA.

1st Brigade.

- 1 European Regiment.
- 1 Sikh Pioneer Regiment.
- 1 Native Infantry Regiment.

2nd Brigade.

- 1 European Regiment.
- 1 Sikh Infantry Regiment.
- 1 Native Infantry Regiment.

Artillery and Sappers.

- 1 Mountain Train Battery.
- 1 Field Battery, Armstrong Guns.
- 2 Companies, Sappers (Native).

Cavalry.

- 2 Regiments, Irregular Native Cavalry.
- A Small Ordnance Park.
- A small Engineer Park.
- Commissariat Park.

RESERVE ON THE COAST, WITH TRANSPORT IN COURSE OF ORGANIZATION AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, IN CASE OF AN ADVANCE BEING NECESSARY IN SUPPORT OF COLUMNS.

Reserve Brigade.

- 1 Regiment of European Infantry.
- 2 Regiments of Native Infantry.
- 1 Company, Sappers (Native).
- 1 Field Battery, Armstrong Guns.

In the event of the reserve being called up, which would probably be the case before the operations were concluded, Government must be prepared to supply its place by a reinforcement from India, or, better still, by one held in readiness at Aden of a like strength.

The 1st and 2nd Brigades would be about	...	4,000	men.
Artillery	300	„
Sappers	200	„
Cavalry	900	„
	Total	5,400	men.

Reserve Brigade.

Infantry	2,000	men.
Artillery	150	„
Sappers	100	„
	Total	2,250	men.

Contingent on demand to supply reserve if called to the front, 2,250 men.

THE FORCE TO BE EMBARKED AND LANDED ON ABYSSINIAN COAST WOULD BE—

Column	5,400	men.
Reserve	2,250	„
	Total	7,650	men.

To be held in readiness—

Brigade	2,250	men.
	Grand Total	9,900	men.

All the servants and camp followers from India landed in Africa should be well armed.

The Medical Department must be strong in officers and stores. If Anesley Bay were the base of operations, it would be a wise precaution to have a hospital-ship of good size there.

The Topographical and the Telegraph Departments should not be neglected on such an expedition. They are both essential.

Though the coercion of the Negáshi Theodorus and the liberation of the captives may be the sole aim of the expedition, it does not follow, unfortunately, that the force may be able to effect these objects, and return to the coast without making some stay in Abyssinia. The column will advance under the disadvantage of knowing nothing of the country. Under such circumstances, great rapidity of action cannot be expected; it must feel its way with more or less caution; a temporary occupation will probably prove inevitable, and that again will entail the necessity of endeavouring to restore order in the vicinity of the position occupied by the troops, and on the line of communication with the coast. The mere advance to the plateau from the coast, though the route may present difficulties, will really be the easiest part of the business. The temporary occupation and the ultimate withdrawal from the country to the coast will prove the more serious part of the enterprise. Much will depend on the judgment and tact with which the Abyssinians are conciliated, and the good fortune that may attend the endeavour to restrict hostile operations to a conflict with Theodorus; but in the disturbed and wasted state of the country, it is impossible to foresee what complications may arise from the jealousy of factious chiefs. It does not follow that because they are in rebellion against Theodorus they should side with us. On the contrary, they may resent the domination, temporary though it may avowedly be, of foreigners, and cause much trouble to the force. Once embroiled with any of the chiefs and races now harrying Abyssinia, the withdrawal would be very difficult, if not dangerous. The fact is, that it may turn out far easier to get into and occupy the country than to leave it at the moment we may desire to wash our hands of the affair. Government must therefore be prepared to afford a somewhat protracted support, both naval and military, to the force in Abyssinia. Although a division well commanded might, if fortune befriended the enterprise, effect what is desired, it might on the other hand be necessary not only to send up the reserve brigade, but even to follow that up by another, always at the same time maintaining a strong hold of the

base of operations on the coast. It is exactly that sort of expedition the precise issue of which it is impossible to foretell, from the circumstance that, what with our own ignorance of the country and its difficulties, the anarchy which at present prevails there, and the reception of a foreign force being always an utter uncertainty among savages and semi-savages, the elements of trouble and discord are many, and those of order non-existent; alliances with petty chiefs would be insecure, and as much a source of vigilance as their own hostility, whilst before our armed domination could retire, it must, for its own welfare as well as that of the people who came under its temporary protection, leave some organized power to take its place. Nothing would be more disagreeable, and hardly anything more discreditable, than a withdrawal which took the form of a retreat in the face of hostile masses; and this must almost inevitably be the case, unless, before the withdrawal from the country began, there had been a reconstruction of some sort of substantive power to be left behind us. To retire amid seething anarchy would be to invite pursuit and attack, if only for the sake of plunder, and we might suffer more on the withdrawal than during the advance.

XXIX.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED EXPEDITION TO ABYSSINIA. DATED THE
15TH JULY, 1867.

In a Memorandum, dated 10th June last, drawn up at the request of the Viceroy, and having reference to the possible despatch of an expeditionary force to Abyssinia, I drew attention to the fact of the conquest of Yemen by the Abyssinian Negáshi in A.D. 525, and that for half a century that power maintained its hold over the Arab province. The purpose of this historical quotation was to point out that if 50,000 or 60,000 men could be marched from the highlands of Abyssinia to the coast, cross the Red Sea, invade Yemen, and hold it for fifty years, this could not be done without the road or roads from the plateau of Abyssinia to the coast being practicable. From Arab history it appears that the elephant, an animal certainly not found in Arabia, was in use

with the Abyssinian conquerors. This simple fact indicates the general practicability of the routes by which the Abyssinian forces descended, and afterwards maintained their communications with their highlands.

Since writing the forementioned Memorandum, a reference to Portuguese history has recalled a fact which has a closer bearing on the practicability of an advance from the coast to the mountain camp and fastnesses of the Negáshi Theodorus. About 1541, Don Stephano de Gama, after his repulse at Suez and sundry ravages on the Turkish possessions in the Red Sea, reached and occupied Massowah. From thence his squadron sailed to Zeila, which was taken, and became the starting point from whence Don Christopher de Gama, at the head of 400 Portuguese, well-armed, disciplined after the European manner, and having with them a few field-pieces, commenced his adventurous march, with a view to effect the relief of the Empress of Abyssinia, Cabelo Oanguel, who had been forced to take refuge in a fastness on the top of Mount Damo. This small Portuguese force was considerably augmented by a number of young gentlemen from the Viceroy's fleet, who were permitted to join the expedition as volunteers. Their number, however, is not stated. With this force Christopher de Gama advanced apparently by the direct route towards Lake Tyana or Dembro, through the Dewaro country, at the city of which, Dewaroa, the Empress met him. Where this place Dewaroa may have been is not precisely stated, but Christopher de Gama had proceeded beyond it eight days' journey through a very rough and rocky territory, and three days over a fine spacious plain of a more fertile character, when the Moorish King of Adel, who had spread his conquests from Zeila and Berbera to the foot of the Abyssinian highlands, attacked Christopher de Gama. In two severe actions the Portuguese commander defeated his opponent; but in a third, after his enemy had received strong Turkish reinforcements, Christopher de Gama was defeated, in part owing to his own rashness. Though beaten in this fight, the residue of the Portuguese troops afterwards did good service in Abyssinia, though they had lost de Gama.

I have noted these circumstances because the King of Adel or Zeila was not a despicable foe; the reinforcements which enabled him to fight his third and successful action are represented to have been six hundred Turks and two hundred Moors on horseback, a thousand arquebussiers, and ten pieces of field artillery.

We know that the calibre of the fie'd guns used by the Portu-

guess and the Adel king was small, probably not exceeding 2- or 3-pounders, but then at that period the carriages were clumsy, and the facility of moving artillery far less than in the present day. For instance, the 9-pounder Armstrong, adopted for colonial service, is probably far easier of draft than were these Portuguese and Moorish field guns of 1541-42, yet history shows that these were marched from considerable distances and in different directions without any insuperable difficulty, and played a prominent part in the three sharp actions fought by Christopher de Gama. The fair deduction is, that the country, rough and difficult though it may be, is not at all impracticable for light field guns. Of course for mountain train guns the country must be perfectly practicable.

Another conclusion is that the country is not impracticable for cavalry, otherwise the Adel king would not always have had a considerable part of his force of that arm.

It is to be regretted that the exploring expedition under Lieutenant Burton to the Somali country had so disastrous a termination in 1855, and that, its purpose being the exploration of the country between Berbera and Zanzibar, very little information was collected calculated to throw any light on the route by which Christopher de Gama advanced to the neighbourhood of Lake Dembra; but the enterprise which he, with a small body of disciplined troops, did not shrink from boldly carrying out in 1541-42 can hardly be impossible to a well-equipped British force in 1867.

The invasion of Yemen naturally turned attention to the routes leading from the highlands of Abyssinia to the ports from which the Abyssinian forces embarked for the opposite coast. But attention to the remarkable expedition of the Portuguese in 1541-42 renders it expedient, should a force have to be sent, that very careful inquiries be made as to the route from the head of the Gulf of Tajurrah straight on Magdala and Debra Tabor; for, as a rule, what has been done before can be done again unless, as compared with the Portuguese of 1541, the British power of 1867 is less enterprising. My object is to qualify what my previous Memorandum might be regarded as conveying, namely, a decided preference for the routes from Anesley or Amphilla Bay, leading into the Tigré province. The presumption is, of course, in favour of routes by which an army of 50,000 or 60,000 was poured down upon the coast, or is supposed to have descended; but our information is so vague as to these routes, that it will not be wise to neglect so positive a fact as the march of the

400 Portuguese in 1541-42 by the direct route from Zeila, and the feasibility of that route should be carefully ascertained.

It must be remembered that the connection between Abyssinia and the Portuguese at Goa had for some time preceded this expedition, and that from the time of Albuquerque (1505) there had been a frequent passage to and fro of emissaries between Goa and the Abyssinian Court. When, therefore, the expedition from Zeila was determined upon, the Portuguese were no doubt in possession of pretty good information as to the most practicable routes; and as John III. had himself ordered the Viceroy of Goa to furnish four hundred and fifty musqueteers from India when sending Bermudez on his mission, the expedition was not hurriedly extemporized, but very deliberately pre-arranged, and that, too, whilst Bermudez, who knew Abyssinia well from long previous residence, was at Lisbon. It can, therefore, hardly have been chance that led Bermudez, when with the Viceroy at Massowah, to prefer an advance from Zeila. There must have been very forcible reasons for this preference. Possibly some of the old writers who have dwelt upon Don Christopher's gallant enterprise would, if searched, afford an insight how far it was a consideration of the practicability of the route or of political circumstances which led Stephen de Gama, when master of the choice and with Bermudez at his side, to weigh from Massowah and land the force at Zeila; but no books that I can here command throw any light on this point. The fact renders advisable a careful collection of information on the present state of the route from the head of the Gulf of Tajurrah.

Considering that annually some 20,000 people assemble at Berbera from all quarters of the mainland, and again disperse and return, and all this without organized pre-arrangement, there must be cattle and provision and water on the lines of road converging on Berbera.

The Portuguese, after losing their leader, did admirable service in Abyssinia, were much dreaded, and improved the Abyssinian troops in the art of war. All this they undertook in support of a Jesuit policy, and the desire to subject to the Church of Rome the Abyssinian Christian Church. Our Government in England has to consider whether the manner in which its patient remonstrances and Her Majesty's letters have been received and treated by King Theodorus, and the outrages inflicted on our Envoy and the Consul, and British subjects with them, call for a defence of the honour and credit of the nation; but if Her

Majesty's Government deem that a sufficiently low note of humiliation has been sounded, whatever the route by which Her Majesty's forces had to move I hardly think they will in the issue show themselves a degenerate race to the brave four hundred men under Christopher de Gama, for they will have a more honourable cause of war than had the Portuguese, and every motive that is likely to arouse the spirit and the endurance of a British force to face and surmount the difficulties of such an expedition.

The real difficulty, an honourable withdrawal from the country of Abyssinia, I have touched upon fully in my previous memorandum.

XXX.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED EXPEDITION TO ABYSSINIA. DATED THE
18TH AUGUST, 1867.

Since my note of the 15th July, 1867, was written, I have received from Calcutta several works which seem to establish the fact that the march of the 400 Portuguese under Christopher de Gama was from Arkiko, at the head of the Bay of Massowah, and not from Zeila or Tajurrah. In Purchas' Pilgrims, Part II., there is a translation of the report of the Patriarch, Don John Bermudez, to John III. of Portugal, of what happened to Don Christopher and his party. He describes the surprise of Arguico after the Viceroy's return from Suez; the selection of the commander, Don Christopher; the departure of the Viceroy and his fleet after receiving the blessing of Bermudez, who says of himself and his small force that after the fleet went to sea, "we remained on land very solitarie, and beginning to travel, within three days we came to Debarua." Bruce, in his second volume, confirms this; and it seems pretty clear that it was from Arkiko that their advance was made, not from Zeila through Dewaro. Some similarity between Debarua* and Dewaro may have led to the error, as also some uncertainty as to the precise date of the attack of the Portuguese on Zeila, and the translations not being very exact, writers have confused events. Although it does not affect the general argument in my note of the 15th July last, I

* Also spelt Debarwa.

think it right to correct the error into which I was misled, as I entertain no doubt, on Bermudez' own authority, that Arkiko was the Portuguese starting point.

This makes no difference as to the expediency of obtaining information of a reliable kind as to the route from Tajurrah; nor any as to the practicability of the country for military operations, and the movement of artillery. The Portuguese pieces did good service, though the carriages made up in the country had for tires old broken-up fire-arm barrels, no iron being obtainable with which to tire the wheels.

As pointed out by Salt, there is great difficulty in recognizing the old names employed by the Portuguese; so that to trace their routes is not always easy. Still, even with only such works as I have been able to obtain from Calcutta, there appears fuller information as to Abyssinia than we had respecting Afghanistan when the first advance was made through the Bolan Pass upon Kandahar and Kabul; and I deem it probable that in England, where there must, in our public libraries, be copies of the original works of Tellez, Ludolph, Alvarez, Bermudez, Lobo, and many others, there must exist far greater facilities for sifting out useful information than is afforded by the means available in this country. Salt points out that, on comparing Mr. Coffin's route from Amphilla Bay to Chelicut with that of Jerome Lobo's, two centuries previous, there was little difference, except in the status of the tribes, between the coast and the Pass of Senafé. Whatever the political changes of a country, its physical features, those which affect military lines of operation, remain in a mountainous country permanent; and the whole of Abyssinia was so repeatedly traversed by the Portuguese Jesuits who long resided in and wrote of that country, that unless their letters and descriptions are more inexact than was usual with that learned and well-trained society, a little labour devoted to a scrutiny of their works, and a judicious compilation of particulars bearing on the nature of the main routes both from the coast and also in the interior of the Amhara and Tigré provinces, could not fail to be useful. It ought to be easily and rapidly executed in England by any officer of experience, master of the Portuguese tongue and conversant with Jesuit Latin, and having the resources of the British Museum Library at his disposal.

XXXI.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED DESPATCH OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO
ABYSSINIA. DATED THE 4TH SEPTEMBER, 1867.

We are now in September, and as yet have been unable to give positive orders as to that portion of the force for Abyssinia which may be sent from Bengal. This delay is consequent partly on the decision of the Home Government having only lately reached us, and partly owing to the time it takes to communicate with Bombay, to which Government the organization and despatch of the force is entrusted. It will now be hard work for the departments most concerned, viz., the Commissariat and the Ordnance, to be ready with their equipments by the end of October, or early in November.

The report by telegram given by the Bombay Government on the authority of Major Merewether, as to the prospect of obtaining baggage cattle on the shores of the Red Sea and the coast of Africa, is not encouraging, since they say clearly that this source cannot be relied upon.

Under these circumstances, it is certain that that which has always appeared the main difficulty of the expeditionary force may be said to have ceased to be a problematical, and to have become a positive difficulty, which will tax the means and energies of Government to surmount in such time as to enable the force to move from the coast in December after arrival and debarkation.

From every point of view, it is advisable to reduce the necessity for extraordinary exertion on the score of baggage animals to a minimum, and to employ such troops in every arm as require least provision in that respect.

Hence it is worthy of consideration, with a view to the early mobility and efficiency of Sir R. Napier's force, whether it would not be a great advantage to him to have one or more of the field batteries of artillery which he requires replaced by mountain train batteries. Besides the Darjeeling battery, we have the six or eight new mountain guns lately received, originally sent out for the Bhootan campaign, for which they were not in time; they are

admirably suited for a campaign in Abyssinia, and would make a most effective battery of mountain train guns. I would suggest that one of the Madras field batteries be replaced by these guns, properly equipped in every respect as a mountain train battery. For the mules a portion might be taken from such as the Punjab Government may succeed in obtaining, with the help of a few, if necessary, from the frontier mountain train batteries.

I proposed twenty elephants as an aid for the field batteries, and to carry the mortars; but it might be preferable to equip a battery of 6-pounder Armstrongs with elephants instead of horses. Allowing six elephants for gun, limber, &c., thirty-six elephants would be required, and four for the mortars,—altogether forty elephants. But then we should save the transport of the horses of the battery, and, instead of waggons, the ammunition not in the limbers could be carried on mules, pack bullocks, camels, according to the country passed over. The battery would be far more effective for mountain work than a horsed battery.

These arrangements would secure three batteries, all very efficient in range and shot thrown, and just as movable in a mountain country as it is possible for artillery to be,—just as movable as the troops themselves.

All the ammunition should be sent from India, ready packed for mule or bullock carriage. This would not render it at all less easy to put two mule loads on a camel if the *suleetas* are properly made. The great point is that there shall be no preparing of packages on shore when the troops are landed; but that, according to the available carriage, the shot, shell, and ammunition of every kind shall be in handy packages marked and numbered, so that the contents of every package may be known.

The same observation applies to the engineer park.

If we are to make up mule, ox, and camel pack or saddle gear, no time should be lost in giving the Commissariat notice of what it has to prepare.

In case of the force being delayed in Abyssinia, and having to pass a rainy season there, the Commissariat should have a few men acquainted with elephant-catching and training. The force ought to be able, if detained in the country a rainy season, to supply itself with mules, and possibly even elephants, to make up, and more than make up, its losses. The wild elephant abounds, and mules are the ordinary mount of the Abyssinians of any means,—the horse being kept rather as a war mount, than for common work,—the mule is in fact the Abyssinian roadster.

Since writing the foregoing paragraphs, I learn from various telegrams and letters that doubts are entertained in England whether the expedition can be carried out next cold season, whether it will not have to be delayed until the following cold season. With respect to the recovery of the captives, I think any protracted delay of this kind is greatly to be deprecated, and that, if possible, it should be avoided. The main difficulty, that of transport cattle for the force to advance over the highlands of Abyssinia, is somewhat distinct from the same difficulty of advance as far as the first healthy uplands, up to which the camel can be used. I think it, therefore, of extreme importance, as the force to advance over the highlands will be practically limited by the amount of transport cattle available, whether mules, ponies, or bullocks, that the advance of the moderate force should not be hampered by a quantity of artillery and waggons, for which roads must be made and great delay incurred in their construction, to the exhaustion of the force and its supplies; but that the artillery with the force should be in good quantity, yet as easily and rapidly movable as the force itself, and not over-burthened with the portage of spare ammunition in large quantity as if about to engage an enemy with good troops and efficient artillery. I think the force of eighteen guns, equipped as I have proposed, would be a source of great strength to the moderate force that will advance; but rather than hinder it with the impediments of the wheeled carriages of a fourth battery, I would propose, if Sir R. Napier thought the three batteries insufficient for the advance over the highlands, either to equip a second 6-pounder Armstrong battery with elephants, as I have proposed, or to cut down at once six of the 6-pounder Armstrong guns, so as to reduce their weight and turn them into a mountain-train battery.

The fifth battery which he requires might be a field battery complete, and would be of use with his reserve brigade on the uplands near the coast. Thither it might reach without much hampering the movements of the force.

The object should be to have no wheel carriage to move over the passes which, whether by Taranta or Senafé, render the ascent to the highlands difficult for guns dragged.

I think it probable that Sir R. Napier would be content with three batteries so perfectly movable as those proposed in this memorandum, and with one field battery for his reserve brigade on the coast.

XXXII.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED DESPATCH OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
TO ABYSSINIA. DATED THE 28TH SEPTEMBER, 1867.

When my note of the 4th September was written, the Government of India was not in possession of the secret despatch of the Secretary of State of the 19th August last, which states for our guidance that, "although circumstances of a local character dictate the immediate equipment of the force under the superintendence of the Government of Bombay, Her Majesty's Government are desirous that Your Excellency should afford Mr. Fitzgerald the benefit of your advice and assistance in furtherance of the great national objects of the projected expedition." Nor had we at that time, the 4th September, received the reply of the Bombay Government of the 13th September to our despatch of the 25th August. But as on the question of the artillery to be employed on the Abyssinian campaign, my views practically coincide with those of Sir W. Mansfield, as set forth in the Adjutant-General's despatch of the 24th September, I wish my note of the 4th September to be attached to this Minute, though it will be at once perceptible that it was written before the relative positions of the Government of Bombay and the Government of India, in connection with operations in Abyssinia, had been indicated by the Home Government.

Since the 4th September we have further received the confidential memorandum of Sir R. Napier, dated the 2nd September, sketching his projected operations; and also he has intimated that it is calculated that the main body of the expeditionary force will sail from Bombay between the 15th November next and the early part of December, and that about twenty days may be taken as the passage to the port of debarkation. We are also aware, to a certain extent, of the preparations making in Calcutta and elsewhere by the Bengal commissariat on requisitions made direct by the Bombay military authorities to our Commissary-General or his subordinates, to which requisitions they are energetically responding, and using every exertion to comply, as rapidly as possible, with the various wants of the Bombay force.

Our information is very insufficient ; but such as it is, it points to the conclusion that the expeditionary force can hardly all reach the port of debarkation before the end of January, if even so early. Should this be the case—and I think I am taking a more favourable view than the state of preparations, so far as we know them, warrants—the force will scarcely be able to accomplish more before the setting in of the rainy season than to occupy the first and second posts contemplated in Sir R. Napier's plan of campaign. The onward advance to the 3rd and 4th points will hardly be practicable before the end of the next rainy season, and a forward move from point No. 2 will, in all probability, be deferred until about this time next year, or a little later if the monsoon happen to be protracted, as it sometimes is. Counting six clear good campaigning months, from October or November, 1868, to March or April, 1869, the force will be very fortunate if, considering the length of the line of operations, the strength of the column and of the posts left to secure communications, and the amount of provision to be pushed forward, it can accomplish the object of the expedition and return to the coast to embark for India within that time. If, instead of Massowah, the port of debarkation were the head of Anesley Bay, it might be possible for the force to reach a point No. 2 in advance of that contemplated by Sir R. Napier, and thus to shorten the distance to be traversed in reaching points 3 and 4 ; but even then great good fortune will attend the force if it return to the coast by April, 1869. It may have to stay on the highlands of Abyssinia over the rainy season of 1869, and not be set free for return to India before the end of 1869, or the March or April of 1870. Of course it is possible that Theodorus, or some successful opponent of his, may release the captives, and thus facilitate an early withdrawal of the force ; but we must, I think, not calculate on such a contingency. It is just as probable that Theodorus might withdraw the captives from Magdala, leave strong garrisons in Debra Tabor and Magdala, and retire with the captives to the strong country to the south or to the west of Lake Dembra. Be this as it may, the deliberate nature of our operations will afford him ample opportunity to suit his movements to circumstances ; and if any of his early energy is left, it will not be right to build on mere accident and good fortune.

Under the uncertainties of the expedition, the Bombay Government should, I think, early prepare for the despatch of reinforcements to its Native regiments. Of these it sends nine, and it rejects our advice to increase their strength before embarkation to

the strength to which we raise the two regiments to proceed from this Presidency. There can be no doubt to any one who has had experience of the mere effect from the friction of war on such a campaign, that these nine weak regiments will rapidly dwindle in strength to skeleton corps, if operations are protracted through 1868 into 1869. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who commanded the Bombay army for five years, warns us that the attempt to feed these nine regiments with men by recruiting will fail whilst they are on foreign service. The only alternative left to the Bombay Government will, therefore, be the despatch of fresh Native regiments—and it ought to be ready to do so at an early period. Otherwise, the homogeneity of the Native force, on which Sir R. Napier lays stress, will have to be broken by sending Madras Native troops. Prudence demands that the Bombay Government should be prepared, whenever necessary, to despatch strong reinforcements of Native infantry, and it can scarcely calculate on less than four or five regiments being thus additionally engaged in this service. Half the Bombay Native army may thus be early thrown into Abyssinia, and for such a contingency, not only the Bombay Government, but the Government of India must be prepared.

But for my desire that Sir R. Napier should have had the best troops we could give him, I cannot say that I regret his decision; for our Native force is barely equal to our peace requirements, and we can, in reality, very ill spare the two good Native regiments of infantry we are despatching to Abyssinia.

Under these circumstances, we must look to the Madras army to replace the Bombay regiments which will have to be sent as reinforcements, and the Madras Government should be timely informed of the part it is expected to fulfil.

I concur in the propriety of Sir W. Mansfield's proposal with respect to the distribution between the Presidencies of the loss of four European regiments. But, whilst the South of India will thus be weakened by the withdrawal of two European regiments and a proportion of artillery, and half the Bombay Native Army may be soon beyond sea with Sir R. Napier, and the better part of that army's staff, I think it worthy of consideration whether it would not be an advantage to the public service, on the departure of Sir R. Napier, to make the South of India temporarily one command under the Madras Commander-in-Chief. The command would after all be but a moderate one, and by this means the Madras staff would be utilized, and the drain on the staff and

regiments of the Bombay army would be more economically and also more efficiently met, and form a larger available supply of officers than can be the case if the Bombay command pass into the hands of some subordinate general officer at Bombay on the departure of Sir R. Napier. The whole resources of the South of India would, in this way, be much easier brought to bear in support of the requirements of the arduous campaign on which Sir R. Napier has entered. As yet the resources of the South of India appear to have been very little drawn upon. The tendency has been to look to Bengal for everything, even for coolies. Whereas, for service beyond seas, the coast populations of the South are certainly preferable to the inland people of the North of India. The Danakel and the Somanli tribes of the coasts of Abyssinia are, however, more likely to be useful, if properly managed, than either Southern or Northern coolies from India, among whom there will be frightful suffering and waste of life.

From what has preceded, it will be observed that for the carrying on of these uncertain operations to a successful conclusion, I think we should look to the two coast armies as the main instruments. To the Bombay Native army we must trust for bearing the brunt of the wear and tear of what may be a protracted series of operations. Upon the Madras army we must rely to act as the reserve of the Bombay army, setting the latter free for active service, and supplying its place as regiments are absorbed in the campaigns of Abyssinia. Provided this employment of the Madras army be confined to the Peninsula, it will be found quite equal to this duty within moderate limits; but in order not to exceed the capabilities of this reserve, it may be advisable, as the drain proceeds on the Bombay army, to draw regiments elsewhere than from the Bombay territory proper, and the stations on or north of the Nerbudda.

To say the least, the progress of affairs in Central Asia and Afghanistan is not assuring. Without the smallest alarm at what may be impending, ordinary prudence and foresight render it daily more and more imperatively necessary that, on the Indus line of frontier, there should be one policy, one command, one local Government. The policy of the Government of India should be open to no misconception from the fact that, whilst the Agents at Peshawar say one thing, the Agents on the Scinde frontier say another, and are continually, both directly and indirectly, pressing a traditional policy of their own. From Kurrachee to Peshawar is our most dangerous frontier, and that upon which

our military force must be ever ready for sudden action under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief and the orders of the Government of India through the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. It is perfectly anomalous that on such a frontier the agent at Peshawar, as the representative of the Punjab Government, enunciates one thing, whilst the Agent on the Scinde frontier, looking to Bombay for a lax and distant control, may propound another. The force on one-half the line of frontier looks to the Commander-in-Chief in India, the force on the lower half of the frontier looks to the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay. As Bombay troops may just as well be taken from Scinde as elsewhere, the opportunity will be a good one to place that whole frontier, on which one will and one policy should rule, on a sound footing, by transferring its political, civil, and military administration to the Punjab Government. One thing is certain, namely, that with all its staff of any experience away with half its army in Abyssinia, and even then, with all its commissariat and other means concentrated on that expedition, forced to look to Bengal and Madras for every kind of assistance, no reliance whatever could be placed on the efficiency of its commissariat and other establishments in Scinde, if there suddenly came a necessity for action on the Indus frontier. Whatever else we do, we cannot afford to be caught slumbering in inefficiency on that frontier.

Passing to details, Sir R. Napier having full discretion as to the organization of the expeditionary force, I think the selection of the brigade staff for which he has asked may be left to himself in communication with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The batteries of artillery should each be of war complement strength, with a full proportion of carbines and small arm ammunition. In mountain warfare, the support of cavalry, whether European or Native, is often quite out of the question; and a mountain battery may now and then, under particular circumstances, be much indebted to its own rifled carbines.

The Government of India should be kept much better informed than has as yet been the case of everything connected with the expeditionary force.

We should know what arrangements are made or proposed for the early and correct audit of all expenditure connected with the expedition, so that we may not pass long years hereafter in the adjustment of accounts between the Home and the Indian Governments.

Both the Home and the Indian Governments should have early intimation if the campaign is likely to be protracted beyond 1868, so that the most timely and complete arrangements may be feasible as to shipping, money, provisions and reinforcements.

XXXIII.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED DESPATCH OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO
ABYSSINIA, DATED THE 4TH OCTOBER, 1867.

As previously stated in my Minute of the 28th September, my regret that the Bombay Government should have rejected our advice had reference rather to the efficiency of the expedition than to considerations of the general security of India. As far as the latter is concerned, and may be considered dependent on Native troops, I cannot say that I greatly regret Sir R Napier's decision as to the Native element of his force being mainly drawn from the Bombay army. It leaves us so much the stronger in India, as the drain is less on our better class of native troops.

I am opposed to our Bengal Native army being regarded as a reserve for supplementing the possible requirements of the campaign in Abyssinia. It is not with that view that I accede to the expediency of increasing the strength of our native army in Bengal. Nothing urged in the minutes of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief or his Excellency the Governor-General modifies my opinion as to what is essentially necessary for the proper management of our Indus frontier, and as to the quality of the troops—Native troops, I, of course, here mean—who should occupy that line. In anticipation of having to do so when Bombay native corps are taken from Scinde, I approve of an augmentation of 5,000 men to our native infantry, but would not spread that increase rateably over all the native infantry regiments. Those in Assam, for instance, might be excepted, and others also. The bulk of the increase should be allotted to the Punjab regiments of the army, to the Goorkha corps, and to the Punjab Frontier Force.

During the Persian Gulf Expedition under Sir J. Outram, there was no hesitation in throwing entirely on the Bombay army the

duty of finding Native troops for that service. Had the campaign been protracted, Bombay was expected to furnish reinforcements. Unless that Native army has since then been deteriorated to a very remarkable degree, I see no sufficient reason why it should not be left to cope with the requirements of the campaign on which it is entering in Abyssinia. We may be sure that the Bombay Government and Commander-in-Chief, who are in a better position to judge of the temper of their troops in connection with foreign service than we are, would not fail to make a timely representation if the drain on their army became administratively embarrassing, and meanwhile, I think the Bombay army may fairly be given its turn of active service and its advantages.

I have before said that the Madras army is the proper reserve of the Bombay army, south of the Nerbudda and exclusive of Scinde. If the Bombay Government, in the course of operations in Abyssinia, found the drain on their own army too great, the Madras army might furnish a couple of regiments for service beyond sea. It has served in China, Burmah, and elsewhere, and I am strongly in favour of utilizing these coast armies to the utmost before we draw more largely on our Bengal Native army for service beyond seas. It may at any moment have more on its hands than it is properly equal to, even when the augmentation shall have taken place.

As the Madras Commander-in-Chief could, during the absence of Sir R. Napier, place his head-quarters in easy communication with the Government of Bombay, the alleged dislocation of administrative arrangements involved in my suggestion is, I think, greatly exaggerated, whilst the advantage of enlisting, as it were, the interests and exertions of the Madras Commander-in-Chief and the Madras army in energetically and promptly supporting the wants and wishes of the Bombay Government with respect to active operations in Abyssinia are underrated. I must repeat that as yet the resources of the South of India are untouched, whilst we are stripping ourselves in the North of means that may at any time be wanted, and which we should have enhanced difficulty in replacing.

Scinde, as a Commissionership, can be as easily under the Punjab Government as under that of Bombay. There is less difference between the Belooch and the Afghan tribes on the Kohat or Peshawar frontier than between these latter and the Sikhs of the Manja, and certainly far less than between the Belooch and the people of the Bombay country proper. I hold,

therefore, that the differences of race between the Belooch and the Afghan tribes are no reasonable bar to our having one administrative head and one military command on the Indus frontier; and the fact that it was proposed in 1848 and then declined is to my mind no proof that it has not now become expedient, and may be any day necessary. It was hardly necessary in 1848 to advocate a complete system of railways from Kurrachee to Lahore and Peshawar, yet I maintain that, under existing circumstances, this has become a desideratum of national importance, and one that cannot be too early and thoroughly executed if we are to maintain with our small military force indisputable command of the Indus Frontier and Afghanistan.

My general concurrence in the despatch addressed to the Bombay Government has to be qualified, therefore, by the views expressed in these two minutes on the advisability of making all the use we can of the coast armies, drawing as little as possible from our Bengal army. If Sir R. Napier, upon whom the responsibility of the expedition has been laid, feels that he can carry out to a successful issue the campaign in Abyssinia with Bombay troops without inconvenience to the Bombay Government, or disturbance of the temper and content of the Bombay army, and without more seriously drawing on Bengal troops, he, from a broad military and political point of view, adopts a course favourable to the general security of India.

XXXIV.

MINUTE ON THE CONNECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WITH
THE PRESIDENCY BANKS. DATED THE 13TH JULY, 1867.

The question, whether it be expedient to maintain the existing relations of the Government with the Presidency Banks in the capacity of a shareholder, is one, in India, of a practical rather than of a theoretical character. As far as the science of Banking, as developed in a great commercial country like England, is concerned, the tendency has no doubt been adverse to the continuance of any exclusive privileges from Government in favour of Banking Companies. Theoretically, therefore, the views ex-

pressed by the Right Honourable Mr. Massey would probably meet with pretty general acceptance. Even in England, however, these theoretical principles have not been there carried out. On the contrary, though in 1826 Lord Liverpool expressed an opinion, with respect to the extension of the term of the exclusive privileges of the Bank of England, very similar to the opinion now expressed by Mr. Massey with reference to the inexpediency of the continuance of the privileges of the Presidency Banks, yet in 1833 Lord Althorp continued the Bank of England Charter with all its exclusive privileges, and the Act of 1844, though it modified some, conferred other privileges. Whatever the theory and science of Banking may say, therefore, the practice even in England has been to admit the expediency of privileges in favour of the Bank with whom Government deals.

That Government in India is a shareholder in the Presidency Banks may be a vitally valuable privilege to those institutions, still, so far as the principle involved is at stake, it is only a question of degree of privilege as compared with those enjoyed by the Bank of England; and it is a privilege in right of which the Indian Government can legitimately exercise a power of control which circumstances render indispensable here, whereas in England no such necessity exists. The attention of every Banking establishment in Great Britain is continuously fixed upon the working and measures of the Bank of England; the whole kingdom and an enlightened and vigilant Press watch its every move, and compare its action with the Bank of France and other European State Banks; but in addition to this professional scrutiny of rival Banks at home and abroad, and the keen criticisms of a watchful Press, the Bank of England is subject to periodical inquisitions of a very searching and able kind before Committees of the House of Commons and House of Lords. Under such circumstances, vast as are the interests—the national interests—involved in the procedure of the Bank of England, the Home Government would gain nothing by having Directors of its own sitting in the Bank parlour. Considering the nature of Party Government, the responsibility of the Bank management would probably be weakened by the introduction of Government Directors, and by Government becoming a shareholder.

How much the reverse of all this is the case in India hardly requires demonstration. Our European mercantile community has nothing of the permanence of the great firms of England,

but is for ever changing. Its numbers are few, and the amount of capital they represent, moderate. Last year thinned the Banking firms. The few that weathered the difficulties of 1866 did so more or less by the aid of the Presidency Banks at critical moments, and, at the best, they are very far from holding that position or commanding that influence which the Banking establishments of Great Britain enjoy with regard to the Bank of England. The general European community is small, and the Press which represents it is very limited, and with one or two exceptions evinces more ability in the discussion of other subjects than money or banking questions. In a word, as compared with England, the European public which the Press represents being mainly that of the Presidency towns, it is only necessary to refer to a census to see what proportion it bears to the population of an ordinary English borough. Need it be pointed out that India has no House of Commons or House of Lords to engage, whenever a question of fact and practice, or of principle, is mooted, in those searching investigations which every now and then occupy both Houses with respect to the Bank of England, and ventilate every financial question bearing on its action, its functions, and its privileges. The absence of all these potent allies to the Home Government in scrutinizing perpetually the proceedings of the Bank of England, forces the Government of India to substitute in their place Government Directors representing in the Presidency Bank parlour, not only the interests of Government as a shareholder, but those higher principles and considerations which find expression in England in the authoritative voice of a representative Government, a vigilant moneyed interest, and an intelligent public and Press of vast power and influence. It may be comparatively a weak substitute, but it is the only one practically at our disposal, and, with the exception of the Bombay Bank, it has worked well and safely. In the absence of any available and efficient mode of replacing the existing system of control, I am opposed to shaking the credit of the Presidency Banks and the confidence of shareholders by any change, more especially by such a change as an auditor* system involves, when combined with the withdrawal of Government from a positive right of timely interference in consequence of ceasing to be a shareholder.

Of the importance which is attached to Government maintaining its existing relations with the Presidency Banks, we have

* Post audits are futile where Government cannot recover improper issues.

proof in the present position of affairs at Bombay. It is notorious that the reconstruction of the Bombay Bank has no chance of success, unless Government pledge itself to continue to the reconstructed Bank the existing relations. Accordingly, that portion of the Press which is the organ of the reconstruction scheme, endeavours to make out what, as far as my information goes, is contrary to fact, viz., that the Government has expressed its readiness to maintain existing relations with the reconstructed Bank, if the Bank of Bombay be resuscitated from its present collapse. On the other hand, that part of the Press which advocates the amalgamation of the Bengal and Bombay Banks taxes the Government of Bombay, whose preference for the reconstruction is well known, with having, by its letter No. 787 of the 1st July, 1867, adopted a course fatal to the amalgamation, as in the face of the words, "it by no means follows that it would be thought expedient to extend to an amalgamated Bank concessions which might be necessary in the case of the reconstruction of the existing Bank," it is certain that the shareholders of the Bank of Bengal will abandon at once all negotiations on the subject of amalgamation, and leave Bombay to find her own way out of the mess into which she has fallen. Both schemes, therefore, are represented by their respective advocates to depend entirely on the declaration Government may make with regard to the extension of existing relations, or the reverse. Both schemes will fail and fall through if Government pronounce its intention of severing its connection with the Presidency Banks.

The effect of such an announcement would not, however, be limited to the abandonment of these two rival schemes, for it would operate most perniciously on the Madras and Bengal Banks; and it hardly seems expedient, just at the time that public confidence and public credit are rallying from the panic of 1866, to strike so depressing a blow at the two Banks which have carried us securely and successfully through the crisis of 1866, and to do so in behalf of theoretical views which, however much in unison with the pure science of banking, have never been practically carried out to their full extent even in England, and are certainly too far advanced for the circumstances of our position in India.

Mr. Massey adverts to the protest, a copy of which I append to this Minute, in which the claims of the shareholders of the Bombay Bank to indemnity at the hands of Government are

advanced. I concur with much that Mr. Massey notes in the paragraph which closes with this advertence, and I also agree with the doubt which my Right Honourable Colleague expresses whether such a claim can be sustained; but, however undesirable for the Government to be placed in such a position, it might, in my opinion, be placed in a far worse, if, trusting its cash balances to Presidency Banks, it parted with its real close-supervision and control. The remedy to the evil which has befallen the existing system appears to me to have a searching inquiry into all that brought about the collapse of the Bombay Bank. Were such an investigation rigorously carried out, and its results made public, it would prevent any recurrence of the culpable neglect with which the conduct of the Bombay Government Directors has stained the system. They at any rate were, or ought to have been, independent, and their votes and action could not have clashed with other interests and speculations, with which they had no excuse for being largely engaged, whatever may have been the case with others. To gloss over transactions which are as yet wrapped in a sort of fog, is more discreditable to Government than Colonel Pelly's protest. I am in favour of a thorough scrutiny.

My object in first moving in favour of a State Bank was partly the wish to resuscitate credit in one of our chief mercantile centres, Bombay, which appeared to me practicable, as I still think it, by the amalgamation of the Bengal and Bombay Banks, partly that I think a State Bank preferable to existing arrangements. If the Presidency Banks were really as independent as the Bank of France is of the Bank of England, I could understand the arguments in favour of three State Banks instead of one; but no one who is conversant with the actual working of our system can for a moment be deceived by this style of reasoning in favour of independent State Banks at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. One State Bank is, in my opinion, much safer and much more manageable than three. I carry this so far that, if the connection between the Government of India and the Presidency Banks is to be severed by withdrawal on the part of Government from the rights and position of a shareholder, then I consider that the proper course to pursue is to revert to Government being its own banker, and to Government keeping in its own hands all currency arrangements as to issue of notes, reserves of coin, &c. There will be no safety in any intermediate system which supersedes positive and timely control by post-audits, and wipes away the

confidence of the great mass of shareholders by placing them at the mercy of directors whose individual interests are very far from being always those of the Bank, the employment of whose capital and credit rests on their discretion, and over whom, circumstanced as the bulk of shareholders undeniably are, the effective check and control of the latter is purely nominal. The various attempts to frame legislative enactments in England with the view of establishing some sort of control over Joint-Stock Companies, proves how severely the license they enjoy has been found prejudicial to the interests of the general community in Great Britain, and how anxious the lawyers and statesmen of England have been to devise a remedy. The argument based on the fact that the Indian Bank failures were proportionately fewer in India than in England, only proves the exceeding value of the stability of the Presidency Banks, based on the existing Government connection, which enabled the Presidency Banks to aid and support any banking or other firms whose business was on sound and not on speculative foundations. I deprecate handing over the public credit, so to speak, to Joint-Stock Companies in India uncontrolled by Government supervision—it is more dangerous to us in India than it is in England; and if we are to part with the only really timely security we have, in deference to the theory of the science of banking, then I think it imperative that Government should be its own banker, and revert to the system of having a State Bank clear of all Joint-Stock shareholders or relations.

XXXV.

MINUTE ON A PROPOSED SUCCESSION DUTY. DATED THE 11TH
SEPTEMBER, 1867.

I doubt if any one acquainted with the law and practice of inheritance among Hindoo and Mussulman populations, or conversant with the social status and habits of the different races and classes of India, would regard as anything but chimerical the levy of a Succession Duty. Such a tax would have almost insurmountable practical difficulties to contend with, if honestly and fairly applied, and it would enjoy but one facility, namely, an extreme facility in creating discontent wherever imposed.

I concur generally with the views expressed in the minute of the Governor-General, and am not at all in favour of attempting to recruit our revenue receipts by recourse to a Succession Duty on either real or personal property.

Nor do I except Bengal Proper on account of the advantages enjoyed by the landowners under the permanent settlement. The fact that so large a share of the rental of the land has by that settlement been left in their possession, appears to impose greater obligations than can be discharged to Bengal Proper by its wealthy zemindars by the occasional incidence of a Succession Tax. Something more than this is advisable, and is a positive duty, both on the part of Government to enact, and of the zemindars to pay. In the end the value of their estates would be largely increased if the system of internal communications in Bengal Proper were made what it ought to be, and not left what it is, about the worst in India.

XXXVI.

MINUTE ON THE NEW FORM OF RAILWAY CONTRACTS. DATED THE
20TH SEPTEMBER, 1867.

*Contract with Indian Branch Railway Company for Railways in
Oudh and Rohilkhand.—General Terms of Contracts granting
Guarantees of Interest to Railway Companies.*

The despatch from the Secretary of State, No. 18 of the 23rd March last, intimating the negotiations with the Indian Branch Railway Company, is a practical admission that English capital will not embark upon the construction of railways in India without a guarantee of interest from the Government of India. Native capitalists having uniformly held back from becoming shareholders in these undertakings, and having even retrograded from last year's proportion of being a little over to that of being below one per cent., India must look exclusively to England for the capital necessary for any extension and completion of her railway system, and must be content to obtain it on the best terms as to the rate of guarantee that can be secured in the English money-market.

This financial disadvantage under which India labours in the construction of its railways is, however, compensated by the right which it confers upon the Government of guarding the interests of Indian as well as those of the English shareholders. As the payment of guaranteed interest is a charge on the revenue raised from the people of India, not upon the capital raised by the English shareholders, the Government of India occupies a different position with respect to Indian Railway Companies, from the position in which the Home Government stands with respect to Railway Companies in England. Though a truism, it is necessary to note the fact, for it explains the diametrically opposite results of the two systems, and also the utterly different obligations under which the Home and the Indian Governments, as well as the shareholders of the two distinct systems, lie.

The basis of the English system was private enterprise and competition; in other words, speculation but partially and very inadequately controlled by the authority of Parliament, which at first thought the British railways such profitable investments, that it was provided by legislative enactment, that when dividends amounted to 10 per cent. it was at the option of the State to take over the lines. Regarded almost, if not quite, in the same light as other Joint-Stock Companies, and being well represented in Parliament, however ruinous the extent to which rivalry and unremunerative expenditure was carried, and however destructive to the interests of the original shareholders of many of the Lines the speculative mania of their directors, Government possessing no direct and incontestable stake in these adventures, its interference was in effect paralyzed by the prevalent principle of allowing free scope to private enterprise so long as prior rights and claims of opposing companies were not seriously infringed.

Hence it ensues that there is justice in the remark, that whatever the faults directors may have committed, they have done nothing without the deliberate approval of Parliament, and that the whole of the ruinous procedure of those Railway Companies now in a state of collapse, was carried on under the formal and solemn sanction of Parliament.

Competition and speculation of this dangerous character has no chance of support where the direct revenues of Government are so deeply pledged as is the case with the Indian system of Guaranteed Railways. As no one can reasonably contest the immense pecuniary stake of the Government in the success of the Indian railways, so no one can call in question the right or the wisdom of

the Government of India in so adjusting lines, and controlling expansion of branches, as that it shall carefully eschew the fatal errors which are now depressing to a ruinous extent the value of some 400 millions of property in Great Britain, and that, too, at a period when the Bank of England rate being 2 per cent., and the market rate $1\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., there should be no difficulty in the way of sound Railway Companies obtaining accommodation under most favourable conditions.

The inference that may be legitimately drawn from the contrast of these two systems is, that, as the ruling principles which lie at the root of both are wholly distinct, there is a very wide difference, and but very faint analogy, between the positions of the Home and the Indian Governments with regard to Railway Companies. From the nature of the compact, which saddles its resources with the payment of guaranteed interest, and the gift of land free of charge, the Government of India incurs much greater risk and far heavier responsibilities than fairly fall on the Home Government; and further, its own special risks are greatly aggravated by the fact that, practically speaking, neither the shareholders nor the directors, all resident in England, can effectively supervise or control railways in India. Government thus is answerable at the bar of public opinion, not only for the protection of the interest of the Indian taxpayer, who provides the guaranteed interest and the land as a donation, but also that the indifference of shareholders secured 5 per cent., and too remote to watch and control the expenditure of their capital, shall not by rendering Indian railways a byword for scandalous extravagance and mismanagement, check the flow of British capital to these important public works.

It is hardly necessary, in addition to the foregoing essential differences of primordial conditions to dwell on the political and military considerations which still further draw a strong line of demarcation between the Indian and the English systems. In England, railways do not run through States in various degrees of dependence, claiming under treaties complex territorial and suzerain rights, which even the international laws of Europe are not conversant with, and which the compact United Kingdom is absolutely free from; nor in Great Britain, sea-girt and comparatively homogeneous in its population, can the State be said to be liable to the same military contingencies, internal and external, as are unfortunately indissoluble from the accidents of our rule in India. To dwell upon these, also a truism, though one pregnant with dangers, would demand far more space than is consistent with

the limits of this Minute. It must suffice to advert to these major considerations in a manner very inadequate to their real importance, still more inadequate to the correction of their exceedingly imperfect conception by the British public in England, but to the momentous importance of which the Secretary of State and his Council must be so fully alive, that any expatiation upon them would appear almost a work of supererogation. Dismissing them briefly in the confidence that their very magnitude precludes their being ignored with ignorant and presumptuous indifference, I feel confident that no mere insular prejudice will deem them of ideal or exaggerated moment. Yet, I may, perhaps, be here excused for repeating what I have more than once found it advisable distinctly to state, namely, that at best what we designate peace in India, is and must be a state of armed vigilance.

Under the combined considerations of our political and military status, of the responsibilities which press upon the Government from the system of guaranteed interest as opposed to that of the English system of competition and speculation in the very midst of a plethoric abundance of local capital, I can hardly conceive any one contesting the fact that the right of the Government of India to exercise an effective control over Indian railways is a far more imperative right, and one much more inherent in, and inseparable from its condition, as also infinitely more a paramount necessity, than the intervention of the British Parliament in the affairs of British railways. I therefore concur with the principle which underlies the Minute of the Governor-General, that the Government of India must exercise, not a shadowy and nominal, but a stringent and effective control over the distribution of lines of railway, over their projected works, and over their management and expenditure. In short, I hold the opinion that it is, and should continue to be, the deliberate policy of the Government of India to act on the broad principle that a public monopoly of the magnitude of Indian railways must remain in public, not slip into private hands; must be administered for the progress and welfare of the general public as well as for the profit of the Railway Companies; and that these all-important objects can only be secured by the active, efficient, authoritative control of the Government of India. With the example before us, of the hopeless state into which private enterprise has sunk 400 millions of British railway capital, it would be little short of insanity to pursue such a precedent and to apply it to Indian railways. We see that even where

it was the question of buying up English railways, involving the purchase by the State of between four and five hundred millions of capital, that remedy was gravely considered and rejected ultimately on grounds which have no application whatever to Indian railways. Whereas in the case of the Irish railways, the conditions of the question were different, and the purchase by the State was a matter of twenty millions instead of four or five hundred millions. Two of the Commissioners—Sir Rowland Hill and Mr. Mansell—were strongly in favour of buying up the lines, and thus securing for Ireland an efficient and economical railway administration under Government control. The majority of the press in England, and that by far the best informed part of it, supported the views of Sir Rowland Hill and Mr. Mansell with regard to the State purchase of the Irish lines, because eagerly desired by the shareholders themselves, because it is a moderate financial transaction quite within the power of Government to effect without difficulty, and because Irish railways having been already aided by large advances from Government, and the system of subsidies having failed to secure the companies from insolvency, the logical issue of such a position of affairs was that Government should complete these transactions by buying up the lines. It is known that Government has since practically adopted the view of the minority of the Commission, and has introduced a Bill which is to empower the acquisition by the State of the whole system of Irish railways.

However insuperable the difficulties which present themselves to the amelioration by private enterprise of the state of insolvency into which the English and Scotch lines have fallen, it is palpable, that although the English and Scotch Railway Companies are averse to absorption by the State, and the Government shrinks from so stupendous a transaction as the compulsory purchase at a price fixed by arbitration of between four and five hundred millions of railway capital by the creation of five hundred million of stock, to the derangement and depreciation of existing Government securities, yet that the British public have no hope in the present helpless state of railway interests, but from the intervention of the aid of Government. Whatever form that assistance may take, the cry of the Press and the public will probably, before long, force the Government to devise some mode of aiding the railway interests to extrication from the existing ruinous depression, but we may, I think, feel certain that whatever the mode in which the Government may come forward to lend a helping hand to English and Scotch lines, this will only be done under

conditions of proper Government supervision of the working and resources of the aided lines, and of the exercise on the part of Government of restrictive powers, as to the construction of competing lines, or the development of unprofitable branches. In fact, there will be an approach, so far as feasible, to the Indian system which now forms a perpetual subject of contrast with the English system. Whilst money in the Stock Exchange is freely offered at $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., it is something marvellous, the state of paralysis and collapse into which the English and Scotch Railway Companies have fallen, and the circumstance is utterly condemnatory of the system based on uncontrolled private enterprise.

With this great national failing before us we are, I think, warranted—

- 1st.—In opposing any relaxation of the control of the Government of India over Indian railways.
- 2nd.—In arranging some mode by which in a term of years the Government of India shall effect the purchase of railway stock, and become the proprietor of the Indian railways.

So far from thinking that the control exercised by the Government of India has been excessive, and has proved prejudicial to the progress and efficiency of Indian railways, its interference as some check on profuse expenditure has been most wholesome so far as it went. Unfortunately, an interested outcry acting on an ill-informed public, had for a time too great an effect even on the Government itself, which shrank from supporting its Consulting Engineers in the discharge of their delicate and difficult duties. The public and the Press failed to see how deeply the interests of the community at large, and of the shareholders in particular, were bound up with the exercise on the part of Government of an effective and judicious control. The failures and disasters on the Great Indian Peninsular Railway could not, certainly ought not to, have occurred if the Government control and supervision had throughout, from the projects and estimates for the works to their construction and completion, been properly exercised. It is not necessary here to enter upon any discussion of the real causes that rendered Government control more slack on the Bombay side of India than in Bengal, and in the North-Western Provinces; but certainly the result proves that, however vexatious the interference of the Consulting Engineers and the Government may often have been regarded by the East Indian

railway local authorities, the public places far more confidence in the character and stability of the great railway works constructed by the East Indian, the Delhi, and Punjab Railways, as also by the Madras Railways, than it does in the case of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, and the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway; though the expenditure on the latter was enormous, and with respect to both lines the interference of Government was reduced to the minimum consistent with the obligations of Government.

From the preceding remarks it will, therefore, be manifest that I entirely agree with the views expressed by the Governor-General in the paragraphs of his Excellency's Minute, 18 to 29 inclusive.

Government powers of control must be strengthened, not weakened, and the bugbear of centralization, a convenient term for disparaging any measure tending to subject companies having public monopolies to public authority and effective control, must be treated as what it really is, a specious sophistry used as a veil for wasteful expenditure.

In the case of loans for remunerative Public Works, I advocated that no Public Works should be undertaken of which there was not a real prospect of their becoming self-supporting, besides accomplishing the gradual extinction of the loans, and I remarked that general taxation, applied to the advantage of localities is, under other conditions, hardly defensible, but that the objection might be removed by the establishment of a Sinking Fund, and making the loans repayable within a fixed period.

It is on the same principle that I advocate the gradual purchase by Government of railway stock, so that within a fixed period the Government of India may become the proprietor of Indian railways. It is a course calculated to give confidence to English capitalists; it is fair to the taxed Indian community; and ultimately it should prove profitable to the Indian Government.

On other points my opinions are so much in unison with those of the Governor-General, that it is unnecessary for me to enter into what would prove a parallel view of the provisions of the new contract, differing only on some minor details from his Excellency's remarks, and differing in no essential way even in such minor differences.

XXXVII.

- . MINUTE ON AFFAIRS IN CENTRAL ASIA. DATED SIMLA, THE 5TH
OCTOBER, 1867.

Since my Minute of the 5th February, 1867, on the projected occupation of Quetta, was written, nothing has occurred to lead me to modify the opinions therein expressed. Certainly the clamour of the Press, or rather of a part of the Press, both in England and in India, has in no degree shaken my conviction of the soundness of the views I then expressed. I say this without at all shutting my eyes to the military successes and rapid progress of Russia in Central Asia, and the unexplained assembly by Persia of a considerable force at Meshed, and of a smaller one in Seistan, contemporaneously with the negotiations which have passed between Ameer Shere Ali's son, his deputy at Herat, with the Persian authorities.

I do not pretend to believe that the advance of Russia through poor and difficult countries along the line it has taken, has no other significance than that of commercial enterprise in Central Asian regions. As little do I believe that Persia has ceased to covet the possession of Herat. Nor do I ignore the fact that the progress of Russia, the known subordination of Persia to Russian dictation, and the alleged overtures of Ameer Shere Ali to Russia and Persia, have made a considerable impression on the minds of our Native subjects in almost every part of India, not excepting our Native troops. But, provided we do not defer the obviously necessary precautionary measures which I have persistently and repeatedly urged, I view the attitude of Russia and Persia with respect to India without fear, or mistrust of our ability to cope with future contingencies.

We are, however, losing time, and also a favourable opportunity, in neglecting to take advantage of the present for the completion of the Indus frontier group of railways. I think it a mistake to have preferred the Rajpootana line of railway to the completion of the rail communication between Mooltan and Kurrachee, and between Lahore and Attock. I think both might be carried on; but if we are to restrict ourselves to one of the two out of financial considerations, then, instead of throwing upon either the

Baroda or the Great India Peninsula lines, whose permanent works and ways do not enjoy the confidence of the public, heavy additional traffic, I would on every ground, except immediate returns, prefer that the Indus lines be not left in a state of disconnection and comparative inutility.

At the same time the river communications should be perfected.

Under existing circumstances, it is impossible to foresee when, or how, we may be called upon to act on the Indus frontier, or beyond it. The important thing is, to have prepared before that time overtake us every means that can insure rapid and effective action either on or beyond the Indus.

Meanwhile, the true policy for us to observe is, to avoid all aggressive occupation of posts in advance of our present frontiers, and to cultivate as good an understanding with Afghan and Belooch rulers as possible. In a word, we should do nothing to excite their jealous suspicion of our power and motives; nor allow them to play on any weak apprehensions of Russia or Persia, in order to engage us as partisans in their fratricidal struggles for power.

Without disturbing the details of administration, Scinde should be subject to the Punjab Government, and thus come under the more direct control of the Government of India. I have elsewhere stated that it is anomalous that, on so important a frontier, we should be liable to have a different policy advocated in Scinde from that pursued at Peshawur; still more anomalous that the military force on the Lower Indus should be under the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, whilst the troops on the Upper Indus and its affluents are under the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal. One Government, one policy, and one command should watch over the frontier from the sea-board to Peshawur. There should, in these respects, be no more disconnection or isolation than in its railways.

XXXVIII.

MINUTE ON FINANCIAL DECENTRALISATION. DATED SIMLA, THE 7TH OCTOBER, 1867.

This scheme for the disintegration of the Imperial revenues in favour of the Local Governments is advocated on political and financial grounds which appear to me to be incorrect assumptions, and therefore to want all real practical solidity. Although I regret the circulation of the scheme as calculated to give more countenance to its entertainment than it merits, and as certain to evoke more or less of that clamour which the Government of India is said to be unable to resist, yet, unless much more potent reasons can be shown than any that have as yet been advanced, the replies of the Local Governments consulted, however backed by clamour, are not likely seriously to affect my own convictions on this important subject.

2. Without the smallest reflection on the high character of Local Governments, this is a matter upon which they cannot advise with impartiality. To men in authority, control of any kind is generally much more irksome than agreeable; but, perhaps, the least palatable of all is financial control, and any curb on profuse local expenditure. However temperately exercised, it is sure to produce more or less of irritation, and sometimes, as we have experienced, a good deal of active official resentment. Such a feeling does not unfortunately expire with a Governor's tenure of office; for it pervades the official circle in contact with him, and becomes a traditional sentiment of opposition to the Supreme Government, but too likely to be early and forcibly impressed on an inexperienced successor. The existence of such a traditional sentiment may be regretted, but can hardly be soberly admitted as a sufficient reason for a hasty subversion of a carefully elaborated financial system which, thanks to the labours of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Laing, is now first beginning to be properly worked and understood by every branch of the public service. Radical change under such circumstances is pernicious, and most inexpedient when wholly unnecessary.

3. Equally invalid appears to me the argument which, whilst dwelling on the ephemeral character of the Indian Government in

all its parts, applies that peculiarity especially to the Governor-General and the Government of India in contrast with the minor Local Governments. Manifestly this objection, which is inherent in our administrative system, is not confined to the Government of India; but, whether for good or for evil, is equally the brand of all our Local Governments. So likewise the vague charge of liability to "special crotchets" which is associated with the ephemeral nature of the Government of India. We certainly have witnessed instances of special crotchets falling in with popular fancies driven to much greater lengths in the case of Governors of minor Presidencies than in that of Governors-General; and, in one notorious case, the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood, showed that there was a limit to the patience of the Home Government in allowing an insubordinate Governor to contemn the authority of the Government of India. Although it is true that there are varying degrees of support given by successive Secretaries of State to the position and authority of the Governor-General in Council, and that, therefore, there may be corresponding degrees of callousness to the rebukes of the Supreme Government, that stage has hardly as yet been attained when disobedience to the Government of India is sure of impunity from the want of firmness or vigour at the India Office in support of the paramount authority in India.

4. As far as crotchets, especially popular crotchets, are concerned, the Governor-General, from the very constitution of his Council, is differently circumstanced from the Governors of subordinate Presidencies. Local Governments cannot be expected to prove free of local biases, and it is beyond their power of resistance not to be infected by whatever public fever of the moment may be plunging an influential local community into a wild career of speculation and extravagance. It is both easier and more popular to place itself at the head of such a movement, than to have the boldness to attempt to check or control it. On the contrary, what Mr. Mill observed in the debate on Mr. Ayrton's resolutions, is as applicable to the position of the Governor-General in Council, as to that of the Secretary of State in Council. "Gentlemen knew their own Presidencies, and those who were concerned in the administration of one had more or less prejudice against those who administered another. Those who were in Bengal knew less of Madras and Bombay than those who had access to the records of all the provinces, and were accustomed to deliberate upon and discuss them, and to write about them; and

so with regard to each of the provinces. A larger view of Indian affairs, less coloured by imperfect information and prejudice, was obtained by a Council comparing its opinions than would be found in any Presidency." Now, as the Legal Member, the Financial Member, the Commander-in-Chief, and ordinarily the Governor-General, are not Presidency men, and the three other Members are from different Presidencies and services, this dictum is fully as forcible in the case of the Governor-General's Council as in that of the Secretary of State. But more than this:—The Government of India has at its discretion that which the Secretary of State in Council has not, viz., the power of assembling wherever the Governor-General may think its presence desirable; and although this power has not as yet been exercised, except in ordinary course at the capital, Calcutta, and at Simla, that is, in the Bengal and in the Punjab Governments, yet it is provided for by Act of Parliament with an evident intention that so important an element of practical control should not be a dead letter. The Central authority in India has, therefore, in this respect, a more effective mode of active supervision than is enjoyed by the Secretary of State in Council.

5. All wars are, in a certain sense, a source of extravagance, as also, in an analogous sense, are a large class of great measures having the ultimate welfare and improvement of the country in view; and as the Local Governments have long ceased to engage, *proprio motu*, in all such great operations, whether of peace or war, measures of that importance and magnitude being in the hands of the Supreme Government, it is an incontrovertible truism that, if the Indian public debt be analysed, it will be found to have been mainly incurred through imperial, and not through local extravagance. To all who consider the growth and development of this Indian Empire from the state of mere commercial factories on the coast to its present dominion over the length and breadth of India as a huge mistake, if not worse, the process may, in a particular sense, be charged with extravagance; but a close comparison and investigation will satisfy any impartial mind that never was a conquest of equal magnitude effected, from a purely financial point of view, on such favourable and profitable terms; and that where a war, such as the Afghan War, has proved a profitless drain on our finances, and a severe blow to our fame, the calamitous adventure was due, not to the military crotchet of a Governor-General, but to the policy of the Home Government. To suppose that the dire necessity of war can be staved off by cur-

tailoring the resources of the Government of India for meeting and prosecuting war when imposed upon it by the force of circumstances, or the orders of the Home Government, appears about as rational a procedure as it would be to scuttle our iron-clads and dismiss our land forces, to prove to the world the sincerity of our peaceful intentions. If war, offensive or defensive, come upon us, no fanciful restraints due to an arbitrary distribution of revenue will make the difference of the fire of a single cartridge. War hangs on no such gossamer threads. As far as mere war crotchets are concerned, it is notorious that it has been due to the steady repression of the Government of India that the traditional policy of the Scinde frontier authorities, an advance through the Bolan Pass into Afghanistan, has not succeeded in committing us to an aggressive policy. From the time that Colonel Jacob first urged on Lord Canning action against Persia from the Scinde frontier, up to the present moment, it has been with difficulty, and only through the firmness of the Supreme Government, that the policy accepted without a murmur at Peshawur, and there honestly prosecuted in accordance with the instructions of the Governor-General in Council, has not been contradicted by the pursuit of a different policy on our Scinde frontier. War, moreover, is no longer in the discretion of the Governor-General, who is by Act of Parliament compelled previously to take the orders of the Home Government before an aggressive shot can be fired. If so solemn a provision of an Act of Parliament should ever fail to restrain a Governor-General, most certainly the delusive manacle of a fixed ratio of share of revenue to a minor Government must prove ludicrously inadequate to curb his martial ardour.

6. During my incumbency of the office of Foreign Secretary I had the opportunity for four years of watching the degree of interference exercised in that department over the expenditure of minor Governments. I recollect no single instance in which, under Lord Canning, Lord Elgin, or Sir J. Lawrence, the control of the Government of India was carried in financial matters, involving frequently considerations of much delicacy and difficulty, to an extent otherwise than salutary. Nor was there any question as to the effective character of the control. Since I have been a member of this Council, and have watched specially the proceedings in the Military and in the Public Works Departments, and have paid attention to the general questions involving expenditure in the Home and Foreign Departments, I cannot recall to mind any occasions in which the check of the Administrative Depart-

ment was uncalled for, or the final review and decision of the Financial Department not *primâ facie* right in principle. Decisions have been sometimes modified on further explanations; but the very necessity of having to furnish such explanations renders Local Governments properly careful in submitting proposals for increased charges. Strange to say, the Government that has been treated with the greatest liberality, if not laxity, by the Government of India is precisely that which has shown most disposition to evade, if not to oppose, the financial control of the central authority. There has been no difficulty in our financial relations with the Madras Government; on the contrary, with hardly an exception (one may cite, perhaps, the Police and the Godavery Works), nothing can have been more moderate and economical than the procedure of that Local Government. There has been no difficulty with Bengal, the Punjab, the North-Western Provinces, Burmah, the Central Provinces, or Oudh; on the contrary, all these Administrations, which have been much more stringently dealt with than Bombay, have evinced no impatience under, or repugnance at, the salutary control of the Supreme Government. Bombay alone has sought to turn away attention from numerous and, some of them, very gross cases of irregular and profuse expenditure by raising the cry of petty and vexatious interference on the part of the Government of India. Even the collapse of the Bombay Bank, owing to a purely local mismanagement, for which it is difficult to find terms of appropriate severity, was at one time gravely attributed to the dangerous interference of the Government of India; because Mr. Massey, when staking the treasure and credit of the Supreme Government in support of the imperilled Bombay Bank, called for precise information as to the real financial position of that institution. So far from thinking the control of the central authority to have been exercised in a manner too minutely critical and scrutinizing, I am strongly of opinion that the reverse has been the case with regard to Bombay; and I have always regretted that the untimely death of Lord Elgin prevented the adoption of a course which I more than once pressed on his attention, and the adoption of which he seemed disposed to entertain, namely, that six months should be passed in that Presidency in 1864 or 1865 by the Government of India. Such a visit might probably have resulted in a good deal not at the time palatable to the Bombay Government, though it might also have saved us from much that has subsequently happened. Be this as it may, however, I assert

confidently that at present there is absolutely no ground whatever for the allegation that the financial control of the Government of India goes to undue lengths in what it attempts, and miscarries miserably to the extent of the excess. On the contrary, any partial miscarriage of control in the solitary instance of Bombay, whose infractions of financial rules have been condoned by the Home rather than the Central Government, is no proof whatever that the rules are faulty, but that their relaxation is highly inexpedient, and that more rigid subordination to them should be enforced both by the Government of India and the Home Government. To subvert the financial control of the Central Government, because one out of nine Administrations has proved rather refractory, is about as sensible a procedure, to my mind, as to annul the Articles of War and the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, because a regiment should happen somewhat to misbehave. I venture to doubt the statesmanship of ruling either India or armies in this way.

7. I fail to see any analogy between English county expenditure or American State expenditure and that of Indian Local Administrations. Both systems are based on the theory and practice of the control of the people or their representatives. There is not a shadow of such control in the case of Indian Administrations. Even in municipal arrangements, except in a few places, the control of the people is a pure fiction; and even where it is not, as in Calcutta and Bombay, that result is already being experienced which is loudly complained of in almost all great cities in England and America. In Calcutta we have, in fact, long been engaged on a series of attempts to remedy the defects of local self-government; Bombay much the same, but rather worse. We are following in our experience very rapidly in the steps of London, and some of the chief cities of England, as also those of America. In France and the other great Continental States, not only the capitals, but all the cities and large towns, have more or less drifted from local self-government into something very different; though often, like our Municipal Committees in India, there remains a shadow and fiction of the defunct principle of local administration. If such be the case where there is a semblance of popular control over a municipality, as in Calcutta and Bombay, what can be expected where, as in the case of Local Governments, all control by the people is entirely ignored, and the only real practical control that remains is that of the Central Government?

8. I am not aware that any one advocates petty interference in a particular class of public works. I certainly do not, though I am in favour of a careful general control and supervision over all that class of important public works which are of such magnitude as to demand the increase of debt in the form of loans, guarantees, and the like. The only condition on which we can expect British capital to risk itself in the fertilization of India and in its general progress, is that capitalists shall have the security that the Imperial revenues are not to be frittered away to meet the caprice of Local Governments. Capitalists know well that centralization, with respect to the receipt and allocation of public means, is synonymous with economy, with a just distribution of available assets, and with a correct view of the relative wants of the different provinces of the empire. This is a duty which cannot be delegated to those not in a position to take a general as contradistinguished from a local view without at once shaking the confidence of capitalists. Practically they rely upon the Imperial revenues of India as a security for the money they embark; but if a sixteenth of that can be permanently alienated on such grounds as are now proposed, there is nothing to prevent the process being enlarged to an eighth, or a fourth, or a third. Indeed, we were candidly told that the permanent alienation of revenue might rise gradually from two and a half millions to fifteen millions; manifestly a general ratio, such as a sixteenth, contains no single element of reasonable satisfaction as to its permanence. It presents no financial principle whatever but that of opening a wide door for the demand of further alienations of Imperial revenue. No Government will be content, and, as the scheme provides for supplemental grants, strict adherence to the specified ratio will be impossible. The scheme will thus have diminished the means of compliance, at the same time that it stimulates the demand for large assignments. The diminution of friction will be altogether ephemeral, if indeed there be any; for we have seen how at once Bengal, when consulted, claimed a larger ratio. With every augmentation of the ratio of alienation, the power of the Supreme Government will be curtailed in the adaptation of expenditure to real requirements. It will be more and more crippled, and less and less able to meet great emergencies. As financial control, too, passes from its hands, the reality of its power will evaporate; yet India must be governed; and as I have no faith in the Government of India by perpetually changing Secretaries of State at Westminster at the head of a

confederacy of Local Governments and Administrations, in supersession of a Government of India on the spot, I greatly deprecate the reduction of the authority and power of the Governor-General in that essential, not only of all power, but of all good government, the effective control of the Imperial revenue.

9. Mr. Lushington's note, which is, in my opinion, a very sound exposition of the existing system, renders it unnecessary for me to analyze the scheme now proposed in greater detail, as I had intended. I concur with the Governor-General in most of the observations contained in his Excellency's Minute, and therefore abstain from mere recapitulation.

XXXIX.

MINUTE REGARDING ENGINEER OFFICERS IN INDIA. DATED THE
12TH OCTOBER, 1867.

I concur with the Secretary, Colonel Dickens, in the necessity of forcibly bringing to the notice of the Secretary of State the difficulties under which the Department of Public Works labours, in consequence of the supply of Engineer Officers having practically ceased. I do not, however, agree with Colonel Dickens in the suggestion he has thrown out, as a sort of *pis-aller*, the appointment of a committee to consider, in fact, the mode of working out Sir W. Denison's scheme, for I regard that scheme as based on a misapprehension both of our position and of our requirements in India, and on a misapplication of principles which, however suited to the great Military monarchies of Europe, and somewhat dubiously so to England and its Colonies, are especially unfitted to the circumstances under which we are placed in India.

To establish this normal fact, I must glance at an essential difference between the military policy which has hitherto guided us in India, and that which prevails in the Military monarchies of Europe. In both cases, it may be broadly asserted, without fear of contradiction, that necessity imposes the distinctive lines of policy.

The frontiers of the great Continental States of Europe are studded with strong fortresses occupying vital points of strategical importance, whether for offensive or defensive warfare. On some

frontiers these fortresses are numerous, and the rôle they have played, and may again play in the course of campaigns, is very considerable. Besides frontier fortresses, most, if not all, of the great Military monarchies find it necessary to have some of their chief cities in the heart of their territories very strongly fortified; and, in addition to this, their chief ports are elaborately provided with the most powerful and costly works to secure them against Naval as well as Military enterprise. Their armies are large, and can man their fortresses adequately, both in peace and war. Ample accommodation for these large armies has to be provided both in open and in fortified places. Under such circumstances, there is ample purely Military occupation for the Officers of Engineers in time of peace. With respect to England, the case is somewhat different; except on her coast, chiefly at her Naval dockyards, she has few fortresses or forts; and even in her Colonies she has not many, though some of them are very important ones. The accommodation for troops is scattered, dispersed, in fact, all over the globe; so that, one way and another, she has some occupation on purely Military Works for her Engineer Officers, though, as a rule, it is proverbially light, and often so unimportant as to amount to a waste of highly trained officers on a class of works which could be every whit as well done by a cheaper instrumentality.

In India we have very few forts of any consequence. In fact, our defensive works are confined to affording security against such Naval attacks as hostile squadrons might attempt on two or three of our Indian ports. On the frontiers we have no fortresses at all, for a few posts in petty fortlets on our North-West frontier do not deserve to be specially mentioned. They are mere out-posts intrenched for security. Our occupation of the Empire from north to south and east to west does not depend on defensive works at all, but on a Military superiority, prepared at all times to take the field at once, and crush opponents. We have no great monarchies to contend with internally, nor externally have we any of those threatening masses of organized and well-equipped Military strength which impose a necessity on European States to fortify strongly the key-points of their respective territories. On the contrary, our defensive posts, such as they are, have in view the security of the sick and the families, whilst the troops are set free to act on the offensive. Our arsenals even, except Fort William and Allahabad, are content either with the *enceinte* of Native forts, or, as at Ferozepoor, with little more than a strong fieldwork trace. In a word, our military policy

is not that of depending on defensive works, for which we could not spare troops, but on an active offensive. We have, therefore, very little scope for the employment, in any number, of Engineer officers on permanent fortifications, or other purely military works. The construction of barracks now in progress is exceptional, and will come to a close in three or four years. If, therefore, the necessity for Engineer officers is to be measured by the number for whom regular employment on permanent military works can be found, and by the number required for the Sappers and Miners, we want very few in India.

But here, I think, lies the great error of Sir W. Denison's scheme. The mere fact that we do not trust for our hold of the country on permanent fortresses, does not diminish the necessity for a large available supply of military engineers whenever internal or external operations on any scale become inevitable. On the contrary, the very smallness of our forces, and the circumstances under which they take the field, render it more than usually imperative that there should be no lack of officers qualified by their professional training to afford the troops the aid which the resources and expedients of the military engineer may be able to afford them. For instance, in 1856, any one adopting Sir W. Denison's mode of providing military engineers for the Bengal Presidency would have left the Bengal Army with a total of establishment strength one-third fewer officers than were actually killed, wounded, and put *hors de combat* in 1857. I need hardly advance a stronger practical instance of the utter inadequacy of Sir W. Denison's scheme for the requirements of India: for it must not be supposed that the expenditure of engineer officers in the course of the various operations in 1857 was at all excessive or disproportionate to the ordinary casualties of siege, defence, or field operations.

The radical error of Sir W. Denison's scheme is, that there is no proportion between our peace-requirements of military engineers, and our war-demand for such officers; and that to make the peace-requirements the basis of calculation is tantamount to securing thorough inefficiency in time of war in a branch of the service where failure involves more than ordinary disgrace as well as disaster. From a military point of view it is essential that we have available in the country a large supply of Engineer officers ready for any emergency in the field, though our military policy, and our mode of garrisoning India, is not of that kind that can find in time of peace purely military employment for this body of

available scientific officers. Our Indian system, therefore, has been to utilize them to the utmost in time of peace, and certainly experience has satisfactorily proved that in time of war they were none the less efficient, because, accustomed to great charges and heavy responsibility, their intelligence had not been allowed to rust in the discharge of petty and narrow duties during long intervals of peace. Whether they failed or succeeded in war I leave to facts and history to speak. I do not know with whom it rests that the Home Government has failed to send out the number of subaltern Engineer officers who are required for India by the Department of Public Works. I can scarcely suppose that, considering that the Government of India pays for the Engineer officers employed in this country, the British Government would deliberately relinquish so fine a field for the more enlarged employment of Royal Engineers, unless they are persuaded to endorse with their approval the very restricted view of Sir W. Denison. As far as the interests and the general efficiency of the corps of Royal Engineers is concerned, it will hereafter be a matter of serious regret, both to India and to England, if so contracted a view be taken of Imperial interests. I venture to think that employment on our great works of irrigation, on the supervision and extension of railways, on a variety of large Civil and Marine Works of different kinds, on our Trigonometrical and other Surveys, in our various Secretariats, and on our frontier and other campaigns, is not a bad school, and that few great countries alive to their own interests would neglect such opportunities of forming a body of Engineer officers with wide and varied experience, and good convertible intellects, fit for any duties that the State saw proper to entrust to them.

Of course, if the Home Government is not prepared to replace the old corps of Indian engineers, now fast passing away, recourse must be had to other devices. If I may judge by the results which have as yet attended the substitution of the competitive system of young civil engineers for young military Engineers, neither economy nor efficiency nor, what is all-important in India, the tone and character of the Department of Public Works will fail of rapid deterioration. The military officers in that Department, whether of the Engineers, the Artillery, or the Staff Corps, impart to it their habits of discipline and subordination, and the high principle which has been a distinctive attribute of men who have not graduated in the school of the home system of civil engineers, contractors, &c. Whatever the causes, there is a different senti-

ment as to what is due to the public service, to Government, to superiors, to punctilious probity, between men who can be arraigned before a court-martial and tried on charges of conduct unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, and those who cannot be so called to question. I do not for a moment deny that highly honourable men are to be found among the purely civil members of the Department of Public Works; but what I do assert is, that the Department is incalculably benefited by that which no mere money value represents in this country, and of which the natives are very keen appreciators, the feelings, conduct, and position of gentlemen. I would not be misunderstood to mean that the fear of courts-martial imbues officers with more delicate sentiments of subordination, probity, &c., but that the profession in which the tone of feeling is pitched so high as in the British army, where conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman is hateful to the service, is a profession which, when its members are in any force in a Department, give a tone to the conduct and principles of its officials, which is all-important where men must be trusted as they are in India. I repeat that there is no estimating the value of this element, and that the Government of India will only awake to its sterling importance when, which I trust may not occur from any present short-sighted and contracted measures, it shall have irrecoverably disappeared. I look to the Royal Engineers to replace my own old corps, and those of Madras and Bombay; and I am advocating Imperial interests when I deprecate the desertion of this noble field by a class of officers alike valuable in peace and war.

I would earnestly call the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that this is not a question of military precisionism; not a mere War Office question,—but a broad question of administrative and executive efficiency.

Let it be remembered that Mr. Massey's Budget-Estimate for 1866-67 anticipated an expenditure in the Department of Public Works amounting to £5,770,000, or nearly six millions sterling, and that we cannot expect a lower expenditure in 1867-68. On the contrary, in after years, as the expenditure on barracks decreases, the development of irrigational works cannot fail to entail a correspondingly increasing expenditure on reproductive works.

Let it be remembered also, that the estimated expenditure on railways for 1867-68 is $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions, exclusive of that of the Branch Railway Company which has just been granted a Government guarantee on $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions sterling. Also that of the estimated

amount for sanctioned lines, 88 millions sterling, about 68 millions have been advanced for expenditure, leaving 20 millions still to be expended; and that other lines are under consideration, involving a capital of 18 millions more, so that we may anticipate a future expenditure of 38 millions on this class of works.

Now, I would ask especial attention to the fact that the Department of Public Works is entirely responsible for the expenditure of the six millions on civil and military works; and that on the character of that Department, for its probity as well as its professional ability, will depend whether the 6 millions accomplish its proper amount of work, or only a half or two-thirds what it ought to complete.

Again, we owe it to the check and supervision of our consulting engineers that there has not been greater profusion and extravagance in railway expenditure than has taken place; and that, with some rather glaring exceptions, the 68 millions have not been profitlessly squandered, but so spent that the British capitalists have confidence in our system of Indian railways, and they are beginning to realize receipts exceeding the 5 per cent. guaranteed interest. When we compare this result with the collapse of some 500 millions of railway capital in England I think it will be allowed that I am borne out by facts in the assertion that this is not a mere War Office question of military organization on sapper and miner principles, but a very large administrative question. I do not hesitate to say that it is difficult to calculate what India on this point owes to the exertions, temper, and judgment of its Engineer officers, from the time the system began, under the supervision of Colonel Baker, up to the present moment, through a series of able and honourable men, who, though sometimes very indifferently supported, have done, and are doing, their best to protect the real interests of the public, the shareholders, and the Government they serve.

In India, when military works are finished, such as barracks, hospitals, &c, we consider it a waste of valuable officers to put the mere ordinary conservancy and petty repairs under the charge of Engineer officers. When such works are completed they pass into the charge of the Barrack-Master's Department, under the Quarter-Master General of the Army; and it will be observed by a reference to the Army List, that neither among the 1st nor the 2nd Class Barrack-Masters is the name of a single Engineer officer to be found. According to Sir W. Denison, they ought all to be Engineer officers. Here we have a touchstone of the essential

difference of the two systems. In India we have better use for the talents of our Engineer officers, and do not waste them on what can be just as well done by an instrumentality more easily obtained.

I regard the seconding of Engineer officers merely as an expedient, by partially but arbitrarily conforming to Home prejudices and practice, to obtain an increase to the numbers which are strictly available according to the allotted strength of brigades, such establishment strength being very much too small for our requirements. But any degree of seconding is of no use if young officers, by which I mean subalterns, are not sent out to fill up both the establishment strength and the seconding process as it takes place.

It is no use sending out officers of high rank and formed habits. Men must train and fit and adapt themselves to Indian service; officers cannot step into places of responsibility and importance without an apprenticeship to the country. They must break in to the real hard work of the Indian system, and rise gradually to posts of trust and importance. If they cannot face the period of apprenticeship it is of no use their coming out.

Anything like a compulsory return to English, as contradistinguished from Indian, service should be avoided. It may very safely be left optional to them to hold on to the country, or to leave it. By the time they have been seven or eight years in the country the decision might safely be left to themselves.

If we ever return to a local army we might return to the Indian Corps of Engineers, but not otherwise. India is an immense field, and the best school we have for forming, in time of peace, our officers of every branch, and more so for the Engineers, if the Home Government will open its eyes to the fact, than for any other branch. But then I regard, and always have regarded, the Engineer portion of the military establishment of an empire as essentially the connecting link between the scientific progress in civil life in all civil engineering in its numerous phases of experimental philosophy and practical application, and the growing imperative necessity of saturating the military element with every progressive advance in the command over physical powers. I do not exclude the other branches from this necessity of keeping pace with the progress of invention, for war necessitates the use of all successful advance in physical discovery and science; but it is specially the function of the military engineer to graduate equally in civil and military science, and he is only of use on service in

proportion as he has mastered both, whilst he can only master the one—civil engineering—by constant practice, and thus qualify for the other, which is accidental and exceptional, as war is the exception not the rule.

Of course, it must rest with the Home Government the view taken of this question, which, as far as India is concerned, is one of vast administrative and economical importance, and, to my mind and apprehension, anything but a mere narrow question of Sapper and Miner organization. In fact, this view of the matter is so new, and I hope I may be pardoned in so saying, so narrow, that I am painfully sensible of the extent to which I have weakened the broader considerations by endeavouring to combine them with what I confess I deem the very secondary and purely militarily derived aspects of the question, originally derived from military Continental monarchies, whose military and civil *status* and policy has hardly a single practical analogy with that of our position in India.

If the Home Government reject this invaluable field for its Engineer officers it will be time enough to turn our attention to other and inferior expedients; but until the Home authorities do so, and do so in definite and official terms, I think it premature to open up a chapter of vague suggestions, open to many inherent and radical objections. I would press upon the Home Government that this is a large administrative question, involving far higher interests, both to India and England, than conformity to the exemplar of the corps of British Sappers and Miners.

XL.

MINUTE ON HARBOUR DEFENCE. DATED THE 20TH FEBRUARY, 1868.

I concur generally with the despatch of the Inspector-General of Ordnance.

I do not care much whether the indent be for 9-inch rifled M. L. guns or 7-inch rifled Armstrong guns, provided that without delay a supply of efficient ordnance for the purpose in view be sent out rapidly with carriages, ammunition, shields, &c., complete.

I presume that the Bombay defences are being adequately pro-

vided for, as officers are specially charged with the important duty of early placing in a position of security that important harbour.

But provision must be made for the Hooghly, Mutlah, and Rangoon rivers; yet since my Minute of the 19th March, 1867, written nearly a year ago, little has been done to provide us with guns that shall ensure our vital points from insult and disgraceful operations. We are still at the mercy, in case of sudden war, of any petty hostile squadron, armed and cased as American, Russian, and French sea-going frigates of even light draught now are.

The indent must be for a sufficiency of heavy rifled ordnance, not only for the two batteries on the Hooghly, but also for an effective battery at Fort William, one on the Mutlah, and a powerful one at Rangoon. I would therefore augment the indent and double it.

But, judging from experience, we shall have so long to wait before anything is done that I strongly recommend the appointment of a Select Committee of scientific officers to carry on a series of experiments, so that in case of war we may have an organized system of torpedo defence for our Calcutta and Rangoon rivers. Major Trevor and Captain Wallace are two officers fit by their qualification to carry on such an inquiry, and I would add one or two intelligent young officers, so that we may have men conversant with the subject, and available in case of war.

The President of the Committee should be given a discretion to indent on the Arsenal and Marine Departments for all that was necessary, and should also be allowed to incur a moderate expenditure in carrying on the experiments.

Nothing is more dreaded, either by troops or seamen, than the destructive means of this kind of defence, which science places at the disposal of the attacked; and a hostile squadron, with no dockyards at hand in which to refit, would be careful how it encountered a system of defence which, where it fails utterly to destroy, hardly can fail to injure most dangerously.

Moreover, it is not a costly means of defence, though so formidable and destructive if rightly managed.

XLI.

MINUTE ON THE PROPER SEAT OF GOVERNMENT IN INDIA. DATED
THE 27TH FEBRUARY, 1868.

The Secretary of State has requested, in the 8th paragraph of his Despatch, that the important question on which he desires to receive the advice of the Governor-General in Council should be considered, as well from an Imperial point of view and on its bearings on the general government of India, as in relation to the effect it has upon the more limited question of the proper form of government for Bengal. Every one will, I think, feel the justice of this remark, and that the problem of the best government for Bengal can hardly be solved independently of the collateral questions, namely, whether Calcutta shall remain the seat of Government for the Government of India as well as for the Government of Bengal; and whether the Government of India shall be stationary or movable; tied to one spot or perambulatory; or migratory from one capital to another as an alternative metropolis.

2. Affecting these questions is the consideration that in the course of a century the British power has passed from a struggling and nascent state to undisputed supremacy over the vast territories which now compose British India. It has, in fact, attained the natural boundaries of the Empire; and having reached these obligatory limits, it has ceased to be aggressive, and is compelled, by its own high interests, to prefer the consolidation of its acquisitions to further barren and unprofitable conquests, beyond difficult frontiers. For the future, secure possession and undisturbed progress in the material prosperity of its dominions must be its main aim. The days of conquest in extermination of rival powers, or for the extension of territory, are over; and those State exigencies which formerly were a reason, especially when a Governor-General was Captain-General, for his presence (so to speak) in the field, have entirely ceased. Circumstances, therefore, present no sufficient reason for any departure from the systematic and deliberate form of administration which Parliament has, after long experience and mature consideration, ruled to be the best for the general government of India; on the contrary, the existing condition of India

removes all excuse for recourse to that exceptional mode of government, viz., by a Governor-General separate from his Council, which was only contemplated by Parliament as an extreme measure to meet extraordinary dangers.

3. At the same time, though circumstances are such as almost imperatively to prescribe an orderly and regular general administration, and consequently, it might be thought, are equally favourable to a stationary government, this is only partially the case, as the supervision and control of minor governments cannot sometimes be effectively carried out from a distance. My Minute of the 7th October, 1867, a copy of which I append, will explain at greater length the circumstances under which, I think, it may be sometimes absolutely necessary, in maintenance of its authority, for the Government of India temporarily to establish itself elsewhere than at Calcutta.

4. I can conceive circumstances arising in Europe which might also render it advisable, for the sake of rapid and early communication with England, that the Government of India should for a time be on the Western and not on the Eastern coast of this Empire. Even in connection with the Abyssinian difficulty, it might have been of advantage, had the Government of India early placed itself at or near Bombay. Events might happen on the Indus frontier to render its presence desirable in the Punjab; or great administrative questions may arise with respect to Madras and Bombay, which might render it expedient that the Government of India should for a time assemble in one or the other of those Presidencies.

5. It may be inferred from the foregoing that I deem it exceedingly undesirable to regard as permanent the practice adverted to in the 6th paragraph of the Despatch of the Secretary of State. So long as the Act of Parliament, which very properly sanctions such movements of the Government of India as are above contemplated, remains in force, the adjournment of the Government of India to Simla can only be regarded as accidental. For such a purpose it offers advantages. House accommodation is more abundant than at other Hill stations, and as some of these are now periodically occupied by Local Governments, the Government of India could not resort to them without creating great inconvenience. But though these may be considerations of some importance, when the visits to Simla are occasional and dependent on the health of the head of the Government, Simla, viewed as a permanent alternative metropolis, presents many most serious drawbacks.

6. If time be of any moment in the affairs of this world and age Simla would tie down the Government of India to the most unfavourable position that could well be selected with regard to postal and telegraphic communications. It is difficult to choose a point on the map of India that shall more successfully solve the problem of being as remote as possible from Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Kurrachee, and, of course, England. Whilst its position, three or four marches in the mountains, and on the left bank of the Sutlej, secures its being practically cut off from Lahore and the Punjab during the rains by the Sutlej and the Beas, and of course secures a maximum of delay in the postal and telegraphic communications with Lahore and Peshawur.

7. It is not, however, solely in the matter of postal and telegraphic communications that the position of Simla is objectionable. The annual migrations thither from Calcutta involve the loss of two months out of the twelve in the transaction of ordinary current business. From the time that the move from either end commences to the time that the Offices are re-assembled and work is again in full swing at the other Government terminus a month elapses. Thus for two months there is a *bonâ fide* paralysis of work. Besides this, however, another result ensues, which is very serious. For obvious reasons, the main part of the legislative work has to be got through in Calcutta, and the necessity of condensing into four or at the utmost five months, and those very busy months for the Executive Government, all that the Legislative Department may have to bring forward, puts a strain on all concerned, that is, in my opinion, unfavourable to the satisfactory consideration and execution of this very important part of the functions of Government. It has been argued that the result is, on the whole, advantageous, as a check is thus put on too active legislation, and that the two months of dislocation of Government Offices has also the beneficial effect of an enforced holiday, of a vacation much needed by the whole Government and its establishments, and a vacation that can be to some degree utilized, as affording an opportunity for assembling chiefs and holding *durbars en route*. There is some truth in these aspects of the question; but they can scarcely be admitted into serious consideration of the administrative question of the value of Simla as an alternative metropolis.

8. It was not until England possessed herself of Bengal that her progress to Empire in India was assured. From that time the issue was certain. It has been with Calcutta as the head-quarters

of the Government that British India has attained its present territorial completeness. We must remember the inestimable value to a maritime Power like England, holding India on the tenure she does, of an Indian capital with proper precaution almost unassailable from the sea, yet in easy communication with it; secure, as the commercial capital not only of a rich province, but of the great Gangetic Plain; and as a seat of Government presenting the advantage of being in the midst of a docile and industrious population, requiring themselves but a very moderate force for the insurance of general tranquillity, yet a province of incalculable value as a military base. Such a capital cannot be lightly thrown up, in deference to vague apprehensions as to its salubrity being inferior to that of other parts of India, apprehensions to which the residence of Lieutenant-Governors, Judges of the High Court, Bishops, a large body of European officials, and a still larger body of mercantile men, give a practical denial. Natives from the Upper Provinces nominated to the Legislative Council may, no doubt, be reluctant to quit their own climates and homes; but in their case the expense of living in Calcutta has fully more to do with this reluctance than any real fear of the mild but beautiful cold season, during which they attend in Calcutta. The fact is, that, from its proximity to the sea, the climate of Calcutta is much less an extreme climate on the score of heat than the climates of Allahabad, Agra, Delhi, and Lahore. It is absolutely certain that to change the seat of Government to any of these old capitals, or to any other site in the Plains of India, would signally fail to remove the cause of migrations to the Hills; it would intensify the desire to escape from the extreme of heat to a cool climate.

9. It will be understood, from what has preceded, that whilst I am of opinion that Calcutta must remain the seat of Government I am not in favour of fixing upon Simla as an alternative capital, nor of the annual migrations which such an arrangement involves. I think that the Governor-General in Council should establish himself, from time to time, in such places, and for such periods, as the exigencies of the public service may render advisable, but that these temporary transfers of the seat of Government should be regulated by other considerations than those of merely securing a cool climate; should, in fact, depend on great administrative and political reasons; and that purposes of good and effective government would be far better prosecuted by the Government of India remaining for a year, or even two, if necessary, in one place, than

by the constant dislocations of business inseparable from systematic migrations to and from Simla, or indeed to any other Hill station, from Calcutta. This view, however, is essentially allied with the fact that the Government of India has, in a great measure, ceased to be a purely executive Government, and that its functions are mainly those of exercising a general and an effectual control over the subordinate Governments and administrations, and a direct and positive control over the finances of India, and the general legislation for this vast Empire—a condition that can hardly be said to be fulfilled by its being half the year in Calcutta and half the year at Simla.

10. In reply to the first question, that put in the 12th paragraph of the Secretary of State's despatch, I should, therefore, say that, accepting the fact that no change can, or should at present, be made in the site of the capital of India, I am so far from recommending that Bengal should be placed under a government similar to that of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, that I should prefer seeing those presidencies made Lieut.-Governorships, and assimilated to the form of government which seems best for Bengal. Their native armies are so reduced that they cease to be a valid reason for either separate Commanders-in-Chief or distinct Governments. The Civil Services would remain as they are, and there would be no radical change in any part of the Civil Administration.

11. With regard to the questions put in the 13th and following paragraphs of the Secretary of State's despatch, I would reply that the only modifications which seem expedient in the form of Government for Bengal are—

1st. That the Lieutenant-Governor should have a Secretariat Council, *i.e.*, the Secretaries should, *ex-officio*, be members of his Council; but the Lieutenant-Governor should only convene them as an Executive Council when he deemed it advisable.

2nd. The Secretaries should, *ex-officio*, form part of his Legislative Council, which cannot with advantage be abolished, and takes off from the Legislative Council of the Government of India much that the latter body could not execute half so well, or rapidly.

3rd. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal has quite enough to do without attending as a member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, or as a member of the Governor-General's Legislative Council. He should be exempt from both.

4th. With respect to the question in paragraph 17, I think it

should be in the discretion of the Governor-General in Council to take up any local administration whatever; the Lieutenant-Governor then taking his seat in the Council of the Governor-General, but not his Secretaries. In this respect I would make no difference between Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, or the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab.

12. With respect to the question put in the 18th paragraph of the despatch of the Secretary of State, I think the law, as it now stands, far preferable. Any provision such as is sketched in the 18th paragraph would simply allow the Governor-General to pack his Council, and to avoid the responsibility under which he now lies, when away alone from his Council. It would defeat the whole object of a Council and be a premium on prolonged absences from the seat of Government, on prolonged suspensions of regular and orderly administration of affairs, and on unnecessary migrations. There might be circumstances of great and sudden emergency, though I have rarely known them, which warranted a Governor-General proceeding from the seat of Government alone, without his Council; but then it is essential that, under such exceptional circumstances of independent action, there should be no weakening of responsibility.

13. For the convenience of history, it may be usual to ascribe to the head of a Government, as to a Commander-in-Chief, all that is done; but to those who have looked into the actual conduct of affairs, and are conversant with facts, this conventional fashion of history is well known to be an utter fallacy, and that the men who in the administration of great governments require no council are so extremely rare and few, that it is wiser to proceed in this respect on the experience of all time, than on any sanguine hope that Providence has in store for India a crop of exceptionally perfect rulers.

14. For this reason, among others, I am extremely opposed to the grant of summary powers of legislation, to enable the executive authority to make regulations having the force of law, unless this power be very strictly limited in its application to outlying tracts, where the habits of the people and the state of barbarism is such that the introduction of our law or its systematic administration is alike incongruous and impracticable.

15. I see no necessity for separating Orissa from Bengal. Bengal, Behar, and Orissa are our oldest Regulation Provinces.

16. I have before said that Sind should be under the Punjab, and I remain strongly of that opinion.

17. Assam is so much connected with Bengal that it seems very inexpedient to separate it from that Government, even though a chief commissioner be appointed—a panacea which will not do much to restore its prospects unless the Bengal Government work cordially with him, and this it is more likely to do when under its authority than if detached from it.

18. The question whether the Board of Revenue of Bengal should remain on its present footing or be replaced by a Secretary or Financial Commissioner is one on which I should be disposed to accept the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor. Great interests are under the Board of Revenue, and if that Board is replaced by a responsible Secretary or a Financial Commissioner, or remain in its existing form, it should find place in the Council of the Lieutenant-Governor. I am under the impression that, properly made use of, a Board of Revenue may be made a more effective instrument than a single Secretary or Financial Commissioner, unless the Staff of the latter be such that he can afford to depute them, or to be himself frequently absent from the Local Government.

19. Since writing the foregoing paragraph I observe that great stress is laid by the minutes of my honourable colleagues on the expediency of forbidding the practice of direct communication with the Secretary of State on the part of the Madras and the Bombay Governments. So long as they remain on their present footing the relations of the Local Governments of Madras and Bombay with the Home authorities can scarcely be changed. They have existed from the time those Presidencies were first established; and are increased in importance from the proximity of Bombay to England. It is the distance of the Government of India, and the infrequency of its visits either to Madras or Bombay, which weakens its influence. Its practical acquaintance with those Presidencies is felt to be less than with Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab, and the exercise of its authority is, therefore, more questioned, and with some show of justice. But the remedy for this is not an injunction that would be inoperative, but that the Government of India act on the powers entrusted to it by Parliament with regard to Madras and Bombay, as well as to the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab. It would then speak with authority unweakened by alleged practical ignorance, or indifference, or jealousy. If we are to have a fixed alternative capital to Calcutta I would rather see it at Poona, or somewhere not far from Bombay, than at Simla;

but if the Government of India passed about two years out of five at Madras and Bombay we should hear little of its loss of weight and influence in connection with the subordinate Governments, even though the Lieutenant-Governors for those Presidencies were appointed from England, as I think they might with advantage also be, to Bengal, the North-Western Provinces and the Punjab, the Governor-General being, with respect to all the Local Governments, entitled to submit three names on the occurrence of vacancies, but the Home Government selecting from those names, or not, as it deemed best for the public interest.

20. In conclusion, I would observe that the real improvement of the Bengal Administration lies deeper than in such refinements of the machinery of Government as have been touched upon in this Minute. This top-dressing, so to speak, does not touch the root of the evil. A docile, ill-informed but industrious population entirely in the hands of the Zemindars, with whom the permanent settlement is formed, are hardly in a position to make themselves heard or their wants known. Our district officers are few and their relations with the people distant, and functionally barred by the prevailing rights and interests of the intermediate and more influential class, with whom the fiscal relations of the Local Government are close and constant. The Zemindars are not the representatives of the masses in their material interests, but sometimes the reverse, that is, adverse rather than friendly representatives. Yet to gauge the feelings, and wants, and circumstances of dependent millions, where the points of direct contact and sympathy are so few as under such circumstances they are between the European functionary and the ryot, is extremely difficult. In a word, the European functionary is, by the system, more isolated from the masses in Bengal than he is elsewhere in India, and, whatever the advantages of a permanent settlement, it certainly has the disadvantage of practically having created in Bengal a permanent barrier between the mass of the cultivators of the soil and the European officer, in the best, the only position in which acquaintance with the people is really a feasible accomplishment. To remedy this radical difficulty is a grave, large, and complicated question.

XLII.

MINUTE ON A PROPOSED LICENSE-TAX. DATED THE 13TH
MARCH, 1868.

The course approved by the majority of the Council on the question of the financial arrangements for 1868-69 appears open to the following very grave objections:—

It continues a tax, called the License or Certificate Tax, which is a direct tax no longer necessary, under a form which in its provisions, though approaching to an Income-tax, manages to combine all the objectionable features of an ill-adjusted Income-tax with an ill-adjusted License-tax on trades and professions.

It is eminently a retrograde step, and reverses the policy advocated by this Government, approved by the Secretary of State, and proclaimed to the public as our future policy, of not throwing entirely on the present tax-payer the cost of reproductive works, or of great and costly permanent military works, from both of which future tax-payers will derive even more advantage than those upon whom the whole burthen is now thrown.

By absorbing not only current receipts but also the unexpended balance from the Military Public Works Loan of this year it cripples the financial elasticity of Government, and paralyzes its power to meet the expansion due to the growing necessities of British rule otherwise than by raising loans for requirements not fairly the subject of loans. Further, this appropriation of nearly the whole of the surplus for 1868-69, as shown in the estimates, at once deprives the Government of entertaining any one of those proposals for which the Governor-General stated to the Council additional means were required, and for the accomplishment of which his Excellency so strongly contended for the retention of the License-tax. The entire proceeds of this tax will now be swallowed up in the public works extraordinary, and any improvement to the administration involving expenditure outside the Budget grant must be indefinitely postponed, or, if the policy of to-day is to be the future policy of this Government, must at least be postponed until means can be found from some new source of taxation.

It thus retards general progress in India by the check given to

the free and healthy flow of British capital, which was setting steadily in from the confidence felt in the sound financial status of the Government of India. It does so at a time, too, when British capital is in search of secure and profitable investments, and India offers the security of a sound progressively increasing surplus, due to no straining of receipts or stinting of ordinary expenditure.

It prefers, by a general or imperial License-tax, to make it cumulative upon the heads of those already taxed in that form under a wide-spread and searching system of municipal taxation now in active force over the whole of India, whilst in its character of an Income-tax it rigorously exacts from the civil and military services a percentage on salaries which have been so frequently declared to be reduced to the lowest possible limit consistent with efficiency.

It does all this when, without the aid of the License or Income Tax, for I scarcely know which it should be called, the financial position of the Government shows a surplus of half a million sterling over the one million sterling required in the 67th para. of Secretary of State's despatch of 14th June, 1867, to be appropriated for the gradual repayment of the debt incurred for extraordinary expenditure on public works.

Even taking the expenditure of the public works extraordinary at the still higher figure given in their own estimates,* and admitting that the whole of this sum could be spent, the above conditions of the Secretary of State would still be faithfully observed, as the surplus would still be upwards of a million.

It does so at a time when there has been spent on barracks, chiefly from revenue, £3,700,000, and there still remain to be spent on this account six millions and upwards in the course of the next three years. By the end of 1868-69 there will therefore have been spent, almost entirely from revenue, five and a half millions, and if the public works estimate be worked up to, close on six millions will thus have been squeezed from the existing tax-payer for permanent military works.

It transfers from military works to irrigation works the assumed unexpended balance of the present year loan, £800,000, in order to meet the expenditure of the year of 1868-69 on reproductive works. By this arrangement no margin will be left to meet any expenditure which may yet fall upon us during this year.

It leaves the cash balances at the low limit of ten millions, so

* Estimate for public works extraordinary, £3,492,090. Estimate in financial statement for public works extraordinary, £3,092,090.

that if circumstances should occur during the year which call for any large and sudden expenditure, we shall not have the means to meet it, while the money market may then be most unfavourable towards our borrowing either in England or in this country.

It prefers the worst and least profitable employment of a surplus with the maintenance of an irritating and unproductive tax, to the discontinuance of the latter and a more beneficial way of utilizing the surplus. It departs from a sound principle, and reverts to one which has hampered the progress of India incalculably, and against which, in the interests of India as well as of its value to the British Crown, we have for years been struggling to obtain a reasonable relaxation. When at last granted, it is rejected just when we are in a position advantageously to turn the permission to account. It is remarkable, however, that even if, merely for the sake of argument, it were assumed to be the instructions of the Secretary of State to pay for public works extraordinary out of revenue in future it might have been done safely without recourse to a tax which is vexatious, and the proceeds from which are scarcely commensurate with the inconvenience.

The items on the receipts side of the Budget Estimate are avowedly entered at a lower rate than may be fairly calculated as the result of the actual returns of the year 1868-69. There is no doubt that, without being over-sanguine, another £1,000,000 might be added to the £48,586,900 of receipts, viz., half a million for the usual annual progressive improvement, and half a million on opium, provided the present prices are maintained. But to be well within limits, I will only add half a million. This would give a total of £49,086,900. To which the addition of the assumed £800,000 of unexpended balance of Military Public Works Loan would give an available surplus of £3,350,190. There would, therefore, after providing for the expenditure on public works extraordinary, amounting on the estimate to £3,092,090, have remained a small ultimate surplus of £258,100: and this without inflicting on the trade and artisan classes all over India an invidious tax.

The justice of imposing an Income-tax on the officers of Government, civil and military, is more than questionable. It is light, it may be said; but this circumstance does not affect the principle involved, of selecting a special class for purely exceptional taxation: nor is the popularity of the License-tax much improved by thus trying to float it into acceptance.

XLIII.

MINUTE ON THE SUBJECT OF ARMS FOR THE INFANTRY OF THE
NATIVE ARMY. DATED THE 3RD APRIL, 1868.

Since the Military Department addressed the Commander-in-Chief the subject has been brought to a point by the proposal of Sir R. Napier at the close of 1867, to arm with spare Enfield rifles some of the native troops now serving in Abyssinia; by the discretion given to Sir R. Napier to carry into effect his proposal; and by the despatch of the Secretary of State, which calls upon the Government of India to consider the question in its broadest and most comprehensive relations, as well as in its special one in connection with what may have been done in Abyssinia.

2. We have as yet no report from Sir Robert Napier, intimating that he has acted on the discretion given him in this matter, and has placed the Enfield rifle in the hands of any part of his native force. We have, however, signified to the Secretary of State that there was no intention to revoke from any native troops Sir R. Napier might thus distinguish the arms entrusted to them, but that we purposed to allow of their retention until they were replaced by other arms equally or even more efficient when the proper armament for our native army was decided upon.

3. I have failed to learn from any accounts of the Press correspondents in Abyssinia that the Enfield rifles had been disposed of as proposed by Sir R. Napier; but I do not apprehend that this step, if taken, would lead to any misrepresentation in India, or to attempts to prejudice the natives against foreign service. If done at all, Sir R. Napier will have been careful to render the concession of the superior weapon an honour and a privilege; and as the Belooch corps have the weapon, and have had it for some time with no other apparent effect than to stimulate the desire of other Bombay native corps to be similarly armed, there would appear to be no danger on this head in the Bombay army. On the Bengal native army the fact that a part of the Bombay army asked for and were given the Enfield rifle would, when it became known, produce no other effect in the present day than a little jealousy or emulation. I have never attached any weight to the opinion that the Mutiny of 1857 was due to the introduction of the Enfield and

its cartridge. When they got the arms by capture the mutineers' prejudices never militated against their using them against us. It was a convenient pretext. Its utility as such has passed away. When opportunities for mutiny recur, should they unfortunately be allowed to recur, there will never be a want of pretext, but it will most probably be a new one rather than an obsolete pretence.

4. The Secretary of State himself suggests the replacing of the Enfield rifles by breech-loading rifles, and invites opinion on the policy of taking such a step, not by indiscriminately arming all native troops in this way, but by prudent selection of the corps to be thus entrusted with the improved weapon. The Secretary of State evidently contemplates a gradual as opposed to a sudden and entire change in the armament of our native troops. This amounts to an admission that the time has arrived for placing better arms in their hands, and that it is only a question how to effect this safely, gradually, judiciously, so as to improve the efficiency of the native troops in proportion to their fidelity and intelligence, or their capacity for learning the use of a superior arm in a proper manner.

5. I think that there can be no question that the time has arrived for this measure, and that if we neglect to set about it cautiously, but in earnest, and in good time, we run no small risk of having it suddenly and disagreeably forced upon us by having the inferiority of the musket now in the hands of our native troops painfully realized even in this country, let alone on our frontiers or in more distant fields. On this point I shall mention the following circumstances.

6. At the same time that the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 29th February, 1868, was placed before me in the Military Department, the Foreign Department submitted an application from the Resident in Nepal on the part of Sir Jung Bahadoor for permission to land and convey to Nepal a consignment of two 12-pounder rifled Lancaster guns, one 8½-inch mortar, and ten Snider breech-loaders complete. An important part of the invoice is a number of cases containing all that is necessary for casting long shells for the 12-pounder rifled guns and shells for the 8½-inch mortar. The expert to whom these articles are consigned, and who undertakes to start such a factory for projectiles, would find no difficulty, with the pattern Sniders before him, in attempting breech-loaders for Nepal.

7. In October last the Government of India appropriated, paying for the same, the six 12-pounder Armstrongs imported by his

Highness the Guicowar. What passed in connection with the importation of arms into Burmah, when the treaty was made, must be in remembrance of the Council. I advert to these facts as proof that it is not alone the Wagheers of Kattywar who are alive to the value of rifled cannon and breech-loading arms of precision, but that from Burmah to Afghanistan, and from Nepaul to the Deccan, there is a growing desire for the acquisition of improved fire-arms. Where the desire is well-nigh universal, the discouragement the Government of India may give to their importation can only be partially operative. Even now arms of precision are steadily, though slowly, finding their way into India, and will gradually, where there are means, supplant the inferior and obsolete weapons. The process may be slow at first, as the cost of such arms and their ammunition yields at present aid to our measures of exclusion; but the process is certain to be accelerated not only in India itself, but on its frontiers, the moment it is any one's interest that this should take place. It will also be accelerated in ordinary course with no other stimulant than the growing desire to possess such superior arms. Repressive measures may delay, but all experience proves that they cannot long prevent, the ultimate supersession of inferior by improved weapons. This broad and inevitable result meets us on the very threshold of this momentous inquiry; it cannot be overlooked, or regarded as chimerical, but must be faced as an ugly reality.

8. What is the case on the North-Western frontier? It happens that I had written thus far when the letter from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, No. 108-959, of the 23rd March, was put into my hands. I invite attention to this letter as indicative of the latest opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor and the frontier officers. The latter are no doubt just now sore under the check received near Kohat when Captain Ruxton fell, with nine or ten killed, and double that number wounded. The particulars of that frontier affair are not, I regret to say, as yet before Government, at least I have not seen them, and therefore am not at all in a position to assert that the details of that skirmish would be found to offer any direct bearing on the question now under consideration. But whether this late affair be in point or not, one thing is certain, namely, that our frontier force is exposed to frequent conflict with a bold, fine race of mountaineers, good shots and careful of their ammunition, having a thorough knowledge of the ground on which they act, and the *sang froid* to take every advantage of the range of our smooth-bore Victoria musket, or Brunswick rifle, of our ig-

norance of the ground, and of the effect produced by bringing down the European officers who lead. Palpably, the balance of advantage would still remain on their side, even were our frontier force much better armed than it is.

9. Pass now from Kohat and its neighbourhood to Abyssinia. Whilst perusing the foregoing, I have had to read the report of the interview of Sir R. Napier with Kassai, Ruler of Tigré. His 4,000 men of escort are represented as being armed with matchlocks and double-barrelled guns of foreign manufacture. It must be apparent that if the poverty of Abyssinia can afford to put into the hands of its rabble troops double-barrelled guns, we may be pretty sure that richer countries, which are more advanced in civilization and are in more intimate relations, both commercial and political, with European nations, will scarcely lag behind the Abyssinians. The world, civilized and barbarian, will move on in the improvement of arms and in the supersession of old by new weapons, and we cannot expect to stand stationary in India and retain our superiority. The question merely from this point of view resolves itself into one of practical expediency. Which is wisest, to wait until we are driven by disaster to arm our native levies efficiently with respect to surrounding progress, internal and external; or to be before-hand, and, making use of our means and opportunities, to secure success and avoid disgrace by a timely maintenance of superiority in arms and training? Common sense may be left to give the reply.

10. But to come next to a very important consideration, the fitness of native troops by aptness and intelligence for such a change, I must candidly admit that I should have advocated the change suggested by the Secretary of State, with far more confidence as to a proportional result, if the organization of the native troops had been different from what it is, and if European officers had been, as formerly, in command of companies, instead of native officers. It is easy to foresee that even with our English troops, officered by educated gentlemen, the introduction of the Snider must be accompanied by a careful training of men and officers, so that, as in the Prussian army, the use of the breech-loader rifle at long ranges, and for nearer and more decisive conflict, may be thoroughly and severally understood. So far as Prussian successes depended on the needle gun, and not on strategy or tactics, it was the intelligent use made of the weapon which procured for the Prussians such marked superiority over the Austrians. It must not be forgotten that, comparing with

English, French, Prussian, or any other armies of civilized European Powers, the scale of general intelligence which prevails among Sepoys and native officers (in command of companies) raised from the ranks, it is futile to expect on the part of our native troops any analogously apt intelligence for the skilful use of the Snider or of any other breech-loader arm of precision. The teaching of a single European instructor of musketry, though zealously backed by the intelligence of the few European officers now attached to a regiment, cannot be expected to effect much against the counterpoise of adverse conditions. Practically, for fighting purposes, the general intelligence will be of a low standard, and instruction would be most utilized by being a good deal concentrated on the picked men of native corps.

11. Fidelity among mercenaries depends on a multiplicity of considerations, and it is only within certain limits that with respect to ourselves it can be predicated to be more reliable in one race than another. It is a matter in which local sympathies and local antipathies may both subserve to keep men true to their colours, and to ourselves, so long as no class is preponderant, and they are not studiously amalgamated, so as to train them to make common cause. It is preposterous to suppose that men of different creeds, colour, language, habits, and prejudices, can entertain any very violent preference for aliens like ourselves; at the same time the points of sympathy between Sikhs, Pathans of the Frontier, Goorkhas, Oude Hindoos, Berar Hindoos, Jats, and Rohilcund men, are few, and perhaps counter-balanced by the antipathies of creed and race. The degree of loyalty to our rule will oscillate, and cannot be a fixed quantity, or one easily measured. Therefore the policy should be one of showing no other partiality than that of the appreciation of good service and conduct. So long as our mercenaries see that they are only auxiliary to the European force, and not greatly preponderant; that the magazines are carefully guarded by reliable troops; that the artillery is European; that the treasuries are not entrusted to the native army; that the European force is so distributed on the lines of railway communication that it is in easy connection, and admits of rapid concentration in force on any point; mere self-interest and the perils of a reverse course will co-operate with native race antipathies and distrust to keep our mercenaries in their proper sphere of being useful servants to a liberal and considerate Government, rather than again attempting, as in 1857, to become its master. Except the Goorkhas, who are few in number, the expediency in the long

run of treating any race with special favour may be doubted, though officers are prone to those with whom they have been associated.

12. I should be in favour of first introducing the short Snider rifle into the Goorkha and the Punjab Frontier Force Corps. A good effective weapon is very essential both for the Goorkhas and the Frontier force, but even with these the introduction should be gradual, and confined at first to the flank companies. After a time it would be seen by experience how these picked companies and their native officers managed the weapon. The flank companies of the regiments of Native Infantry stationed in the Punjab might also gradually be given the short Snider, and in process of time and reliefs it would not be long before every regiment had at least one if not two flank companies thus armed; but considering the low scale of intelligence prevalent amongst the native officers and men, and the labour of teaching and training them in not only the use, but the care of such arms, a good deal of attention will at the commencement be advisable in the selection of the corps. We have the official reports of some commanding officers on the inefficiency of their native officers; and it is perfectly well known that in reality, though not so prominently brought forward, the fact is not confined to the Muzbee Sikh Corps. Emulation and the natural desire to be as well armed as others will have its effect in sharpening the intelligence of all more or less; and no great period ought to elapse before every regiment attained the moderate mark of being able to furnish a couple of companies fit to be entrusted with the new weapon.

13. If there were a smooth-bore Snider using the same ammunition as the short rifled Snider, and having an effective range with fair accuracy of three hundred yards or so, such a weapon would in my opinion be the most serviceable to put into the hands of the remaining companies of a native regiment. The marksmen fit to use the rifle are few, and it is waste of ammunition to expect or to allow the bulk of a regiment to try long range firing. It also gives them a bad training, for all real fighting is not at imaginary distances straining the range of natural vision, but according to ground and circumstances at from 300 or 350 yards to close quarters; and this is the range the bulk of a corps should be carefully trained to sweep with an effective fire. Of course such a smooth-bore Snider as I mention would, like the Victoria or the old smooth-bore musket, carry much further than 300 or 350 yards; but I am talking of effective reliable fire, such

as the mass of ordinary troops can be trained to deliver with fair accuracy. I think that our Native Infantry thus armed would be all that we can expect to make of them under their present organization. We should utilize the more intelligent and naturally good marksmen under the training of a skilled instructor by having a part of the regiment armed with the short rifled Snider, and should render the less intelligent mass of a corps all the more formidable by confining its training to what it was really fit for, and within the power of its few European officers to see that it mastered and accomplished well. As the bore of the smooth and of the rifled Snider and the cartridge would be the same, there would be no inconvenience on the score of mixed ammunition. But if a smooth-bore Snider cannot be constructed to secure this, then the only remaining alternative is to arm all with the short rifled Snider.

14. By the time our native army was thus provided with effective arms our English troops would probably be in possession of a superior weapon to the long rifled Snider; but even the latter would give them a superiority of armament over the short rifled and the smooth-bore Snider or the rifled Snider in the hands of the Sepoys generally. At the same time the inferiority of the latter would not be so great but that the English soldier would feel that the native regiment could afford him effective support, and share the fatigues and the fighting of a campaign without being under a disability deliberately imposed from a want of confidence. With native troops our European officers must risk their lives in an especial degree, but where the question lies between the remote contingency of disloyalty on the part of their men, or discomfiture and inefficiency in front of an enemy, no officer would hesitate in his choice. In the employment of mercenary levies there is and always must be risk, both to the officers and to the State. But the risk is not diminished by a policy of galling mistrust. If loyalty be expected, confidence must be shown. Loyalty cannot be regarded as the *natural* fruit of distrust. Treason is an occasional evil, but a brave reasonable confidence wins, whereas a timid mistrust revolts human nature and makes it prone to treason. If we raise and arm men, we must trust them and make them sensible that the British officer is not only ready to place his life in their hands, but to lead them confidently against any hostile opponents, and that the State will not commit them to conflict under unfavourable conditions if it can avoid it. The obligations are to a certain extent mutual. We

had a century of loyalty and the pride of having played a not unimportant part in the conquest of a great empire before we had a year of mutiny, but we should never have had the century of successful conflict for supremacy if we had started with biting and timid distrust.

15. With regard to the tenth paragraph of the despatch from the Secretary of State, I would observe that the basis of a militia system, whether that of England in its old compulsory, and still in case of emergency legal form, or in its new voluntary form, or whether that of the conscription in France and Prussia, is founded on an appeal to national sentiment and independence in antagonism to foreign aggression and oppression. These various systems invoke nations who are or ought to be one with their rulers in language, interests, and patriotism. However we may labour to make our rule acceptable by its toleration, justice, absence of tyranny and exaction, and consideration for the habits and prejudices of the native communities subjected to its control, it would be dangerous to deceive ourselves into the supposition that our relations to the millions of India admit of so direct an appeal to national sentiment as is involved in the idea of a militia force. Our large police force is the nearest approach we can with safety make to a militia; and even that has its dangers, which are reduced to a minimum by care as to the arms of the police, its numbers, training and constitution, and by its separation as much as possible from the regular troops. It is not good policy to have a man more of either than is absolutely necessary for the discharge of the very distinct duties assigned to each; and I do not think that the native troops in Bengal admit of any further reduction. The service is already far from popular, in consequence of the heavy duty which falls on the men; and the assembly of a moderate force for service is even now a matter of considerable difficulty, as was shewn in the Sittanah and Bhootan affairs. It is some excess of native troops over the requirements of the Madras Presidency which has really enabled Sir Robert Napier to embark on the Abyssinian enterprize the number of Bombay native regiments now engaged in that campaign and withdrawn from India; but Bengal and Bombay have also besides been forced to augment the strength of their native regiments, so small is the available margin of native troops for any military operations on or beyond our frontiers. I see no prospect of any material reduction, if peace continue; but a certainty, if war unfortunately occurred on any scale, of having to increase the Bengal native

army. Before the Abyssinian Expedition it was at the minimum of strength. When that campaign is over and troops return to India we may again revert to this minimum; but we cannot well sink below it without correspondingly increasing our European force. We have, I think, as nearly as practicable solved the problem of holding India with as moderate a European garrison and as limited a native force as are compatible with the secure and tranquil possession of the Empire. We can in peace hardly reduce the one without increasing the other, which of course involves financial considerations of the heavier cost of the European element and the difficulties of England in providing it. We have little more force of either sort than meets the desirable object of a tranquil occupation favourable to material progress, improvement, and growing wealth. But we are so circumstanced that if war were forced upon us we can augment our native force more easily than our English force, and should be compelled to do so. It is satisfactory to add that during the continuance of a war and the stirring excitement it gives to troops, the augmentation to our native army is free from danger, and might in case of necessity be carried to a much higher ratio in proportion to the available European force than would be wise in peace. I have no hesitation in saying that if our magazines were equal to the emergency and our command of good well-trained European officers adequate, we could double our native army for a struggle almost as quickly as if we had a militia on a conscription system in force; and at the conclusion of such a struggle could again reduce our native forces without danger by the exercise of a wise liberality, far more really economical than any other course that could be pursued.

XLIV.

MINUTE UPON THE STRATEGICAL POSITION IN INDIA WITH REFERENCE TO FOREIGN INVASION. DATED THE 15TH JULY, 1868.

I have had these papers before me for some time, but I have been delayed from a more early disposal of them, partly by press of business, but mainly by a sense of the difficulty of adequately discussing the very important questions raised by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. These questions involve the consi-

deration of political and military contingencies, with respect to which the reliable data are few, and recourse must be had to hypothetical reasoning if they are at all handled. General principles must of course be applied, but on such subjects these necessarily admit of much latitude of application. I shall make my meaning plainer by concisely stating the way in which his Excellency Sir W. Mansfield has brought forward a subject which demands at the hands of Government careful attention.

2. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in a memorandum dated the 2nd May recommends, as a matter of first class strategical importance in the ultimate defence of India, that Ferozepore should be reduced to the rank of magazine; that the magazine at Mooltan should be elevated to the rank of an arsenal; and that arsenal should be covered by sound fortifications; that the additional buildings, sanctioned for the arsenal at Ferozepore, should not be constructed; and that the trace of the fort at Mooltan should be delayed until the further pleasure of the Government of India is made known to the Punjab Government.

3. These recommendations are based on a review of the future contingencies to which our dominion in India is exposed from the attacks of foreign armies, directed by scientific generals, and armed with all the modern appliances of war. The opinion is expressed that circumstances are quite possible which would again render the Punjab a great battle-field in another generation. It is contemplated that Russian dominion, which has now spread over Central Asia to the confines of China, might, after a twenty years' war, finally establish itself at Candahar and Cabul, and that the danger to our posterity, some fifty or a hundred years hence, may arise, either from the invasion of a regular army when Cabul and Candahar were Russian dominion, or from a tribal invasion in consequence of pressure from the rear put upon the people from the Caspian to China, or in consequence of a strong Central Asia Power arising from the dismemberment of the Russian Empire, and emulating the old Mahomedan conquerors by an invasion of India from the passes of Afghanistan. It is alleged that whilst guarding against insurrectionary dangers which have passed, and which are not likely to recur, we have sedulously omitted to think of a possible, and at some future date, great probable, risk, the same being thought to be imminent by a certain school of politicians.

4. Few will dispute what may be termed the fundamental idea on which this able memorandum is based. The progress of

Russia in Central Asia has been rapid and successful. She may be regarded as now occupying a line which extends practically from Tashkand, through Samarcand and Bokhara, to Sarakhs, that is to near Meshed; whilst Persia, which is under her influence, presses from Meshed to her new post on the border of Seistan, closely and watchfully along the Herat frontier. As the Russian province of Turkistan cannot pay the cost of the occupation, and as the conquest was in no respect necessary with the view of obtaining a more secure frontier than the Jaxartes, it would be puerile to suppose that this policy of aggression and annexation has only these unprofitable tracts in view. The world, both Moslem and Christian, think otherwise, and it is just possible that the Moslem and Christian world are not far wrong, though prone to exaggerate the power and resources of Russia.

5. The state of Afghanistan, where the struggle for power is still raging, and where the rival chiefs are regarded as bidding against each other for that support from Russia which they fail to obtain from the Government of India, still further moves the Moslem and Christian world. It argues that a country so distracted by civil war may fall an easy prey to the Russian policy of annexation, and submit to the yoke with the more good temper from the prospect of an early descent upon India, and an unceremonious acquaintance with our treasuries. Now the Moslem and the Christian world are somewhat divided on the point of when this may be expected. The majority of the Moslem are inclined to regard it as a proximate event, the majority of the Christian and perhaps the Hindoo world are more disposed to view it as a remote one; but whether proximate or remote, all seem to consider it merely a question of time, and that England is doomed to see Cabul and Candahar in the hands of Russia, and is pledged apathetically to await the leisurely development of an organized attack, coming down like an avalanche from the mountains of Afghanistan upon our Indus frontier.

6. Without hazarding conjectures as to the time when our equanimity may be disturbed on the Indus frontier, I may observe that it has never occurred to me as a probable future contingency that we could tamely permit, without a blow being struck, the occupation of Cabul and Candahar by any other Power than the Afghans themselves. Such a paralysis of foresight and action has never presented itself to my mind as a

reasonable probability. Convinced that if we are ever again compelled to enter Afghanistan in force, a second voluntary withdrawal will be impossible, and that our occupation must then be permanent, I have always advocated the policy which aimed at the eventual consolidation of an Afghan power capable, with our assistance, of resisting successfully foreign invasion. But this view must not be confounded with a policy that would submissively welcome the occupation of Afghanistan by Russia. I have, therefore, always, envisaged the question of the defence of India from a somewhat different aspect than that which contemplates Cabul and Candahar as Russian provinces. From a period anterior to the beginning of the last war with Persia I have opposed untimely interference with the Afghan chiefs and people in the hope of the consolidation of their national power; and that the defence of Afghanistan, through the instrumentality of the people themselves, and organized on a national and independent basis, was not impossible with our friendly aid and support. But this failing, whether from civil anarchy and dissension or any other cause, I have always contemplated an enterprising and active defence beyond the Indus as fully more probable than a merely passive defence on that river.

7. Manifestly, however, questions of this kind must depend on the breadth and character of the war; on the strength of our forces in India; on the state of India itself; on the nature of our relations with Afghanistan and Beloochistan; and not a little on the strength of an enemy from the westward, and the means at his disposal. The problem, therefore, is of that complexity, embracing, as it does, the east and the west, strength at sea, and strength on land, that it is utterly impossible to foresee and predict what might at some future period be the course adopted for the defence of the Indus frontier. Circumstances would dictate, and the Government of a future day must be guided by the necessities of the day. One thing, and one thing only, was an indubitable matter of fact; and one for which the present, and not the future, was the opportunity for providing; namely, that whatever the exigencies of a problematical future, the Government of that day, be it far or near, should be in a position to act with the utmost advantage either beyond or upon the Indus. Hence the earnestness with which on repeated occasions I have pressed upon the attention of the Home and Indian Governments the truly vital importance of the early completion of the river

and railway communications of our Indus frontier from Kurrachee to Attock. I have done so in the Foreign or Political, in the Military, and in the Public Works Departments, and had at first to urge my views against adverse opinions. Pregnant with imperial consequences, the matter was too momentous, in my opinion, to admit of any discouragement leading me to reserve or silence, and I refer to my minutes of the 13th October, 1866, and of the 5th July, 1867, in the Public Works Department, and to my minutes of the 5th April, 1867, in the Military, and of the 5th February, 1867, in the Foreign Department, for the opinions which prevail with me on this great question.

8. At the risk of making this minute more prolix than I wish it to be, I must quote the 2nd and 5th paragraphs of my remarks on the projected occupation of Quetta :—

“ 2. If it ever became advisable or necessary to occupy Afghanistan there can be no doubt that we are now in a position to execute such a movement with far greater facility and security than when we advanced in 1838, with Sindh in the hands of the Amcers, and the Punjab a compact military power under Runjeet Sing, both interposing between the small column launched into Afghanistan and its base of operations. With the Indus frontier, from Kurrachee to Peshawur, under our rule, we are otherwise circumstanced than was the case when we marched to put Shah Shooja on the throne of Cabul, and we have only to accomplish that which I have always urged to be commercially as well as politically and militarily expedient, namely, the completion of what I have elsewhere termed the Indus group of railways, in order to secure to ourselves such a thorough command of that line of frontier as shall leave it entirely in our own discretion to operate below or above the passes, as might be judged at the time most advisable. As a general rule, I concur in the opinion expressed by his Excellency Sir W. Mansfield in his able minute with regard to the defence of the Bolan Pass (page 7) ; but at the same time it is easy to conceive circumstances which might combine to render the partial or the entire occupation of Afghanistan necessary as a theatre for offensive operations on our part in aid of Afghan resistance to invasion from the westward ; it is a country admirably adapted for giving the fullest effect to the destructive warfare which Afghans, thus supported, could wage with small loss to themselves against hostile columns. This is one contingency, and a variety of others might be quoted as possible inducements to an advance beyond the Indus frontier.

I shall not enter into an estimate of the probability of such remote contingencies, but admitting their future possibility, it will, I think, be all that political and military considerations demand if our lines of rail and river communication on the Indus frontier are rendered as perfect as it is easily in our power to make them, so that without our at present incurring the risk of complications with Afghan or Belooch tribes and politics it may yet be in our power rapidly to mass and securely to feed and support our forces, whether intended for operations above or below the passes—wherever they may be sent on that frontier. The bare fact that such was the position of the British Government on the Indus frontier would not only prove a sedative to the turbulence of frontier tribes, but render any aggressive movements upon Afghanistan from the westward, or any hostile attitude on the part of the Afghans towards ourselves, dangerous to those who chose to provoke our power and means of striking.

“5. If our position on the Indus frontier be one of unmistakable strength it will long paralyze aggressive presumption. I know that we could again seize Afghanistan if it were advisable or necessary, and that with our Indus frontier complete in its communications, parallel and perpendicular, no power on earth could shake us out of that country. I know, too, that with the Afghans friendly and cordial, we could, without the actual seizure of the country for ourselves, organize its defence in a most destructive manner against hostile invasions; but neither alternative is at present imposed upon us as of the smallest necessity, and I am absolutely opposed to precipitating complications and plunging into certain difficulties out of respect for nervous apprehensions, the realization of which is, if it ever take place, remote, and can be met when the time comes, whichever way may be most advisable, provided, in the meantime, we so perfect our position on the Indus frontier that offensive or defensive operations, whether above or below the passes, are alike at our command.”

9. Bearing in mind the part that Afghanistan may have to play, whether only aided or occupied, in case of serious danger from the westward, the magazines and depôts which would have to feed either mode of operation with ample ordnance means must be so distributed as to combine safety with convenience of position. These are conditions still more necessary to be observed if the active defence of the frontier awaited the *débouché* of hostile columns from the passes into the plains on the right bank of the

Indus. The arrangements existing, or about to exist, seem fairly adapted to answer both objects—action in Afghanistan or below the passes. The line of magazines, namely, Hyderabad, Mooltan, and Rawul Pindee, are in secure positions on the left bank, whilst the depôts of Kurrachee, Dehra Ishmael Khan, and Peshawur, are in advance on the right bank of the Indus—well enough placed as ancillary to the magazines in support of offensive movements in advance, or on the right bank, but wisely only subsidiary as being more exposed than the magazines retired behind the river in good strategical positions, and in the case of Mooltan, so far retired as to be in the fork of the Chenab and Sutledge Rivers, and therefore covered by the Indus and the Chenab. In case of serious operations on a large scale another depôt would be requisite about Bukkur or Shikarpore according to the line taken by the railway from Kotree to Mooltan. From the character of the frontier it is essential that both depôts and magazines be provided with sufficient defences to secure them from easy capture. They should be defensible by a weak garrison, and the magazines strong enough to enforce respect from disciplined troops.

10. The probabilities are that an invading army of the strength likely to be brought against us would find the British power more than its match, wherever the theatre of operations chosen by the Government of India. But there of course remains the supposition that the reverse were the case, and that we were beaten in the first sharp struggles, and had to give ground before large and successful invading forces. An army of this kind, issuing from so poor a country as Afghanistan, must select for its main line of operations the tract of country in which it can both recruit and maintain itself. To cover its flank, it must send a division to fall on the lower Indus through the Bolan Pass, and thus to interrupt the rail and river communications between the mouths of the Indus and the Punjab. But though effective for this subsidiary object its action would be limited to the Indus and Sindh, because the desert country eastward of the Indus is unfavourable to an advance in force against India. The main line of operations must therefore lie along the northern and more fertile parts of the Punjab, whatever the passes by which it descended from Afghanistan. An army thus circumstanced would have two objects in view, first, not itself to be driven, if it lost an action, down upon the sterile tracts of the southern parts of the Punjab; secondly, if possible to throw back the already beaten British force, not upon its reserves and reinforcements in the north of Hindoostan,

but off its own proper line of operations down upon the desert tracts to the south of the Punjab, and thus to isolate the debris of our forces between the forks of the rivers, where escape is difficult from want of fords, and the troops in Hindostan could lend no help to the army placed between the hostile columns of the enemy on the Lower Indus and in the Punjab.

11. On the other hand, it would be the object of a British commander carefully to avoid laying open his line of communications with Hindostan by thus permitting himself to be driven south. An invasion of the kind here contemplated, which would have the conquest of India in view, could only be undertaken by a force adequate to such an enterprize, and it would be opposed with all the force that could be collected for the first severe actions. If the enemy was not overthrown in the first encounters, and the British army had to retire before its successful adversary, the retreat must be to a secure position, where the reinforcements from Bengal and Hindostan would have a chance of reaching in time for fresh efforts. Such a purpose could not be attained by a march south on Mooltan, which laid open the North-West Provinces. Under such circumstances, a British commander must not be embarrassed by the reluctance with which he would sacrifice a great arsenal at Mooltan when forced to withdraw, leaving the north of the Punjab in the hands of the invader. Such an arsenal would help greatly to consolidate an enemy's position in the Punjab, the new base from which the advance on the north of India must be made. Having nothing between Allahabad and Mooltan, except the Agra magazine, a British commander would be in the dilemma of having to elect between laying open the north of India and being separated from his reinforcements with a view of trying to save Mooltan, or of sacrificing that arsenal with a view to effect a junction with reinforcements, and to repel, if possible, the invasion of the North-West Provinces. As it must be a beaten army that fell back on Mooltan it would leave its successful opponent in a central position between the beaten army and the reserves hastily pushing up in support; a superior enemy would thus, at his discretion, attack either the beaten army or its reinforcements as was most convenient. Circumstances would decide his choice in this respect, but under either alternative, Mooltan would soon be at his disposal, and the north of India open, or else already in his hands.

12. If we are to have a well fortified arsenal in the north of India it should, I think, be in a secure position to the east of the

Punjab, and covered by its rivers. It should be so placed as not only to support the force and magazines in the Punjab, but also to serve as a convenient and safe *point d'appui* for an army forming with a view to retrieve mishaps to the westward. If selecting, *de novo*, the proper site for a large strongly fortified arsenal of this kind, Ferozepore would not now be chosen. For an arsenal fortress constructed with vital objects in view, the difference between the cost of water conveyance, of stores, and that of their portage by rail is really of minor importance, and a great arsenal of this character would not be advanced to so forward a position. If it were thrown to the west of the Jumna it would hardly be further than to the neighbourhood of Umballa. Probably preference would be given to a well selected point in the Northern Doab.

13. Although, in case of very serious reverses, Ferozepore may not be the best position for a grand arsenal with permanent fortifications, under ordinary circumstances it has its advantages. It is in a safe position, though only some forty odd miles from Lahore, and a trifle more from Umritsur. In case of necessity, it is in easy military connection with a force operating in that vicinity, or beyond the Ravee, to cover the capital. Whatever is done to repel an enemy advancing on Lahore is, from their relative positions, effective protection to Ferozepore. It is, therefore, hardly conceivable how it could become a question of sacrificing the one to the other. As a rule, arsenals and magazines are in war protected by successful actions in the field fought at some distance from them. The position of the reinforcements and the state of the army after a defeat, as also the character of the pursuit, would influence the commander of a beaten force in the selection of his line of retreat. He might make a divergent retreat, or one on a single line, fall back on Ferozepore, or partly on Ferozepore and Ludiana, or even Roopur. But it could not be fairly said that he sacrificed Lahore to Ferozepore, because he was not strong enough to make good his position on the Ravee, or between the Ravee and the Sutledge. Even if he fell back on Ferozepore, because previously too much weakened by actions on the frontier, or on the Jhelum and Chenab, to strike a blow to save the capital, he could not be said to sacrifice the latter to Ferozepore. The fact would then simply be, that he fell back to the left bank of the Sutledge by the shortest line on Ferozepore; and pivoting on the arsenal which was then temporarily secured, could, if reinforced, again advance by the shortest line, or act on the flank and rear of an enemy attempting to pene-

trate into Hindostan by crossing the Sutledge at Hureekee or eastward. The mistake in countermanding the march of the reinforcements which Broadfoot had put in motion would not, we may be sure, be on such an occasion repeated. It was that error which paralyzed the small forces under Littler at Ferozepore, and gave the Sikhs the splendid opportunity of advancing and attacking our columns in detail. Wherever our reinforcements were collected, we should hardly play the game of defence from invasion so ill again.

14. I am averse to spending large sums on permanent fortifications either at Mooltan or Ferozepore. The defensive works should at both places be of a similar character; and on the chance of Mooltan having to play an important part, which is by no means an improbable contingency, I should have no objection to the simple elongation of two of its fronts from 1,100 to 1,400 feet, in order to secure equal space with that enclosed by the defensive works at Ferozepore, always provided that this can be done without incurring great additional expense in the purchase of land. There are two contingencies under which Mooltan might have to play an important part, viz., first, action on the defensive rally, though of an active offensive character above the passes in Afghanistan, or even at their *debouché* into the Plains; secondly, in the event of an invasion not occupying the lower Indus by a descent through the Bolan, or in consequence of a repulse given to an enemy in the plains of Shikarpore. Under either of these conditions it might be of advantage that the magazine at Mooltan had ample space, and even cover for all that could be required. The cover could always be added rapidly enough, but the area could not be so conveniently added and brought within the bastion defences, unless at once included before these are constructed.

15. If it were contemplated to move any of our military factories to Ferozepore it might be a question whether defensive works of a more permanent character should not be substituted for the existing defences; but no one advocates the transfer of our great factories from Dum-Dum, Cossipore, and Ishapore, or from Allahabad and Cawnpore, to points further north and near our Sutledge line. They are well and securely placed where they are, and can easily feed by the aid of the railway, the magazines to the north and north-west of Allahabad.

16. Greater security might probably be given to Ferozepore without having recourse to any very expensive class of defensive works to attain that object. An enemy advancing from Afghan-

istan must reach the Indus with a siege train of limited strength, and there must have been great negligence on our parts if vital points were not furnished previously with heavy rifled ordnance of a calibre to impose respect on ordinary siege ordnance, for though it might be rifled, it could not be very heavy. Threatened magazines would also be easily strengthened, where necessary, in anticipation of danger.

17. In the present state of our military posture in India, of the question of heavy ordnance for defensive works, and of the best mode of using these pieces, I am much averse to expenditure on permanent fortifications. The science of the military engineer, like that of the artillerist, is in a state of transition. But more than this, I have no doubt of the issue, whatever the course of defensive action given to our army on the field, provided the organization of our native army is adapted to campaigns in which real fighting may be looked for, provided the native troops are properly armed, and provided we have the means through an elastic organization of doubling, without difficulty, the strength of our Native troops, so that our invaluable European infantry may be saved as much as possible from the ordinary fatigue duties of war, and its weak strength in numbers husbanded to the utmost for the moment of actual conflict. But even if the issue were more precarious than I think it, I should grudge heavy outlay on permanent works, exposed to the chance, if fortune were at first unpropitious, of early falling into the hands of a successful enemy.

XLV.

MINUTE ON MILITARY REDUCTIONS. DATED THE 23RD JULY, 1868.

This is a very clear, valuable memorandum, and I shall be obliged by a copy being sent me for further and separate consideration.

I concur with the Secretary in the opinion that the suggested reductions could only be effected after a great deal of correspondence, sure to excite a good deal of acrimony and resentment, and to cover a considerable period of time.

This, however, might not be a sufficient reason for deferring the consideration of this question to another time; but I am under an

impression that the day cannot be distant, if not already at hand, when, with reference to other considerations than those of economy, more radical changes may become advisable; and therefore such reductions as these form part of a more general scheme.

The smallness of the Native armies at Bombay and Madras, as compared with former times, the moderate strength of their European force, and the conditions under which the reliefs of the European troops for Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, are carried out, all seem to me to point to the military arrangements of Commands-in-Chief being modified, so as to concentrate under one executive military command and head all the movements and reliefs, and to reduce the commands at Madras and Bombay to a position more subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief in India than is at present the case. I do not think the present moment perhaps the best for mooted this general question, because our railway communications are incomplete, and matters in other respects may not be quite mature, Government transport being in its infancy, and some of the arrangements of questionable stability; but I am convinced that it will not be very long before the exigencies of the service will, in spite of any reluctance to diminish the status of the subordinate commands and the importance of Local Governments, force this question upon the consideration of the Home and the Indian Governments. I would therefore defer to such a review of the organization of our higher military commands the subsidiary reductions pointed out in the accompanying memorandum. They would, as parts of one great scheme be less likely to excite opposition than if pressed at present on unwilling Governments for consideration.

XLVI.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSAL FOR AN OPIUM RESERVE FUND. DATED THE 31ST JULY, 1868.

The proposal for a reserve fund derived from the opium revenue is put before the Council with the strong support of the Governor-General, but with a sedulous care on the part of the Financial Minister to guard himself against the supposition that he is committed to the policy of the measure for the execution of

which he enters into full details. As Sir R. Temple abstains from expressing any opinion, Mr. Strachey and Mr. Maine confine themselves to a guarded indication of their own views, apparently reserving a fuller treatment of the subject until it should be submitted to the Council as a formal proposal on the part of the financial member. To a certain extent I concur with my honourable colleagues, but as the financial member's functions are not in authority of a different order from those of any other member of the Council, and as this measure is initiated by the Governor-General, who is as responsible for financial as for legal or political measures, and as we were informed that the proposal had, besides the support of his Excellency, the favourable opinion of members of Her Majesty's Government, I shall, in deference to his Excellency's call for opinions, state my own briefly and generally, avoiding at present entry into details.

The scheme is derived from the system pursued by banks working on sound principles of having a rest or surplus fund, or guarantee fund, as these reserve funds are variously called. Their object, whatever their designation, I take to be one and the same, namely, to secure to the shareholders, as far as possible, uniformity of dividends. When the profits in any year fall below the amount necessary to meet the usual dividend, the surplus or reserve fund makes good the deficiency. The surplus fund is employed in banking business, and yields profits, which either augment the dividend on the capital, or are otherwise applied in bonuses, &c., to the benefit of the shareholders. However worked or applied such funds are, this is their aim, the advantage of the shareholders.

Even in railways, though few, if any, English Companies have any funds to reserve, the object is the same, namely, to cover accidental extraordinary expenditure and ultimately to secure the interests of the shareholders and to impart a permanent value to the railway stock or scrip,

I can understand the value of surplus or reserve funds in banking, in insurance companies, and in railway systems, for all have the same object in view,—security of dividends and of the value of the shares as stock. But a reserve fund from opium revenue seems to me to aim at a different thing from the advantage of the taxed public, who are the real shareholders in the fiscal burthens to be borne, and have most interest in the adjustment of such burthens.

On the contrary, the object of the opium reserve fund is, whenever the returns from opium are favourable, to create an artificial

and arbitrary deficiency to the amount reserved, and to impose unnecessary taxation or to maintain it in order to provide for this deficiency.

The alleged aim is to secure to Government a uniform return from the opium revenue by making good years cover the shortcomings of bad years; but though this, if properly worked out, might, as far as Government is concerned, be a convenience, it is hardly to be expected that the public, the taxpayers, would approve of the imposition of additional burthens in order to diminish a disturbing uncertainty of future Budgets, and to lighten the labours of financial members by thus guaranteeing them against fluctuations in one important item of revenue. The public would be the less disposed to approve of such practice from the fact of the steady increase of the opium revenue being patent to everybody who pays any attention to a long series of Indian balance-sheets.

Although the scheme may not be, strictly speaking, a sinking fund, it presents all the weak points of a sinking fund. The objection to the latter is not so much that in the form of terminable annuities or in some other mode the vote of a half million annually may not be skilfully applied to the extinction of a part of the State debt, but that Governments when embarrassed and pressed for means are certain to reconvert annuities and put an end to sinking funds, however ingeniously devised. There cannot be a doubt that these objections are fully more applicable to the scheme under consideration, which, whilst it demands from the public the same annual self-denial as do money votes for a sinking fund or terminable annuities, does not, like either of these, keep before the public a large prospective extinction of debt, but, on the contrary, the imparting stability and endurance to odious and vexatious license and income taxes.

The proposal is in fact to take, say half a million of surplus opium revenue, and not to count it as part of the annual surplus, but to remove it by this process, a purely arbitrary one, from the debatable ground of the best way of applying any such surplus, whether to the extinction of debt or the reduction of taxes, and to devote it nominally to the maintenance of an equilibrium in the receipts from opium, but really to evade the necessity for touching existing taxation. This is hardly justifiable as a scheme of prospective finance, and would fail to impose upon the public.

The Government with respect to Bengal opium regulates the quantity of opium put up at its auction sales with reference to

other than mere trade considerations. The public comprehends the expediency of reserves of the drug with a view to the equilibrium of supply proportionate to demand, of frustrating gambling, and of securing revenue; but this is not likely to be confounded with the institution of a reserve fund for the stereotyping of taxation, and under certain contingencies adverted to by Sir W. Mansfield, not only for the stereotyping of existing taxation, but for its positive increase in order to supplement an artificial deficiency.

The disturbance due to the oscillations of the opium revenue is not, under ordinary circumstances, so great but what the Financial Department can within certain limits follow the fluctuations and give the Financial Member approximate data for his Budget calculations; and as the sources of Indian revenue, though not very elastic, are consequently steady, and not by any means complicated, but peculiarly simple, the difficulty, such as it is, of estimating opium receipts hardly demands on the part of Government the very exceptional treatment involved in this proposal.

I prefer adhering to the well-established principle that a financial statement of receipts and expenditure should be divested, as far as possible, of misleading and dubious items, and free from suspended funds having prospective and uncertain financial operations in view. It is better that the Financial Member should have one such moderate difficulty as the opium receipts to encounter, and to enter approximately to the best of his judgment in the financial estimate of the year, than to sanction an unsound principle, and one which will inevitably be a fruitful source of cavil on the part of the public against Government.

XLVII.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED REDUCTION OF SALT DUTIES. DATED THE
17TH AUGUST, 1868.

I regret that I can find no arguments either in the note of the Financial Member, Sir R. Temple, or in the draft despatch to the Secretary of State, which reconciles me to the abrupt change of policy which, contrary to former orders from the Secretary of State for India, imposes upon the present taxpayers the whole cost of the permanent barracks now in course of construction for

our European troops. I perfectly agree with the remarks made by Colonel Dickens, the Secretary of the Department Public Works, and concurred in by Sir R. Temple, that every consideration of humanity towards our European troops, as well as of economy in the cost of construction, is opposed to the retardation of progress by the curtailment of the outlay on barrack building. Any such unwise restriction is synonymous with a prolonged sacrifice of valuable lives, which can be avoided by an early completion of the necessary accommodation. But though I admit the force of this argument as justifying the outlay of the ten millions sterling with an avoidance of all unnecessary delay, I cannot discover that it justifies the imposition of ten millions of extra taxation on the taxpayers of the few years over which this charge is spread.

Ten millions sterling thus laid out can in no sense be termed regular expenditure. It is palpably and hitherto has been avowedly exceptional. Unremunerative it cannot be called, unless the prospective saving in human life and the popularity of soldier service in India be matters of no moment to England. It is at least an outlay that is an insurance on the value and security of all capital embarked in India; and even as such, the narrowest of all views of the subject, it is an extraordinary charge. I am quite unable therefore to appreciate, as is done by his Excellency the Governor-General and Sir R. Temple, the wisdom of the financial principle and of any maxims which may be derivable therefrom, which, whilst it excepts irrigation and special fund works, regards the ten millions sterling as ordinary charges. In principle there is no essential difference between the special fund works and the permanent barracks outlay.

The foregoing is, however, not the only point in which I have the misfortune to differ in opinion from my honourable colleagues.

I have in a previous minute pointed out what I considered the grave objections to the principle involved in having an opium reserve fund such as was sketched by the Financial Member with the approval of the Governor-General. I beg that a copy of that minute may be appended to this one, as it will render unnecessary my repeating the observations therein made.

I must, however, observe that the proposed despatch to the Secretary of State makes a wide departure both from the original sketch to which I allude in the preceding paragraph and also from paragraph 50 of the Secretary of State's despatch, as I understand the latter. I think it clear from the abstract of the receipts from

£8,385,000	Receipts.
£1,904,000	Charges.
£6,481,000	Net revenue.
£6,250,000	6½ millions.
£231,000	Reserve fund.
or £228,000	Reserve fund,
	if Bombay charges be included.

opium for ten years given in the margin, from the average struck on the income of those ten years, and from the result deduced, that the Secretary of State, when ordering that in future years the sum was to be estimated at not more than six millions, had the gross and not the net returns of opium in view. The proposal to secure 6½ millions net seems rather to defeat the intention of the Secretary of State, and to leave a very moderate residuum as a reserve fund to meet oscillations, which, according to the construction to be put on paragraph 50, vary from five to eight and a half millions sterling.

It is more in consonance with my own views that the Budget Estimate should be framed on a limitation of opium receipts to 6½ millions net than to 6 millions gross, though I think the principle bad in both cases, as contrary to the financial practice of Government, which must bank and employ this reserve in some way or other, and may be open to much misconstruction in its banking operations if the reserve fund is to be the result of the six millions gross limitation. If the reserve fund is to be the residuum of 6½ millions net, the charges being very close on 2 millions, it brings the estimate so close to the existing system that the objections are greatly reduced. But I entirely doubt this being the plan or intention of the order of the Secretary of State, which it is intimated the Government are bound to carry into effect.

Whilst there is complete uncertainty on this important item it seems extremely inexpedient to tamper with the salt revenue in the manner proposed by Sir R. Temple. Avowedly the suggested changes contemplate a deficiency, and though that deficiency is reduced by an assumed increase of consumption, there were not, in the course of the preliminary discussion held upon this subject, any data produced which claimed even approximate accuracy or even ordinary reliability.

Further, the preliminary discussion of the 6th August laboured under the grave disadvantage of being brought before the Council precisely as the opium reserve fund question had been, namely, without any expression of opinion on the part of the Financial Member; and also without the members of Council having had time to consider the able report of Mr. Allan Hume. Although some of the Council committed themselves under these circumstances to a vague resolution that they were prepared to support a modification of the salt tax, to be compensated by additional taxation in other forms, they were not pledged to do this in

ignorance of the scope of the orders of the Secretary of State with respect to the opium reserve fund. Some of the members of the Council had scarcely had time to read, still less to consider, the important despatch of the Secretary of State, and I would invite attention to the fact that whatever the real meaning of the fiftieth paragraph with regard to an opium reserve fund, there is no suggestion in the despatch to tamper with the salt revenue with a view of creating a real deficiency in that item of revenue in addition to an artificial deficiency in the opium revenue.

Moreover, I venture very earnestly to call the attention, not only of my honourable colleagues, but also of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, to the fact that the contemplated reduction of the salt duties on one hand and enhancement on another are proposed in contempt of the deliberate opinions of the highest local authorities.

Thus speaking for Bengal, Sir C. Beadon states on grounds that cannot be impugned that the tax* which could be best borne by the people, collected at least cost to the State and inconvenience to the taxpayers, is an additional tax upon salt.

His views are practically endorsed by Mr. A. Hume in the note to paragraph 94 of his valuable report.

For the Punjab Sir D. Macleod pronounces the opinion† that the circumstances of the people of all classes have improved and are improving so much that he is decidedly of opinion that, if the Supreme Government should deem it expedient to raise the duty to the rate levied in Bengal, the measure could be carried into effect in the Punjab, after six months' notice, without the slightest difficulty or inconvenience.

The Government of the North-Western Provinces agreed to raise the salt duty from Rs. 3 to Rs. 3-4.

The Chief Commissioner Central Provinces assured the Government of India‡ that those provinces had so advanced in prosperity that they could bear in 1867 a tax of Rs. 3-4 better than four years previously they could bear a tax of Rs. 3.

The Bombay Government admitted that if it were an object of vital importance to the Government of India it could not object to an increase, though in ordinary circumstances it did not consider an addition of 8 annas to the tax would be expedient.

* *Vide* letter of 8th March, 1866. † Letter of 12th October, 1867.

‡ Letter of 23th January, 1868. Letter of 6th February, 1868.

The Madras Government, in the interests of the State finances, deprecate increase.

The result of this cursory review of papers, which deserves the careful attention of my honourable colleagues, is that they will find that the suggested alterations in the incidence of the salt duties are deprecated by all the local authorities best qualified to form and offer a sound opinion on the subject; by which I mean that it is proposed to reduce duties declared by competent authorities to be not only not oppressive, but the reverse, and so much so as to admit of augmentation without inconvenience; whilst, on the contrary, it is proposed to increase duties in countries and provinces where such measures are declared to be opposed to the interests of the State, and the chances are diminished consumption and a loss of revenue.

Of course, if there were any imperative necessity shown for this scheme I should be the last to demur. But, as far as I can perceive, there is not only no imperative necessity, but the whole project is based on what I must, without any disrespect for opinions adverse to my own, designate as a sentimental phase of financial policy.

I entirely concur with the opinion very boldly expressed by the Hon. E. Drummond, when Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, by far the best and most thoroughly financially experienced officer that has for a long time past been in those provinces, a man trained by long years of experience in the Financial Department, yet having no financial crotchets of his own, and as keenly alive to the welfare and interests of the poor as to the difficulty of exempting them altogether. He wrote as follows on the 8th March, 1866:—

“I proceed to remark upon the nature of the means by which additional revenue is sought to be imposed, premising that, although I fully admit the many advantages of direct taxation, I am very strongly opposed to it in any form in this country generally, if it can possibly be avoided, believing, as I do, the difficulty of applying it equally, and without the most lamentable oppression, to be, in the present state of native society, all but insuperable.

“Holding this opinion, I am satisfied that any indirect tax is preferable to a direct one, and that however great may be the objections theoretically to an addition of the duty upon salt, such a measure would really be a mercy to the people, and would be so accepted, if it saved them from the evils of direct taxation.”

In corroboration of this practical, and it may be unsentimental, view of taxation, I must add my own experience that, from the indirect way in which the masses pay the salt revenue, I never heard, when in closer and more constant intercourse with the agricultural population than falls to the lot of most men, a single complaint against the salt tax. From the manner in which salt is given with the purchases made from Bunyas, the levy of the duty is simply inappreciable by the masses, and though the price of flour and various grains which form the staple food of the people is seriously affected, as every one knows, by the seasons in India, I have never yet seen any one attempt to connect the rise and fall of the price of rice or flour in the bazaars with the price of salt. The importation of salt has so lowered the wholesale cost of the article that it would be a pure absurdity to attempt to prove anything of the kind in spite of the rate of the duty.

Mr. A. Hume's report disposes of theoretical fancies about cattle suffering from want of salt, and points out what we are really responsible for in consequence of the existing system. But to accomplish that no reduction of duties is advisable or necessary.

Sir R. Temple informs us that we must try to raise at least half a million by new taxation. He admits that the letter of Secretary of State's instructions involves raising at least three-quarters of a million or even a million. These admissions, it must be remembered, take the 50th paragraph as to the opium reserve fund in a sense not borne out by the context. The admissions may therefore be very fallacious.

We have not only these uncertain amounts, namely, artificial deficiencies on opium, real deficiencies needlessly created on salt, but the omission of an inevitable expenditure on marine. We cannot go on without crews and vessels for service in the Indian Seas, Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea.

The deficit is at present a very uncertain quantity, but what with the charge for barracks, for opium reserve fund, for salt revenue charges, and for a resuscitated marine, possibly also for an improved arming of the Native armies and rifled heavy ordnance, I am disposed to place it at a higher figure than Sir R. Temple. The data are so dubious that I will not risk a guess, but I leave it to my honourable colleagues to make their own estimates, and I am confident the most moderate one will double, if not treble, Sir R. Temple's of the deficiency, based on the conditions prescribed by the Secretary of State.

When I turn to examine how all this is to be met, I find that the License-tax, condemned by the Secretary of State in paragraph 59, is to be developed by a process which leaves all the Secretary of State's objections to it untouched, and raises a heap more.

For the upper ten thousand, as they are termed, there is to be an Income-tax based on individual assessment, without a revival of the Income-tax machinery. This is an arrangement rather nebulously stated.

Those below the ten thousand are to remain classified under the License-tax system.

Both these main divisions, as also official incomes, are to have the rate of taxation raised.

Fundholders are to be taxed, on the ground very audaciously asserted, but without proof, that the equity of the measure is indubitable.

The richer persons of landholders are to be taxed, because very fit subjects for taxation.

Householders are to be taxed as a corollary to the taxation of the landholders, though the chain of reasoning by which this result is arrived at is not explained.

The taxing of Joint Stock Companies is to be revised.

All this is to raise half a million in time of peace, and without the smallest necessity for an amount of experimental financing quite incommensurate in result with the disgust which it will infallibly produce. In a word, we are to part with half a million easily collected, and without a murmur, in order to have recourse to an increase of direct taxation so odious that it proved formerly a signal failure, was utterly hateful and oppressive, and did more to demoralize the people than all Government attempts at education or Missionary attempts at the introduction of Christianity could counteract in a century.

Of course, if Sir R. Temple's estimate of the deficiency which is to be purposely created is, as I believe, much under the mark, keeping the instructions of the Secretary of State in view, then the Income-tax must be proportionately increased on official salaries, and the upper ten thousand. As we know how the latter deal with the system, and that the official salaries are the only class that are reached with any certainty or precision, the scheme resolves itself into a very simple process of adding to the burthens of the official classes in a positive degree very measurable, but also of adding in a degree not measurable to the intensity of the discontent and to the unblushing evasions of the upper ten thousand

not under the influence of European feelings, and resenting all approach to inquisitorial valuations of income.

The European mercantile community I class with the official community in the incidence of such a tax for reasons too obvious to demand explanation.

I trust my honourble colleagues will weigh the consequences of this complication of taxing landholders, fundholders, householders, Joint Stock Companies, &c., all over India to raise half a million in lieu of salt revenue remitted before they embark on the disturbance of ideas involved over the length and breadth of India by such a course; and even if it meet with the support of the Council, I indulge the hope that the Secretary of State may be led to pause before he endorse an experimental system of taxation which is the most admirably calculated to secure a maximum of irritation with a minimum of profit at a juncture when the finances are prosperous, and there is no object to be gained by giving financially an impulse to discord.

XLVIII.

MINUTE ON RAILWAY EXTENSION IN INDIA. DATED THE 16TH
MARCH, 1869.

I have given a general concurrence to the two despatches forwarded by this mail, namely, that on the agency by which Indian railways should in future be constructed, and that on the selection of new lines for construction, because on some points they contain an expression of opinion in accordance with views which I have long held and pressed upon the consideration of Government, both when I had the honour of a seat in the Council of the Secretary of State, and also since I have sat in the Council of the Governor-General.

Before touching on these points, however, I wish to remark that, in India, the distinction between commercial and political lines is a distinction to which I cannot give my own adherence. In our Indian railways it is to my mind impossible to separate the political from the commercial value of these great lines of com-

munication. I certainly would not advocate the construction of any line from purely political motives; and in strenuously and repeatedly pressing for the early construction and completion of the Indus group of railways, even when Sir John Lawrence and the rest of the Council were not disposed to accept my view, I was influenced quite as much by the commercial as by the political advantages of this measure. To bring the Punjab and the whole Indus frontier into easy connection with the sea-board seemed to me of incalculable importance commercially, as well as politically of advantage. I do not think we have as yet any data on which to estimate the value of the trade which may accrue from facilitating the flow of British goods into Central Asia, and from remedying the defects of the position of the Punjab as to traffic ascending from the sea-coast.

I therefor concur with the one despatch in the prominence given to the early completion of the Indus frontier group of railway lines, being confident that, in the interests of peace and of commerce, no other line is of equal importance. Of peace, because nothing is so calculated to insure that blessing, both internally and externally, as the conviction that the British Government is master of the position on the frontier from north to south; of commerce, because no other line, whilst thus insuring the general confidence of the country in the peace and security of our frontier provinces, has a larger field than Central Asia for the consumption of many of our British and Indian products when once that region is really tapped.

The general principle arrived at in the other despatch, namely, that State railways can in India be constructed more economically by the Government than by companies, is one so long held by myself that its present assertion by the Government of India cannot but command my thorough concurrence.

So long as the railway companies enjoyed the confidence of the money market, and could command its ready assistance, I felt disposed, though well aware of the non-economical result, not to disturb the financial field of railway enterprise by the intervention of Government as a competitor against the companies for capital to be devoted to that class of reproductive works, deeming it, under such circumstances, enough to exclude all companies from irrigation works and their finance operations, which I have always insisted should be most strictly under the Government in India, and not under companies. But when it became clear that from the competition of foreign enterprises in the English money market

there was nothing to be gained by abdicating the financial field in favour of railway companies, and that the English money market evinced greater confidence in the credit of the Government of India, and the security derived from its wielding, like Russia, the whole financial resources of the Empire, than in the compacts of companies with the Government of India, the one sole reason for compliance with the system of railway companies was cut away. The moment the Government had to aid largely the railway companies with its own funds that last argument in their favour was rooted up.

I venture very earnestly to press upon the consideration of the Secretary of State for India that in all that relates to the control of the Government of India over railways in India there is infinitely more, whether the matter be viewed from the social, the economical, the commercial, or the political points of view, in favour of its effective control than can be alleged for the position and requirements of the great European States, such as France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. We have everything to gain by a positive, not a nominal control; everything to lose by a feeble sham control. If the great States of Europe, warned by the collapse of the British system from a financial point of view, have strong reasons for the maintenance of their State systems, and if the smaller States, such as Belgium, have good reason to be satisfied with their State systems, neither small nor great States of Europe have, in comparison with the British Government in India, either financially, politically, or commercially, in any degree the same vital necessity for positive control over railway enterprises as is laid by every consideration, whether social, financial, or political, on the Government of India.

XLIX.

EXTRACTS FROM A MINUTE ON ARMS FOR BRITISH AND NATIVE INFANTRY DATED 3RD JUNE, 1869.

I would here observe that previous to the mutiny in 1857 the recognized principle which regulated the stock of muskets in reserve was one in stock for one in use. The wisdom of this principle was shown when on that emergency arising the Feroze-

pore Arsenal was able to equip the large force raised in the Punjab, and when other magazines were likewise equal to arming the levies, police, &c., suddenly raised at that period.

I must also remark that that principle was applied when our Native armies were very much stronger in numbers than they are now, and the ratio of one arm in reserve for every arm in use gave a proportionately larger reserve with which to meet all emergencies. In case of war or any other necessity, the Government of India could have armed a largely increased force without any difficulty. Now, with Natives armies at very low strength, the ratio of the reserve stock of small arms should be greater than formerly, as in case of war, internal or external, falling upon India, her few Native troops must of necessity take the field, and according to the circumstances of the war, fresh troops must be raised to replace those actively engaged; for, strictly speaking, we have no reserve of Native troops, unless a small excess of the Madras army can be called such, and yet the country, when stripped more or less of Native troops, must be held. As British troops must also of necessity, in case of war, be largely employed, practically their absence has to be temporarily supplemented by such means as are available. The smaller our Native armies the larger should be the ratio of our reserve stock of small arms to the peace establishment strength of the Native and European troops.

Although not opposed to utilize the muzzle-loader Enfield rifles, as set free, and found serviceable, by putting them into the hands of the Native troops, I cannot regard this as anything but a temporary measure, and one in some respects of doubtful expediency, as there is not only the doubt about the cartridge which may have passed away as a source of suspicion among the native troops, with whom in 1857 it was more a pretence than a reality, but there is the facility with which its ammunition can be made and procured.

I hold to the opinion that it is safer from the cautious and distrustful point of view, and more expedient from the points of view of efficiency and good policy, to be prepared to arm our Native troops with breech-loader weapons after the whole of our European troops shall have been thus provided. I would therefore avoid further indents for obsolete small arms, except to such very moderate degree as may be unavoidably necessary, and would inform the Secretary of State that we regard it as a mere question

of time, and of the outturn from the factories of breech-loader service weapons as affecting that time, when the Native troops must be armed similarly with the British troops. That consequently the present indent for breech-loader small arms has reference rather to the presumed capabilities of the factories to issue the new breech-loader weapon than to the ultimate requirements of the armies, including the native troops in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.

L.

EXTRACTS FROM A MINUTE ON THE STUD DEPARTMENT. DATED THE
16TH AUGUST, 1869.

The Military Department now places before Government, with a view to early decision and orders, three reports on the important question of Cavalry and Artillery Remounts :—

1st.—The Report of the Commission assembled by General Order by the Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army, of the 26th October, 1866, and communicated to the Government of India under a covering letter of the 14th June, 1869. These papers were received at Simla on the 5th July last.

2nd.—The Report of the Stud Committee assembled by the Government General Order of the 2nd October, 1868, and which is dated the 1st July, 1869, but which from the sickness of some of the members of the Committee and consequent delay in Press correction, &c., reached the Government of India somewhat later than the above date.

3rd.—The Report of the same Committee, dated the 24th July, 1869, upon the proposals of Mr. R. D. Ross, Army Commissariat, deputed by the Government of South Australia to explain its views.

2. Mr. Ross's proposals I take first, as they struck at the root of the whole question. They were that the Government of India should establish a depôt for horses at Port Darwin, in Clarence Strait, and draw the whole of the remounts for the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, which he estimated at 2,000 horses

per annum, from thence. The scheme contemplated as essential to its success the abolition of the Government studs and discontinuance of recourse to other countries from whence are procured, as shown in the Madras Committee's Report, a main part of the remounts for the armies of Madras and Bombay.

3. To this proposal there are, I think, the gravest political as well as economical objections. I have so repeatedly insisted in my minutes on military questions upon the vital necessity of India being, as far as possible, self-reliant, that I am half reluctant to be so often harping upon this principle. But any neglect of it might have such fatal consequences to our power in India that when I find it calmly proposed that the British Army in India is to be made entirely dependent on one source of supply for horses, namely, the distant one of Australia, with its long sea transport open to every kind of interruption in war, I may be excused in the face of what, from a military and political point of view, is so wild and dangerous a project for once more asserting the paramount necessity of India being self-reliant, and not dependent for the supply of its ordinary military requirements on long sea lines of communication, whether with Great Britain itself or its almost independent colonies.

4. I quite coincide that Australia, with its area not far short of twice that of our Indian Empire, could vastly increase its present total of 617,000 horses, and could supply our cavalry and artillery remounts. Of that, as far as mere numbers are concerned, there can be no doubt. I grant also that by a redundant importation, in excess of our actual requirements, the Government of India could make provision by large reserve depôts for the contingency of interrupted sea lines of communication; but no one in his senses would recommend this as good, financially, as an arrangement for the Government of India to adopt. Such reserve remounts would, whether imported some time previously in anticipation of war, or only immediately before its outbreak, cost in feed and keep in the one case, and in price in the other, in addition to feed and keep, enormous sums, and be anything but economical.

5. If State reasons are against the project, the Committee show satisfactorily that Mr. Ross had omitted from his estimate, when he arrived at the conclusion that the Government of India would save a clear sum of £16 on each remount they are now purchasing at £60, the cost of the construction, establishment, and maintenance of the Government depôt at Port Darwin, and had taken

an unusually low rate for freight charges. I agree with the Committee in their general conclusions that it would not be expedient for the Government to adopt the proposals of the Government of Australia as explained by Mr. Ross, for I feel certain that no material saving would be effected, but probably much the reverse, as I think the Committee have rather underestimated the cost of construction and maintenance of the depôt.

6. I agree, too, in their other general conclusions, that the regularity of supply, considering the routes and distances to be traversed from the breeding districts to Port Darwin, seems very doubtful; and that failure of supply, when all other sources had been closed, would be to our armies disastrous in the extreme. I think the Committee right when they hazard the probability of the trade, under the Port Darwin scheme, falling into the hands of a monopoly, and in their preference for the open market and deprecation of resort to any other course of supply from that quarter.

7. The Committee glance only incidentally at an objection to the Port Darwin scheme, which has great weight with myself. I advert to the difficulty of exercising proper supervision over a large and costly permanent depôt, such as we should have at Port Darwin. Practically, the Government of India could exercise no efficient control over it. Spasmodically it would, no doubt, attempt control, but would, as a rule, be baffled by the inherent difficulties of the unchecked growth of a system with which it had no means of coping, and to which the integrity of its own officers, supposing that to remain above suspicion, could offer but a weak barrier.

8. I can only regard Australia as an ancillary source of supply, not as one upon which India is to make its armies absolutely dependent. I therefore dismiss the further consideration of Mr. Ross's proposals, and turn to a consideration of the report of the Stud Committee.

11. It is manifest from the necessity we have been under for some years past of purchasing largely Australian horses that the Committee are indisputably right when they pronounce that they consider that the studs at present neither work satisfactorily nor are equal to the supply of the requirements of the service. The material point is, whether the suggestions made by the Committee will, if fairly carried out, enable the studs some years hence, and

at a more reasonable cost per remount, to meet the wants of the service.

12. To my mind it is pretty clear that if the suggestions of the committee be accepted and acted upon, it will take about an equal time, namely, ten years, to effect both a marked improvement in the produce of the studs and a supply of young horses adequate to the wants of at least the Bengal army.

22. I concur in the recommendation for the establishment of an experimental stud in the Punjab. As compared with Hurriana and parts of the Punjab, I know of no districts in India so well suited to rear a hardy race of horses. My impression is, that as these studs became developed, the value of the Central stud would gradually diminish, for that climate cannot be a good one in which to maintain a stud of which it can correctly be said that "any stud in the district would, if left to its own resources, speedily deteriorate in the quality of its produce." No such result has ever been experienced in the cattle of Hurriana, or in the horses formerly bred in the Punjab; and the consequence must be the gradual transfer of the Central stud to the more favourable northern tracts and studs.

23. It has been alleged that it is politically inexpedient to have a stud thrown so forward on our frontier as the Punjab; but this objection does not carry weight with myself.

24. I entirely concur with the Committee in its remarks on what it styles "the liberty principle" for young stock. There may be a few more hurts and accidents from the adoption of this system, but it will be compensated by the greater out-turn of well-developed and capable horses. The point cannot, in my opinion, be too forcibly insisted upon.

28. There is a point upon which I am not clear as to a satisfactory decision. It is the question of the best mode of introducing more trotter stallions. I concur entirely with the Committee in the value as a remount for cavalry or artillery of the three-parts bred, short-legged, weight-carrying, compact, powerful, active horse. Such an animal is out-and-out the most useful horse for the service. The class of horse which forms the staple of Irish and English hunters ridden by those who cannot afford to pay fancy prices may be taken as the kind of horse wanted. But how to obtain the stallions for this class of breed is the question. Colonel James takes a somewhat different view from the rest of

the Committee. It is the only point on which there is any difference of opinion, for on all others the Committee are unanimous—a somewhat extraordinary phenomenon where the multiplicity of questions have respect to horse-flesh. I am not competent to offer an opinion of any value on this important particular. But I am disposed to think Colonel James is right; for, as the Committee would purchase yearlings of the trotter and hunter class, I do not see how such young stallions could be shipped for India without great losses, and probably much detriment to the survivors before they recovered from the hardships of sea transport. I am therefore disposed to the opinion that Colonel James's suggestion for a farm in England to breed stallions and rear purchased stallion yearlings merits consideration. Both purposes might be combined.

31. I am not disposed to think that the south of India is likely to prove a favourable field for the creation of a breeding stud; and that the results of the Bengal studs should impose care how proposals of this kind may be entertained. We have as yet to await the views of the Committee, of which Mr. Fanc is president. I am, as at present informed, very much of the opinion quoted with approval by Mr. H. D. Phillips as his own, and that of Mr. Casamajor, that, as a rule, no really good horse was ever produced south of the Beemah.

32. It is perhaps too sanguine to contemplate such an improvement of the studs in the North-Western Provinces, in Hurriana, and the Punjab as to anticipate that they should be so developed as to be equal to the supply of more than the wants of the Bengal army. It will require some years to accomplish that degree of efficiency; but, supposing that attained in the course of the next eight or ten years, the further progress might be far more rapid, and I am disposed to think that Government should concentrate its efforts on the most promising field, and not fritter them away on experimental fields in the south of India.

33. It is unfortunate that the experience of the Madras Presidency is even more unfavourable to the Australian horse than that of the Bengal Presidency, and that the Madras Government has felt it to be its duty to restrict the purchase of Australian horses. Nothing can be more striking than the description of the Belooch horse given in paragraph 27 by the Madras Committee, and as the so-called northern horses are represented as being very mainly of this class, it might have been supposed that such Australian horses as are procured in open market at Calcutta

would have been far preferable. But though the Governor in Council expresses the opinion that the report of the remount commission leaves a more unfavourable impression on the mind in respect to the horses of the Madras army than is justified by the facts of the case, it is clear, from the remarks of the cavalry and artillery officers consulted by the commission, that in the absence of Arabs, Cape horses, and the real Persian horse, the service looked to stud horses, of which the officers who had served in Bengal spoke highly.

34. In the 15th paragraph of their order the Madras Government intimate their resolution to depute an officer to the Cape to report on that source of supply and to effect purchases. It is to be hoped that this trial may be more successful than preceding ones, for the Cape horse has always shown well as a serviceable horse in India; and if Madras could succeed in obtaining a better supply of remounts both from the Cape and Australia, that presidency might avoid competing for Gulf horses and northern horses with Bombay, which is better placed for securing the pick of those markets.

LI.

MINUTE UPON BARRACK EXPENDITURE. DATED SIMLA, THE 13TH
AUGUST, 1869.

The memorandum of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated Nynee Tal, 11th April, 1869, on the subject of a reduction of barrack accommodation, opens up the whole question both of the policy to be pursued with regard to the military occupation of India by our European troops, and of the mode in which provision is to be made for the accommodation of those troops. The letter addressed by the Quartermaster-General to the Inspector-General of Military Works, dated 24th May, 1869, is in the same sense, and may be considered conjointly with the memorandum of the 11th April.

2. The stress laid in the 11th and 12th paragraphs of this memorandum on the pressure exercised upon the Home and the Indian Governments for placing more European troops in the Hills, and the anticipation that at some future day the two Governments will have to yield on this point, bases the argument for reduction of accommodation in the Plains on a future change of policy.

With respect to such an anticipation, it must be observed that the advocates for placing a larger portion of our European forces in the Hills do not restrict themselves to a mere augmentation of the percentage on strength of regiments to be detached to the mountains, but have always pressed for much more than this, and have insisted, as they did before the Royal Commission in 1859 and 1861, on the expediency of stationing more whole regiments in the mountains. Under the supposition that the two Governments will be forced to yield to this pressure, it will not at all satisfy its purpose merely to increase the drafts from regiments sent to Hill depôts, for much more radical change of policy is involved.

3. The question was fully and deliberately considered not only in the report of the Royal Commission of the 19th May, 1863, but when that report reached India; also when in the Military Department in 1863 the distribution of the army of Bengal was decided upon; again, when in the Military Department the question of hill depôts for sick detachments, and of hill stations for whole regiments, was very carefully discussed so late as July and August, 1865. In various despatches the approval of the Secretaries of State has been communicated to the Government of India in connection with the series of measures both in the Military and in the Public Works Departments, which were consequent on these deliberations and decisions. If, therefore, a reversal of the policy thus far accepted and acted upon is to be contemplated, and to enter into our computations in the matter of barrack accommodation, we require the instructions of the Secretary of State.

4. I do not for a moment lose sight of the fact that the decisions of the Home and of the Indian Governments have been but very partially in accordance with the result of the inquiry of the Royal Commission given in few words at page seventy-five of the folio volume of their report. For the sake of convenience, the results as there stated are given below,* and it is only neces-

* "The result of our inquiry into the important subject of Hill stations may be given in a very few words, as follows :—

1st.—To reduce to a minimum the strategic points on the alluvial plains, and to hold in force as few unhealthy stations as possible.

2nd.—To locate a third part of the force required to hold these points on the nearest convenient hill station or elevated plain, including in this third, by preference, men whose constitutions are becoming enfeebled, and recruits on their first arrival; and to give the other two-thirds their turn.

3rd.—Never to trust to simple elevation as a means of protecting health; but while occupying the best available elevated stations, to place these (for they want it just as much as the stations in the Plains) in the very best sanitary condition.

sary to compare them with the resolution of the Government of India of the 24th August, 1865, on which we are now acting, to perceive that the latter falls far short of the conclusions of the Royal Commission. In my minute of the 27th July, 1865, I went further in favour of placing whole regiments in the Hills than was adopted by my honourable colleagues (the Commander-in-Chief included) in the resolution of the 24th August, 1865, but still far short of the principles laid down by the Royal Commission. In fact, I adhered in that minute to the views I expressed when giving evidence before the above-mentioned Sanitary Commission in 1861. I must add that since I recorded my opinions in 1865 I have seen no reason to modify them. I hold them still, and am not prepared, unless the Secretary of State take upon himself the responsibility of ordering a more entire compliance with the views of the Royal Commission, to change the policy which now regulates the military occupation of India, namely, that the evacuation of the Plains in favour of the Hills is inexpedient, because the prevention of insurrection and its attendant evils by the presence of troops judiciously distributed over this great empire is preferable to being forced, after outbreaks and disorder have gained head in consequence of the absence of troops, to have recourse to military operations to restore order and punish revolt.

5. For reasons briefly stated in my minute of the 27th July, 1865, I do not approve of the system of increasing the detachments sent to the Hills from regiments and batteries to 20 and 25 per cent., still less to a general order enforcing whether necessary or not, such a separation of men from their corps. But whether a system so injurious to discipline were to be adopted, or one of stationing additional regiments in the mountains were to be preferred, I think it essential that such a practical reversal of policy should be first carefully considered, and then, if approved, formally ordered, by the Secretary of State. For it would then become a reasonable question whether greater modifications than those recommended by the Commander-in-Chief should not have place. There are already 5,897 men in the Hills, exclusive of officers, but including working parties, which on a total of 37,502 establishment strength gives in Bengal close on 16 per cent in the Hills. Supposing it struck on the actual strength the result is over 16 per cent. But if we assume, as prognosticated in paragraph 12 of the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum, drafts to depôts to the amount of 20 per cent., we have an aggregate of 24

per cent. on establishment on actual strength. Regiments in the Plains would be left with a strength under 600 rank and file, say 570 to 580, of which a considerable proportion must be men in hospital, time-expired men, recruits, and men to be invalided. Practically regiments under such circumstances could hardly produce on emergency 400 effective firelocks, a body not equal to much of an effort, as a single skirmish may seriously cripple it. If we are to accept as a likely contingency a state of regiments so painfully unsatisfactory, it ceases to be a question of a reduction of accommodation to that which would suffice for 700 men, for that would be in excess of what would be required, as in reality there would then be only from 570 to 580 privates for whom to provide cover; that is, the reduction in barrack accommodation might amount to striking off about 300 rank and file per regiment, instead of 154; in other words, ought on the proposed principles of calculation to be double.

6. If it be proper, which I do not question, to exercise forethought with respect to the future, I would invite attention to facts noted in my minute of the 23rd May, 1865, when the question of reducing the strength of British regiments to 750 rank and file was before this Government. As shown by the extracts given below,* I then adverted to the risk of making the safety of India depend on the permanence and security of the Suez route as that upon which we could at all times rely for reliefs and drafts. The considerations then urged have equal validity against the restriction of barrack and hospital accommodation to calculations based on a minimum on a peace strength of 750 men; and they were thus applied at the time. I then not only opposed the notion that we could safely arrive at the English peace strength of regiments, that is 560 privates and 40 corporals, say about 600 men, but also objected to a number, 750, far below the ordinary strength of British regiments when sent abroad for service. Nothing that has happened in the east or west since May, 1865, has furnished grounds for modifying the opinions then expressed.

* "Even if the arrangements by the Suez route were invested with greater permanence and security than they really can be, I should demur to encouraging the notion that peace in India is the same thing as peace in England; and that the peace establishment for battalions in England is suitable to those in India. But our hold of India depends not only on the adequacy of our European force for fighting purposes in ordinary times, but also that it be such that a mere temporary interruption to our command of the sea do not seriously affect or prostrate the efficiency of the force. I think it would be dangerous in reliance on the Suez

7. In considering the subject before us, I do not deem it advisable to confine forethought as to future contingencies to the pressure of public opinion forcing Government to place more British troops in the Hills. For we cannot ignore the fact that public opinion is now compelling Her Majesty's Government to consider a question of the very gravest national importance, and one the solution of which, according to the statement of Her Majesty's Minister at War, does not contemplate any system of special regiments for service in India. I here advert to the sketch given by Mr. Cardwell of the measures to be introduced during the next session of Parliament, with a view to shortening the period of active service in the British army. As it has been distinctly announced that service in India is not to be an exemption or exceptionally treated, it follows that if the ordinary system be pursued, the charges on account of transport will be greatly enhanced, and a considerable portion of the British force must be always afloat, unless some modification of system be adopted, which, whilst avoiding any alteration of the fundamental period of service, shall yet diminish this palpable inconvenience. Although periods of regimental reliefs and the expiration of short service engagements may be said to have no necessary connection, yet in fact the forementioned inconvenience of having a minimum of utilization of the short service in consequence of so much of the force being afloat might be alleviated by an arrangement which has frequently been suggested, namely, the despatch of regiments of such original strength, and in

route, which in the present phase of naval armaments in Europe is especially exposed even to protracted interruption in case of sudden hostilities, to adopt the peace establishment strength of corps in England. However useful and advantageous the Suez route arrangements may prove, to risk the safety of India on their permanence seems inadvisable.

“Further, on the prospect of war in India or in the East likely to cause the serious employment of a part of the battalions forming the garrison of this country, the strength of such regiments and of any likely to come into play as reserves should be reinforced from England, and raised as rapidly as possible to a more efficient strength than 750 privates. Any Government would be culpable that neglected this obvious precaution, and it is palpable that the question of barrack and hospital accommodation will not safely bear to be narrowed down by calculations based on the minimum of 750 strength, still further reduced by the deductions which admit of being made on various accounts. It will be better to assume a higher strength as the basis of calculation, so that the work, when done, may suffice for any but exceptionally high requirements. A very contracted provision of barrack and hospital accommodation may, bearing in mind public feeling on this subject, as well as the health and comfort of the soldier, result in future heavy expenditure.”

the main constituted of men whose service has the greater part to be worked out, that allowing for a rate of annual diminution easily calculable they shall, at the expiration of a short tour of service in India, remain of efficient strength without intermediate receipts of batches of recruits. I am not myself in favour of discarding the idea of regiments for extended periods of service in India, or even for permanent service, with liability to be employed when necessary anywhere out of India; but if the principle enunciated by Mr. Cardwell is to be strictly adhered to, and no difference allowed with regard to India, then such a system as that above alluded to, where the reliefs are at short intervals, might be made to fit in with Mr. Cardwell's scheme economically. It is not likely to be overlooked in the consideration of this momentous subject, and if it were adopted, the proposed reduction of barrack and hospital accommodation would prove a serious embarrassment.

8. I now pass to the details of the proposed reductions; and the first remark I have to make is that every point has been previously fully discussed, and that not a single fresh argument has now been adduced. Of course it may be alleged that India is poorer than she was in 1865, and less able to incur the outlay necessary for the welfare of the British troops; but I dismiss such a statement as not worth serious refutation. The assertion would impose upon no one of ordinary information. In fact, whatever the shuffling of the financial cards, such an argument is, in my opinion, an insult to common sense, and implies confidence in the ignorance of those to whom it is addressed.

9. With respect to details, the following is a brief summary of what has passed up to the present time. In March, 1865, it was decided, upon the urgent representations of Sir Hugh Rose and Sir Robert Napier, who had, in fact, pressed for even more, namely, twenty-two per room, that each company of infantry was to have four dormitories, each containing twenty beds. In a despatch to the Secretary of State of the 30th June, 1865, it was recommended, in consequence of a minute by Sir William Mansfield, to reduce the dormitory accommodation to sixteen beds per room. In minutes of the 26th and 29th of June, 1865, I dissented from this proposition; and in a minute of the 16th December, 1865, I showed by a return from the Adjutant-General's Department that on the 1st January, 1865, if the proposal of sixteen men per dormitory were adopted, twenty-four out of thirty-six regiments would have been without sufficient accommodation for an aggregate of 1,591 men, or nearly the strength of

two regiments; and that even on the scale of eighteen men to a dormitory, seven regiments would have had a deficiency for a total of 464 men.

10. It must be remembered that the Government of India, when recommending the reduction from twenty beds to sixteen per room, did so on the ground of "the intention of the Government of India to develop the sanitary Hill depôts system so as to insure accommodation in the Hills for about 10 per cent. of the strength of the army," and also on the ground of "a recommendation having been made to reduce the number of privates in a regiment to 750 men."

11. The reply to this recommendation was decisive on the part of the Secretary of State. He replied emphatically—"I question the wisdom of reducing to so low a point as that which has been proposed the accommodation in each sleeping room, and I do not think it should be less than for eighteen men, notwithstanding the proposed reduction in the number of men per regiment."

12. I must add that the decision thus communicated was dated the 8th November, 1865, and that it reached the Government of India before my minute of the 16th December, 1865, had been transmitted home. It is clear, therefore, that the latter, which was not forwarded in consequence of the arrival of the above decision settling the question, could have had no influence on orders passed independently of a return which, had it been before the Secretary of State, could scarcely have failed to confirm the Home authorities in the correctness of their decision. I should now wish that a copy of my minute of the 16th December, 1865, and of the return to which it refers, be appended to this minute.

13. I have no doubt, notwithstanding that regiments have been allowed to fall very much under their proper establishment strength, that similar returns for the 1st January, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, when men have returned from the Hills to their regiments, would show corresponding results. I am not prepared, therefore, to accept computations based on the number of absentees from their regiments in June as at all giving a correct representation of the accommodation necessary for the troops during the cold season, when most of the absentees join their corps. If the return for the 1st January, 1869, of men left in the Hills were compared with that for the 1st of June, which shows 1,676 men at Hill depôts, it would be found that the year did not greatly differ from that of 1865, when only 405 men remained in the Hills on the 1st January. Even assuming that the present

peace establishment was to be considered permanent and not exposed to future contingencies, still without returns of the kind and for the years I have mentioned, during which there has been no very great variation of strength of British troops except that as before remarked, the regiments are now far below their proper strength, it is palpably contrary to the data for 1865 to proceed upon hypothetical assumptions in a matter of such grave importance. I trust, therefore, that neither the Government of India nor Her Majesty's Secretary of State will depart from the deliberate, and, in my opinion, very sound, decision of November, 1865, without being first in possession of reliable data warranting a change of orders. It would be desirable that such returns were not limited to the 1st January, but comprised the months of November, December, January, February and March for the years 1864-65, 1865-66, 1866-67, 1867-68, 1868-69, and it must be remembered that they will be affected by the fact that on the 1st June, 1869, there was a deficiency of 3,510 to complete the establishment strength. For whilst twelve regiments had a small excess, no less than forty infantry regiments were more or less wanting in their proper complement. The cavalry also was deficient by 297, and probably the artillery also proportionately wanting its fixed complement.

14. It is indubitable that Hill depôts will, when complete and viewed in connection with accommodation in the Plains, be double provision for 3,230 men. The same may be said of hospitals. But as every consideration of efficiency and discipline renders it imperative that as large a number as possible return to their colours at the commencement of the cold season, and that the regiments during that period of five months be as strong as practicable for all purposes of military training, I fail to see how, consistently with the requirements of discipline and efficiency of men and officers, this result of any scheme of Hill depôts can be avoided any more than in hospitals. Besides, a glance at the returns of details of convalescents and sick sent to Hill depôts proves that, though the aggregate of men at depôts may only vary within certain limits, there is the greatest discrepancy as to the numbers sent by regiments of similar strength. Those in healthy stations, or whose general health is good, send few, the unhealthy stations send many. The one regiment needs in the Plains accommodation for nearly its full strength; another for somewhat less; a third for a good deal less. But there is no *permanence* on this point either as to stations or regiments; on the contrary much oscillation and un-

certainty. Nor can this inseparable condition of service in India be remedied by such a General Order as is contemplated in paragraph six of the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum. Whilst a regiment or a battery may not need to send three or five per cent. to Hill depôts, others may have to send ten or twelve per cent., others fifteen or twenty, or even more. The sanitary status of corps and stations cannot be predicated as constants for reducing accommodation in the Plains in exact proportion to that provided at Hill depôts; both regiments and stations are subject to fluctuations and disturbances of sanitary conditions that preclude such a course. No one can foretell what proportion of the Hill depôt accommodation will be required for this Military Division or that Military Division, consequently no one can predict where full accommodation in the Plains may be necessary, or the reverse. But it must be there when required.

15. The foregoing I regard as a fundamental objection to the proposed reductions, which are regarded as feasible, either by reducing the area of barracks where they have not as yet been commenced, or by reducing the number of barracks where these have been commenced.

16. The first mode of reduction involves a recast of all the auxiliary accommodation, the day and mess-rooms, &c., on the lower floors. With regard to this class of accommodation, it must be distinctly borne in mind that it did not originate with the whims of commanding officers, nor rest with the Engineers who had to plan the barracks, but that the whole was prescribed as necessary by the Home and Military authorities acting in accordance with public feeling and the requirements of the Royal Commission. Further, that one reason for preferring the eighteen beds per room was that this area admitted, though it but barely admitted, of these requirements being met, whilst lower numbers, such as sixteen and fourteen beds, precluded compliance with what was laid down as indispensable. On this subject it must be specially remarked that the alleged superabundance and liberality of this class of accommodation is only one-sixth more in the new than the soldier had before in the old description of barracks, the plan of which was condemned, among other reasons, for neglecting to provide properly for the reasonable wants and comfort of the soldier. Not only was this class of accommodation arranged as to its details by the Inspector-General of Military Works in consultation with the Military authorities here in India, but according to orders the whole of the plans and arrangements were submitted

to the Secretary of State for the criticism of the Home authorities. Under these circumstances, if, in consequence of a reduction of dormitory accommodation, there is to be a departure from the amount of auxiliary and day and mess-room accommodation of various kinds sanctioned after so much careful study and inquiry, the Secretary of State must manifestly be consulted, and the whole question of this class of accommodation be re-opened, as also the details of its combination, when modified, with the barrack plans.

17. Besides proving just sufficient to afford in the lower story the required auxiliary accommodation of sorts, the allowance of eighteen beds per room presented the further advantage that when regiments should be over the ordinary strength, either in war time or when swelled by volunteers from departing regiments, the additional strength of men could be accommodated by a temporary diversion of mess and day rooms to dormitory purposes. Under exceptional circumstances, a regiment of a thousand men might, with the temporary inconvenience of thus occupying mess and day rooms, be provided with good cover. There was thus combined the fulfilment of two objects,—the adequate provision of a class of accommodation pronounced authoritatively to be indispensable for the comfort of the soldier, and a reserve of available room to satisfy unexpected emergencies.

18. The other mode of reduction, namely, by diminishing the number of barracks, involves the same consequences. A certain amount of auxiliary accommodation must either be omitted or provided for by separate buildings. This again demands reference to the Home authorities for our guidance.

19. Whatever may be the barrack and hospital accommodation provided by Her Majesty's Government in the Crown Colonies, which are mostly in temperate, and only partially in tropical zones, it must not be forgotten that their barracks were constructed before the public movement inaugurated by Florence Nightingale took place, and that public opinion has pronounced so strongly and unmistakably against the barracks and guard rooms of England that the more modern structures of that kind are vast improvements on the old. Besides, service in India must be regarded as exceptional and as necessitating, on the part of the Government of India, which employs so large a part of Her Majesty's army, special exertion to accomplish what is possible in mitigation of the severity of the climate, and in reduction of the heavy annual mortality, which, besides the detriment to the State of a terrible consumption of valuable soldiers, was thought to

have a very prejudicial effect on the recruiting of the British army. Considering the strength of British troops demanded to garrison India, the cost of those troops, and their value as the safety and the very marrow of our power, the bad name service in India had notoriously acquired among the lower orders in England, and the desire to improve the class as well as the number of recruits when wanted, it was a wise and a far-sighted policy to expect such exertion on the part of the Government of India, and it is not a policy which, in my opinion, we should tamper with.

20. It is palpably the case that the scheme of eighteen beds per room gives a small excess of accommodation over the strength of 810 privates. It gives an excess of forty-four men, the number allowed for the band.* For obvious reasons, the band barrack is kept separate from the others; but if this attention to the general comfort of the soldier be deemed too great a refinement, the discrepancy could be removed by knocking off the separate band barrack. But the excess due to the eighteen men per dormitory was preferred among other reasons to a lower provision of accommodation in deference to a feeling entertained of late years with equal force and propriety. The rate of sixteen men per room gave too low a total, and it was essential to make allowance for a deficiency which frequently happens in the authorized complement of married men with a regiment; yet equally necessary is it to provide that when the married men approached the complement allowed, regimentally the excessively objectionable practice of mixing up the married and unmarried men in the same barrack ranges might be avoided. I cannot bring myself to regard this as a piece of needless consideration or hyper-refinement. I think it due to the married soldier and his family, and an additional proof, if any were wanted, how carefully thought out on every point was the selection of eighteen beds per room.

21. Supposing the two methods of reduction to be attempted, the reduction of 154 men per regiment can be approximated to by either knocking off four half-company barracks on the 18 beds scale, which gives 144, or 10 under the 154; or by the adoption

* Married men	90
Band	44
40 rooms × 18 =	720
					720
			Total	...	854

of 14 men per room, which would give a total of 6 men short of the 700.*

22. Now, under the supposition that a General Order were issued, which, I think, would be wrong in principle, forcing commanding officers to send from every regiment and battery, whether necessary or not, their full quota of 10 per cent. to the Hill depôts; supposing, too, that those men when they rejoined their regiments for four or five months in the cold season needed no cover, which I do not admit; and that, consequently, the reduction could be effected to the full extent proposed; it is necessary to see where an application of these two modes of reducing accommodation could take effect in order to estimate the real financial result. I cannot reject from this consideration the present state of progress in the provision of barrack accommodation, nor the fact that reductions could not be made at Peshawur, Rangoon, and the Hill stations. It follows that the proposed reductions could only be carried out at certain stations, and those on a scrutiny of the details of progress must be the undermentioned:—

1st.—Stations where new barracks have to be built, but are not commenced, and where therefore the 14 beds per room could be applied—

									<i>Reduction.</i>
Dinapore	160
Hazareebaugh	160
Benares (Wing)	80
Meerut	160
Sydun Baolee	160
Ferozepore	160
Sealkote	160
									<u>1,040</u>

2nd.—Stations where knocking off four half-company barracks could be applied—

Moradabad (Wing)	72
Mhow	144
									<u>216</u>
									<u>1,040+216= 1,256</u>

* Married men	90
Band	44
40 rooms × 14 =	560
								<u>694</u>

I have not entered stations where the barracks are well advanced, for the obvious reason that, to throw away good work done and good accommodation, would be held ridiculous by the most unflinching economist. The stations are:—Mooltan, Jullundur, Saugor, Fyzabad, Seetapore.

23. Assuming the cost per man at the liberal rate of Rs. 1,500, the saving thus effected would be $1,256 \times 1,500 =$ Rs. 1,884,000, or £188,400, that is a saving of 1·7 per cent., or well under 2 per cent. on the eleven millions for barrack expenditure. Even if the folly, as I should think it would be generally regarded, of stopping barracks well advanced were perpetrated, and the reduction of men due to Mooltan, Jullundur, Saugor, Fyzabad, and Seetapore included, raising the total reduction to 2,136 men, the saving on the eleven millions would be a little under 3 per cent., and would amount to about £320,000. Whether it be worth while to re-open the whole subject of barrack accommodation with the view of getting insufficient and worse auxiliary accommodation for the men, besides insufficient barrack accommodation for State purposes, in order to save 2 per cent. on the eleven millions, is of course a question on which there may be a difference of opinion; but to my mind it is utterly inexpedient seriously to cripple the barrack accommodation of the State, and to diminish the auxiliary and mess and day-room accommodation of the men, besides leaving some of them for four or five months of the year without barrack accommodation at all, unless always and systematically obtained at the expense of the comfort of the men in the Plains, in order to accomplish a saving of 2 per cent. on the estimated outlay. The comfort and welfare of the British soldier has, I feel, to be thought of in India as a *per contra* to the 2 per cent.

24. When the budget estimate for the current year, 1869-70, was under consideration, I stated that the building of barrack and hospital accommodation was in full swing; that the grant for 1868-69 would be worked up to and expended; and I opposed and deprecated the heavy reduction made on the Military Public Works Grant estimated for 1869-70 as necessary. That reduction was made on the assumption that, as the budget grant for 1868-69 would not be expended, that for 1869-70 could be reduced without detriment to the actual progress which the Department could accomplish. There is now proof by the statement of the Accountant-General,* that in 1868-69 the total expenditure on military works has amounted to about 210 lakhs, against a budget grant, exclud-

* *Vide* appended statement.—A.

ing stores from England, of 217 lakhs, and a regular estimate of 197 lakhs. It proves, therefore, that the expenditure has been 13 lakhs more than the regular estimate, and 7 lakhs less than the grant, excluding stores from England. This in itself is a sufficient proof of the inexpediency of the reduction of the grant for the current year to 180 lakhs, that is, to 30 lakhs less than the expenditure of the last year, contrary to the advice both of Colonel Dickens, the Secretary in the Public Works Department, and Colonel Crommelin, the Inspector-General of Military Works. But if other evidence were wanted there is plenty of it.

25. The fact is that the reduction made in the grant for military works was so sudden and so large that it involved stoppage of works and all the attendant loss and inconvenience of such a procedure. I call special attention to the remonstrances of the Bombay Government. I am aware that the high rates of the Bombay estimates for barrack accommodation has been advanced as a reason for the proposed reduction of barrack accommodation in Bengal, a reasoning which is quite inadmissible; for wherever it may be necessary, we are bound by every consideration of sound policy, economy, and humanity to provide proper accommodation for our British troops. The fact that Bombay may be behind-hand in this matter, and that their estimates are high, does not remove the necessity for fulfilling this duty adequately in Bombay without detriment to Bengal. We may, as already done more than once, force them to revise and reduce their high estimates; but sudden interruption to works in full construction is certainly not the way to secure economy of construction; it may delay but cannot force them to dispense with suitable cover for Her Majesty's troops. The result of the reduction of their budget grant from $39\frac{1}{2}$ to 29 lakhs is shown in their repeated remonstrances, in which they detail the various works in progress in the cantonments of the Bombay Presidency, prove how the existing grant is utterly and totally inadequate to ensure proper progress, and that in some cases the grants for works will be exhausted by the end of July, leaving nothing to be done for the remainder of the year, and dwell on the false economy of retarding construction.

26. From the Bengal Government, which had reduced its budget estimate from 36 to 25 lakhs, the sudden order for a reduction of 6 lakhs produced a remonstrance, showing the great difficulty of carrying out the order, and that it was impossible to obey it. The Government of India, forced to admit the strength of the representation, conceded a lakh to Bengal, but took the amount from

the Central India Grant. However, this concession has proved insufficient, and the Government of Bengal report that lines for a Native regiment at Alipore cannot be constructed from want of funds unless an additional grant be made, or other works already unsparingly reduced be checked, which must in effect mean that they will be stopped.

27. From Rajpootana and Central India we have had what are practically remonstrances, and in the Punjab, at Rawul Pindee, the barracks, already well advanced, are stopped in construction for want of funds.

28. It would, however, be an unpardonable error to imagine that the fact of no formal remonstrance having been made by a local government or administration is any argument that the enforced retardation of many necessary works was not objectionable. Their reduction statements are in themselves to any one acquainted with the history of some of the works the strongest possible remonstrance. It would extend this minute too much were I to enter upon this subject. I refer, however, to those reduction statements where it is seen that hospitals, barracks, arsenals, forts, the evacuation of mosques or sacred buildings, and a variety of minor works, such as water supply, &c., have been either suddenly retarded, or for the present abandoned in consequence of this summary withdrawal of funds. I say "all necessary," because nothing can have been greater than the care and discussion prior to the admission of works as necessary. The best proof of this being the number of stations, such as Umballa, Cawnpore, Ferozepore, Kamptee, Jubbulpore, Dinapore, Hazareebaugh, &c., where, by improving existing barracks, or deferring as long as safe to substitute new ones for old and imperfect and objectionable structures, Government has been able to put off, if not able in the sequel to avoid, considerable expenditure.

29. The argument that it is a financial necessity to cripple and retard the completion of proper barrack and hospital accommodation for an indefinite period with a view of not bearing too hard on the annual revenue, upon which it was arbitrarily made a charge, in order to afford colourable justification to the imposition of an Income-tax, does not, in my opinion, merit serious controversy. The same authority that reversed the sanction accorded by Sir C. Wood can again by a stroke of the pen authorize what Sir C. Wood had approved, and by doing so can relieve the artificial difficulty which now hampers to a very unnecessary degree every Indian budget. It is futile to speak of similar demands

arising in the future as a defence for casting on the present the whole burthen of an expenditure that should at least be spread over twenty years. If we were likely to advance our frontiers, and in the course of doing so had to desert existing military stations, there would be more show of reason in the plea of an apprehension of similar requirements in future. But our Empire has attained its natural limits, and no man, who knows what is beyond them, can contemplate advance of our frontiers as either probable or desirable. Our stations are, with few exceptions, strategically well placed on the great lines of railway and river communication, and there are very few either in Bengal or in Madras and Bombay that could be thrown up as having ceased to be necessary to the secure military occupation of the country.

30. But even if the present uneconomical system, for it is hugely so, of condensing on revenue the whole charge within the year, be maintained for the sake of consistency, I deprecate cramping and treating the Military Public Works outlay as has this year been done, or making inadvisable reductions of accommodation to save 2 per cent. on the gross expenditure. There are items of civil expenditure on which reductions and retardation are just as feasible and far less questionable in policy than the starving of necessary military works. By the accompanying statement, showing the expenditure on military works, including the budget grant for 1869-70, we shall have spent upwards of seven millions out of the eleven; and the only possible result of needlessly protracting what remains to be done is not economy but a protracted, and therefore enhanced, outlay on establishments which cannot be dispensed with, and which must be maintained even when work is crippled and retarded by want of funds.

31. Whilst we are plunging with unprecedented readiness and liberality on an expenditure of millions on what are styled reproductive works, and undertaking to construct railways, we are not only grudging a necessary outlay on cover for our British troops, but so managing the Military Public Works that the course pursued is not likely to enhance in general estimation the efficiency of our Public Works Department to carry out some of the gigantic undertakings to which the Government of India is pledged, and on which it has already embarked. Public confidence is hardly likely to be increased by observing the changes of policy and procedure in so simple a matter as barrack accommodation, and the loss and delay caused by an inadequate supply of funds, and the

untimely stoppage of works. The public will not fail to observe either that, whilst we are at a loss for qualified officers for irrigation and other works, we adopt a system by which we absorb on the construction of barracks for a needlessly protracted period a large staff of some of our best engineers, civil and military.

32. There is one other point upon which I must dwell, and that is the inexpediency, from motives of economy, of having recourse to temporary structures. Whether in the Hills or in the Plains recourse be had to this mode of building it is waste of public money in the long run. I call attention to the appended statement, where it will be seen that the barracks built at Dugshai from 1851 to 1858 were, after a series of repairs and defensive additions, condemned in 1864. The barracks for married men at Subathoo and Sinchall tell in the statement their own story, but not the waste of money in repairs, patching, propping, &c., and in the end to no purpose at Sinchall, where barracks built in 1857-58 are abandoned in 1868. In the Plains it is the same tale. At Umballa the barracks may be said to have been twice rebuilt since first construction; at Loodianah some of the temporary barracks were blown down, and killed and injured many of Her Majesty's 50th regiment; at Ferozepore the Artillery and Infantry barracks have long been condemned, after having cost largely in the course of maintenance and occupation; at Hazareebaugh there has been two sets of barracks, and the last built in 1858-59 are to be replaced by new ones. It is of course necessary, under certain circumstances, to hut men and officers, as now is the case at Chukrata, but this temporary shelter will have to be replaced by permanent accommodation, and I am not in favour of having recourse to temporary huts at Kailana for the depôt.

LII.

EXTRACTS FROM A MINUTE ON THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE. DATED THE 30TH AUGUST, 1869.

The despatch of the Secretary of State, Financial No. 52, dated the 26th January, 1869, was communicated to the Military Department by a confidential docket dated 1st March, 1869.

2. With regard to "a general and searching review of military expenditure in all branches on the same principle as that adopted

in 1859-60," I concur with the opinion expressed by the Governor in Council at Bombay, namely, "that when the Government has selected the most experienced men for the heads of supply departments, and for the office of controller, which is in fact a permanent commission for inquiry into such matters, it is doubtful whether under ordinary circumstances, as at present, anything would be really gained by the appointment of a Special Commission."

4. It was well known in India, though it appears not to be equally so in England, that all that was done of real value in 1859-60 was not the work of the commission, but of the heads of departments, and that what the commission did arbitrarily and summarily on its own intelligence proved baneful to the efficiency of the service, and most uneconomical in its results. It might be held invidious to review the instances to which I allude, but without going to that length I may be permitted to observe that a commission of the kind, anxious to signalize itself and to vindicate the necessity for its appointment, and sensible at the same time that the responsibility of its summary and capricious reductions can by no possibility fall on its own shoulders, but will drop on those of the departments who are subjected to its final experiments, is the very worst form of action in India. I must also be permitted to observe that the irresponsible commission above adverted to proceeded to such lengths that I felt it my duty in the Council of the Secretary of State for India to point out that it had overstepped its own and had assumed the functions of the Governor-General in Council, and that it was necessary to conclude its existence, which was done. I am therefore strongly opposed to repeating a measure of which Lord Canning had experienced the full evil before he was relieved of it.

5. On special subjects I fully appreciate the value of commissions composed of carefully selected men of competent knowledge and experience in the specific question put before them. The Stud Committee is an instance, and others could be easily adduced. But a general commission to do that which the Government is alone competent to perform seems to me an anomaly derived from parliamentary precedent, wholly inapplicable to the condition of affairs in India, and to be avoided.

6. It must be added that the practice of referring to the Controller-General for reports on the financial bearing and consequences of every military measure connected with expenditure, and the discretion allowed, and in my opinion very wisely allowed,

to the Controller-General, to offer suggestions and advice, has matured in the Department of Military Accounts, and its head, a comprehensive grasp of the generals and the details of military finance unsurpassed in accuracy by any other financial department of the State. It is very unadvisable to throw out of gear a machine of this kind just as it has got into good working order. With this expression of my own views, that a general and searching review of military expenditure in all branches can be carried out on sounder principles than by the spasmodic process of 1859-60, I proceed to notice the question of the Stud Department.

7. *Studs*.—It appears, after a careful analysis of the stud and remount charges of the three presidencies, that the Controller-General* arrives at the conclusion that the remounts at Bombay do not cost above Rs. 500, or at Madras Rs. 729; whilst in Bengal the average is Rs. 1,485, or, allowing for increase of stock, Rs. 1,287 each; and he records his conviction that in a purely financial point of view the result is most unsatisfactory.

8. In the report of the Stud Committee it is shewn that the cost of a stud remount has been as follows :—

	Rs.
For seven years (1861-62 to 1867-68 inclusive)	1,485.
„ five „ (1863-64 „ „)	1,789.
„ three „ (1865-66 „ „)	2,194.

Colonel James, a member of the committee, would exclude the sum of Rs. 860,727 included in the statement of gross expenditure, and this reduces the cost of a remount to Rs. 1,326, instead of Rs. 1,485; but even if this view be accepted, there remains the indubitable fact not only of the enormous cost of the Bengal stud remounts, but also of a steady and enormous increase in the annual cost of our remounts. It should also be noted that the rent of the lands occupied by the stud is not, except where rent is paid, charged against the stud. The revenue that would be derived from the Government estates is altogether omitted from account, yet it might be fairly regarded as a charge against the stud. Thus it appears, assuming that the Stud Committee calculations are correct, that for the three years 1865-66 to 1867-68 inclusive, the Bengal stud remounts have cost four times the amount of Bombay remounts, and three times the cost of Madras remounts. Certainly, both upon the laborious inquiry and report of the Stud Committee, and upon the searching financial analysis

* *Vide* para. 13 of his review, &c., &c.

of the Controller-General, it is impossible to conceive anything much more unsatisfactory than such a state of Bengal stud outturn.

9. It almost would warrant the extinction of the Bengal Stud Department without further delay. Against a summary procedure of this kind, however, which would involve a sacrifice of nearly a million sterling of capital, there are the serious objections to India becoming entirely dependent on foreign and colonial sources for a supply of horses for military purposes, and thus of her being exposed to the danger, latterly so greatly increased, of having her supply of horses seriously interrupted by naval warfare. Besides the dangers of a dependence of this description, it must be remembered that the moment India ceased to be self-reliant she would be at the mercy of Cape or Australian or Gulf horse-breeders and dealers, who would raise the price of remounts, also at the mercy of shipowners and others unconnected with India, and that the money thus spent on imported horses, instead of circulating in India, would pass into the pockets of those wholly unconnected with India. As the Stud Committee do not despair of such reductions, modifications and improvements in stud management as shall, whilst giving better horses, diminish the cost of stud remounts to a reasonable price, I am in favour of acting on their recommendations, and have, in a separate minute on their report, pointed out how, in my opinion, action may at once be taken.

18. I have, in my minute on the report of the Stud Committee, supported their recommendation for the establishment of a Remount Depôt, partly for the reasons they have assigned, but also for one which did not enter into their consideration. In the event of the Stud Department failing in the course of the next few years to improve their produce and the number of remounts; in fact, should the liberty principle and the breeding in Hurriana and the Punjab not succeed, and the abolition of the studs and substitution of colonial and foreign remounts be forced upon Government, the expansion of the remount Depôt to the required extent would be an easier and more satisfactory operation than if it had to be created to meet the emergency wholly *de novo*, and without any experience in the working or management of such a reserve. The officer in charge of the Remount Depôt being independent of the Stud Department would be an effective check on the outturn of the stud remounts, and a comparison of the annual returns of the Stud and the Remount Depôt would

enable Government to measure exactly the real progress and promise of the studs.

19. I see no reason, however, why Hurriana and the Punjab should fail as good horse-breeding countries; and if the stud officers can heartily enter into the new system, it may be fairly anticipated that in the course of ten years the Central Stud would not only have been wholly abolished, but the breeding operations transferred to much more favourable tracts of country, where they could be conducted on so free and natural a scale and system as to ensure a good, adequate, and far cheaper supply of Stud Remounts than at present.

20. When dealing with the supply of army requirements, it is eminently indispensable in India to bear in mind the contingency of war and its drain on resources. From this point of view also, pending the anticipated development of the stud supply, the maintenance of the Remount Depôt is advisable. For should, through any misfortune, war overtake us before the Stud Department has had time to improve up to the mark it is expected to attain, the sudden expansion of the Remount Depôt by colonial and foreign purchases would be an immediate necessity, and could be managed with less wasteful expenditure. I am aware that, when proposing army reductions, it is not the fashion to contemplate such contingencies, and that financially they are regarded as extraordinary calls best left to the future to be met as circumstances arise; but I have seen too much of the results of such short-sighted economy to view it as being anything else but synonymous with future lavish outlay. As armies are meant for war, and are a weakness and disgrace if war find them unequal to its strain, my object in this minute is to combine economy with war efficiency in the hour of need. I cannot but think that if we can realize in the Stud Department, by the sale of estates and by sales of "bad" and "fair" stock and other reductions, from 17 to 20 lakhs, as much will have been effected as the Secretary of State could expect. Consistently with the future progress of the Stud Department greater reduction is hardly compatible, and some cost will be incurred in Hurriana and the Punjab.

I now pass on to other subjects noted in the despatch of the Secretary of State.

27. As the Secretary of State has called special attention to the Grant I. for Army and Garrison Staff, I shall offer some remarks

upon it. I must premise that in a minute of the 23rd July, 1868, when adverting to an able report by Colonel Norman on the reduction that might be effected in the army staff in the Madras and Bombay presidencies, I deferred, for the reasons assigned therein, the review of the organization of our higher military commands. I think the juncture has arrived, in consequence of the Secretary of State's despatch of the 26th January last, for now offering such remarks as I have to make upon this important subject, one which my minutes of the 21st July, 1868, and 23rd July, 1868, show to have been for some time anteriorly matter of reflection.

28. Whilst accepting the feasibility of Colonel Norman's proposed reductions, I pointed out that they would, as parts of one great scheme, be less likely to excite opposition than if pressed at that time on unwilling Governments. I pointed out that the smallness of the Native armies at Bombay and Madras as compared with former times, the moderate strength of their European force, and the conditions under which the reliefs of the European troops for Bengal, Madras and Bombay are carried out, all seemed to me to point to the military arrangements of Commanders-in-Chief being modified so as to concentrate under one executive military command and head all the movements and reliefs, and to reduce the commands at Madras and Bombay to a position more subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief in India than is at present the case. I also stated my conviction that it would not be very long before the exigencies of the service would, in spite of any reluctance to diminish the status of the subordinate commands and the importance of local governments, force this question upon the consideration of the Home and the Indian Governments.

29. Supposing the time to have arrived for considering this question, both in connection with economy and efficiency, it involves in one respect a constitutional change. I would propose but one Commander-in-Chief, and that the commands of the Madras and Bombay armies be merged in that command. But under such circumstances I am of opinion that the Commander-in-Chief should not have a seat in the Council of the Governor General, but should be set free for an active, though not hurried, supervision of every part of his executive command. It is only by such devotion of time and attention to the duties of his charge that a Commander-in-Chief can acquire a practical and thorough knowledge of the state of the different parts of the army, and of

the disposition and character of the men and officers which constitute the forces under him. To do full justice to so great a charge demands undivided attention, and to be untrammelled by the sessions of a Council. Such a change would also remove the anomaly of the Commander-in-Chief, as Extraordinary Member of Council, taking part in a review of his own executive acts. As part of the salary of the Commander-in-Chief was originally due to the position generally given him in the Council of the Governor-General, some reduction might be made, though moderate, as the control of the Madras and Bombay armies would be added. Still I think that the Commander-in-Chief would be well paid by being assigned a salary equal to that of the ordinary members of the Council of the Governor-General, viz., £8,000 per annum. This would effect a reduction of £2,000 per annum.

30. The Madras and Bombay forces are in reality not more than each a weak *corps d'armée*, and in no other army in the world would separate Commanders-in-Chief be assigned to such forces. When the difficulties of communication rendered intercourse between the presidencies slow and tedious, and when the Native armies were much stronger than they are at present, there was a practical reason for these commands being separate from that of Bengal. Powerful Native States intervened, and there was not that unity of British dominion and coherence of its parts which now has place. All this has greatly changed, and even with the addition of the Madras and Bombay armies, the Commander-in-Chief, at the head of 192,762, or 191,704 European and Native troops, could move about and inspect and control that whole force far easier than in 1857 he could the 160,133 which constituted the Bengal force alone. The difference of about 32,000 men which would be in excess of the command in 1857 is more than compensated by the facilities which railways alone afford for the movements of a Commander-in-Chief and steam communication has improved as well as railways. In 1857, the Madras command was over a force numbering 61,970; it is now reduced to 44,852, and admits avowedly of still further reduction. The Bombay command was in 1857 over a force of 55,643; it is now reduced to a force of 46,874, all told. Under these circumstances I cannot see the necessity for maintaining in 1869 the same amount of commands-in-chief for a total of 192,000 men as was kept up in 1857 for 276,000 men, when neither railways nor steam communication at all presented the facilities of locomotion they now offer. I am

therefore of opinion that, without any detriment to the service, a saving of £23,000 can be effected by the reduction of the Madras and Bombay commands-in-chief.

31. I do not think that this proposal involves, as supposed by my honourable colleague, Sir R. Temple, a fusion of the Native armies and a loss of their traditions. This result is not a necessary consequence, for there is nothing to prevent the department of the Adjutant-General having, when amalgamated, distinct sections for the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Native armies, the recruiting of which should, in my opinion, be kept perfectly distinct, the reliefs of which also should be made to circulate within, so to speak, provincial limits. I have no doubt that the concentration of three commands under one Commander-in-Chief would result in a reduction of the departments of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, inasmuch as the substitution of one headquarters for three headquarters could not fail to effect some considerable reduction of these now distinct establishments. Manifestly, instead of three Adjutants-General and three Quartermasters-General, one Adjutant-General and one Quartermaster-General would suffice, though three Deputy Adjutants-General and three Deputy Quartermasters-General might still be required for these administrative departments at first. I say at first, because there is no reason why ultimately some further reduction should not be possible. The reduction of two Adjutants-General and two Quartermasters-General would yield about £10,000, and the concentration of the establishments might give a further £4,000. Altogether, therefore, the reduction of the two minor commands-in-chief and of their appendant Adjutants and Quartermasters-General would result in a saving of about £37,000 per annum.

Adding the reduction on the Commander-in-Chief's salary of £2,000 and that proposed by Colonel Norman of £8,623, there results a total on Grant I. of £47,623.

This would reduce the Grant I. from £529,840 to £482,217. This may not seem a large amount, but it would incidentally effect greater economies, as I shall show hereafter.

32. If it were thought too sweeping a change and objectionable on political or administrative grounds, then I am strongly of opinion that the commands of the Madras and Bombay armies might be amalgamated, and that the Indian forces might then practically be under one Commander-in-Chief, having under him all the troops to the line of the Nerbuddah, and a second Commander-

in-Chief, subordinate to the first, having under him all the forces south of the line of the Nerbuddah. I, however prefer my first proposal as that which would be likely to work best, though, as under either proposal, the Commanders-in-Chief would have no seat in the Executive or Legislative Council, there can be no valid objection on merely administrative grounds. The Commander-in-Chief north of the Nerbuddah would be over a force of about 104,475. The one south of the Nerbuddah would command about 86,000 men according to present strength. To those who attach greater political importance than I do to the separation and decentralization of the minor Governments and armies, the second proposal may appear preferable to the first; but having on a former occasion expressed the opinion that Madras and Bombay could with great advantage be ruled as Bengal, the North-West Provinces and the Punjab arc, viz., by Lieutenant-Governors, I am not so impressed with the expediency of maintaining the existing status of the Madras and Bombay Governors as some, for whose opinions I entertain respect, are. Certainly its collateral effect in the increase of military expenditure has been great, and the best chance of economy and efficiency is the centralization, not the decentralization, of military command.

33. I must, however, here guard myself against misconstruction. There is nothing, in my opinion, so prejudicial to the efficiency of the Native armies as the neutralization of the authority of commanding officers of regiments by the endeavour to exercise their powers from the Adjutant-General's Office. To that kind of centralization I have the strongest objection; and the risk of anything of the kind having more place than it has already a tendency to assume would be much diminished by having only one Commander-in-Chief and one Adjutant-General instead of two or three of each.

34. I do not intend here to follow the careful analysis made by Colonel Broome in paragraphs 34-44 inclusive* on this most important, because *the* regulating, Grant as to expenditure in other Grants. I can add nothing to the Controller-General's explanations. My object, however, is here to call attention to the same fact upon which I dwelt prominently when remarking on Grant I., namely, that the Government of India having to accept the organization of Her Majesty's European army, has in fact but a very partial if not only a nominal control over military expenditure, the largest and most costly branches of which are

* Grant III.—Regimental pay, allowances, and charges.

withdrawn from its management. Take, for instance, the establishment of a European regiment of Infantry as shown in the Budget estimate of 1869-70. It will be observed that, out of total annual charge of Rs. 364,287-13-4 for one regiment of 40 corporals and 750 privates, the officers cost Rs. 165,331-3, or nearly one-half the whole charge. If the non-commissioned officers above the rank of corporal be added the combined cost of officers and non-commissioned officers is annually Rs. 187,465-5, that is, more than the half of the whole annual charge for the regiment. If a cavalry regiment be taken, the cost of the officers in proportion to that for the men is still greater. Whilst the 28 corporals and 378 privates cost annually Rs. 82,636-5, the commissioned officers cost Rs. 156,186-4; and if the non-commissioned officers above the rank of corporal be added, the cost is Rs. 178,476, that is, more than double the cost of the men, and very close upon one-half the whole annual charge for a cavalry regiment. We may therefore fairly say that of the total for India on account of this Grant in 1868-69, amounting to Rs. 22,241,200, or £2,224,120, one-half, or £1,112,060, was for the pay of the officers. The Budget estimate for 1869-70 shows a similar result. I would invite attention to the fact that, without any reduction of the 61,907 European troops necessary for the garrison of India, a very large diminution of charge might be effected by our having fewer regiments, and those of augmented strength in privates and corporals.

35. If the regimental organization of cavalry is to continue it is demonstrable that with five regiments of proper strength the wants of India could be met. One regiment for Madras and one for Bombay and three for Bengal, provided the regiments were in corporals and privates double their present strength, that is about 812 instead of 406, would furnish European cavalry to the amount required. A saving of the cost of officers for six regiments, that is of a total of about Rs. 1,070,856, could be thus effected without any detriment to discipline or efficiency in this one branch alone. If the squadron organization is adopted, which is in many respects more elastic and economical than the regimental one, and better adapted to service in India, there cannot be a doubt but that the officering of twenty-two squadrons, aggregating 5,060 non-commissioned officers and rank and file, would cost even less than the regimental system.

36. If we turn to the infantry it is equally demonstrable that in a somewhat similar manner a very considerable reduction of

expenditure might be effected without any diminution of the strength of the rank and file and non-commissioned officers. We have arrived, in the course of nine years, very closely to the strength which in 1860, when minuting on Sir W. Mansfield's proposals, I stated as the permanent garrison with which India could be held under favourable circumstances. I was myself inclined to prefer the number of infantry regiments—forty-five—on which Lord Canning's memorandum of 1858, in accordance with my own views, was based. But accepting Sir W. Mansfield's numbers of infantry and cavalry regiments, whilst reducing their proposed strength from 1,125 and 736 respectively to 850 and 550, I venture to lay down that the permanent garrison of India should be as stated below.* It is in fact now, according to the Budget estimate for 1869-70, also given below.† It will be observed that the difference between 62,400 and 61,366 or 1,034 men, is not great. I am, however, still disposed to prefer a smaller number of infantry regiments than fifty-two (our present number), with the proviso that they are of greater strength in non-commissioned officers and privates. Such a change might dovetail well and economically with the short service about to be introduced in the British army, and the frequent reliefs of regiments in India. Discontinuing the system of drafts, forty-five regiments which came out on relief, of a strength of 1,125 non-commissioned officers and privates, would maintain the force at an average strength of about the present numbers. The saving of seven regiments of officers' charges would yield Rs. 1,157,317, that is, rather more than would accrue on the six Cavalry Regiments of officers. The two together would save Rs. 2,228,173.

37. I come now to the Artillery branch, and see no reason to change the views expressed in my minute on Artillery reductions

* 10 Cavalry at 550 =	5,500
54 Infantry ,, 850 =	45,000
Artillery and European Sappers	11,000
				Total	62,400

	Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates.
† Artillery	878	11,608
Cavalry	352	5,060
Engineers	329
Infantry	2,028	44,698
Total	3,587	61,366

of the 6th July, 1865. Acting on the principles there laid down, I would reduce the horse artillery, which is the most costly and least useful part of this arm, to the number of batteries corresponding with the number of Dragoon regiments, that is, instead of having two brigades of twelve batteries in Bengal, and two brigades in Madras and Bombay, each of four batteries, making a total of four brigades with twenty batteries, I would have only one brigade of six batteries, which would give one battery to spare more than the number of Dragoon regiments. The saving, therefore, on this branch alone would amount to about Rs. 1,746,563. I would not reduce the field batteries at all, but would maintain them at their present strength. Incidentally this reduction of horse artillery would of course have the further economical effect of diminishing the number of remounts necessary. The reduction of fourteen batteries of horse artillery is tantamount to a reduction of 2,492 horses. As the batteries are short of the establishment strength of horses, the number really available in consequence of the reduction would be less, say, by the time the reduction was sanctioned, 1,500 horses remained good for the service. This alone would save the purchase of colonial and foreign remounts to an amount of Rs. 900,000, and would raise the total saving on the Artillery account to Rs. 2,646,563, and give a total, including Cavalry and Infantry reductions, of Rs. 4,874,730, or £487,473, which added to the proposed saving on Grant I. would give £535,096, or more than half a million sterling. Evidently, however, the whole is dependent on the decision of Her Majesty's Government, rather than on that of the Government of India; and even if approved, it could not be at once carried into effect, but would require a couple of years to complete.

38. I know it will be alleged that by thus reducing the strength of cavalry, infantry and artillery officers, the reserve of officers from which the staff corps is to be supported would be reduced. The objection is worth little, and my reply to it is that the Government of India cannot afford to pay so monstrously high for a reserve from whence to draw about one subaltern and a half per regiment. Moreover, I am convinced that a radical reform awaits the staff corps system and the organization of the Native armies.

39. I have not considered any modification of short periods of service and relief in India by a system of Volunteer Corps for more protracted service in India, but liable at any moment or on any emergency to general service elsewhere than in India. An

authoritative expression of opinion on the part of a member of Her Majesty's Government seems opposed to any arrangement of this kind being in contemplation, or having the approval either of Her Majesty's Government or of the House of Commons. I am myself of opinion that very considerable economy might result in favour of the military charges of the Government of India were a scheme devised of the kind to which I make a passing allusion; but here again the Government of India is in the hands of the Home authorities, and can hardly presume to advise where the question blends so intimately with the general measures for the strength and security of Great Britain and its army scheme of reserve.

40. Were such a reduction as I have suggested effected in the number of European regiments in India, a not inconsiderable saving in expenditure on barracks would ensue. It is difficult to estimate this correctly, because my proposal involves no reduction of the rank and file. But it may, in round numbers, be roughly approximated at a saving of—

					Rs.
New Barracks for 3 Infantry Regiments	4,500,000
Ditto 3 Cavalry „	3,000,000
Ditto 6 Horse Artillery Batteries	2,000,000
				Total	9,500,000

It will be observed that I estimate the saving at under one-half the number of regiments reduced; for instance, I assume that if my suggestion were adopted the question of new barracks at Hazareebaugh for a regiment of infantry would be settled in the negative. As recommended in my minute of 27th July, 1865, an additional regiment might be placed in the Hills. Out of the stations where new barracks have to be built, but are not commenced, it may be feasible, without throwing up obligatory points, to reduce two European infantry stations in all India at least. So, too, with the cavalry,—the question of cavalry barracks at Deyrah Dhoon would be settled in the negative; and out of all India at least two more stations, where new cavalry barracks have to be built for present number of regiments, would no longer need them, as they would cease to be stations for European cavalry. The same remarks are applicable to the horse artillery batteries. If the £950,000 thus saved be added to the £635,000 before calculated, there would result about £1,485,000, or very close on a million and a half sterling.

41. As "the revision of all staff appointments and establishments" must, under the present system, include the Native armies, I shall make some few observations on this momentous subject before I proceed to Grant IV., or the commissariat expenditure.

42. According to the Budget estimate of 1869-70, I take the establishment strength of the Native Army to be as follows:—

Bengal	63,131
Madras	32,431
Bombay	26,880
							<hr/>
					Total	...	122,442
							<hr/>

43. Dealing with the Native army, as has been done with the European force, that is, taking the charges for the European commissioned officers with the native armies, I find that in Bengal the cost of the European officers is $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{5}$ that of the Native infantry; in Madras $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{4}$ nearly; in Bombay the same, namely, $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{4}$ nearly; and that the general average is $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{5}$ nearly. This, however, is struck on the general cost of Native army, including all establishments, non-combatants, &c. But if the European and native officers are taken together, and the charge on their account compared with that for the fighting men, the commissioned grades are $\frac{1}{4}\frac{1}{1}$ of the cost of the fighting men, or one-third of the whole charge of an infantry regiment, including non-combatants, &c.

44. The cavalry, in consequence of the much higher pay of the sowar or Native trooper, show a different result. The European and Native commissioned officers cost one-third (nearly) of the fighting men, or one-fourth of the whole charge for the regiment.

45. Here, however, the last average comparison is delusive; for, whilst the fighting men of a Native cavalry regiment number—duffadars, trumpeters, and sowars—444 sabres, the infantry regiment numbers—naicks, drummers, sepoys included—656 muskets. As both infantry and cavalry regiments have the same number of European officers, eight, it follows that, whilst there is one European officer to $55\frac{1}{2}$ sabres, say 56 horsemen, there is only one European officer to 82 muskets or Infantry soldiers.

46. It is worthy of attention that with a European infantry regiment there is a commissioned officer to $23\frac{1}{2}$ muskets, and with the European cavalry a commissioned officer to 13 sabres.

47. When striking these averages for the sake of comparison I omit the Native commissioned officers, as I also omit the non-

commissioned grades above corporal, which in a British regiment may be regarded as the equivalents for the Native commissioned officers. I note the results in corroboration of my previous remarks on the excessive expenditure entailed on the Government of India by the present weakness of British regiments in the number of rank and file.

48. To return to the Native armies and the officers of the several branches of the service in the three presidencies, I have, in my minute on the staff corps controversy between Major-General Hannington and Major-General Norman and Colonel Broome, stated briefly my own view as to the staff corps system and the present army organization. I need not here repeat it, and the following remarks are purely on the financial bearing of these questions.

49. The cost of European officers to fighting men of the Native armies is, compared with that of officers to fighting men in British regiments, more moderate. But when the non-commissioned officers above the grade of corporal are added to the officers of a British regiment, and the commissioned Native officers above the grades of naick and duffadar added to the European officers with Native regiments, we arrive at the same conclusion of the intrinsically high cost of weak regiments. The European cavalry have 1 officer or non-commissioned officer to $5\frac{1}{2}$ sabres; the Native cavalry 1 to $21\frac{1}{4}$ sabres; the European infantry 1 officer or non-commissioned officer to $9\frac{1}{2}$ muskets; the Native infantry 1 to $10\frac{1}{2}$ muskets. However, except in the Madras army, where the number of Native regiments might certainly be reduced by the number shown in the Madras Minutes of Government, circumstances do not, in my opinion, warrant reduction in the number of Bengal and Bombay regiments, nor in the strength of rank and file composing them. I regard the Bengal and Bombay Native forces as being practically at a minimum strength, and that neither for internal or border contingencies it would be safe to reduce them. Madras, with its strong Police officered by European officers, could certainly make a reduction; and as the new organization has rendered this army much less efficient as a fighting force than it was before, there would be no great loss in available military strength if it approached more nearly to the Bombay army in numbers. Such reduction would amount to 5,550, and would be about seven regiments, say nearly 10 lakhs per annum. The Madras cavalry is in course of extinction, and could with advantage be reduced from four to two regiments, and

a saving be effected of about two lakhs per annum. On the Madras native army, therefore, at an early date, there might be a saving annually of about 12 lakhs, or £120,000.

LIII.

MINUTE ON PUBLIC WORKS EXPENDITURE. DATED THE 12TH
SEPTEMBER, 1869.

With reference to the expected deficiency on which His Excellency's Minute of the 10th September, in the Public Works Department, is based, I have carefully abstained from expressing any reliance upon the statements brought forward by the Financial Department. On the 8th instant, the Council was informed that the expected deficit amounted to one and a half million sterling. On the 10th instant, the Council was told that the deficit amounted to two million three hundred and thirty thousand pounds.

2. To show this sudden increase ascribed to the Department of Public Works, no sort of statement was submitted, nor any explanation offered. Whether, therefore, the estimated deficit of a million and a half, or that of two million and a third, or neither the one nor the other, be correct, seems a perfectly open question. Neither estimate has my confidence, and, under such circumstances, I must be excused from sharing in the financial panic under which the Government of India is at this moment labouring.

3. It follows that any recommendations which I have made with regard to Military expenditure had in view the Financial Despatch of the Secretary of State, No. 52 of the 26th June 1869, and not this elastic deficit.

4. With regard to the estimated expenditure of Public Works for the present year, I cannot agree that £5,664,000 represents the customary annual expenditure of the country. It is a misnomer to call the expenditure on the new barracks an ordinary annual outlay, except in the sense in which the charges on account of Railways and Irrigation represent the present customary annual expenditure of the country. Some, and I fear many, of these so-called reproductive works will have less to show than the return on barrack outlay due to diminished sickness, invaliding, and mor-

tality of European troops. I cannot, therefore, pass by this (to me) fallacy unnoticed.

5. The proposal is to reduce this grant by one-fifth; and the first step in furtherance of this measure is to reduce the military works grant by nearly one-third, that is, from one £1,800,000 to £1,250,000 for 1870-71, also to effect a reduction in the present year of £300,000 on military works.

6. With regard to this latter reduction, I must call attention to the fact that the total amount applied for by the different Governments amounted to £3,172,500, and that, as shown in my Minute of the 13th August, 1869, the establishments would have worked up to that allotment. The grant allowed was £2,240,000, or nearly one million less than the Governments had asked for. Subsequently, at a budget debate in the Executive Council, the grant was further reduced by £440,000; so that the net grant for 1869-70 was reduced to £1,800,000. Under the supposition that this is still further reduced by £300,000, the total net grant will be £1,500,000, that is less than one-half the amount originally applied for; and up to which, with a view to economy of construction, early completion of barracks, and early reduction of establishments, the Governments had been encouraged to be able to work.

7. What will be the result of this last reduction may be summed up in few words. Bombay, which asked for £770,000, will receive £245,000; Bengal, which asked for £360,000, will have £170,000; the North-Western Provinces, which asked for £440,000, receives £215,000; and the Punjab, which required £600,000, will have £300,000.

8. The abstract of the remonstrances received from the Bombay, Bengal, and North-Western Provinces Governments are appended to this Minute. How these Governments can carry out the proposed additional reduction of £300,000 remains to be seen; but certainly I agree with every word which the able and cautious Secretary of Public Works, Colonel Dickens, expressed in a Note of the 12th February 1869, when the reduction to £1,800,000 was resolved. I request that the four last paras. of Colonel Dickens' Note may be appended to this Minute.

9. Passing over the fact that a quarter of a million, when bad building is to have a protracted existence, is a very restricted allowance on that head, it is indubitable that to reduce the barrack expenditure from a million and a half to one million for major and minor works will indefinitely delay the completion of the necessary accommodation, and greatly increase the ultimate cost to the State.

10. To myself, who cannot perceive, considering the much larger amounts embarked in works which demand much power of hope and imagination to call reproductive, that the interest on a couple of millions, say £100,000 per annum until paid off in a few years, would ruin the financial position of the Government, this argument, based on the inevitable necessity presumed to arise out of the alleged deficit, fails to carry force.

11. Neither does the argument, based on the reductions recommended in my Minute of the 30th August, have weight; for, if Her Majesty's Government were to approve of the proposals contained in that Minute, there is not a single obligatory point which would not be held; and it must be remembered that the forty-five European Infantry Regiments and five European Cavalry Regiments would be of ample strength to detach wings when necessary.

12. Independently of the question of policy involved in placing more Regiments in the Hills, not only must proper barracks be built for them there, but, as a matter of economy, it is certain that the cost of maintenance is higher in the Hills than in the Plains, and that viewed financially nothing will be gained.

13. I must again repeat that the Engineers are not responsible for the distribution of barrack accommodation. They had to construct barracks and hospitals according to the orders they received. If those principles are wrong, they are open to correction, and the Engineers will be bound to carry out whatever improvements, based on sanitary objects and conditions, Government may adopt and prescribe. It is only necessary to refer to the Resolution of Government of 16th December 1864 to see, with regard to paras. 44, 45, 46 of Colonel Crommelin's Memorandum, how completely Colonel Crommelin's views were deliberately overruled.

14. In the course of late discussions I have heard no new principles of a sanitary kind that appeared to me likely to reverse those so laboriously arrived at by the Sanitary Commission in England and those in India. No one would be more glad than myself were novel sanitary principles to be advanced that could add, when obeyed, to the health and comfort of the British soldier. By all means let them be stated by those who entertain such new principles as applicable to barrack and hospital accommodation, and let competent Sanitary Commissions consider them. But without authoritative change on this important matter, the Engineers can only act according to the instructions laid down for their guidance.

15. Having some acquaintance with the cost of military build-

ings in Europe, England, and the Colonies, I am surprised that the Governor-General should consider the cost almost fabulous to which the country has been put for these barracks. At Mhow and Bombay the cost from peculiar circumstances has been higher than elsewhere. But, as a rule, the cost per man for permanent accommodation of a good description is no higher than the rates of labour, price of material, and competition of Railways and civil works entail. I am under the impression that, as compared with the cost of new military works in England or elsewhere, the Government of India has been well served.

16. How carefully estimates and rates have been examined, and all practicable economy enforced, will be shown by a statement which I have desired the Inspector-General of Military Works to append, if ready, to this Minute.

17. I regret to be forced to take a different view from His Excellency the Governor-General; but I must avow that I regard with the utmost concern the very retrograde policy the Government of India is now called upon to pursue with reference to the proper and reasonable accommodation of the British soldier. I cannot conceive any course more calculated to shake public confidence in the financial power and ability of Government to carry out to a conclusion any large scheme of public works however urgently necessary. Such a feeling will be increased by the knowledge that the late Governor-General, who entered upon the provision of barrack accommodation for the European troops, was a stringent military economist, and would not have undertaken such an outlay had it not been imperatively necessary.

18. I can hardly regard the mission of the Imperial Government with respect to main roads as drawing to a close. I fear that period is still distant; but I concur in the expediency of looking to local resources and Local Governments for the development of subsidiary roads, and even other kinds of feeders to Railways.

19. I must guard myself against its being supposed that I am indifferent to a balance between receipts and expenditure being attained. I consider this should be a permanent aim. That which I deprecate is sudden spasmodic action under every financial oscillation. I have seen too many of them in India to be much alarmed even if the deficit were greater than two and a third millions. I am confident that, without recourse to paroxysmal action, inconsistent with the firmness and the stability of purpose of the Government, however unpromising this year our financial position might prove, it would be easily retrievable by steady,

persistent economy during a very few coming years. The Government is not bankrupt, and I deprecate any exaggeration of a financial position which, though it may be unsatisfactory, hardly deserves the name of a crisis, and is not one of such appalling circumstances, but that its difficulties may be easily surmounted without recourse to measures calculated to shake our credit. Politically, it seems very inadvisable whilst we are, so to speak, having recourse to high farming and sub-soil drainage at great cost, to put out the family and the servants of the owner of the property to stand the weather as they can without proper cover in the open fields. Politically, as well as sanitarily, the Government of India owe this to the British soldier that hap what hap in the region of accounts and finance, it shall not even appear to swerve from dubious pressure in the discharge of its duty to those upon whom, without much profit to themselves, but with the continual risk of health and life to them and their families, our hold of this Empire for the Crown entirely depends since 1857.



LIV.

MINUTE ON THE SUBJECT OF REDUCTIONS OF CIVIL EXPENDITURE.

DATED THE 13TH SEPTEMBER, 1869.

Under the supposition that a consistent effort is to be made to reduce expenditure and to attain an equilibrium, I think it may be worthy of the consideration of Her Majesty's Government whether something cannot be effected in the Civil branch corresponding to the great Military reduction of superfluous Commands-in-Chief elsewhere proposed.

2. In a Minute on Army Reduction I have pointed out that the status of the minor Governments was not, in my opinion, an adequate reason for maintaining three Commands-in-Chief in India, and I adverted to a former Minute on the relations of the minor to the Supreme Government, in which I had expressed my views as to modifications advisable on other than financial grounds.

3. On financial grounds, however, they may now be regarded as relevant, and I enter on the subject with the few following remarks.

4. The Province of Bengal, from which we raise a revenue of

nearly sixteen millions, is ruled by a Lieutenant-Governor, whose staff and household expenses amount to £11,873 annually. The North-Western Provinces, with a revenue of £5,831,000, are managed by a Lieutenant-Governor, whose staff and household expenses amount to £13,048 annually. The Punjab Province, with a revenue of £3,364,300, one of the most important Governments in India, is ruled by a Lieutenant-Governor, who with his staff costs the State £12,447 per annum. The Madras Presidency raises a revenue of £7,649,230, and is ruled by a Governor, who with his Council, staff, and household, costs the State £35,337 annually. If the body guard be added, the charge amounts to £39,621, that is, to more than thrice the cost of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who supervises more than double the amount of revenue. The Bombay Presidency raises £8,977,840 of revenue, and the Governor, Council, staff, and household cost the State £40,521 annually. If the body guard be included, the charge is raised to £45,193, that is to say, to close on four times the cost of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who controls not only nearly double the revenue, but rules over many more millions of subjects.

5. Considering that both Madras and Bombay are not in the throes of giving birth to young administrations, but that all the Civil Departments have long since taken a substantive form, and that the territories have been long habituated to our rule and system, there certainly appears room for effecting reduction of expenditure by altering the status of those Governments to the position of Lieutenant-Governorships. Instead of costing together £84,814, they would then cost about £26,000, and there would thus result a saving of £58,814.

6. This, however, is not all that might be effected. Minor administrations may, without disadvantage, be absorbed by transfer to Lieutenant-Governors. Thus, Oudh might be placed under the Government of the North-Western Provinces, and a saving of £14,534 be effected. The Central Provinces might with every advantage be transferred to Bombay, and a reduction of expenditure of £13,896 ensue. Scinde might, in exchange for the Central Provinces, be taken from Bombay and placed under the Punjab Government, and here again there might be a saving of about £10,000. On these few heads alone there would result an annual reduction of £97,244.

7. If to this be added the reduction on account of passages, outfit, &c., the gross saving would be well over a hundred thousand pounds per annum.

8. I venture also to call attention to the rapid growth of expenditure on account of "Law and Justice." In 1861-62 the charge under this head was £1,898,516. In 1868-69 it had risen to £2,857,580. So that in the space of seven years there has been added nearly one million sterling to civil expenditure upon this single item. It is true that the receipts have augmented by £473,824, that is, to nearly a half of the increased expenditure. But the tendency to further augmentation of expenditure in this direction is so great that it is vain to anticipate that the receipts from stamps, &c., can at all keep pace with it. We are already forced to reduce the Judicial Stamp duties in consequence of a fall of receipts from that source.

9. The cost of this department not only needs check, but should be kept nearer its receipts in amount.

10. Another department, namely, that of Education, threatens a rapidly increasing expenditure; for the provision as yet made is quite inadequate to the aims of Government. It aims at coping with the great task of the education of the masses, a very gigantic undertaking, and one utterly beyond present resources, yet one at which all local governments are more or less striving. Laudable and desirable as the progress of education may be, financially its requirements cannot be made a further burthen on the Imperial, but must fall on local resources.

11. I shall not touch upon other items of civil expenditure, such as lunatic asylums, jails, &c., for doubtless the member of Council in charge of the Home Department will treat of such reductions as are practicable. But my object is to call attention to the fact that, however popular it may be to regard the Army, and I would have added Navy, if any had been left to India, as the field for financial manipulation, there is a very fair chance, unless care be taken to curb outlay in other and more favourite directions, that any saving that may be the result of military reductions, will be more than absorbed by the simultaneously rapid growth of civil branches of expenditure under the heads of "Law and Justice," and "Education," besides other heads which I need not mention, unless Government can resist the pressure put upon them in favour of special branches. There will be no hope of attaining to a real financial equilibrium unless this can be assured. A paroxysm of military retrenchment, accompanied by very petty civil parings, preparatory to increased civil charges the moment the financial panic is allayed, will really eventuate in the reverse of a satisfactory state of financial position.

LV.

MINUTE ON BARRACK EXPENDITURE. DATED THE 6TH OCTOBER,
1869.

I wish to guard myself against the supposition that I concur with the view taken by the documents published for general information in the *Gazette of India* of the 4th October, with respect to what they comprise under the term of "ordinary public works," and therefore, of ordinary expenditure.

2. I remain of the opinion that an outlay so exceptional as that on the barrack fort of Peshawur, and on the permanent new barracks and hospitals, whether in the plains, the hills, or in magazines and refuge forts, an outlay dictated by every consideration of security, of necessity, of humanity, and of the soundest economy, might with equal justice to the present and to the future Indian taxpayer have been spread by loan over a period of years instead of being suddenly accumulated upon the current revenues of the year. That in fact the charge for such permanent works ought not to be treated as ordinary, but as what it is, extraordinary expenditure.

3. According to the course suddenly adopted in India in 1868, a British Chancellor of the Exchequer would have been perfectly justified, when the Portsmouth and other defensive works were in full swing and half finished, in casting the eight million on current receipts without the smallest consideration of the effect of such a measure on the financial equilibrium of the year, or of subsequent years. I venture to think that such a course might have disturbed the equanimity of the British taxpayer when it was known that its object was to force the imposition of, or an increase to, the income-tax. Also, I imagine that the measure would have somewhat deranged the budget arrangements of so rich a country and elastic a revenue as that of England. If such an experiment could not be tried with impunity in a wealthy country of enormous resources like England, and there was no financial immorality in spreading out the incidence of some eight millions of expenditure on permanent defensive works and cover for their garrisons over a considerable period, I have yet to see the argument of the smallest validity for pursuing a different course in a poor country like India, with a very inelastic revenue, and upon which eleven millions is a far heavier burthen

to be met within a short time than eight millions would have been on English receipts. For in England the income-tax is not the notable failure which has hitherto made that tax, whether called license or income, a byword in India as combining a maximum of vexation and fraud with a minimum of return.

4. If the original policy of meeting the charge for these permanent works had, from the amount involved, threatened the solvency of the financial position of British India, I should have objected as strongly as any one to its continuance. Notoriously this was not the case, and is not now so. It would have been a wise and economic mitigation of our means, as the eleven millions could have been easily repaid within a moderate period from the surplus which it is in our power to maintain.

5. Whatever the previous errors of the Financial Department, and the unexpected result of a more careful review of expenditure in various Departments, it owes much of its existing difficulty in clearing itself from these embarrassments to this change of policy as to the charge for great military works which are to last as long as our rule does; a change of policy all the more unintelligible as it is in violent contrast to the liberal recourse to loans for so-called reproductive works. If any financier had sought out the best mode of crippling the financial position of Government, of subjecting it to the greatest amount of present embarrassment, of giving the most unfavourable view of its capabilities, of running down the value of its securities, and of lowering and damaging its deservedly high credit in the money market, he could not have conceived a more certain method of attaining these ends, and of spreading an exaggerated idea of the collapse of a financial system hitherto characterized as remarkably sound, than by the narrow measure of 1868.

6. I am not disposed to sanction either its expediency or wisdom by stereotyping, as is done in the documents promulgated on the 4th October, that narrow conception of the best application of means and credit which has intensified temporary financial difficulties, and confirmed the notion that deficits to a large amount are the permanent condition of our Indian financial position. Whilst I cordially concur in all measures of sound economy which aim at establishing a surplus of receipts over expenditure, I am averse to countenancing the impression which is in part due to the temporary pressure caused by the step taken in 1868, which has ever since been a fruitful source of derangement in our budgets.

LVI.

MINUTE ON BARRACKS AND HOSPITALS. DATED THE 15TH
OCTOBER, 1869.

Colonel Crommelin brought to me yesterday morning a confidential Resolution that was to be discussed in Council to-day. It was accompanied by papers by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and Mr. Strachey.

2. The latter set forth Colonel Crommelin's original views, and contested by quotations from the Report of the Sanitary Commission, that the exclusive use of upper-floors as dormitories was not insisted upon by the Home Authorities, but was ordered upon the general conclusions of the Authorities in India; and he argued on that ground, that no reference to the Secretary of State was necessary in making a change of principle, and occupying lower-floors as dormitories in the Plains.

3. I do not agree with the conclusion thus arrived at, for, although the Sanitary Commission and the Home Government very properly left a discretion on the subject to the Authorities in India, yet the latter having, on strong grounds, recommended the general application of the principle, that dormitories were to be in upper-floors, and the Home Authorities having sanctioned this, I consider that before a rejection of the principle is authorized in the terms of the confidential Resolution, a previous reference to the Secretary of State is both necessary and advisable.

4. I do not concur with the dogmatic assertion that dormitories on the lower or ground-floor have been proved to be as healthy as those on upper-floors; on the contrary, not only is all medical opinion generally very strongly opposed to this view, but also all Native opinion, as is shown by the fact that whether living in the arid or in the moist and damp climates of India, every Native who can afford it makes the upper-story his dormitory.

5. That the masses cannot do this is a proof of poverty, not of the salubrity of sleeping on the ground level. Accordingly it is remarkable that whilst the masses both in the arid and damp climates of India suffer at certain periods of the year from fevers of various kinds to a very serious degree, the inhabitants of Burmah,

Pegu, and the Tenasserim Coast, though exposed to a climate of extreme moisture and heat, suffer much less, mainly in consequence of their raised houses, not from the absence of malaria, which abounds everywhere.

6. But if proof is required of the comparative salubrity of upper-floors, there is an example in the Dalhousie Barrack in Fort William, where the improvement has been so great that some medical men were sanguine enough to entertain the hope that such barracks were even effective in lowering the cholera rate of deaths, as well as the fever classes of disease—a hope which I have always held as perhaps chimerical, though I cannot contest the fact of the marked improvement as to the infrequency of cholera attacks on the Dalhousie Barrack.

7. His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, repeats that it has been over and over again proved that an unnecessary amount of accommodation has been prepared. I have shown in my Minute of the 13th August, 1869, that in a Minute of the 16th December, 1865, I pointed out, on data furnished by the Adjutant-General's Department, that so far from being proved, the reverse was the only possible conclusion from these reliable data. I am surprised that neither of these Minutes appear as yet to have been sent home.

8. His Excellency also recommends that the re-distribution of the Army be made a subject of reference to the Adjutant-General. I think this neither necessary nor expedient. If any consideration of the distribution of the Army were necessary, which I do not admit, it is the function of the Government of India, not of the Adjutant-General, to consider and to decide upon the proper disposition of the Force at the disposal of the Government. But, besides this instruction, which is both irregular in itself, and out of place in a Resolution in the Department of Public Works, I maintain that the proposed reductions of European Regiments from fifty-two to forty-five necessitates no re-distribution.

9. The confidential Resolution seems to contemplate a setting aside of Company organization, and of the adaptation of barracks to the Regimental system. I regard this as a most questionable proposal, and one which, if accepted, should have the previous sanction of the Secretary of State, who would, of course, consult the War Office. Much as I prefer upper-floor dormitories, whether at Rawul Pindee, Gwalior, or Calcutta, yet in dry and healthy climates, rather than have recourse to disruption of regimental

organization, it might be preferable to sacrifice part of the subsidiary or auxiliary ground-floor accommodation, and to put a few of the men to sleep there.

10. Upon this point, however, of the great preference to be given to dormitories on upper-floors, I call attention to the strong opinion expressed by Sir J. Lawrence in his Minute of the 18th March, 1864, and to the whole of his arguments in favour of double-storyed barracks. Also I call attention to that of Sir Hugh Rose in his Minute of the 7th July, 1864, also to that of Sir R. Napier in his Minute of the 29th February, 1864, and to the terms in which the Sanitary Commission, of which my honourable colleague, Mr. Strachey, was then President, spoke of the relative merits of double-storyed barracks as compared with barracks on one floor only:—"We dissent from the conclusions of Colonel Crommelin on this subject, and entirely agree with the remarks made regarding it by the Honourable Sir R. Napier. Although we cannot say that, in the Upper Provinces, double-storyed barracks are always absolutely essential, we believe with Sir R. Napier, that there is no part of the plains of India in which it would not be beneficial to the health of the men that they should sleep in upper-storys, and that it should be a rule never to let them sleep on the ground-floor if it can be avoided. Not only may we expect a considerable reduction in sickness caused by malaria, but as Sir R. Napier has observed, we should thus obtain for the men at night a complete separation from the places for taking meals, and from many minor accompaniments of barracks which tend to render the air of a sleeping ward impure."

11. I fail to perceive in the circumstance that the Financial Department has discovered a deficit instead of a surplus, any logical reason for a sudden revolution of opinion as to the sanitary principles which should guide the housing of the British soldier.

12. I object to temporary huts in the Hills being regarded as suitable for the permanent residence of European troops.

13. With regard to Native hospitals, this is a subject which may require investigation. The Sanitary Commissioner may be right, or he may be wrong, in thinking that the hospital accommodation is on too large a scale, and that a hut system of hospital would be better suited to Natives and attendants on them; but this is a point on which we ought to have the opinion of the Inspector-General of Hospitals.

LVII.

MINUTE ON THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS IN HORSE AND FIELD
ARTILLERY IN INDIA. DATED THE 16TH OCTOBER, 1869.

I have stated in a previous Minute, dated the 20th August last, that circumstances did not warrant reduction in the number of Bengal and Bombay Native regiments, nor in the strength of rank and file composing them. That it was only in the Madras Native army that reduction appeared feasible to the extent stated in the Minutes of the Madras Government.

2. After such an expression of opinion, it may be desirable that I should explain why, holding such views, I concurred in the transmission to the Secretary of State of a Despatch, No. 349, of 4th October, 1869, proposing reductions in the Bengal and Bombay Native armies.

3. The fact is, that previous reductions have fallen heavily on the Madras Native army, and its officers have in consequence suffered so severely that I gave weight to the argument that to impose greater reductions, albeit feasible, without touching the Bengal and Bombay armies, might be open to misconstruction, and give rise to clamour. It is therefore solely on grounds of temporary expediency that I am induced to support the Bengal reductions.

4. Upon this point it is only on the condition that in the Bengal army there shall be no reduction of numerical strength of men under arms, and that the opportunity be taken of largely increasing our useful Pioneer regiments, that I assent to the reduction.

5. The same remark applies, though in a minor degree, to the Bombay army.

6. I feel painfully, not only that these reductions will cause great sensation in the Native armies, and strike heavily the position and prospects of their European officers, but also I am keenly alive to the fact that, though financially these reductions may help to meet the requirements of the moment, they do not in the smallest degree remedy the inherent and permanent defects of the existing system, whether organic or financial, and that the Home Government must not mistake transient measures of economy as being any cure of radical errors. These measures may

not make the Native armies worse than they are, but they certainly will not make them better; and in some respects they will aggravate the evils attendant on the present organization, though in the general sense in which I understand the Despatch to make the assertion, there may be no present detriment to such degree of efficiency as our Native armies can reasonably claim to have attained at this present moment.

7. As the Secretary of State, in his Despatch No. 52, of the 26th January, 1869, refers to the reports of the Military Finance Commission, I have for the sake of a somewhat searching comparison obtained from Colonel Broome a completion up to date of the table which accompanied their Report No. 5483A, of the 14th January, 1862. The completed table is that marked A. I prefer, however, that marked B, which is more accurate in its rates.

8. The Finance Commission chose the year 1835 as that which showed the army as left by Lord W. Bentinck after his reductions and before the Afghan war. The year 1845 was taken as showing the army after the Afghan war and before the first Sikh war. The year 1847 shows the army after the first Sikh war, when the Punjab was partially occupied, and the Sikh power humbled, but the country had not been annexed. The year 1853 gives the army after the annexation of the Punjab and the final extinction of the Sikh army; 1856 shows the army before the mutiny; 1858 the army as it stood just after the mutiny; 1861 gives the army as it stood when the Report was written. Colonel Broome has added the subsequent years, and brings down the statement to the present time.

9. It will be observed that as compared with 1835, our Native army is 16,000 men under that in Lord William Bentinck's time, prior to the annexations which subsequently took place, and so largely increased British India and the area to be occupied. It will also be seen that whilst the rate per man of the European troops has increased from 820 to 1,100 rupees and would be higher if malt liquor were included, the rate per Native soldier has only increased from 230 to 270,—or if we take the year 1856 as the starting point, the rate has only increased from 250 to 270 rupees per man. Considering what has been done for the Native army in consequence of the permanent rise in the price of food and fodder, this augmentation of rate must be regarded as more moderate than could have been anticipated when compared with the decrease in the value of money.

10. Instead of the earlier period of 1835, it may be best to limit

the comparison between the present time and 1836, and for this purpose tables C, D, E, F, G will be found useful. It must be remarked that with regard to infantry and cavalry, Bengal rates are used; but that if Bombay and Madras rates had been taken, the results would have been higher.

11. In order to analyze the difference between army expenditure in 1856-57 and 1868-69, three distinct points have to be considered.—1st. Strength and composition of the army at the two periods. 2nd. Annual increase due to augmentation of rates per man. 3rd. Cost of the officers.

12. Bearing in mind that the cost of the European soldier is fully four times that of the Native, and that the strength of the army was—

1856,	Europeans	36,062	Difference.
1869,	„	61,634	
		<hr/>	25,572
1856,	Natives	197,081	
1869,	„	122,442	
		<hr/>	74,639

the difference in cost may be thus ascertained—

$$\begin{array}{r}
 25,572 \times 4 = 102,288 \\
 -74,639 \\
 \hline
 27,649 \\
 \hline
 27,649 \times 270 = 7,465,230
 \end{array}$$

say $74\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs due to difference in composition of force.

13. At the Bengal rates, as before noted, the increase due to that source of additional expenditure is as follows:—

		Rs.
European Cavalry	...	$5,050 \times 148.3 = 7,50,398$
„ Infantry	...	$44,698 \times 74.2 = 33,16,591$
Native Cavalry	...	$18,649 \times 99.6 = 18,57,440$
„ Infantry	...	$99,568 \times 9.6 = 9,55,852$
Artillery (average)	...	$11,608 \times 50.3 = 5,83,281$
Total annual increase	...	Rs. ... 74,63,562

Of course if Bombay and Madras rates were applied to their respective armies, the result would be over the $74\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs.

14. These two items together account for £1,492,879. There must be added fully £300,000 for compensation on account of price of grain and forage. This raises the above amount to £1,792,879.

15. From Table II it will be seen that as compared with 1856, we have in 1869 a reduction of 1,201 European officers in number, that is about one-fourth, but an aggregate increase of cost of above 7 lakhs annually; notwithstanding the reduction in staff corps pay, the average cost for officers has increased from Rs. 4,448 to Rs. 6,278. The result is that the 3,312 officers at present cost above seven (7) lakhs more than the 4,513 did formerly, and actually cost Rs. 60,60,960, or £606,096 more than the same number would have cost in 1856. We have therefore the singular result as regards the officers of the Indian army that though they have been reduced in the interval between 1856 and 1869 by 25 per cent., their average cost has increased more than Rs. 1,800 each, or a total of above 60 lakhs. The fact is that the larger proportion of the higher grades now existing annuls the effect of the lower rates due to the decreased staff corps pay of grades, and this cause of augmented expenditure will increase, and not diminish, for a considerable number of years. It cannot be said, therefore, that the present system, for which the Government of India is not responsible, as it was imposed upon it by the Home Government, is a financial success from an economical point of view.

16. If we add the above £606,096 to the £1,792,879, we reach the figure of £2,398,975, and account for the difference between the charges of the two periods compared within £41,000. I am indebted to the Controller-General, Colonel Broome, for the statements on which these calculations are based, and the above result tends to prove that without going into much more laborious calculations it would be difficult to make a nearer and more reliable analysis.

17. If the financial results set forth in para. 15 had conferred upon India an efficient Native army, the State might have been regarded as compensated for the non-economic character of the system. Unhappily the reverse is notoriously the case. No one pretends to question the fact with respect to the Madras army, and very few do with regard to the Bengal and Bombay armies. The general conviction is that the present organization, though it may do in peace, cannot stand the strain of war, and that to quote Abyssinia and ignore Umbeylah and China is a delusion. The universal impression is that we are therefore paying very high for a system which gives us no reserve of European officers, places those we have, except the commanding officers and adjutants of regiments, in a false position with regard to the Native officers,

and yet does not pretend to have in the latter a class of men fit to command and lead companies.

18. This last fact, one which is incontrovertible, greatly embarrasses the question of putting improved arms into the hands of our Native troops. Whilst myself satisfied of the necessity for placing better arms in their hands, and in favour of that arm being a rifled breech-loader, I cannot disguise the fact that it is the opinion of some of the best officers with whom I have spoken confidentially on the subject that it is utterly vain to expect that under the present system that care and training in peace and control in war could be exercised by Native officers in command of companies which are essential conditions of a proper use in the field of such valuable and effective weapons. In a minute of the 3rd April, 1868, para. 10, I touched upon this subject, and every opportunity that I have since had of consulting officers of judgment and of experience in the field has tended more and more strongly to confirm the conviction that the present system is extremely unfitted to the satisfactory introduction of improved arms among our Native troops, and yet it must be done whether the system be maintained or altered.

19. Having guarded myself from misapprehension as to the reductions proposed for the Native troops, I take this opportunity of correcting some misapprehensions into which his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his minute of the 1st September, 1869, has fallen, with reference to proposals made in my minute of the 30th August, paras. 36 and 37, for reductions in the line and in the artillery.

20. The average annual death ratio per 1,000 men is known, as also the average loss per 1,000 men from invaliding and other causes. It is a matter of simple calculation that a regiment which enters India of the strength of 1,125 diminishes under ordinary circumstances—

The 2nd year to	1,040
„ 3rd „	970
„ 4th „	900
„ 5th „	840
„ 6th „	780
„ 7th „	725

This is an approximation, and of course if the death and invaliding rates are taken at higher proportions, a more rapid diminution is the result, and the strength the seventh year may be reduced to

600 ; but this is taking larger death and invaliding rates than now shown by the reports of the Sanitary Commissioners.

21. Exceptional epidemics of cholera or other maladies may disturb such calculations with respect to particular regiments, and greatly affect the death-rate in the year in which the regiment has the misfortune of being victimised by their scourges. But such events affect the general average less than might be supposed.

22. If the system of reliefs with regiments of 1,125 strength were introduced there would result, as reliefs are gradual, that long before the whole forty-five regiments to be retained had been relieved, the average total strength of European infantry in India would correspond very closely with its present strength. This would be effected, if losses were not annually filled up by fresh details from England, by the confined reductions due to deaths, invaliding and other causes. Thus if five years reliefs were the rule and the third year represented by a strength of 970 were assumed as the average strength of regiments in the country, there would be 43,650 in India, or 822 under the present establishment strength and 2,215 over the present actual strength in the country. So far, therefore, as the mere number of European troops in the country is concerned, such a mode of reliefs would maintain about the same strength as at present.

23. With respect to the proposed reduction of horse artillery I was in hopes that the reference to my minute of the 6th July, 1865, would have secured me from misconstruction, and from the remark made by his Excellency, that whilst proposing to deprive India of no less than fourteen batteries of horse artillery, I left the remainder of the arm in this country, whether in the horse or field batteries, in an inefficient state. I can only suppose that this misapprehension on the part of Sir W. Mansfield arose from his understanding the passage in my 37th para. "I would not reduce the field batteries at all, but would maintain them at their present strength," in a different sense from that in which it was written, and which the context, the reduction of number of batteries of horse artillery, might have shown to refer, not to the strength of men or guns per battery, but to the strength in batteries as the integrals of the artillery branch ; as I had previously referred to my minute of the 6th July, 1865, it never occurred to me that such a misconception of my meaning was possible.

24. I think it the more necessary to correct this misunderstanding, as it was decided in yesterday's Council to support the artillery reductions recommended by his Excellency the Com-

mander-in-Chief in preference to those I had recommended, and which had been commented upon in his Excellency's minute of the 11th September without my colleagues having before them any correction of the error into which Sir W. Mansfield had fallen, or the opportunity of referring for themselves to my minute of the 6th July, 1865.

25. I invite the attention of the Home authorities before they decide on the question of artillery reductions to that minute, for I deem the subject one of *extreme* importance, both from the financial and from the military point of view.

26. With respect to horse artillery, I noted that it was a very costly branch, and one, when in excess of its specialty requirements, not so useful as the field batteries. That in point of fact (and I spoke from no inconsiderable experience and observation in the field) the instances were exceedingly rare in which a field battery properly horsed is not equal to perform all that the horse artillery is ordinarily called upon to do in action. That to provide for such rare instances, which if the arm is properly used can only occur in support of European and Native cavalry brigaded together, horse artillery batteries might with advantage be considered as generally an adjunct to the Dragoon regiments, and the number of these batteries be regulated by the number of Dragoon regiments employed in India. I opposed, on grounds stated, Colonel Adye's suggestion to reduce the number of horses, but proposed on the contrary in case of external war to increase the compliment of men and horses to war strength in the batteries destined to move beyond our frontiers.

27. I see no reasons to modify these views; on the contrary, all that has happened since 1865 demonstrates that with the progress made in a general use of rifled breech-loading firearms,—a progress from which our frontier and other enemies are not excluded—Cavalry will in future have a different *rôle* to play from entering into exposed line of battle in masses, and that to paralyze a large body of most costly artillery by attendance on cavalry kept as much out of sight and under cover as ground and tactics will admit, is simply an enormous loss of power in deference to an obsolete system. That consequently the object should be to reduce the number of horse artillery batteries to that which is absolutely necessary, but to have that small number, from which great rapidity of movement will (if they are to be of any use) be required, thoroughly efficient in men and horses.

28. I cannot but think that it was a perception of the real play

open to cavalry and horse artillery in future that lately led Sir W. Mansfield to propose the substitution of the 7-pounder steel gun, now in use with some of our mountain batteries, as the proper gun for horse artillery batteries,—from its lightness, effective range, and the horse power sufficient to move such a gun with great rapidity.

29. I regard the horse artillery, now armed with 9-pounder Armstrong guns, as practically of at least twice the value of our old 6-pounder smooth-bore horse artillery. In other words, that we should be better off with six batteries of 9-pounder Armstrong horse artillery than with double the number of the old horse artillery 6-pounder batteries. Considering the opportunities of using them, therefore, I regard it as a waste of artillery power and of public money to have more than six batteries in attendance on cavalry.

30. In fact, the less cavalry is taught to depend on its auxiliary artillery, the greater will be its mobility and utility in the field. The tendency to regard itself as auxiliary to the horse artillery retards and cramps the action of cavalry.

31. In my minute of the 6th July, 1865, I have dwelt on the reasons for not reducing the number of field batteries. Briefly stated, they are that the occupation of India with the smallest possible numerical strength of European troops involves as a consequence that they shall have the support of an adequate body of artillery, and that the peculiar position of our European troops in India requires that the proportion of guns to men shall be a high one.

32. Further, that in the event of war on a serious scale the necessity would be imperative for an increase to the strength of the Native army—even the Abyssinian campaign forced us to augment the strength of our native regiments, and I may repeat what I stated in the 6th para. of the minute to which I refer:—“A sudden augmentation of the kind gives neither well-trained nor reliable troops, and as a rule such battalions, even when fully officered, need a stronger support of artillery than would be necessary with more veteran battalions. General Chamberlain’s observations on the inadequate strength of the Native corps, even for such a mere frontier affair with border tribes as that at Umbeylah, shows that the strength of the Native regiments is quite unequal to the requirements of a protracted campaign. If our weak Punjab corps, the best in our service and close to the frontier, were, after a skirmish or two, reduced to the predicament

stated by General Chamberlain, it is manifest that in the event of war there must be a considerable and sudden addition to this portion of Her Majesty's forces, and that what with the rawness of the troops, the dangerous paucity of European officers on the irregular system, and the eventual ignorance between them and the men hurriedly raised, a counterpoise to so many sources of inherent weakness must be sought in the number and efficiency of the guns."

33. On these grounds I then objected to any reduction of the number of field batteries; and it is on these same grounds, though aware that the regiments in the Punjab have been increased in strength, that I deprecate now any reduction of the number of field batteries. I call attention to what I wrote in paras. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 of my minute of 1865. I hold to the same principle with regard to the artillery which guided me in the proposed reduction of European regiments from 52 to 45. I would add to the field batteries the strength of men I propose to reduce in the 14 horse artillery batteries, so that there shall not be a fighting man the less in this branch any more than in the infantry, and the field batteries will be rendered more efficient and equal to supplementing on emergency what I feel to be the radical weakness of our present military status in India, viz., the actual value and condition of our Native armies as fighting, not as police, armies.

34. To descend from the larger to the minor considerations which affect the artillery question, I would earnestly invite the attention of Her Majesty's Government to two points, one touching on the *personnel*, the other touching on the *matériel* of artillery.

35. I ask to be permitted to remark that the brigade system is one not suited to our requirements, and involving in itself, and as an inevitable consequence, a very much larger number of field officers of artillery than we have any necessity for, or any occupation in their own branch to find them. I write this without the smallest desire to restrict their employment on the general staff of the army; whether as brigadiers, or as officers in command of divisions, without any doubt they are as fit, and in the present day perhaps fitter, for brigade, divisional, or even chief commands, as any other officers, for their military education is not, in my opinion, a disqualification, and their practical experience with troops with which the branch acts gives them a general, as well as in their own corps a special, experience. But from an

economical point of view the brigade organization overloads us with field officers of artillery for whom there is really no employment.

36. On the subordinate point of *matériel* I would suggest for consideration the incalculable advantage of having one field gun for service purposes. Whether it be the 12-pounder Armstrong or the 12-pounder rifled bronze muzzle-loader or Maxwell gun, I insist that it is a waste of power and efficiency to have 9-pounders, whether for horse or field batteries. The difference in weight of gun, and consequent requirements of horse power, whether for draught of gun or of ammunition, alike in field and in horse artillery batteries, is not such as to warrant (in my opinion) the loss of positive power inherent in adopting the 9-pounder instead of the 12-pounder. I venture with reluctance on a point of mere professional detail at the close of this lengthy minute, but if my view be a right one as to the subordinate *rôle* in future of horse artillery and the major importance of field batteries, the advantage of one calibre, one description of ammunition, and the simplicity and economy which this alone involves would greatly preponderate over an additional pair of horses to a team for horse artillery consequent on the use of the more effective piece of ordnance, and its somewhat heavier ammunition. I am confident that the real economy in fighting power, as well as in all magazine and constructive arrangements, would vastly preponderate in what I venture to suggest over a mixture of calibres, some of which are of inferior calibre and not nearly so effective in the field. The difference in the weight of the gun is not, I maintain, worth consideration.

LVIII.

MINUTE ON ARTILLERY IN INDIA. DATED THE 7TH MARCH, 1870.

In my minutes on Army reductions I noted how ill adapted to India was the brigade organization of the royal artillery.

I regret that the memorandum of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 3rd November, has only now come before me, for it asserts strongly the same conviction, and bases it on the opinions of the most experienced and able artillery officers.

We have as yet received no official intimation from the Secretary of State on the subject of the reductions of artillery proposed by the Government of India; but it is probable that the views of Her Majesty's Government will have found expression before these papers can be officially communicated. Still it may be of some utility to note that the conclusions at which Sir W. Mansfield has arrived are practically such as have long commanded my own views.

I shall not dwell upon the question whether it is yet too late to revert to an organization of four instead of one regiment of artillery. When amalgamation was being discussed before the Secretary of State, Sir C. Wood, he was so far persuaded of the expediency of keeping the four regiments distinct, that even the Commander-in-Chief in England was for a time disposed to follow that course. Having failed *then* ultimately to carry the point, I cannot hope that *now*, after so many years of amalgamation, anything I could again urge in 1870 would produce any effect in favour of what was then rejected, and I still continue to think very erroneously rejected, with regard to the permanent interests of Her Majesty's army. I accept the so-called amalgamation, but fail to see any necessary connection between that and the brigade organization.

Such an organization may be suitable to large continental armies, though even with respect to these I must be permitted to be absolutely sceptical as to its merits. I have, however, no sort of doubt that with respect to Her Majesty's service in India it continues a maximum of costliness with no pre-eminence of efficiency, and that it cannot be too soon abolished. Admitting that Sir W. Mansfield's suggestions, under the assumption that the brigade organization is to hold good, would yield an economical improvement on the present system, I regard these suggestions as simply calculated to make the best of a bad system.

I am as opposed to the brigade organization, which can give us such extravagant results as has been the case with the 6th brigade of garrison artillery recently come to Bombay, as I am to having a large superfluity of horse artillery. The strength of the 6th brigade was 450 men, with no cattle attached, save bullocks and elephants to one of its six garrison batteries; yet for these 450 men it had a Colonel-Commandant and a Colonel left behind in England, and brought out to India with itself a Colonel and four Lieutenant-Colonels, who drew between them about £6,500 a year, and this, though probably there will only be one portion

of the brigade at any place large enough to require the supervision of even one field officer. Manifestly one field officer to every 64 men is a proportion out of all reason.

Certainly, the seconding of field officers cannot under such circumstances be necessary, and cannot be too soon discontinued. It is a remedy which will gradually affect the reduction of field officers with the least of hardship to the officers of the corps of artillery, and without any detriment to the efficiency of the public service, though the State would be saved the pay of 25 Colonels and 15 Lieutenant-Colonels. It must be clearly understood, however, that the incidence of reduction must be made to fall equally and fairly throughout the amalgamated body of artillery, and not be confined to the Indian amalgamated corps.

With regard to the Inspector of Artillery being made Commandant of Artillery in India, I entertain doubts both as to the position and the authority such an officer could hold. When the Indian Artillery existed, the Commandant of Artillery held in each presidency the position of the head of the Royal Artillery regiment at the Horse Guards. That ceased with the amalgamation. Now, in all regimental details, the Royal Artillery is commanded by the colonel, the field marshal commanding-in-chief; whilst in all matters of discipline and control the artillery with brigades and divisions is commanded by and through the general officers commanding the divisions of the army. A commandant of Royal Artillery could not, under such circumstances, exercise any specific powers, except such as the Commander-in-Chief in India might choose to delegate; and as he could only correspond through the Adjutant-General, he would only be an additional channel of communication between the Deputy Adjutant-General of Royal Artillery and the Commander-in-Chief in India. In so far as the appointment would have any practical results, as the Commandant of Artillery in India would probably be in direct communication with the Colonel, the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, as well as with the Commander-in-Chief in India, the responsibility of the latter with respect to artillery matters would be impaired by the intervention of an irresponsible officer. I fail to perceive that any greater advantage could accrue from the advice of an officer bearing the title of Commandant of Artillery without the reality of command than can be derived from the advice of a good Inspector-General of Artillery.

I now come to a subject on which there exists great diversity of opinion, namely, a more general use of Native drivers. The

remarks of Sir W. Mansfield and of Colonel Broome will no doubt be read with great interest, and it is clear that a great saving may be effected by reverting to the employment of Native drivers. There is, however, one point not noticed either by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief or the Controller-General, yet it is one of some importance. The old Indian Artillery was trained up in the habitual use of Native drivers. The gunners and the drivers thus formed had mutual confidence, and as there were no reliefs of whole batteries and brigades at a time, but a continual feeding of the corps by European recruits, who at once fell into the training and feeling of their more experienced comrades, there was no distrust of the Native drivers. The state of the case is altered since 1857-58. Not only did the events of that period lead to the discontinuance of Native drivers, but the system of frequent reliefs of brigades of Royal Artillery introduces a body of gunners trained up in a system of European drivers of the same class with themselves, and essentially of the same body. Every battery fresh from England would therefore, if Native drivers are introduced, have to accommodate its prejudices and confidences to a novel system. By the time it has served its apprenticeship to the system, and has become familiar with it, the battery is relieved from home, and the process has to be repeated. Under such conditions it is almost impossible that the same confidence should grow up between the artillery officers and gunners and the Native drivers as naturally enough existed formerly. Both the officers and men are new to the country, as a rule do not understand a word of the Native languages, and would require time to surmount these disadvantages. It may be doubted whether a battery newly arrived, and put in possession of its guns and waggons driven by native drivers, would prove very efficient for service if suddenly sent into the field. On such occasions homogeneity of personnel is self-reliance and power. It doubles daring and strength, and adds proportionately to the confidence and effect with which the captain of a battery of rifled guns would throw them into action. After a couple of years' experience in India there might be a favourable change in the feeling towards the Native drivers, but it could not be reasonably expected at first that either officers or gunners could find themselves and their weapons and ammunition in the hands of Native drivers with complete satisfaction.

Although this aspect of the question must not be put aside as of no weight or moment, yet it does not amount to being a posi-

tive bar to the reintroduction of Native drivers within certain limits.

No one who has had experience in Indian warfare, and who has considered the conditions under which our forces take the field, can fail to have been struck with our inevitable dependence on Native agency. The most vital department, the Commissariat, relies for its efficiency on the trustworthiness of its subordinate Native officials; our Commissaries of Ordnance and their moderate European staff may supervise and be held responsible for our parks of ordnance and ammunition moving in the train of our armies; but a moment's thought will convince any one how dependent on the loyal conduct of the park establishments, drivers, &c., all of them Natives, an Indian army must always be. Our engineer parks are the same. All this may, I know, be admitted; but then it may be urged that these departments are only auxiliary to the one main object of bringing into action in a state of thorough efficiency, at the right time and place, a certain number of guns and men upon whose conduct hangs the issue of a short, sharp trial of strength, and that it is bad economy, where so much hinges on this final result, at all to imperil success by the deliberate introduction of an element of weakness—one which at a pinch might fail us again as it has failed us before. Whilst such possible failure at critical junctures would, from the superior value as a source of fighting power of our rifled guns, be a far more serious and dangerous contingency than was formerly the case with our smooth-bore guns, it will be argued that whilst arming our infantry with breech-loading Sniders, we do not entrust Natives with carrying the pouches and ammunition of the European troops.

I am not disposed either to understate or to undervalue the force of this mode of reasoning, which further allies itself, in some degree, with the policy of maintaining as small a Native army as consistent with a tranquil hold of the country, and with the policy of confining the possession of rifled field guns to the European artillery.

With the main features of this policy I concur, but as our gunners are few and costly, it is a question of the economy of skilled labour in the shape of formed artillerymen drivers, as well as of economy of cost. Colonel Broome points out that the syce drivers to a field gun are well under control. In this I agree with him. If, therefore, syce drivers are to be reintroduced, they should be as well paid and as well treated as the sepoy, and they

should be the only drivers in field batteries. With horse artillery they might drive the first line of waggons, but with respect to the special duties in action of horse artillery and the small number of batteries of horse artillery which are really required, I would keep European drivers with the horse artillery guns. I am strongly opposed to the extravagant quantity of horse artillery at present kept in India, and deem it waste of money, but I am just as strongly in favour of having the small quantity I hold to be necessary maintained in the fullest strength and efficiency.

Acting with respect to Native syce drivers on the same principle as we do with regard to Native troops, I would not have a man of them more than necessary. On this point I have received a valuable suggestion from Major-General F. Turner, C.B., our Inspector-General of Ordnance, and himself, as well known to my colleagues, an officer of much experience in the field. His proposal is as follows :—

“As an object of legitimate economy it appears to me that the second line of waggons with batteries might be reduced ; it must be allowed that it is unnecessary in a time of profound peace to maintain every battery everywhere in India on a full war establishment, suitable for the most extensive and protracted operations. It is not the practice at home, nor is it, it is believed, elsewhere, to keep up such large trains of artillery ammunition. It is absolutely necessary in this country—as ought to be every other portion of the army—that batteries of artillery should be maintained in a complete state of efficiency and readiness for immediate active service, and in a condition to repel any, the most sudden, outbreak or attack ; but experience has shown in this country, especially during the late mutiny campaigns, as history likewise tells of campaigns in Europe, that the quantity of ammunition with batteries in possession of one line of waggons is ample for all ordinary service, the requirements of grand operations being met from the parks of reserve ammunition which must be formed on every occasion of the assembly of an army in the field. The reduction of cattle should not be to an extent to cripple the artillery if batteries are required for service ; but instead of maintaining the full war establishment of thirty-six batteries in this presidency, the contingencies of service might be met from transport trains at important bases. Already such are kept up at Allahabad and Ferozepore—880 bullocks at each place. Let the total be raised to 2,000 bullocks, and keep 400 at Rawal Pindi. These would meet the requirements of any sudden emergency,

and form the nucleus at either place for the most extended operations. The cattle would further help economy by earning their keep, under proper regulations, as it is understood the transport train bullocks do under present circumstances."

I entirely concur in the expediency of this suggestion, which would of course be as applicable to the batteries in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies as to those in Bengal. The economy of the measure would be great,—the efficiency just the same.

I must request the Military Department to refer to the Account Department, and to append to this minute a concise statement of the saving that would result from the adoption of the foregoing views as to the reintroduction of syce drivers to the extent I advocate, and the abolition of the second line of waggons.

I am not able to support Colonel Broome's proposal for forming a couple of battalions of engineer officers out of the surplus of artillery officers. The field officers and captains of artillery could not be expected to qualify for the Department of Public Works, and the subaltern officers could, if disposed, enter the Department Public Works and join the staff corps. Some few exceptions among the captains there might be; but, as a rule, whatever the similarity of their education at starting, up to the point of receiving commissions in the artillery or the engineers, the after training of the officers of the two corps is very different. In instances such as those of Sir Proby Cautley and Colonel Dickens, the artillery officers entered the engineering line early, and had early evinced a predilection for it. I entertain but little doubt that a proportion of volunteers with suitable tastes and qualifications might be obtained, but anything like a wholesale transfer of a strength of two battalions of officers I regard as impracticable and inexpedient.

To the degree that this relief can be applied judiciously for the interests of Government in the Department of Public Works, and for the interests and useful employment of competent artillery officers, I am very strongly in favour of thus utilizing a part of the surplus of artillery officers. It might afford a valuable accession of strength to the Department of Public Works from a class of officers whose superior training and acquirements and experience in life would render them far more valuable as servants of the State in that department than can be the case with classes which enter with less education, no habits of discipline, and not enjoying the privilege of that social position which is inseparable from bearing Her Majesty's commission in the Royal Artillery.

LIX.

NOTE ON THE PROPOSED AMALGAMATION OF THE CENTRAL INDIA AND
 RAJPOOTANA AGENCIES. DATED THE 23RD MAY, 1870.

That Rajpootana has stood still whilst the rest of India, and especially British India, was advancing in material development is indubitable. One reason, however, for the backwardness of Rajpootana is not touched upon in the Governor-General's note ; yet it is one which is entirely beyond the powers of man to affect in any appreciable degree. A vast area of sterile sandy country, varied it may be with rocky but equally sterile country, both occupied by a sparse and poor population, are conditions especially unfavourable to progress. This is not the case in Central India, a large part of which (Malwa for example, and some of Scindia's districts in Eastern and Western Malwa) are very productive, and lie therefore under wholly different conditions from the main area of Rajpootana, which, geographically and hydrographically, is as ill-placed for material progress as a country can possibly be. The central parts of Arabia are scarcely worse placed or circumstanced.

This was very clearly known and appreciated. Rajpootana was never worth the cost and trouble of conquering. It was left by us, as it had been previously left by the Moslem Emperors, to its own Rajpoot Rulers, not because there was any particular difficulty in our case in overcoming Rajpoot valour, but because their territory was not worth conquering, and we had other and more formidable enemies on our hands.

It is necessary to bear this in mind, as it is a key to some of the indifference with which Rajpootana has always been treated.

When employed as a Political Officer in Central India the marked difference between the policy pursued in Rajpootana and that current in Central India very early forced itself upon my attention, and it was prominently noticed in official and other papers which I had then occasion to write. Subsequently, when holding the office of Foreign Secretary, I had repeatedly to advert to a contrast which was continually presenting itself and courting

criticism. I therefore entirely agree with the Governor General's note when he dwells on this fact.

As to the remedy he proposes for the modification of the Rajpootana policy, I wish I could feel as certain of its being adequate to the object in view as I am of the foregoing fact.

When Sir J. Malcolm proposed that a Lieutenant-Governor should be appointed for Central India, including Rajpootana, our policy had not taken form, and there can be no doubt that as a Lieutenant-Governor he would have impressed the same tone and policy on his Rajpootana as he did on his Central India Political Agents and assistants. Since, then, however, more than half a century has elapsed, and during that period the policy pursued in Rajpootana has gradually crystallized under the sanction of our Government into its existing form. To modify and remould it, commencing in 1870, is very far from being the same thing as it would have been had Sir J. Malcolm begun it in 1818. Modifications now will have prescriptive sanctions to contend against, and will excite much jealousy, if not apprehension, on the part of the Rajpoot Chiefs and Thakoors.

Moreover, there is the danger to which our political officers are peculiarly sensitive, and to which his Excellency adverts. In Sir J. Malcolm's day there was a much more distinct and a far firmer policy on the part of the Government of India and of the Home Government than there is now, or, indeed, has been for some time past. Not only has the policy impressed from home been vacillating, but it has become under a variety of influences, which I shall not stop to dissect and classify, morbidly sentimental in behalf of Native chiefs, even where such chiefs have been compromised by disloyalty. The consequence is that not alone Rajpootana, but also Central India, has suffered in the efficiency of our political control. We have lost instead of gaining ground. Uncertain of the support they may receive, and always in doubt as to the policy the Government here or at home may approve, our agents, from the highest to the lowest, have sunk into a condition of practical paralysis when compared with those of even a quarter of a century back, let alone the vigour of those of 1818-20. Whether this be right or wrong is matter of opinion, but the fact is indubitable.

It is really so striking that a Native of rank, great ability and experience, and thoroughly conversant with Native Courts, asked me, not long ago, what the object of the British Government was in rendering its political officers ciphers; for that, as somebody

must rule, if the Government of India did not, or could not, or would not, somebody else must. He went further and stated that if the Government shrunk from its duty of paramount control, such an abandonment of its duty would mature collisions when our patience was exhausted, and end in the destruction of the weaker party,—the Native chiefs,—whom our neglect had left to their ruin.

What is now happening at Ulwar is an appropriate instance of the working of the Rajpootana policy even under such efficient men as Colonel Keatinge and the late Captain Blair. It is impossible to peruse their letters without being conscious that they neither of them felt, in the smallest degree, certain of the policy the Government would enjoin; and, though neither of them were timid men, the political control has been marked by timidity of action, and matters have been left to take their course pending the orders of Government.

The Governor-General has just circulated important papers showing the state of Marwar as represented by that able officer Colonel Brooke, and the imperative necessity for some modification of the policy of the chief is but too apparent.

Unless, therefore, the Agent-in-Chief under the proposed arrangement could rely on the Government of India and the India Office in England concurring in some definite policy that was to have greater duration and stability than depend on the views of official men perpetually changing both at Home and in India, I fail to see in what better position the Agent-in-Chief would be in future than the Agents to the Governors-General now are in the present.

Greater powers than those now enjoyed by the Agents to the Governors-General are not proposed to be conferred, and could not be very well given without a delegation of authority, and with it of responsibility, that would be hardly consistent with the timely and effectual control of the Government of India. Yet, in such a case as that of Ulwar, unless an Agent-in-Chief were more favourably circumstanced as to powers and definite policy, he could do nothing more than refer such a case to Government for decision.

I am not, therefore, sanguine of any great result from the proposed amalgamation of the two Agencies, unless accompanied by a change of policy on the part of the Government of India and the Home authorities. Minor advantages might accrue, but they would be accompanied by some disadvantages; among others would be the area of the charge, for the country of Rajpootana, though it may be said in a way to be surrounded by railways, is

not traversed or intersected by them; the consequence is, that at the present time the same slowness and difficulty of communication as has always existed prevails, and the one representative of Government will not find himself much assisted by the railways in his visits to the great Rajpoot chiefs. Those who have travelled in the Bikaner and Jodhpore territories will know what I mean, and that this assertion is incontrovertible.

I admit the advantage to be derived from unity of policy and direction; but it must be remembered that in bringing to bear on the Rajpootana policy the Central India one, there could not have been a man more thoroughly trained in the Central India school than Colonel Keatinge, nor any one more disposed to apply it, so that Government has really had in Colonel Meade and Colonel Keatinge two Agents trained in the same school, and disposed by that training to act on identical principles. With only such difference as was due to the temperament and experience of the two officers, I hardly think the chance of success against Rajpoot immobility would have been improved by having the weighty affairs and questions of Scindia, Holkar, and other Central India States thrown on the hands of either Colonel Meade or Colonel Keatinge at the same time; though, if these happened to be slack, the magnitude of the charge and the higher position it entailed would certainly add weight to admonitions when personally given, especially if based on a positive policy on the part of the Government of India and the Home Government.

On the details of the proposed amalgamation I shall only observe that it is to me dubious whether the Government will act wisely should they appoint an Agent-in-Chief, if they fix his residence for six months of the year at Ajmere. The demands for his presence will be numerous, sometimes imperative; and as much depends on personal conference with the chiefs of Central India and Rajpootana, whilst there are only a certain number of marching months available, it would, I think, be better to leave it to his discretion to visit Ajmere as often as he could. The visits would probably be sufficiently frequent to exercise a salutary effect on the Commissioner and the local subordinate authorities. If the main aim of the measure is real influence with the chiefs, leave the Agent-in-Chief unshackled as to the disposition of his marching months. They will be amply occupied, and he will soon find that he cannot be a fixture at Ajmere, if he is to command personal influence and to exercise the function of persuasion in a manner acceptable and agreeable to the chiefs, and founded on something more in harmony

with their feelings than the exercise of authority from a distance, and by written communications.

I entirely doubt there resulting any economy in the measure; but I do not think this desirable, or the Governor-General's purpose in his recommendation. If it succeed, any extra expense will be more than counterbalanced by the advantage derived by India generally, but a *sine quâ non* appears to me either a revision of the non-interference clauses in Rajpootana Treaties, or such a construction put authoritatively on those clauses as shall not commit the Government of India to the support, in the supposed interests of peace and good order in Rajpootana, of incompetent rulers at the expense of the reasonable rights of the people and feudal chiefs of that country. The co-operation of the feudal chiefs and people should be enlisted in the interests of good government, which can hardly be the case if the tendency of our policy is to support autocratic misrule, and to ignore all but the letter of Treaties in favour of investing suzerain chiefs with unlimited powers.

THE END.

